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ABSTRACT 
The evolution of ideas on socio-economic development is first 
considered to show that they were theoretical in the beginning, and 
tended to be generalised and accorded global applicability, but were 
revised as experiences in the developing'countries increased knowledge 
of the development process. 
The nature of the construction industry and its role in development 
are next discussed, and the features of the task of improving it 
identified. It is observed that the industry faces problems in every 
country. 
In reviewing existing studies of the construction industries of 
developing countries, the similarity between their diagnoses of the 
problems and prescriptions for improvement are noted. Generally, they 
sugg~st that construction can constrain development and therefore it 
should be improved and expanded to avoid this. 
Main themes of current proposals for improving construction Hi 
developing countries are crysta11i8ed and compared with Ghana's 
experience in developing its industry between 1951 and 1979. After 
showing that Ghana has attempted to implement most of the current 
proposals without significant success, it is observed that certain 
soci8-cu1tura1, historical and political factors underlying the industry's 
pr~b1ems and hindering their solution are often overlooked, and that the 
issue of improving construction is complex and variable. Furthermore, 
despite generally depressing conditions, and contrary to usual calls for 
new procedures and systems and additional resources, much can be gained 
by utilising existing institutions, arrangements and resources more 
effectively. The need for practical approaches is emphasised. A 
programme for improving Ghana's construction industry is formulated. 
Suggestions for modification of current ideas on the construction 
industries of developing countries are made, especially the need for 
strategies to be country-specific and dynamic, the importance of a time 
perspective, and the usefulness of according orders of priority to 
particular measures, and concentrating on those easiest to implement, 
or with greatest linkage effects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to make a contribution to existing 
knowledge of the construction industries of developing countries. It is 
an attempt to test the validity and appropriateness of the main themes 
of existing diagnoses of the problems of, and prescriptions for 
improving, the construction industries of the developing countries, and 
thereby propose necessary changes in present ideas or additional issues 
that need consideration in future. 
1.2. History 
This thesis was first conceived of as an attempt to formulate a 
set of theoretical principles on which the programmes for improving the 
construction industries of countries in developing Africa could be based. 
The intention was to conduct a survey of four of such countries' (Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania) construction industries, and to essay a 
blueprint for future action. The enormity of the task becanle apparent 
when the time and financial resources available were considered, and 
after some background reading and initial discussions with experienced 
academic and professional persons. 
The study was, therefore, limited to Ghana, although in the course 
of the research the author was privileged to visit four other African 
countries for other purposes. Having read some literature on the issue 
of improving the construction industries of the developing countries, 
and being aware that Ghana has, in the past thirty years, tried to 
evolve an effective and efficient local industry, the author was 
intrigued to compare Ghana's experiences with existing ideas on the 
issue, and thereby develop basic principles that could be applied in 
other countries. 
In earlier parts of the study it became clear that the problems 
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of the construction industry emanated, in part, from the industry's 
links with the economy, as well as from the nature of construction 
activity itself. It was also apparent that construction could not be 
isolated from the existing socio-economic, cultural and historical 
environment. Thus the field of the research was extended to consider 
the development process, and the characteristics of the construction 
industry and its role in development. Later, as the complexity of the 
problem became clear, the impossibility of formulating a blueprint for 
cross-country application became evident, Thus, the goal of the study 
became a country-specific programme for improving Ghana's construction 
industry. 
1. 3. Objective 
The main objective of this thesis is to review existing approaches 
to the issue of improving the construction industries of the developing 
countries in the light of the experiences of Ghana between 1951 (when 
it attained self-governing status) and 1979, with a view to: 
(1) ascertaining the similarity or otherwise between suggested 
measures and those implemented in Ghana in the period; 
(2) assessing the success or failure of specific measures and 
identifying factors that supported or hindered their implementation; 
(3) suggesting issues that need to be considered in future in Ghana 
and elsewhere; and 
(4) formulating a detailed programme of action for Ghana's 
construction industry. 
1.4. Method~ 
The study comprised a literature rev~ew and field work. The 
review of literature was to provide the author with a background under-
standing of economic development theory, appraise him of the various 
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writings on the subject of improving the construction industries of 
developing countries, and provide a detailed knowledge of Ghana's socio-
econom1C history, and its construction industry. Since little published 
academic works on Ghana's construction industry exist, most of the 
references were from technical journals, magazines and newspapers. These 
reinforced the author's intimate knowledge of the country and its 
industry. 
The field work involved a detailed on-the-spot survey of Ghana's 
construction industry. This was undertaken between 2nd March and 31st 
May, 1979. A questionnaire was compiled to help in interviews of and 
discussions with persons in the construction industry or in positions 
related to it. A report on these and copies of the questionnaire are 
included in Appendix B. Similar studies were conducted by the author 
in Swaziland, Malawi and Botswana for a different purpose. 
1.5. Outline 
The thesis is 1n five closely-related parts, the objectives of 
each of which are as follows: (See also Fig. 1.1). 
1.5.1. Part I: Development Theory, is to: 
(a) enable the underdevelopment of the construction industries of the 
developing countries to be placed in a wider perspective; 
(b) outline the evolution of ideas on development and thereby show how 
development theory has- been non-homogeneous, and has changed over 
the years, as experience has invalidated certain views; and 
(c) ultimately, show the need for country-specific programmes based on 
each nation's peculiar conditions and resources. 
Though the study of the socio-economic development of the world's 
poor areas is only about a generation old, it has become a specialised 
field on which a huge store of literature exists·. The purpose in this 
thesis is only to summsrise some of the most important ideas and theories. 
The examples are mainly from English-speaking West or East African 
countries with which the author is personally familiar or on Ylhich he 
could obtain information. 
1.5.2. Part II: Construction and Development, 1S to: 
(a) briefly consider the nature of the construction industry, 
particularly its product and its peculiar features; 
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(b) show the role construction can play in development, the effect of 
construction on developme~t strategy, and the implication for 
construction of various types of development strategy; 
(c) theoretically consider the nature of the problem of improving the 
construction industry, show the complexity of the issue and the 
persistence of constraints on the construction industry in all 
countries; 
(d) analyse the construction industry structurally, and obtain a useful 
matrix for further discussion; 
(e) outline existing strategies for improving the construction 
industries of the poor countries and show the relationship between 
them and those for general socio-economic development, and hence 
the inappropriateness of some of the approaches; and 
(f) generally, point out some of the inadequacies of existing 
strategies and formulate a 'synthesis' composed of the most 
important and most common proposals for use in assessing the 
experience of Ghana. 
1.5.3. Part III: Ghana as a Case Study, is to: 
(a) show that since 1951, Ghana has tried to implement most of the 
measures prescribed in existing strategies for improving the 
construction industry in the poor countries; 
(b) demon~trate that the problems of the industry go deeper than is 
usually supposed, and tend to reinforce one another, and jointly 
frustrate attempts to alleviate them: and 
(c) point out that implementing the strategies leads to additional, 
sometimes more difficult problems, and that, like deyelopment, 
improving the industry is an intractable issue which gets more 
complex the further a nation progresses ~n that sphere .. 
At the end of each chapter (in the conclusions) the issues that 
need particular attention in the future, in Ghana as well as ~n any 
country ~n a similar position, are outlined. 
1.5.4. Part IV: A Programme for Ghana~ is to: 
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(a) consider the nature of the task of developing Ghana's construction 
industry; and to show that there is the need for a time-based 
approach, conditioned not only by the length of time it takes for 
pa!ticular measures to bear results, but also by the resources that 
are likely to be available in each period: short-, medium- or 
long-term; 
(b) Identify the most important measures and place them ~n order of 
priority, considering the ease of implementing them, the linkages 
that each has with the others, and hence the success or failure of 
each for the others. Show that contractor development merits top 
priority because it calls for local resources, has the greatest 
number of linkages with the others, and will sooner or later, need 
to be attended to, anyway; and 
(c) formulate, in detail, a programme for improving and developing 
Ghana's construction industry. 
1.5.5. Part V: Lessons for the Future 
is a concluding chapter summarising the main points raised, 
suggesting changes that need to be made in current ideas on the 
construction industries of the developing countries, and briefly 
outlining issues that need to be considered in any attempt to for~mulate 
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a programme for the improvement of the industry ~n Ghana and elsewhere, 
while emphasising the need for country-specific strategies. 
1.6. A Brief Note About Ghana 
Ghana is situated on the west coast of Africa. It has an area of 
about 239,000 square kilometres (92,000 square miles), and a population 
of about 10 million (1970 census: 8~ million). It is divided into eight 
administrative regions, The capital, Accra, has a population of over 
700,000. The official language is English. Ghana has had an eventful 
political history since it attained independence from Britain in 1957. 
Upper 
Volta 
Ivory Coast 
•••••• 8u(cJ~rs 
_ROJII ... d.,S 
_M".",oadI 
It has a tropical climate with 
two main seasons: the dry 
November to April., wet May to 
October. The north of the 
country, with low rainfall, is 
low-lying grassland; the rest 
of the country is covered 
mainly by tropical forests. 
The main exports are 
cocoa, timber, gold, diamonds, 
bauxite and manganese. The 
country has a mixed economy; 
the public sector is partic-
ularly active in the secondary 
sector. Ghana is formally 
classified as a developing country: its gross domestic product per 
capita in 1974 was about 200 United States dollars. Since the 1950's 
the country has endeavoured to create an effective construction industry. 
Thus it suits the purpose of this thesis. 
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PART ONE 
DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
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CHAPTER 1 
DEVELOPMENT 
'~ore, further, quicker, richer, are the watchwords 
of" present-day society ... (and we must help people 
to adapt) for there is no alternative." 
- S. Mansholt, former head of the European Economic 
Community, quoted in E.F. Schumacher, Small 1S 
Beautiful, Abacus, 1973, p. 129. 
"Economic development and cultural modernisation do 
not mean bliss: (a) they end forever the physical 
misery of famine, epidemic disease and early death; 
(b) they change the quality of material, social, 
political and spiritual life ... (c) but the material 
and cultural advances bring with them new problems 
at all levels, private and public: urban slums and 
unemployment, political factions and pollution." 
- G. Dalton, Efonomic Systems and Societ~ 
Penguin, 1974, p. 218. 
1.1. Introduction: The Need for Development 
The standards of living enjoyed by peoples 1n var10US part of the 
world differ considerably, and the rates at which these conditions are 
changing are also different, The inequalities threaten to be self-
perpetuating since most of the less developed countries also lack t.he 
resources required to improve their situation. Various criteria are 
used to assess 'development (see 1,3)", and the world is divided into 
'rich' and 'poor' or 'developed' and 'developing' nations. 
The poorer peoples constitute over two-thirds of the world's 
population, and, "in the main, live in the southern hemisphere, in 
Afri~a, Southern America and Asia. The prospect of global conflict 
between the numerous poor and the few rich was one of the factors which 
dre\V" attention to the need to 1mprove the lot of the less privileged. 1 
Intellectuals of the developed nations, spurred on by the ethical 
consideration that the welfare state need not end within the boundaries 
of their countries, began to theorise on the problem of improving the 
lot of the peoples of the poor countries. 
30 
On the political front, the desire of each of the leading" 
countries of the ideological divide to find favour amongst the poorer 
countries led them to concern themselves with the issue of development. 
The success of the Marshall Plan, which rebuilt the economies of war-
shattered Europe, showed that foreign capital could improve the 
circumstances of peoples in other lands, and, therefore, "" that" poverty 
should not be the inevitable lot of any group of people. At the same 
time, improvements in global communications made the disparities 1n 
standards of living more evident to both the rich and the poor. This 
awareness 
" makes the poorer nations envy the rich, ask them for 
aid with varying degrees of humility or arrogance, and 
even on occasion profess to despise them for their 
materialistic values. At the same time, the richer 
nations alternate between ... sincere attempts to assist 
the poorer, and a bewildered exasperation in which they 
wish the less successful peoples would either adopt the 
practices of the 2wealthier or else accept their inferiority ... " 
The attainment of independence 1n the 1950's and 1960's, of a large 
number of poor countries, their inclusion 1n the United Nations, and 
other international bodies, and frequent references by their leaders 3 
4 to the issue, have kept it in the limelight for several years. In the 
1970's the development of the emergent nations has been seen as a way 
of helping the industrialised countries out of their economic recession. 
Thus development has changed from being an issue of making the poor 
countries less so, to one of mutual concern and benefit to all countries. 
1.2. Development Effort 
Efforts to attend to the needs of the peoples in the less 
privileged parts of the world have been made at both the national and 
international levels. 
Within the poor nations, the awareness of the gap between them 
and the developed countries, a pu"b1ic opinion eager for rapid change, 
and the conviction that it was possible for improvements to be made, led 
the governments to embark on programmes which would result in 
considerable progress. These were pursued with determination and 
tenacity. President Nyerere (1964) said: 
"Development must be considered first, and other matters 
examined in relation to it. Our question with regard 
to every matter - even the issue of individual freedom -
must be, 'How does this affect the progress of our 
Development Plan,' "5 
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Among scholars of the developed countries the issue spawned a store 
of academic writings. The reasons for poverty and underdevelopment were 
diagnosed, and models for economic growth in these areas formulated. 
(See Chapter 2). Zolberg (1962) wrote: 
"The possibility of bringing about rapid development is ... 
axiomatic. It stems from a genuine faith in man's ability 
to rationally control his human and physical environment. 
Operationally, this takes the form of planning. 116 
The emergent countries adopted economic planning as a sort of 
solve-all. In these plans they established ·targets, identified projects, 
indicated sources of funding and other resources, and outlined 
strategies for achieving better standards of living for the populace. 
" ... an economic plan became the characteristic vehicle 
of development policy .... A plan was the indispensable 
passport to foreign aid, the touchstone of rationality 
and domestic efficiency .... Essentially the rationale 
of the plan was to mobilise economic resources and deploy 
them on cost-benefit criteria to projects with optimal 
effects on economic growth rates and structures." 7 
On the international scene, econom1c and technical aid has been 
given to the developing countries by the richer ones, on an unprecedented 
scale, 1n the past three decades. Concern for the issues of development 
at the global level was symbolised by the declaration by the United 
Nations, of the 1960's as the First Development Decade, the aim of which 
was: 
" .to attain in each underdeveloped country a substantial 
increase in the rate of growth, with each country setting 
its own target, taking as the objective a minimum annual 
rate of growth in aggregate national income of 5 per cent 
at the end of the Decade."S 
As a result of these and other efforts some changes have occurred 
,i 
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~n the econom~c and social conditions of the developing countries but, 
compared to the promises made by governments, targets set by planners, 
the potential outlined in existing theories and the expectations of the 
people, the record has been disappointing. Hirschman '(1979) states that: 
"A full generation has nmV' elapsed since 'mankind' took 
up the problem of development of the less developed 
countries; but its 'solution' in any meaningful sense 
of that term, still eludes us, as basic human needs 
remain unfulfilled for large masses of the third world 
and while elementary human rights are often disregarded 
or totally suppressed.,,9 
Over the years, as experience invalidated prevailing theories and 
ideas, new concepts and approaches were proposed, only to be succeeded, 
after a while, by others, Emphasis has shifted from one factor to 
another as the most important condition for development. The very 
definition of the word 'development' has been elusive, and what were 
considered adequate measures of development have changed with time. 
1.3. Definitions of Development 
1.3.1. Introduction 
On what basis is the categorisation of countries into 'developed' 
and 'developing', as the terms have been used above, made? Economists 
see the development process as a way of offering a degree of material 
well-being to the populace. Attempts to define the term have been made 
by social scientists from various disciplines,as well as by administrators 
and politicians over the years. Starting from simple economic assess-
ments, the word has been used to refer to change ~n a wide range of 
attributes ~n a society. 
1.3.2. Growth of the Gross National Product 
The most common measure of development ~s the s~ze of the gross 
national product (GNP) per head of population. By this definition, the 
developing countries are low-income countries, and development is said 
to have taken place when there is an increase ~n GNP per capita. 
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This approach has been questioned because of the doubtful veracity 
of international compar1sons of per capita GNPlO, and also on moral 
grounds: its treatment of people as a dividend (and the smaller the 
dividend, the larger the quotient) is said to degrade humans, neglect 
the quality of the population and discourage investments aimed at 
improving social welfare. Growth alone is considered inadequate since 
it may be disruptive or destructive, and might benefit only a few. 
Earlier assumptions that growth would rapidly trickle down to the poor 
11 proved unreasonable Economic expansion in several developing 
countries led to industrialised urban centres and an affluent few 
emerging and remaining, for long periods, in a predominantly traditional 
society (dualism). Measuring development with per capita GNP also 
neglected the unequal distribution of incomes within the poor countries 
themselves. 
In some places growth had been achieved at the expense of 
individual human rights (eg South Korea). The concept of development 
came to be synonymous with "growth with equity,,12 Malta's Development 
Plan of 1973-80 states that: 
" growth of the GDP is neither the appropriate a1m 
nor an adequate measure of real development. It does 
not necessarily reflect changes in the quality of life, 
improvements in education, the diversity and satisfaction 
of work, increased social equality or greater national 
cohesion and independence .... The test of success of the 
Plan is not the attainment of some particular growth rate 
but whether the basic-felt rieeds of the mass of the people, 
and especially the poorest and least fortunate have been 
met. "13 
1.3.3. Standard of Living 
Qualitative economic definitions of development stressed 
improvements in the standard of living of the people. Elkan (1973) 
suggests that it is: 
" a process which makes people in general better off 
by increasing their command over goods and services 
and by increasing the choices open to them.,,14 
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Thus development could be measured in terms of consumption, the 
supposition being that one who consumes more should be better off than 
one who does not. The attributes of a developed society were identified, 
such as: energy production and consumption; cement, steel, etc. 
consumption; number of telephones, radios, television sets, cars, etc. 
per capita; access to doctors, relative number of hospital beds; and 
percentage of literates in the population15 
The level to which a country had developed was not only determined 
by these criteria but also a minimum level of each major item was 
established as a basic requirement for sustained growth .. This approach 
was criticised for its neglect of the several different methods of 
production for each item and the diversity of patterns of consumption 
in different societies. Wallman (1977) points out that: 
" ... efforts to improve conditions in underdeveloped or 
developing countries continue to assess that improvement 
quantitatively - more is good; growth is progress ; and 
to rate each area in terms of its shortfall from some 
implicit 'developed' goal - we set the objective which 
they have failed to reach. litO""" 
The superimposition·· of rich-country models on developing countries 
in different circumstances are now considered inappropriate. Further-
more, increasing awareness of the finiteness of the world's resources 
and the environmental problems associated with modern technology has led 
17 to widespread criticism of a consumption approach to development 
1.3.4. Industrialisation 
Many authors used to equate development with industrialisation. 
Morris asserted in 1965 that: 
"Most of the experts agree ... that the impetus of 
economic development must be towards new industries, 
new sources of power, a spread of urban living ... by 
and hrge the difference between a rich nation and a 
poor one is the difference between a mechanical and a 
muscular society." l8 
For several years there was controversy over the role of industrialisation 
in development. One school of thought was of the opinion that it should 
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be the vanguard of the process, and another school believed it should 
follow, not precede, agricultural expansion. 
~ 
The developing countries.themselves seemed to favour· the first 
school, and many of them have attempted to move from a basically 
agrarian to an industrialised society19 This was encouraged by the 
success achieved 1n the old countries 1n their industrial revolutions, 
the higher status of industrialisation as an indication of progress, and 
the falling,prices of primary goods on world markets. Whereas a few 
have succeeded (for example, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and 
Japan), others have made little headway, and some have had bitter 
experiences (idle factories; high-cost, poor quality goods; and 
inadequate personnel). . . . 20 Increas1ng protect10n1sm and the non-
availability o~ the mainly foreign inputs needed for a major drive of 
industrialisation, further limit the potential of this apporach to 
development. If a country has comparati,re advantage in agriculture it 
is unwise to suggest a shift away from it; the need may be for more 
productive species, better methods of production, incentives and 
marketing systems. 
"In principle ... the role of industry in development is 
not a question of industry first or agriculture first. 
It is a question of finding the right mix for a particular 
country at a particular time. Any generalised, absolute 
priority for either sector is theoretically nonsense. 
Countries that have attempted crash programmes for industry 
have run into recurring food shortages and agricultural 
crises which have forced them to go back and attend to their 
agriculture, before going on with their industrialisation."2l 
1.3.5. Non-economic Factors 
Sociologists and anthropologists consider development as a 
process in which the human being and the social environment in which the 
economic activity takes place are transformed. Social development 
produces improvements in education, health, nutrition, clothing and 
security, and makes available a better quality of working population. 
Thus there is a causal-consequential mutual relationship between social 
.. 
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and econom1C development 
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This relationship was not recognised by economists in the past who 
considered social investment as a drain on resources which could be 
employed on directly productive projects. Better understanding of 
development has led to the introduction of attributes other than 
econom1c. 23 Curle (1970) suggested that, in addition to a degree of 
affluence, individuals in a dev~loped society should have qualities 
such as security, sufficiency, satisfaction and stimulus. 
Other measures of the level of development along such lines have 
been proposed, For example, Adelman and Morris \1967)24 considered a 
number of economic, social and political factors. 
This issue creates a dilemma. Industria"lised societies are often 
plagued by insecurity, boredom, loss of self-respect, delinquency, air 
pollution, traffic congestion and decaying city centres 25 , whereas some 
p00r traditional societies enjoy stability, tranquility and simplicity, 
albeit in an atmosphere of poverty and ignorance. This 1S resolved by 
outlining the difference between traditional life close to nature and 
that of a simple and romantic life chosen by a person or group 
disillusioned by some aspect(s) of modern urban life. The former has no 
alternatives but the latter does. 
1.3.6. Perceptions 
tDeve10pment' refers to the socio-economic well-being of the 
people in a society but each society has its own values, and one group's 
idea of progress may be different from those of another. As Busia 
(1971) warned: 
" ... the good life ... may be differently conceived in 
different cultures, or aspects of it be given different 
emphasis; it is for governments and planners .. , to 
seek to understand the concepts of the good life which 
they seek to help their people to realise. It is a 
Common experience that there are values for which p~ople 
are ready to sacrifice material efficiency, as this may 
be calculated from rationalised economic consi.derations."26 
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Therefore, the definitions of development may be as numerous as 
there are communities in the world. Even amongst members of a group, 
Wallman and others (1977) found that: 
" .•. it is normal for members of even the most unitary 
and cohesive group to haVE different perceptions and 
contradictory expectations of development, and for, them 
to alter these ~erceptions and expectations with time 
and situation." 7 
1.3.7. Yardstick 
1~us, by what yardstick does one measure development? l~lat is 
progress? The above discussion has shown that such a universally 
acceptable yardstick is conspicuous by its absence. However, it would 
be unW1se to deprecate attempts to formulate such indices since a basis 
is needed for decision-making. It is undeniable that large numbers of 
people 1n certain parts of the world have not benefited from the 
technological advances madeF.by mankind. Abject poverty, malnutrition, 
and disease is the lot of many of these veoples. The developing 
countries are those the majority of whose peoples fall into this 
category. By and large, the classification of countries into 'developed' 
and 'developing' by the United Nations is acceptable to the countries 
themselves, and this thesis uses that basis. 
1.3.B. Non-homogeneity 
It is not correct to refer to a homogeneous group of developing 
countries since even these are at various levels of development and have 
different natural and human potentials. The various countries face 
problems of different intensities and magnitudes, even if of the same 
kind, and their socio-cultural and institutional settings are not the 
same. At present, oil-rich developing countries are differentiated 
from the non-oil ones, and the poor8st 25 countries are also usually 
separated from the others. A so-called "Fourth World" has been 
hypothesised. 
"Upper Volta's per capita income is just £2"5. The 
poverty gap between these so-called fourth world 
countries and a third world country like Zambia is 
as great as the difference in wealth between Zambia 
and one of the Western countries."28 
1.4. Reasons for Underdevelopment 
1.4.1. Introduction 
t d 
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Attempts have been made to explain why some parts of the world 
have not progressed with, or as much as, others. Based on the 
experience of the developed countries, certain factors determining or 
sustaining socio-economic advancement were identified, and it was first 
thought that these 'missing factors' only needed to be introduced into 
the underdeveloped areas for remarkable gro\'1th to occur. Models Here 
formulated and applied which were not only criticised at the time, but 
proved inadequate or inappropriate in practice. Development experience 
in the last thirty years has led to major revisions in the ideas about 
the process. Some of the reasons ascribed to retarded development are 
now considered .. 
1.4.2. The Role of Capital 
One of the earliest views on the lack of development was that 
such countries were trapped in a series of interconnected vicious 
circles' of poverty and economic stagnation. Nurkse (1953)29 suggested 
that one of these circles was that poor people have low productivity, 
low incomes, low savings, and therefore they invest little, the low 
level of investment means little development, and leads to continued 
poverty. 
According to Nurkse, the only way to promote development was to 
break into this vicious circle by providing foreiga investment capital, 
which would start a process of self-sustaining growth. 30 Rostow's (1960) 
analysis of the stages of economic growth also showed that foreign 
capital could raise developing economies to the 'take-off' stage. 
': 
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Critics of these V1ews pointed out that most of today's developed 
nations started with low per capita 1ncomes and low accumulated capital, 
and advanced without external capital. Other writers emphasised a 
number of interrelated economic, social, political and cultural factors 
to be as important as, if not more important than, capital. At the 
other extreme of the argument, Baran (1952)31 stressed that the political 
power structure in poor countries hindered productive investment, and 
that foreign capital would reinforce the socio-po1itica1 systems 
hostile to development. 
In recent years, capital has come to be considered as "a 
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necessary but not a sufficient condition of economic development" 
Although some countries have made some progress with the help of foreign 
capital (for example, South Korea and Singapore), Schiavo-Campo and 
Singer (1968) wrote that: 
". ',' data seem to suggest that important though the role 
of capital undoubtedly is, lack of sufficient savings 
probably has not constituted a major bottleneck for many 
developing countries, and that other constraints are, 
under the economic conditions currently prevalent in many 
developing countries A relatively more limiting than the 
saving constraint."Jj 
That rapid development has not taken place in the oil-producing states 
despite massive growth in their national earnings since 197,3 underlines 
the importance of issues such as entrepreneurship, executive capacity, 
innovation, technology, education and institutions, to which attention 
has been drawn. 
1.4.3, International Trade 
Classical econom1C theory teaches that international trade 
based on comparative advantage would be beneficial to all participating 
nations. Development would, after a time lag, be spread to all nations. 
Some wTiters questioned this, and suggested that development in a 
part of the world tended to impoverish other parts ('backwash effect'). 
Thus, Hyrdal (1963) believed that increased world trade would further 
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II h h f .. . . . ,,34 strengt en t e orces ma1nta1n1ng stagnat10n or regress10n . 
Prebisch (1960)35 found long-term disparities in the demand for 
manufactures and primary products. The former tended to have high 
income elasticities in developing countries, whereas the latter had low 
income elasticities in developed countries. Similar findings by Frank' 
(1967)36 led to calls for delinking of economies. Developing countries 
were advised to move from the production of primary goods into 
manufacturing (import substitution followed by export of manufactured 
goods) . 
These views were not universally accepted. Bauer suggested that 
were they to be true, 
" .. , there would, for centuries past, have been only one 
developed country constantly increasing its lead over 
the others."37 
World trade has enabled countries like Japan and Hong Kong to progress, 
and has improved the lot of peas~nt farmers in places such as Ghana, 
Kenya and the Ivory Coast. Moreover, MacBean (1966)38 found that over 
the period 1946-58, fluctuations in export earnings were not confined to 
primary producers, but also affected industrialised countries. He 
concluded that, although poor countries have less stable export earn1ngs 
than the average developed country, the difference is not large. 
The argument as to whether developing countries benefit or suffer 
from their coexistence, links and tra~e with developed ones is still 
unresolved. Efforts to maximise the benefits, however, are evident 1n 
the workings of producer organisations such as those for oil, cocoa, 
coffee and copper, international groupings like the Group of 77, the 
African, Carribean and Pacific Countries (ACP) affiliated to the European 
Economic Community, and international fora such as the sessions of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and 
meetings on the so-called New International Economic Order (North-South 
. 1 )39 d1a ogue . 
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1.4.4. Colonial Exploitation 
The lack of development in some poor countries 1S sometimes 
attributed to their historical background. Many of them were colonies, 
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and as Hobson (1938) and Baran (1952) suggested, the acquisition of 
territories by imperial powers had basically economic motives: access 
to raw materials, cheap labour, land and additional markets. 
The effects of colonialism are illustrated by the experience of 
the African continent, all of whose more than fifty countries except 
two (Liberia and Ethiopia) were colonies for centuries. Until the late 
1950's, Africa did not exist economically: it was 
" 
a prolongation of European economies ... the 
colonial powers. t. would not process the raw 
materials and did not industrialise.,,42 
The physical infrastructure was created with the objective of promoting 
the exploitation of natural resources and agriculture. Thus roads and 
railways linked main mining or agricultural districts to harbours. 
Industrial and commercial activity was foreign-controlled, and did not 
benefit the local population much. For example, a Committee on African 
wages 1n Kenya (1954) reported that: 
" approximately half of the urban workers in private 
industry and approximately a quarter of those in public 
services, are in receipt of wages insufficient to provide 
for their basic, essential needs of health, decency and 
working efficiency."43 
Profits were repatriated abroad44 and social services were 
neglected, a point made evident by developments in the field of 
education. By 1959, the 24 million people in British East Africa -
Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda - could together achieve no more than 2000 
1 'f' 45. h 1 17 . . schoo cert1 1cate students ,and Za1re ad on y un1vers1ty 
d h · f' . d 46 gra uates at t e t1me 0 1tS 1n ependence Moreover, the aim of 
education was: 
" •.. to train those who will serve the system and acquire 
its values in the process. In so doing it establishes a 
sort of elite widely separated in s~npathies a~d 
aspirations from the stock from which it arose."47 
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Colonialism also entailed some social disruption: rather than 
build on the existing social system, it created a new order and 
established new values. Students of the process have stressed that the 
institutions of colonialism planted the seeds of their own destruction. 
They: 
II created an unstable paradox by importing modern 
educational systems, by rationalising the bureaucratic 
systems of their territories, by introducing taxes, 
exportable cash crops and a general cash economy, while, 
at the same time, the expatriate administrators upheld 
racial and social discrimination, supported ... economic 
exploitation, and in the main lived a life which was 
certain, in its material superiority, to create envy and 
frustration among the colonialised peoples."48 
The balkanisation of the continent left Africa with a legacy of 
over 50 states with different areas, sizes of ~opulation, different 
degrees of natural endowment, and different preferences and allegiances49 . 
The polarisation is increasing: there is little trade among the nations, 
nO 3ffectivc transcontinental transport or communication and a 
multiplicity of monetary systems. Fordwor (1978) asserts that of the 
west African countries, 
lilt is a fair observation to make that, with the possible 
exception of Nigeria, none ... has a potentially large~ 
enough market to make the thought of developing each 
state into a self-sustaining and independent economic 
unit a realistic idea."SO 
The Economic Commission for Africa advises African countries to 
conceive development schemes on a regional basisSl . 
Whether the poor countries would have fared better if they had not 
been through a period of colonisation is uncertain. There are countries 
(such as Liberia and Ethiopia) which have remained underdeveloped 
although they have been free for most of the past century and a half. 
Furthermore, the colonial era saw the ending of inter-tribal wars, the 
establishment of bureaucratic administrations, the open~ng up of new 
economic ventures and the widening of individuals' horizons. Again, the 
var~ous metropolitan powers had different colonial policies, and their 
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impact on the indigenous peoples and the basis for future development 
they created were not the same. Therefore, whereas it is important to 
remember the historical background of the developing countries, their 
present poverty cannot be wholly attributed to colonialism. 
1.4.5, Entrepreneurship 
A nation cannot make any headway in the d~ve1opment process 
unless its people are willing and able to apply their energies and 
skills to productive use. Nigeria's Development Plan of 1962-8 stated: 
"Governments may govern, economists may plan, 
administrators may organise, but ultimately the 
execution of all plans, no matter how well designed 
and intentionea, deSends upon the resources of the 
people themselves." 2 
Some writers stressed that human entrepreneurship was the vital 
factor in development. 53 Schumpeter (1939) saw the development process 
as one ~n which entrepreneurs put innovative ideas to practical use. 
Thus the rate at which a country could develop was determined by the 
number of entrepreneurs it had. McClelland (1961)54 attributed the lack 
of development in parts of the world to the absence of what he referred 
to as "the need to achieve" in the peoples. Hagen (1964)55 blamed the 
low propensity to develop in the emergent countries on the authoritarian 
nature of the early childhood training of their 'traditional' societies, 
in many countries ethnic minorities exhibited considerable entrepreneurial 
ability. Hb'se1itz (1957) 56 ascribed this to feelings of insecurity, 
engendered by their minority status, which spurred them on to economic 
achievements in order to attain equality. 
Discussions of the Schumpeter thesis embraced arguments on the role 
of governments in development. Views on this were ideologically 
polarised, most writers conveniently ignoring the reality that no 
economy was completely devoid of government intervention, and that every 
country had a measure of individualism or applied some aspects of the 
market economy. 
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McClelland's and Hagen's theories could not explain the spontaneous 
surges of entrepreneurial activity in Japan, Philippines and Pakistan 
when conditions were right. Studies revealed that entrepreneurship 
existed in the developing countries but was confined to non-industrial 
. . . h' h . kId f' . k 57 act1v1t1es 1n w 1C r1S s were ess an pro 1ts qU1C er It has also 
been realised that factors conducive to entrepreneurial activity need 
not be the same 1n different societies. (See Chapter 15). 
1.4.6. Socio-Cultura1 Factors 
The social institutions and traditional values of the indigenous 
peoples of the poor countries were considered to be obstacles to 
development. These systems were thought to be resistant to changes that 
were necessary for productive effort and an industrialised society. The 
nature of the societies of the developed countries was altered with 
socio-economic and technological advancement; short-run economic gains, 
materialism and individualism were believed to be some of the bulwarks 
of their progress. Critics against this trend were dubbed romantic, 
idealistic or eccentric58 . Curle (1970) stated: 
lithe high production economies are built upon the ruins 
of the extended family and of the complex network of 
values which had given it continuity ... we can view 
this as a release from a form of tyranny, a freeing of 
man's energies and desires from the deadweight of 59 
tradition which has enabled him to reach great heights. II 
Social scientists wrote volumes ~n the socio-cultural factors that 
tended to hinder development. On the other hand, studies showed that 
traditional .societies were supportive of progress, and that rapid change 
was destructive. Extended families were found to provide social 
insurance and act as spurs to individual achievement, or as buffers in 
times of failure. The experience of Japan has shown that it is possible 
to utilise and enhance traditional values in development. That Japan 
has not witnessed social problems on the scale of many Western countries 
indicates that such an approach is also useful. With the realisation 
that 
" so-called traditional societies prove to be as 
flexible as any others, given sufficient economic 
incentive, and as adamant as any other when it is 
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l~cking 
The calls for institutional changes abated6l , and attention was focused 
on ways in which the influences of tradttional systems could be 
harnessed to support development and gradual adaptation. 
1.4.7. Administration and Education 
The early emphasis on capital and elaborate econom1C planning 
came to be modified, as problems were encountered in the implementation 
of d~velopment schemes. Administrative difficulties were not only due 
to the insufficiency of qualified and experienced personnel but also to 
inter~ and intradepartmental problems such as unwillingness to delegate 
authority, lack of cooperation, rivalries (personal and-departmental), 
red tape, delays and confusion. With the awareness that development 
would increase the scale of activities, it was apparent that the 
administrative difficulties would be exacerbated. Attention shifted 
from 'physical' to 'human' capital as the basic requirement for 
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Investments 1n schemes to enhance executive capacity, which had 
been termed 'unproductive' came to be incorporated in development plans. 
Education became important: earlier emphasis on numbers created problems 
of a different nature; unemployed, educated youths flocked to the urban 
areas, Attention came to be focused on the nature and content of 
education, the importance of inculcating attitudes suitable to mutual 
understanding, and the relation of education and training to the 
, . 1 d 63 country s part1cu ar nee s . 
1.4.8. Other Factors 
Other reasons why some countries are underdeveloped have been 
proposed. Galbraith (1961)64 suggested that, in addition to capital and 
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skilled personnel, at least four of the basic requirements for socio-
econom1c development were: a literate population with some highly 
educated people; a high measure of social justice; a reliable apparatus 
of government and public administration; and a clear and purposeful 
view of what development involves. 
Social justice is considered by others not only as an attribute of 
a 'developed' society, but a motive force to progress. Pakistanis Five 
Year Plan of 1957 stated: 
liThe energies of the cultivator will not find full scope 
unless the fruits of his labour are guaranteed to him. 
He must be roused by a sense of ownership in the land 
and its fruits to enable him to do the utmost of which 
he is capable. He must be enabled to use the fruits of 65 
his labour for his greater comfort and higher social status." 
Land reform, joint ownership of property, individual freedom, and at the 
extreme, radical social revolution by the masses are considered by 
various authors to be determinants of development. 
The virtues of particular political systems are also often extolled. 
Almond and Coleman (1960)66 applied eleven criteria of development to 
66 developing countries classified politically as competitive, semi-
competitive and authoritarian, and found the average score of the 
competitive category to be greater than that of the semi-competitive, and 
that of the semi-competitive to be better than that of the authoritarian 
in nine out of the eleven criteria. Thus democratic systems appeared 
best suited to development. On the other hand, some writers and 
politicians stress the divisiveness of demo~ratic systems, their 
inappropriateness to the environments of the developing countries, and 
their failure in many of the countries67 . A Sierra Leonean Member of 
Parliament said in 1965: 
liThe British government was under a one-party form of 
government during the last world war, when it became 
apparent and necessary to fight against the common foe -
German tyranny and fascism. Therefore, it is just but 
simple and logical that we must bury our hatchets, and 
unite to fight our common enemies which are poverty, 
disease, hunger and ignorance ... 68 
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To other writers, what was important was neither ideology nor the nature 
of the political system but the quality of the government. Kaldor (1965) 
suggested that: 
"The wealth or poverty of a country ... is determined 
more than anything else by the existence over long 
periods of good or bad government. Especially is this 
true of underdeveloped countries where the state 
generates and organises modern economic activities for 
lack of private institutions to do so.,,69 
It is clear that governments and planners should ascertain, and 
try to give expression to, the needs and desires of the majority of the 
populace. Only then will a practical strategy of development be 
formulated. The successful implementation of such a programme would 
depend as much on the commitment and guidance of the government as on 
the enterprise and enthusiasm of the populace. 
1.5. Conclusion 
The study of the problem of developing the poorer areas of the 
world is now about thirty years old. Ideas on the issue have been 
controve1!'sial, and starting with economists, attracted contributions 
from other social scientists, administrators and politicians. The 
understanding of the process of development has been enhanced by the 
experience of the last generation but its precise definition is still 
elusive. The factors thought to be responsible for underdevelopment 
have been well discussed, as have those which were considered necessary 
for development. The problem has been found to be more complicated, 
far-reaching and dynamic than was thought, and to be of a nature which 
calls for a multi-disciplinary and multi-faceted approach. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MODELS AND STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Introduction 
"TIre defining features of this class of theory is 
that development is progressive, that it is good 
(although sometimes painful), and that it is normal 
if not inevitable. By these tokens successful cases 
do not require explanation ... , and the 'pathology' 
of non-development needs only to be diagnosed to be 
cured." 
- S. Wallman, Perceptions of Development, 
Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 6, 
"The early excitement over the [development] problem 
and the great doctrinal debates over alternative 
solutions or strategies have considerably abated; 
and both work on the problem and thought about it 
have become more subdued, diffident, lacklustre, 
yet also more steady ... one of the advantages of 
writing at this comparatively late stage of the 
development effort is the ability to look back and 
learn from past mistakes, of which there have been 
many. Nevertheless, there are pitfalls here also ... 
it is easy to learn the wrong lessons from history. 
In the case of development, wrongheaded learning of 
this sort is already in evidence." 
A.O. Hirschman, Preface to the Rothko Chapel 
Colloquium: Toward a New Strategy for 
Development, Pergamon Press, New York, 1979, 
pp. xvi-xvii. . 
The identification of the attributes of development led to the 
formulation of theoretical models to aid policy-making. Each model 
selects a number of goals towards which development effort should be 
directed, and includes outlines of key strategies, resources and the 
environmental conditions. Earlier approaches focused on economi~ growth 
and assumed world-wide applicability (these are termed 'conventional' or 
'traditional' models in this thesis). The appreciation of the 
importance of socio-cu1tura1 and political dynamics aroused further 
discussion and refinement of the paradigms. Greater attention carne to 
be paid to the needs of the most underprivileged in developing societies 
(the growth with equity models'), and social scientists became sceptical 
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about the efficacy of a 'blueprint' for development. 
2.2. The Conventional Models 
The earlier models were based on the paths taken by the developed 
countries: they considered development to be an attempt to expand the 
productive capacity of the economy, thereby creating additional 
distributable income. This would involve, or result in, Some of the 
basic features of industrial societies. Thus development was a possible 
and desirable once-and-for-all exercise: it becomes spontaneous after 
a certain stage when the necessary conditions are met, or missing 
. d' . d dl 1ngre 1ents 1ntro uce . 
2.2.1. Capital Formation versus Co~sumption 
Some models of development simplified the economy into one 
producing two types of goods: 2 'capital goods' and 'consumer goods' , 
both of which compete for scarce resources. Using the Keynesian 
concept of income-generation of capital, it was considered advisable 
that resources be allocated to investment in order to increase 
productive capacity and, after a time lag (when the multiplier and 
accelerator had operated), generate additional income. A corresponding 
approach (using the Harrod-Domar model)3 outlined the output-generation 
of income. Thus, capital accumulation, through savings or foreign aid 
and investment, assumed prime importance. National economic planning 
involving the calculation of the capital/output ratio for the economy 
and its sectors was considered essential. According to LewiR 
" ... the central problem in the theory of economic 
development is to understand the process by which 
a community which was previously saving and investing 
4 or 5 per cent of its national income or less, 
converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving 4 
is running at 12 to 15 per cent of national income or more." . 
Critics pointed out at the time, as well as later, that there was 
. b . 5 h . no guarantee that cap1tal would e put to productLve use , t at savings 
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~n developing areas could easily be underestimated6 , that the capital/' 
output ratio assumed past relationships which might not always apply and 
that it was possible for increases in output to result from measures not 
related to capital, such as stricter control, administrative reform, 
better management or changes in public attitudes. The neglect by this 
approach of the importance of factors such as education, health, social 
security and technical progress has drawn the greatest criticism. 
"There is considerable empirical evidence that a large 
number of countries have experienced economic growth 
much faster than would be expected on the basis of a 
constant capital/output ratio and the annual rate of 
capital formation .... The principal shortcoming of 
the model for purposes of economic development analysis 
is that it assumes as constant one of the structural 
characteristics, technical knowledge, which economic 
development, almost by definition, considers variable. 
It is not very productive to assume 'other things equal' 
when the principal question revolves around the 
explanation of why and how 'other things' change."7 
The distinction of 'capital' from 'consumption' goods has become 
less clear: investment in projects that raise the quality of life of the 
populace is considered as necessary as that. in those that are directly 
productive (see 1.4.2. and 1.4.7.). 
2.2.2. Exploiting Unemployed Resources 
Developing countries were said to be characterised by a surplus 
of labour in the subsistence sector. A model of development devised by 
Lewis (1953)8 was based on the movement of labour from subsistence 
agriculture and over-manned occupations to the capitalist sector; the 
basic assumption being that wages in the capitalist sector (a little 
above average earn1ngs in subsistence sector) would rema~n constant 
until all the surplus labour had been attracted to it. 
The arguments against this model were that surplus labour could 
9 
not be removed from the land 'olithout reducing agricultural output , that 
the unemployment and underemployment observed ~n subsistence agriculture 
10 
existed at certain times of the year only , and that the model took 
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other important factors for granted: finance (especially foreign 
exchange), skilled manpower and physical infrastructure. 
In practice, development seldom followed the course laid down by 
Lewis: wages rose without significant drops in levels of subsistence 
employment, and increases ~n industrial output were possible without 
considerable increases in employment in the capitalist sector. The dual 
society became the characteristic feature of several developing 
countries. (See 1.3.2) 
2.3. Strategies 
After adopting a model for development each country needs to 
determine ways (strategies) and means (resources) of achieving the 
objectives. There were several feasible paths11 right from the early 
days: writers who agreed on models of development did not necessarily. 
agree on strategy. 
2.3.1. Balanced or Unbalanced Growth 
One of the leading controversies ~n development studies was about 
the size of the effort to be mounted. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943)12 
advocated a 'big-push' on several fronts at once, based on central 
government planning and economic decision-making. The simultaneously 
developed industries would benefit from one another, make more efficient 
use of existing and newly-created infrastructure and generate rapid 
increases in income, and hence, effective demand. The feasibility of 
such an approach was questioned. As Singer (1964) wrote: 
"~ .. the resources required for balanced growth are of 
such an order of magnitude that a country disposing 13 
of such resources would ~n fact not be underdeveloped." 
The other school of thought suggested that developing countries 
should pursue 'unbalanced' growth. Hirschman (1958)14 advised the 
establishment of projects with strong 'complementary effects': those 
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that would, in turn, promote the creation of the greatest number of 
allied ventures. Thus, attention should be paid to the sequence of 
projects. 
Ideas on the subject soon became pragmatic; the choice was to be 
determined by the availability of resources, and the situation. 
According to Schiavo-Campo and Singer (1968): 
"It would indeed be as silly to spread all resources 
around an economy as a matter of systematic policy as 
it would be to concentrate everything, also as a 
matter of principle on one specific sector. Still 
there is a difference between a balanced growth approach 
and an unbalanced growth approach ... To be sure, it is 
a difference of degree and not of kind. A concrete 
approach is strongly influenced by the surrounding 
environment, certainly more so than by economic 
development ideology." l5 
2.3.2. Technolog~ 
The type of technology to be adopted by developing countries has 
also generated much argumertt. Some writers advised against the 
temptation to use labour-intensive methods of production, utilising the 
cheap, abundant unskilled labour in these areas: they advocated 
rational choice based on efficiency and economy. The precedent had been 
set in Europe: 16 Gerschenkron (1965) found that, during the industrial 
revolution, the more backward European countries always adopted bigger 
and more sophisticated projects. Therefore, suggested Kaldor (1965): 
"If you want to achieve the quickest rate of economic 
growth which means maximising output per head of 
population you should invest scarce capital in advanced 
techniques, not waste it on inefficient ones .... There 
is no question from every point of view of the superiority 
of the latest and more capitalistic techniques." l7 
Galenson and Leibenstein (1955) also suggested the use of capital-
intensive techniques since they had the highest 'reinvestment quotient' 
or maximised worker productivity minus worker consumption~8 
As capital-intensive projects led to unemployment, few centres of 
prosperity-generating problems of rapid urbanisation and inefficient 
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production, a new approach was proposed: I intermediate , or 
'appropriate' technology, which, at the same time as being efficient 
and competitive, also permitted reasonable levels of employment, lower 
.capita1 investment and dis aggregated units of production19 
2.4. 'Growth with Equity' Models 
Traditional models of development did not pay adequate attention 
to people, and in particular, the least privileged people. A report by 
the Dag Hammarskjg1d Foundation (1975)20 advocated 'another development', 
essentially a more equitable distribution of the results of econom1C 
growth; and of social and political power. 
New models of development have emerged which 1) see the development 
process as self-sustaining and continuous rather than a once-and-for-al1 
phenomenon, 2) concentrate on the satisfaction of the most essential 
needs of the poor, 3) harness the social and cultural institutions of 
the people, and 4) consider the need for environmental harmony. The 
rationale is a 'trickle-up' effect, development concentrated on the 
poorest in the society initially, and benefiting the most wealthy 
eventually. (As opposed to the 'trickle-down' rationale of conventional 
paradigms. See also 1.3.2.) 
2.4.1. Basic Needs 
The present emphasis on the importance of meeting the most 
essential requirements of the poor is based as much on moral and 
humanitarian as on economic and political grounds. It 1S an investment 
in human resources development to raise productivity and increase 
income, albeit in the long run. Streeten (1974) suggests that these 
basic needs are: 
" ... more and better food, safe water at hand, security 
of livelihood, health, sanitation, education, decent 
shelter, adequate transport. In addition there are 
nonmaterial needs like self-confidence, self-reliance, 
dignity, capacity to make one's own decisions, to 
participate in the decisions that affect one's life 
and work, and to develop fully one's talents ... ,,21 
Thus, development should be a direct attack on poverty. 
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Internally, capital should be switched from large-scale projects to this 
area. The main attributes of the 'basic needs' or 'growth with equity' 
approach to development are as follows. 
2.4.2. Methods of Production 
There should be an equitable distribution of productive assets, 
22 
such as land . Technical information and services should be provided 
23 for small producers . For farmers, efficient methods, new seeds, 
fertilizer and irrigation could be introduced. In the case of self-
employed tradesmen and manufacturers, equipment, credits and industrial 
estates could be provided. A system of feeder roads should connect the 
rural areas with major regional and marketing centres. 
Development should be diffuse and rural-based with each area 
having easy access to reasonable health care and secondary education. 
Emphasis should be on regional self-help and self-reliance: a community 
spirit could be engendered, and off-season labour might be used for 
24 building development works In all fields, efforts should be made to 
choose an appropriate technology. 
2.4.3. Implementation 
This approach to development can only take place within a frame-
work of government planning and control. Some writers take for granted 
the willingness of governments and the socio-political system to 
implement it but others point out that such a programme would inevitably 
be accompanied by slow growth of national income, and lead to social 
tension, unr.est and political instability. A strong and committed 
25 government is, therefore, called for . 
It was likely also, for owners of capital to be" opposed to 
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redistribution of land, or to programmes which threaten their share of 
26 
the market it would take a strong government, again, to effect these 
measures. 
2.4.4. Resources 
According to exponents of this programme, experience has shown 
that the basic needs of the people could be met by relatively low 
27 financial outlays Though this approach to development would be 
slower than industrialisation and look less glamorous, it held a greater 
promise of success. The programme should be financed by domestic 
savings, increased foreign aid and a rearrangement of international 
d . 28 tra e pract~ces 
2.5. Revolutionary Models 
Marxist writers 29 stress the importance of classes in society. 
They reject traditional models of development as resulting in further 
inequality, nor do the 'growth with equity' models go far enough for 
them; moreover, their implementation would be thwarted by the actions 
of the elite and capital owners. Furthermore, unless the class 
structure is radically altered, any change in the international economic 
order would benefit only the rich in the poor countries30 • 
The only answer lay ~n social revolution , the masses overthrowing 
the government and taking power themselves. 
Rural, labour-intensive methods of production would, according to 
this school of thought, freeze the poor in the subservient role of 
producers of primary commodities. Rather, development should be based 
on the latest technology and the most dynamic industry. 
2.G. C0nclusion 
Not only has there never been a single package of universally-
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applicable measures to promote development, although Some models and 
,strategies have been popular with governments and international aid 
. . 31 b h d' . d h . h organ1sat1ons , ut t e om1nant 1 eas on t e tOP1C ave changed over 
the years, as practical experience has exposed the drawbacks in various 
approaches. Social scientists, administrators and politicians have 
become convinced that there is no easy short-cut to development, that 
the solution of some prob1em(s) leads to others, which interact with 
the other issues and diminish the effect of attempts to ameliorate them, 
and that development probably becomes more difficult the further a 
country progresses: issues that were ignored, postponed or unknown, 
become critical and attract attention and resources. 
Although a panacea for development is yet to be formulated, if 
that is at all possible, experience has increased the understanding of 
the process, which may be sun~arised thus 32 : 
(a) development is essentially about people viewing life in its 
totality and participating 1n decisions that affect them; it 1S 
a process of social change in the widest possible sense; 
(b) development is not an imitative exercise, borrowing and delivering 
a ready-made package, but rather an endogenous process which each 
country needs to put into practice in keeping with its own values, 
political systems and resource endowment; and 
(c) the world's resource potential and technological capacities are 
sufficient to meet the reasonable known needs of people everywhere 
if properly mobilised, and if appropriate global systems are 
created to supplement and reinforce national efforts towards se1f-
reliant development. 
The understanding of development has led to the obsolescence and, in 
the main, discarding of certain ideas 33 . The definition of development 
has become broader, and models al:d strategies have tended to be more 
e~a1itarian and oriented towards the quality of life. Streeten (1979) 
" 
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predicts that the main issues will soon change: 
II looking back only a few years, or even months, one 
is astonished at the problems that vexed the profession 
and by the absence of the discussion of problems that 
vex uS today. With the wisdom of hindsight it is now 
clear that the really important issues 1ay'e1sewhere ... 
Very few indeed would have predicted in 1950 that the 
preoccupations of the mid-Seventies would be transnational 
companies, 'stagflation', protection of the environment, 
energy shortages, and the intractable nature of the 
development process. One safe prediction is that few, if 
any, of the problems that concern us now will stand high 
on the agenda in the year 2000."34 
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31. For example, development effort in the 1950's and 1960's was 
dominated by Rostow's approach which formed the basis of the report 
of the Pearson Commission*; the Economic Commission for Latin 
America advocated import-substitution and de-linking strategies 
(Prebisch and Frank)**; and the 'basic needs' approach is favoured 
by the World Bank and the ILO and other agencies (Dag Hammarskj~ld 
Foundation and internal working papers)+. 
This sometimes gives the illusion that a single paradigm of economic 
development exists (in each period). 
* Commission on International Development (Pearson Commission), 
Praeger, New York, 1969. 
** See, for example, Cardoso, F.H., The Originality of the Copy: 
ECLA and the Idea of Development, in Toward a New Strategy for 
Development, op. cit. (ref. 21), pp. 53-72. 
+ See, for example, WEaver, J.H. et a1., op .. cit. (ref. 24). 
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32. The following are based on issues raised in: Wignaraja, P., A 
.Creative Conflict, Development Forum, Vol. VII, No.5, June-July 
1979. 
Schumacher advises that development:" can succeed only if it 
is carried forward as a broad, popular 'movement of reconstruction' 
with primary emphasis on the full utilisation of the drive, 
enthusiasm, intelligence and labour power of everyone. Success 
cannot be obtained by Some form of magic produced by scientists, 
technicians or economic planners. It can only come through a 
process of growth involving education, organisation and discipline 
of the whole population. Anything less than this must end 1n 
failure." - Schumacher, E.F., op. cit. (ref. 19), p. 171. 
33. See Streeten, P., op. cit. (ref. 21), pp. 46-48 for a summary of 
discarded ideas. This does not mean that a common theory of 
development has evolved. For example, the proponents of conven-
tional models continue to argue that history makes it plain that 
the source of dynamism and of hope for higher standards of living 
for the poor is urbanisation and industrialisation, and that only 
through coercion can one keep people in rural areas. They assert 
that their approach is working, but is being judged too soon: 
they cite Brazil, which doubled its GNP between 1968 and 1974 as 
an example, although real wages did not rise, and actually fell in 
certain periods of the 'miracle'. The only answer to development, 
to them, lies in: " ... more rapid growth of the GNP, more use of 
multinational corporations and agribusiness, more reliance on 
export promotion, and ... the necessity of 'getting prices right' 
ie slowing the growth of wages, raising the cost of capital, 
allowing foreign exchange rates to oe market-determined, and 
increasing prices paid to farmers." - Weaver et a1., op. cit. 
( re f. 24), p. 9 . 
34. Streeten, P., op. cit. (ref. 21), pp. 36-37. 
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PART TWO 
CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONSTRUCTION IN DEVELOPMENT 
"The changes in economic conditions in recent years in 
many European countries has demonstrated the sensitivity 
of construction to economic fluctuations and the sector's 
heavy influence on general economic stability ... 
" 
Economic growth and social equality presuppose more 
construction and more construction contributes to growth." 
-Economic Commission for Europe. Long-term Prospects 
and Policies in the Construction Sector, United 
Nations, New York, 1976, pp. 1-2. 
some of the problems with which the building industry 
in Africa is faced are of a similar nature to those 
encountered in more industrialised countries. 
Discontinuous programmes, frequent stoppages of work, 
conflicts arising from the interpretation of inadequate 
or incomplete specifications and drawings, delays in the 
settlement of accounts or in the refund of guarantee 
funds, etc ... " 
-Economic Commission for Africa, Housing in Africa, 
United Nations, New York, 1965, p. 99. 
3.1. Introduction: The Construction Industry 
The construction industry is responsible for the planning, design, 
construction, maintenance and eventual demolition of the buildings~md 
works which enable economic and social activities to be performed. It 
is, essentially, a service industry, obtaining its inputs from various 
sectors of the economy, with which it is interrelated and interlinked in 
a complex manner. 
Since development, by whatever definition, implies or results in, 
an increase in socio-economic activities, the construction indu8try has 
an important role to play in the process. Moreover, the success of the 
development effort will, sooner or later, mean an increase in disposable 
incomes, which will generate demand for additional construction activity. 
Thus there is a cyclic relationship between construction activity and 
development. 
To understand this relationship it is important to consider first 
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the products that the construction industry creates. 
3.2. The Products 
It is difficult to delineate the multiplicity of goods that 
construction activity results in, and it is even more problematic to 
attempt to categorise them. For the purpose of obtaining a basis for 
discussion, however, it is necessary to adopt some sort of classification. 
Thus the products of the construction industry may be referred to as . 
being either 'capital' or 'social' goods. This type of categorisation 
is adopted for its simplicity, and also because it will be useful at a 
later stage (see 3.3). 
3.2.1. Capital Goods 
By 'capital' construction goods are meant the items that are 
used as 'inputs' to create other products or services. Examples of 
these are factories, sheds, warehouses, hotels, offices and shops. The 
increase in demand for such items is directly proportional to the 
additional demand for the goods and services they are used to produce. 
In this same category belongs infrastructura1 works such as roads, 
bridges, railways, ports, and telecommunications installations, which 
are required for distributing goods and services. These usually serve 
more than one establishment or district, and are invariably financed by 
government. 
3.2.2. Social Goods 
Social items of construction are those that are enjoyed as ends 
in themselves, such as houses, churches, parks, social centres and 
monuments. 
The arbitrariness of the categorisation is shown by the fact that 
these may also be considered as enhancing the non-material aspects of 
the people's lives, and hence as productive (see 1.3.2; 6.2.2.1). 
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There is even greater difficulty with 'social' items of construction 
such as schools and hospitals which, even more clearly, 'produce' a 
1 · fl· 1 better qua ~ty 0 popu at~on .. 
With the exception of the demand for h?using, some of which is 
from private clients, the demand for social items of construction is 
government (such as hospitals) or society (such as churches) inspired. 
3.3. The Process and Its Implications 
Construction activity involves the translation of the needs of a 
client into a building or works to: 
(a) support the performance of known activities; 
(b) accord with certain minimum prescribed standards; and 
(c) - blend with its environment. 
The total demand put to the construction industry is a profile of 
var~ous types of work for various clients in certain places. The 
profile is determined, in turn, by the model and strategy of development 
adopted by the country. 
A conventional approach (see 2.2) would call for more construction 
items of the 'capital goods' category. and the 'growth with equity' 
approach (see 2.4:) will entail a predominance'of 'social' construction. 
Furthermore, a 'balanced' strategy would require a comparatively greater 
volume of construction than an 'unbalanced' strategy (see 2.3.1). 
On the other hand, items of construction have a long period of 
gestation, and being built of durable materials, have a long life. Thus, 
they determine the course of future development to some extent: 
factories cannot be converted to hospitals except at some cost, and a 
road supports the establishment of settlements and new socio-economic 
activities which then feature ~n future policies. 
Construction goods are, therefore, not only created in response to 
the needs of a society, but also shape the nature of the society's 
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future. In any country, buildings and works reflect not only develop-
ment strategy, especially those initiated by government, but also tastes 
and preferences (aesthetics, shown in materials), incomes (which 
determine quality and durability as well as quantity), the climate 
(choice of materials), technology (type, size and sophistication), 
culture (shapes and sizes) and history. Turin (1978) believes that 
construction products: 
" •.. are the most visible (because physical) and amongst 
the most permanent (because of the technology we use) 
manifestations of society: of its conflicts, its 
failures and its successes. In fact ... [they] are so 
deeply embedded in the society which produces them that 
it becomes idle to speculate whether they are a cause 
(or tool) or an effect (or consequences) of development.,,2 
3.4. History 
Construction projects have been planned and executed since 
antiquity in all parts of the world, using resources and adopt~ng 
layouts and designs in keeping with the people's culture, their material 
circumstances and their technical knowledge at the . 3 t~me . As needs 
changed the demand put to the construction industry became different, 
and it was required to adapt in several senses. 
In the developed countries change was gradual and the industry was 
able to grow with the economy ~n size, in sophistication and in 
organisational form. Its exper~ence was progressively enhanced as it 
attended to, and overcame the challenges posed by industrialisation and 
econom~c expans~on. 
The case of the developing countries was quite different. Here 
the colonial period (see 1.4.4) saw the introduction of materials and 
techniques that were in use in the metropolitan countries, and a 
'dualism' emerged as 'modern' construction existed with, and gradually 
eclipsed, the indigenous 'traditional' sector. In this sense the 
development of the construction industry was not unlike that o·f the 
economy generally (see 1.3.2 and 2.2.2) but with independence another 
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facet of the issue emerged. 
Political independence was achieved on a wave of support generated 
4 through promises of better conditions by the leaders. The crisis of 
expectations and the genuine desires on the part of the leaders to 
achieve rapid, tangible progress led to the initiation of projects of 
both a capital and social nature, but mostly of the former, on a large 
scale. The local industry was confronted with a volume of demand with 
which it could not cope. Moreover, resources - materials, equipment and 
skilled personnel - were mostly imported; this soon led to balance of 
payments problems, which necessitated reductions in programmes. 
Thus, "it is true to say that the failure of several developing 
countries to make any headway despite elaborate economic planning and 
determined effort is due, in part, to their inadequate construction 
capacity. A few examples in Africa may be cited. In Nigeria (1962-66): 
"During the first two years of the plan period ... few 
of the new major projects were ready for execution. 
Hork had not been completed on such matters as site 
surveys, materials required, estimate~ of costs, and 
engineering and architectural designs." 
Appraisals of plan implementation in Ghana (1965)6 and Tanzania (1967)7 
note similar divergences between planned activity and accomplishments. 
3.5. The Construction Industry in Development 
Several development theorists assumed that industrial growth would 
ensure, or result in, the development of construction8 Others, however, 
have pointed out the important role that construction can play in 
development. Dalton (1974)9 noted that a building industry engaged on 
public works was one of the leading sectors of Russia's development 
10 " 
effort in the early 18th Century, and Flores (1971) observed that 
Mexico created a construction industry which, by building irrigation 
dams and roads since 1925, has supported agricultural and industrial 
expans~on. This showed that: 
liThe construction of irrigation works and highways is 
a strategic measure that induces the establishment 
of a multitude of new productive activities. Hirschman 
would say that the sequence: irrigation-highways has 
numerous backward linkage effects and forward linkage 
effects."ll 
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Writers advocating the 'growth with equity' approach emphasise 
the advantages of self-help and rural development projects using off-
season labour or .uti1ising the enthusiasm and community spirit of the 
rural fo1k12 . 
Even if construction ~s not considered a vanguard of the 
development process, some writers advise that its growth is indispensable. 
Lewis (1955) observed that: 
"More than half of capital formation consists of work 
in building and construction. Hence the expansion of 
capital is a function of the rate at which the building 
and construction industry can be expanded .... Hence 
the question of how rapidly capital formation can be· 
accelerated resolves itself first into the question of 
how rapidly the building industry can be expanded.,,13 
A similar call was made by Turin (1973), who warned that: 
" ... construction can grow faster than GDP, and probably 
it should ... if it fails to do so construction capacity 
may become a serious constraint to a sustained capital 
. "14 ~nvestment programme 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the admonitions on what 
should be done about the construction industry depended upon the 
writer's perception of the development process (see 1.3.6), If it 
meant economic growth then the industry should be enabled to sustain 
planned levels of capital investment. On the other hand, a 'basic 
needs' approach called for rural-based, labour-intensive social projects. 
Later, like the studies of development (see 1.3 and 2.4), the 
very nature of the 'expansion' of the construction industry came to be 
examined. 15 Schumacher (1973) and others warned of the balance of 
payments problems that would be generated by a construction programme 
creating additional wages without corresponding increases in local 
production of wages goods. Drewer (1975)16 referred to the inflationary 
nature of the same phenomenon. 
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In the late 1960's and the 1~70's it'was considered necessary 
that construction should be planned for. It was pointed out that 
countries which had neglected their construction industries in the early 
stages of their development had made a mistake: 
"In a developing country's early industrialisation 
strategy, adequate emphasis should be given to the 
manufacturing of construction plant, equipment and 
tools and engineering equipment for the civil 
engineering industries. Sri Lanka's failure in this 
regard (part lyon acco'unt of her earlier emphasis on 
consumer goods manufacturing) is a lesson for other 
developing countries ."17 . 
A new group of writers from several disciplines emerged, whose major 
concern was how the construction industries of developing countries 
could be improved (see Chapter 5). 
3.6. Features of the Construction Industry 
A deeper understanding of the nature of the construction industry 
is essential if policies formulated for it are to have the desired 
effect. It is instructive, therefore, to consider briefly some of the 
features of the industry. 
3.6.1. Size 
In every country, the construction industry plays a major role 
in the economy, contributing a significant proportion of annual 
national product, employing a sizeable portion of the working population, 
responsible for about half of capit"al formation, and relating to other 
. . ... 1 18 
econom1C act1v1t1es 1n a comp ex manner Thus construction is both 
a determinant of, and a determinate for, economic development .. (See 
5.4.1 and 5.4.3.1 for data on the role of construction in 'the economy.) 
The industry obtains its vital resources (materials, manpower, plant 
and equipment, and finance) from several sectors of the economy, and it 
is affected, favourably or adversely, by a wide range of measures (such 
as restriction of credits (see 3.6.2), taxation, import controls, 
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education policy and support of research). 
3.6.2. Cost, Finance and Government's Role 
The products of the construction industry are very expensive. 
Thus they are purchased from accumulated savings, This has several 
implications. Firstly, excessive demand for construction, creating 
dd " 1 . . h b . fl' 19 a 1t10na wage 1ncome m1g t e 1n at10nary ; secondly, government's 
fiscal policies have a considerable effect on the flow of funds to 
private purchasers, and hence effective private demand for construction20 ; 
and thirdly, government is the most important client of the industry: 
for certain sectors, for example civil engineering construction, it is 
a virtual monopsonist. (See 3.2.1.-2) Thus all governments find 
themselves relating directly to the construction industry as clients, 
and indirectly as makers of policies which affect its operations. 
" ... due to its investmer>.t character, construction may 
serve as an effective means of regulating/stimulating 
economic development. The considerable share of 
governmentally financed and subsidised investments ... 
enables governments to control the building market to 
rather a great extent and to intervene in the shaping 
of conditions .... Beside this type of direct inter-
vention, governments may influence the demand for 
construction also through tax and credit policy, 
price control, etc."2l 
At the micro-level, the high cost of construction means that each 
project 1S a high proportion of the contractor's work load per annum. 
Risks involved in construction are high, and the industry has a high 
f 1 · 22 rate 0 company morta 1ty It also means that clients take care to 
safeguard their investment or minimise their costs. (See 3.6.4). 
In the wide socio-economic context, the implication is that 
construction projects compete with other more obviously productive 
sectors of the economy for vital financial resources, and in the 
developing countries, foreign exchange. Finally, the large share of 
public demand offers governments the opportunity to promote the 
development of appropriate materials, technologies and practices. The 
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role of governments goes beyond their acting as clients to their 
direct (building regulations, codes"etc) and indirect (taxation, wage 
policy, etc) control of aspects of construction. 
with governments, whether knowingly or unknowingly, and whether 
de~berately or otherwise, playing such a dominant role in construction, 
and in view of the important part the industry plays in development, 
most writers urge governments of the developing countries to take 
complete and effective control of it. (See Chapter 5). 
3.6.3. Time Lags 
Construction projects last very long, and call for different 
mixes of vital resources at various stages. For the industry, it is 
difficult to time measures aimed at resolving specific issues to have 
the desired impact at the required moment. 
II the production cyc1es to which the industry operates 
are among the longest in the economy, and ... consequently 
the outcome of a policy decision ..• for construction can 
be delayed to such a point that it occurs when general 
economic conditions have altered and government policies 
have changed.,,23 
Furthermore, the same measure(s) might have different effects on parts 
of the industry at the same time. Thus formulating policies for the 
construction industry is a formidable task demanding foresight, 
expertise and a sense of balance, especially as experience in several 
countries has shown that the industry takes a long time to recover from 
d · . h . d . 24 adverse con 1t10ns suc as a major epress1on, 
3.6.4. Response to Demand' 
Unlike several sectors of the economy, the construction industry, 
1n the main, ,cannot stock its products: it produces in response to 
demand, this being made up of a building or 'yorks for a particular 
client at a predetermined cost, within a specified time, and according 
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to documented instructions. (See 3.3) 
For the industry, this factor, combined with the time it takes to 
develop some of its resources, explains why major swings in demand can 
have a harmful effect. For individual firms, the entrepreneurial 
freedom of the proprietors are limited; the contractor finds many of 
the aspects of his operations beyond his control: the materials and, 
to some extent, techniques to be used are specified, and some 
b d l ' , 25 su contractors an supp 1ers nom1nated . 
3.6.5. Location 
Construction products are, generally, fixed to the ground where 
they are produced. Thus the geographical dimension enters the demand 
portfolio: not only do projects differ in type, calling for varying 
combinations of resources, and not only 1S total demand variable over 
time, but also the demand varies from region to region, and even from 
one district'to another at any time. 
This feature has some implication for the strategy of development 
a country adopts: 'balanced' growth calls for a mobile, nationwide 
industry, whereas an 'unbalanced' approach does not. Thus the type of 
construction industry a nation has or can muster, determines, to some 
extent, the appropriate or possible strategy of development. (See also 
3.3) 
The fragmentary nature of demand for construction has engendered 
a corresponding structure of firms, and practices: in most countries 
there is a myriad of small, often transient firms, with flexible 
employment policies, little investment in capital, little industrialis-
~tion and, usually, a careful delineation of reasonable numbers of 
pro1ects or geographical limits. There is. 
" ... something of a vicious circle in that the instability 
and fragmentation of demand tend to promote an industrial 
structure which is in turn geared to a small-scale 
unstable demand ... ,,26 
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3.6.6. Organisation 
A construction project draws together persons with a variety of 
skills. Generally, the larger or more sophisticated the project, the 
greater the number of different types of skills. The roles of the 
personnel differ from project to project as well as from one stage of a 
particular project to another. 
T . 27 . . d hI' 1 f h . . d ur~n class~f~e t e clang~ng ro es 0 t e part~c~pants un er 
four main groups: Traditional, Component Approach, Speculative Building 
and Package Deal. But Riggin and Jessop (1975) wrote: 
" ... we are not attempting to set up a comprehensive 
typology to embrace all the types of ~atterns that 
exist ... the field is too complex."Z 
They portrayed an industry composed of an interplay of several 
functional organisations participating in the process at various stages, 
in different ways, for varying periods of time, to achieve specific 
subobjectives at various points in time. The subtasks are inter-
dependent, flow into one another, and are performed in an atmosphere of 
uncertainty, in a rapidly changing overall environment. 
Unfortunately, the industry, in most countries, is characterised 
by a rigid set of duties, relationships and authorities which impede 
cooperation amongst the participants and the appropriate harnessing of 
their skills. The Tavistock Institute (1966) wrote of the British 
construction industry: 
"The experience of the team has been of an industry in 
which misunderstandings, delays, stoppages and abortive 
work result from failures in communications and the 
team's impressions were of confusion, error and ... 
conflict. 1129 
Thus, contractual procedures and the definition of roles have 
implications for the efficiency of the industry, a factor of special 
significance to the developing countries who still use the practices and 
codes adopted from the former metropolitan states. (See 3.4) 
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3.6.7. Technology 
There LS a wide range of technologies employed Ln the construction 
industry of each country. In the advanced countries the latest 
techniques have not replaced, but have been added to, the old. sills 
and Vegoda (1973) asserted that: 
"One striking feature of conducting a study in the 
building industry [of the United Kingdom] is the 
frequency with which different techniques or practices 
are traced back to the.Ark ... ,,30 
Thus, in each country, the industry utilises a continuum of techniques 
and materials ranging from the simple, traditional or ancient at one 
end, to the most highly sophisticated or industrialised. 
This is particularly important in the developing countries which 
need a wide range of programmes to initiate and sustain their develop-
ment, entailing a wide spread of work types in a considerably short 
time. To achieve this, they have at their disposal a variety of 
materials and techniques including those recently developed in the more 
d . 31 advance countrLes . Thus, depending on the policy of the government, 
materials and equipment may be imported, and/or foreign consultants and 
contractors employed for a particular project, or alternatively, 
resources may be obtained from within the nation. 
Each country can choose an appropriate technology for its industry 
to reflect national preferences. That construction activities have to 
take place in the geographical location of the intended structure (see 
3.6.5) means that they can be used to transfer appropriate skills, 
techniques and materials throughot.t the country, once choices of what 
is 'appropriate' have been made. 
In all countries there are building regulations and ?ye-laws to 
guide the proper allocation and utilisation of space and minimum 
standards of materials and workmanship in a bid to safeguard health and 
safety. These are instrumental in limiting the choice of materials and 
h . 32 tec nLques 
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Finally, s~nce the products of the construction industry inter-
act with the way of life of the people in a community (see 3.3), the 
rationalisation of its production (ie the choice of an appropriate 
technology) should, unlike other industrial processes which depend only 
on the relationship between man, equipment and technology, consist of: 
" ... a unity between man, equipment, technology, the 
economy, as well as a whole set of social, psycho-
physiological and cultural-aesthetic requirements."33 
This underlines the dynamic nature of the issue of developing the 
construction industry. 
3.6.8. Data on Construction 
The nature of the construction industry, as indicated by the 
above discussion, is one of complexity and variability: a service 
industry interrelated with, and interdependent on several sectors of the 
economy, with demand for its products varying by type and s~ze, as well 
as over time and space. Construction activity also takes place ~n a 
multitude of production units in several isolated areas, and the co~on 
practice of subcontractitig, with risks of omission or double-counting, 
exists with the incidence of copyrights and instances where information 
is withheld for reasons of confidentiality. All these factors make the 
estimation of data on construction difficu1t~4. 
Information on construction, furthermore, quickly becomes obsolete 
due to changing standards, attitudes and government policy. Thus, it is 
difficult to obtain a suitable basis for policy-making for the industry, 
and it is not possible to extend planning for the industry.beyond an 
indication of flexible targets and guidelines. 
3.7. Problems Facing the Industrx 
As ~ result of its features, in no country ~s the construction 
industry efficient and free from major problems. In the United Sta~es, 
" the characteristics of the constructed products 
themselves, including custom-built nature, immobility, 
costliness, complexity and continuously changing 
technology ... has resulted in firms [that] ... are 
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small and numerous, serve a local and specialised market, 
lack vertical integration, are based on a limited degree 
of capitalisation, have a low overhead and profit margin, 
rely on a floating labour for§e, do little mass production, 
and are transient in nature. II 5 
A similar observation has been made about the construction 
industries of the developing countries. Germidis (~974)36 found that in 
the developing countries building firms are short-lived due to 
37 fluctuating demand . The relative labour-intensity of construction 
activity is world-wide38 , a situation which has led to increasing 
construction wages without corresponding rises 1n productivity, and 
d d · . 39 engen ere 1ncreases 1n costs The implications this has in the 
poorer countries (with lower incomes) are obvious. 
The Economic Commission for Africa (1965) noted that some of the 
problems facing the construction industry on the continent included: 
"The absence of local production of materials, high cO'st 
of imported materials, low productivity of labour, high 
proportion of overheads and profits, lack of managerial 
and technical skills, use of ineffective and ill-adapted 
designs, the application of obsolete building regulations 
and bye-laws, the inadequacy of present programmes of 
research ... ,,40 
A surv.e.y-,-of the construction industry in the United Kingdom (1962) 
highlighted a catalogue of problems, many of which could be found in 
the above quotation: 
" ... shortage and high cost of land for building; planning 
procedures cause delay and frustration and increase costs; 
bye-laws are irrational, restrictive and diverse; there 
is a need for standardisation and simplification of 
procedures; lack of cohesion between professions, 
contractor and sub-contractor ... ; insufficient capital 
and low profit margins; excessive reliance on credit and 
retention money; lack of cooperation between the 
industries and research stations; ... (and inadequate) 
research into building economics, practical problems and 
human relations."4l 
Thus, in no country is the construction industry altogether free 
from any major problems. Some of the issues are of concern in all 
countries but, generally, the problems are more severe in the developing 
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countries, and resources more scarce. Thus, just as in general soc~o-
economic development, the industries of all countries are still 
developing in some ways (see 1.3.5); the issues facing the developing 
countries are, however, more fundamental and/or more critical. 
The time dimension puts another strand of the question into focus. 
The environments of the construction industries are dynamic, and the 
tasks facing them are continuously being transformed. Today, the 
industries of the advanced countri~s are facing problems that will, 
sooner or later, assume importance in the developing areas. New 
materials, systems, industrial processes, managerial and organisational 
approaches are needed to deal with factors such as changing 
composition of total demand for construction (with refurbishment 
claiming a larger share); designs and techniques that conserve or 
I 
generate energy; political and social pressure for better living 
conditions in built-up areas (necessitating more consultation of users 
and interested parties) and for a reduction in occupational risks and 
the creation of more meaningful and pleasant jobs. 
Thus the problem of developing the construction industry is also 
one of enhancing its adaptability to enable it to cope in an environment i .1 
which is in a state of rapid flux (as socio-economic development 
proceeds) . 
3.8. The Task 
The issue of improving the construction industry has three major 
facets, imposed by the nature of the industry, the types of resources 
it requires, and its changing environment. 
In the short term, when all constraints are present and resources 
cannot be increased, the ma~n task of the construction industry is to 
improve its efficiency, econom~se ~n the use of resources, and g~ve 
value for money. 
85 
In the medium term, if the capacity of the industry 1S to be 
increased, the supply of the resources it requires should be enhanced. 
This takes time, and calls for capital and other inputs. 
Finally, in the long term, the industry, while meeting an 
increasing volume of demand, should prepare, through research and 
adaptive responses, to cope with a changing environment: this might,_ 
before long, require the industry to adopt aggressive policies (such as 
marketing) instead of its present mainly defensive practices. 
3.9. Conclusion 
The attempts to improve the construction industry- 1n developing 
countries have aimed at increasing its productive capacity. The vital 
role that construction plays 1n development makes it important that it 
should be enabled to perform its duties, if overall socio-economic 
development is not to be constrained .. Not only does the nature of each 
country's construction industry (size, mobility and quality) have 
implications for development strategy, but also it is possible for 
construction to act as one of the leading sectors in the developing 
economy. However, the construction industry has certain features which 
make it vulnerable to external factors, and in no country is it free of 
major problems. Thus it is a difficult sector to legislate for, and to 
manage: seemingly harmless policies have serious ramifications for it, 
and unfavourable developments in it tend to have a lasting effect. 
Finally, the task of developing the construction industry takes a 
different form depending on the time-scale under consideration. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A MATRIX OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
"This paper will first review briefly the role that 
the construction industry plays in national develop-
ment. It then discusses the issues facing the industry 
especially at the early stages of development. 
Finally, it suggests a few areas for discussion and 
for national action. The paper is primarily limited 
to the monetary sector or 'formal' sector of the 
construction industry. The self-help and non-monetary 
construction, its contribution to fulfilling the 
national needs and its potential as a means of 
narrowing the gap between the demand and supply for 
shelter is not discussed." 
Moavenzadeh, F., Construction Industry in 
Developing Countries, in World Development, 1978, 
Vol. 6, No.1 (pp. 97-116), p. 97. 
"Even attempts to understand today's African as a 
mixture of primitive and modern runs the risk of 
overlooking him as a new kind of person dealing with 
new kinds of problems requiring new kinds of 
solutions ... our lack of understanding challenges 
academic theories developed in too small a ~phere too 
long ago." 
- Miner, H., Introduction, in Miner, H. (ed), The 
City in Modern Africa, Pall Mall Press, London, 
1967, pp. 1-2. 
4.1. Introduction: The Need for a Matrix 
Construction activity has been classified, 1n earlier parts of this 
thesis, according to the broad types of goods ('capital' or 'social') it 
produces (see 3.2.). Other usual means of classification consider the 
types of technical production functions required: 'building', 'civil 
engineering', 'repair and maintenance', or the size of the projects 
(usually in financial terms). The type of client is also commonly used 
to classify construction activity: hence there are 'public' and 
'private' sector works. Writers on construction in developing countries 
are often content to consider a dualism, referred to as 'modern' and 
'traditional', 'formal' and 'informal', and so on (see 3.4). It is also 
possible to consider construction on a geographical basis, each country's 
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industry being visualised as a series of regional or district sectors 
(see 3.6.5). Thus, the type of classification or categorisation depends 
upon the purpose of the· analysis. 
To study the construction industries of the developing countries 
it is helpful to consider the inputs that are required. The industry in 
each country then emerges as a number of sub-industries between which 
resources are not easily interchangeable: each uses a different mix of 
inputs and has its own peculiar problems and factors that constrain its 
output. 
4.2. Turints Matrix 
A useful matrix for the construction industry of a typical 
developing country was developed by Turin (1973)1. Considering ways 1n 
which the capacity of the industry might be increased, he delineated four 
different sectors, identified the major resources they utilised, and 
pointed out those most likely to limit the expansion of each sector. 
He thought it possible that: 
" within the same national aggregate of effective demand 
for construction a sector might be overstretched while 
another is seriously under-utilised, a situation too often 
observed in many deve loping coun tries. 112 
These four sectors were: 
(1) International-modern. This sector builds major civil engineering 
works a.nd large buildings in the urban areas, utilising imported 
materials and components, plant and equipment, and large numbers 
of qualified professional and managerial personnel. Expatriate 
contractors· dominate the sector, and the major constraint is 
foreign exchange. 
(2) National-modern. The projects here are main1y middle-sized urban 
Quildings calling for some imported materials and plant. and a 
high proportion of skilled personnel; the contractors are usually 
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local, and the constraints are the availability of foreign 
exchange, technicians and managers. 
(3) National-conventional. This sector 1S characterised by a mixture 
of traditional materials and techniques and a few modern inputs, 
and embraces small contractors and local artisans. It handles 
most private houses in urban and semi-urban ce~tres and rural 
infrastructure, ~nd its constraints are similar to those of the 
national-modern sector; and 
(4) Traditional. This is prevalent in the rural areas, and mostly 
occurs outside the sphere of the monetary economy. 
4.3. -An Appraisal 
Turin's matrix is simple and useful for some analytical purposes. 
However, the following observations may be made about it: 
( - ) 8. although it does not particularly say so, it focuses att.ention on 
the resources required in the physical execution of construction 
projects. Henee it does not consider factors such as the 
availability of design expertise, the effect of planning and 
building codes and regulations, and the type and efficiency of 
client organisation, all of which have implications for the 
effectiveness and capacity of each sector; 
(b) resources are more easily interchangeable between the sectors than 
the matrix suggests. For example, labour-intensive methods can be 
used on projects designed, and easily classifiable, as international-
modern (such as a dam), and capital-intensive methods on projects 
not designed or easily identifiable as such (such as a feeder road, 
which would belong to the national-conventional sector); 
(c) the matrix portrays a frozen picture of the structure of demand, 
and of the industry, although both are variable. For example, 
international-modern projects, and hence international, usually 
~xpatriate contractors, may not feature in a country's portfolio of 
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construction demand in certain years. Among construction firms, 
there is movement between the sectors from time to time (depending 
on the project, but generally, firms tend to grow out of the 
sectors) and one firm may belong to more than one sector at a 
time; 
(d) the importance of time as a dimension is, again, neglected in 
considering the effect of the constraints. Certain resources or 
alternatives for them that are major constraints in the short term 
(especially foreign inputs) may be developed (locally) and become 
less so in the medium or long term. Such a time-based appr:oach 
would help l.n the identification of priorities in the formulation 
of programmes for developing the industry (see 3.8); and 
(e) the matrix is not sufficiently wide to embrace all the variables 
that affect the capacity of the construction industry. 
4.4. Proposed Matrix 
A new matrix is now proposed, which also adopts a resource-
capacity approach to the c?nstruction industries of developing countries 3 
It consists, first, of two main sectors: 'formal' and 'informal'. 
4.4.1. The Sectors 
For projects l.n the formal sector, designs are prepared and 
permits sought, although contractual arrangements need not be formal, 
nor need the contractor be a registered or formally organised company. 
Projects in the informal sector may not be formally designed, nor 
are permits sought. They are mainly undertaken in the rural areas. 
The differenc~ bet\"een the two sectors is generally _rE!gu1atory. 
The latter is ~ot hampered by conventional regulations and organisation 
of the construction industry is more spontaneous and relies on the 
client's initiative. Though more widespread, this sector is often 
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ignored by writers, governments and planners, and its products are 
unlikely to be sufficiently covered by national statistics. (See 3.6.8) 
The two sectors may then be divided into six sub-sectors: 
Formal Sector: International 
Conventional Large 
Conventional Medium or Small 
Self-help Projects 
Informal Sector: Monetary Traditional 
Subsistence. 
4.4.2. The Subsectors 
(1) International 
These are one-off projects at the upper limit of the technological 
continuum (see 3.6.7) such as special factories (for example petro-
chemical works), harbours, hydro-electric power stations, motorways and 
tall luxury buildings (such as conference complexes).· The construction 
firms are usually foreign-owned: a foreign company or its locally-based 
subsidiary, although a few indigenous construction firms have developed 
the competence for some of these projects. They requ~re large numbers 
of skilled professional and managerial personnel, imported plant and 
equipment, and some imported materials and components, The client is 
either the government or a large local or international organisation. 
In the short and medium term (pending the improvement of terms 
of trade or development of local inputs), foreign exchange is a 
constraint on the expansion (of both demand and capacity) of this sub-
sector but where this does not apply, the executive capacity and 
operating procedures of the administering bodies are important. 
(2) Conventional Large 
These are more widespread and less sophisticated than inter-
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national projects. They comprise large offices, school blocks, 
hospitals, factories, major highways and bridges. They are undertaken 
by the largest of the local firms and locally-based foreign ones, using 
some technical and management staff, skilled operatives, some plant and 
equipment and Some imported materials. 
The short- and medium-term constraint is foreign exchange, although 
less so than for the international subsector. With the public sector 
financing the bulk of projects in this category, the efficiency of its 
administering bodies becomes more important. An additional short-term 
constraint is the availability of middle-level personnel and large local 
construction firms. 
(3) Conventional Medium or Small 
These are houses, schools, minor roads, and other m1nor works, 
undertaken in urban and semi-urban areas. The construction fi~ms are 
small and local-owned, or loosely organised cooperatives and self-
employed artisans. Techniques are more labour-intensive and materials 
used range from imported through rationalised-traditional to traditional. 
The main constraint on capacity is the availability of skilled 
tradesmen, whereas formal contractual arrangements and administrative 
procedures also pose problems to contractors. (See 3.6.6) The major 
barrier to increas.e in demand is the availability of mortgages and other 
forms of loans to prospective clients. (See 3.6.2) 
(4) Self-help Projects 
These are usually in the form of communal social amenities such 
as health centres, schools, post offices, amusement places and feeder 
roads. They are initiated and constructed by the rural populace; 
government .provides technica~ aid in the form of documentation and/or 
supervision, and some materials, tools and equipment. Few skilled 
personnel are involved. 
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The limits here are imposed by local initiative and enthusiasm, 
and the effectiveness of government's extension services for such 
projects. 
(5) Monetary Traditional 
In this category are houses, barns and similar small buildings 
and works, undertaken by self-employed artisans using mainly local, 
easily available traditional materials. It is predominant in the rural 
areas and the settlements on the fringes of the urban centres. 
This subsector is threatened by the preference for conventional 
materials. Traditional building skills are being rapidly lost, although, 
to the majority of the populace, this is the only subsector in which 
they can exercise effective demand for construction. (See 3.6.2) 
(6) Subsistence 
This is similar to the monetary-traditional except that here the 
owner or members of his family or an informal cooperative society, 
undertake the construction of the structure. It is also similar, in 
some senses, to the self-help subsector, in that some common faciliti~3 
(such as places of convenience and recreation) may be constructed through 
communal labour but with traditional materials. 
This sector faces the same constraints as the monetary-traditional. 
In addition, the initative of builder/owner(s), the time at their 
disposal, and the cooperative spirit of the society, are important. 
(See Figure 4.1 for diagram of the Matrix). 
4.5. Overlaps, Continuity and Dynamism 
Although an attempt has been made to formulate a basis for 
categorising the construction industry, the boundaries suggested are 
merely imaginary: the various subsectors overlap in several ways. For 
FIGURE 4.1. A Matrix for the Construction Industries of Developing Countries 
TYPE 
International 
(Modern, technically sophisticated: 
dams, motorways, special factories, 
conference complexes, luxury hotels) 
Conventional - Large 
(Modern, large: offices, highways, 
factories, blocks of flats) 
Conventional - Medium or Small 
(Modern, medium or small: schools, 
feeder roads, houses) 
Self-help 
(Social communal facilities, roads) 
Monetary - Traditional 
(houses, shops and similar small buildings 
\ 
Subsistence 
(houses, barns, communal facilities) 
Abbreviations: ST = Short Term 
MT = Medium Term 
LT = Long Term 
RESOURCES 
Foreign-owned contracting firms. 
Some foreign consultancy. 
Imported materials and equipment. 
Professional and managerial Personnel. 
Large local contractors. 
Some imported materials. 
Plant and Equipment. 
Skilled Personnel· 
Small local contractors. 
Imported/Local Materials. 
Few skilled managerial or technical 
staff. 
Skilled operatives. 
Government technical aid. 
Local/imported materials 
Voluntary labour by community, 
Traditional materials and tradesmen. 
Traditional materials. 
Owner/Cooperative labour. 
S/MT = Short and Medium Term 
L/MT = Long and Medium Term 
LIMITING FACTORS 
Foreign exchange (S/MT). 
Executive capacity of client 
organisation. (L/MT). 
Professional and Managerial 
skills (MT). 
Foreign Exchange (S/MT)-
Professional skills (MT). 
Intermediate skills (MT). 
Skilled Operatives (MT). 
Intermediate skills (MT). 
Efficiency of Contractors (LT). 
Government's extension services (LT). 
Local initiative and enthusiasm. 
(Cooperative Habit) (L/MT). 
Attitudes of clients and users (LT). 
Attitudes of clients and users (LT). 
Clients' initiative and Leisure 
Time (ST). 
'" -...J 
example, some conventional materials and skills, such as corrugated 
aluminium roofing sheets and carpenters, or cement and masons, are 
used on traditional projects. 
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The relative size of each subsector existing or desirable in each 
country 1S variable with time, depending on demand and the availability 
of resources, and the mix of subsectors will vary from one country to 
another. Thus the classification 'formal-informal' is not meant to 
portray a desirable shift from the latter to the former, or to lament 
the existence of the latter. Furthermore, although in the former sector 
the categories appear to establish a hierarchy, it does not mean that 
all inputs should necessarily be progressively upgraded. The existence 
of the conventional-medium or small category is necessary and natural; 
that of the international category may not be quite so at all times; 
S1nce projects in that sphere may be few and far between (see 4.3.(6)). 
There 1S also much dynamism in the matrix: individuals may be 
employed in the formal sector on weekdays, and in the informal at week-
ends; construction firms may operate in the conventional-large category 
on one project and in other categories on other projects, both at the 
same time and in future; and design and other consultancy firms 
operate in all categories of the formal sector all the time. Thus the 
matrix is not as rigid as it appears, nor is it a prototype for all 
developing countries at all times. 
4.6. Conclusion 
The usefulness of the proposed matrix lies in the help it can g1ve 
1n the formulation of programmes for developing the construction industry. 
By identifying broad categories of construction activity and the 
resources used it 1S possible, in each country, to determine the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of each subsector - in terms of both supply and 
demand - and to establish priorities and evolve a policy which 
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concentrates on particular subsectors or resources as the structural 
framework on which the expansion of the whole industry is based. (See 
also 3.8). 
4.7. Notes and References 
1. Turin, D.A., The Construction Industry: Its Economic Significance 
and its Role in Development, Part I, Text, 2nd Ed., BERU, UCERG, 
London, September, 1973, pp. D.1S-IB. 
2. Ibid. 
3. The matrix is developed from the author's knowledge of the 
construction industries of Ghana and other sub-Saharan African 
countries, and is particularly applicable to that area. 
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CHAPTER. 5 
CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
"28 per cent of the world population lives in countries 
which account for 82 per cent of the world estimated 
GDP. Conversely, the least developed nations account 
for more than half the world population but only 8 
per cent of the world total product ... these 
inequalities are even greater in terms of construction 
activity with the richer countries .. ; accounting for 
nearly 90 per cent of the total world construction 
activity and the poorer countries in Asia and Africa 
for a mere 5 per cent." 
- Andrews et al. I Construction and Development: A 
Framework for Research and Action, BERU, UCERG, 
London, 1972, p. A4. 
"A glance at the 'Ghana Times' and the 'Evening News' will 
suggest the emphasis currently placed on the economic 
development in the country .... The general 
impression is that what in North America is normally 
on financial pages is simply news in Ghana ... that 
there is a constant emphasis on connnunal material 
acquisitions such as bridges, factories and schools, 
all of which will ultimately contribute to the 
general ,,,elfare, cannot fail to impress itself on 
the Ghanaian and the visitor as a symptom of the 
conununity's deepest concerns." 
- Tiger, L., Bureaucracy and Urban Symbol Systems, 
in Miner, H. (ed), The City in Modern Africa, 
Pall Mall Press, London, 1967, p. 202. 
5.1. Introduction 
Studies of the construction ind~stries of the developing countries 
are even more recent than those of general economic development. They 
have been few, and have basically taken the form of comparing what 
exists ~n the developing countries with what pertains, or is desirable, 
in the industrialised countries, cataloguing and analysing the problems, 
and suggesting solutions. A review of literature on the subject reveals 
a similarity in the major findings, and recommendations made by the 
authors. 
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5.2. Reasons for Studying Construction 
Attention was drawn to the construction industries of the 
developing countries by two main issues, both of which were related to 
the development effort: 
(a) Housing: the development process ~n the poor countries had created 
a few areas of modern economic activity to which people from less 
privileged areas migrated for employment and better social 
amenities (see 1.3.2 and 2.2.2). This 'urbanisation' had created an 
acute housing shortage and deplorable living conditions in the 
cities and larger urban areas of the developing count~ies. The 
inability of the construction industry to cope with the very high 
level of demand was seen as one of the reasons for this housing 
shortfall. 
(b) Construction and Development: statistics showed that the developing 
countries accounted for even less a proportion of global output in 
construction than total global product, and that, generally, the 
construction industry in any developing country contributed less to 
the national economy than its counterpart in a typical developed 
country. This gap n~eded to be redressed. Construction'was also 
found to be capable of acting as a leading sector in socio-economic 
development. Its improvement was, thus, vital. (See 3.5) 
,~_On some occasions, though, the developing countries I constructi:>n 
,. 
industries have been studied because of their employment-generating 
potential, obvious inefficiency, or high costs. Some countries or 
internatio~al organisations have commissioned studies on the subject in 
order to achieve a more efficient use of their financial aid or other 
assistance. From whatever approach the issue was studied, the diagnosis 
of the situation, as well as the suggested cures, have generally been 
similar. 
I, 
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5.3. Housing 
Several studies have been made of the housing situation in the 
developing countries. Whereas some do not go beyond broad statements 
urging economic growth, more equitable distribution of income (and hence 
higher average purchasing power), government-assisted programmes of 
financial, other material, or technical nature, self-help and general 
references to improvement of the construction industryl, others essay 
comprehensive programmes for the development of the local construction 
industry. A few of the latter are considered below. The concern here 
is only with the extent to which reports on the housing situation have 
incorporated recommendations for improving the construction industries 
of the developing countries. 
5.3.1. Broad Approaches 
Some paradigms on the de~elopment of construction to satisfy 
housing needs in the developing countries have looked at ways of 
ensuring improvement in all aspects and areas of the industry. 
5.3.1.1. Role of governments and foreign agencies 
The United Nations Group of Experts (1962)2 estimated that by 1965 
the developing countries would reqUl.re 24 million dwellings annually 
\ 
(IO dwellings per 1000 inhabitants) to house the increases in population, 
to remedy existing shortages and deficiencies and to offset obsolescence. 
There was a negative trend in meeting housing and urban development needs, 
due mainly to insufficient resources or failure to utilize available 
resources to respond to growing needs. 
The construction industry, the Group observed: 
" ... appears to be the least developed industry everywhere 
in terms of mechanization, productivity and the benefits 
derived from building progress by the ultimate user of its 
product .... Progressive methods, except in a few cases, 
have ... been slow in developing and have not been general 
enough. 113 
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This was the caSe although construction was economically important as 
an instrument of capital formation, a user of investment capital, and a 
generator of employment. Construction had not received sufficient 
attention in many development programmes but being labour-intensive, 
its capacity could be increased more rapidly than those of most other 
industries, and with less capital investment. 
A programme for improving the building and building materials 
industries and expanding their capacities would be implemented by 
governments with international technical and financial aid. 
Governments should ensure that economic growth was balanced, with 
re1evan~ social, economic, locationa1 and environmental (physical 
planning) priorities. A central ministry or department should be 
established to coordinate, integrate and, if appropriate, execute 
planned projects. A national building council should also be established 
to implement measures for improvi.ng the construct·ion industry, such as: 
revision of contract procedures and building codes; organisation and 
direction of building research; measures to increase or improve the 
production of building materials and industrialisation of building 
operations; training requirements; integration of the building process 
(involving contractor in the design); working conditions necessary to 
ensure hig~ productivity; standardization of building materials and 
components and modular coordination of design; establishment of systems 
of costing or productivity; and dissemination of, information and 
experience, both national and international. 
Existing resources in the industry should be assessed to relate 
planned construction output to available resources and avoid competition 
between different construction claims and inflation, or possible delays. 
Technical standards should be established in the light of all relevant 
social, economic, health and technical considerations. 
Government should prepare and implement adequate long-range 
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national progranunes for mobilising and training personnel for the 
industry at all levels, the programmes providing incentives and 
conditions for workers to improve their efficiency'through technological 
and other changes. The fuller and more efficient use of abundant labour 
should be an immediate goal. The integration, at the university level, 
of the different disciplines involved in urban regional planning and 
development around practical problems would provide the student with an 
opportunity for observation and research. 
Governments should also intensify research to improve the 
efficiency with which productive resources are used, including advance 
. preparation of drawings and specifications in detail, construction 
progranuning, site layouts, more rational use of labour, accident 
prevention programmes and the application of work study. Other important 
issues included: the development of cost consciousness among all persons 
working in the building industry; better site organisation; ordering 
and delivery of materials on site in good time; obtaining the necessary 
machinery and recruiting the required labour force; project planning 
and control; and good labour-management relations. 
The effectiveness of these approaches and measures depended, to a 
large extent, on the ability of government to mobilise domestic resources 
and to use,external aid effectively. National efforts 
l 
" could gain substantially from international knowledge 
and experience; from freer trade in materials, equipment 
and skills; and from an easier and larger international 
flow of capital.,,4 
5.3.1.2. Regional cooperation 
After a review of the housing situation in African countries, the 
Economic Commission for Africa (1965)5 concluded that demographic ~nd 
socia-economic factors had contributed towards the utter qualitative and 
quantitative inadequacy of housing in most countries. In all parts of 
Africa dwellings were overcrowded and lacked the most elementary 
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amenities. 
The building materials industries were undeveloped, local 
production failed to meet total demand, and costs of local production 
were high due to limitations dictated by scale of operations, lack of 
technical and managerial skills, and inefficient plants. 55 to 60 per 
cent of all materials for construction were imported, materials 
constituting 45 to 50 per cent of construction costs. There was 
surprisingly little intra-African trade, even for commodities which the 
continent exported such as timber or produced below installed plant 
capacities such as cement. 
In the production of building materials attempts should be made to 
reduce the costs of production and transportation, and to use 
comparatively simple technology better adapted to smaller outputs and 
limited local markets. There was scope for research into the establish-
ment of small and1medium production units for items like cement, concr~te 
products, timber and sanitary and electrical equipment. 
Building costs were high because of the reliance on expensive 
imported materials, low productivity of labour, high overheads, lack of 
managerial and technical skills, the use of inappropriate designs, 
inadequacy of research, and obsolescence of building regulations and 
bye-laws. \ 
Indigenous contractors lacked capital and competent supervisors, 
and could not rationalise their working methods because of discontin-
uities in their activities. Efforts should be concentrated on reducing 
construction costs by improving labour productivity through large 
construction programmes which implied frequent repetition of operations, 
and by using programming, material scheduling, cost control and 
effective supervision. 
"A large part of the responsibility for improving the 
present situation lies on the client side, especially 
the public client."6 
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The problems were not only of a technical nature but also of a ~ucial, 
administrative and economic kind. 
There was a need to train administrative and technical personnel 
in the essentials of modern organisation techniques," drawing from the 
experience of more advanced countries. Furthermore, there should be 
. greater regional cooperation among African countries to promote 
complementarity of development rather than competition. 
5.3.1.3. Reducing costs 
In a paper on housing in Africa, Turin (1967)7 noted that in a· 
continent with relatively high rates of population growth (3 per cent ~n 
Ghana, for example) and urbanisation (up to 10 per cent), there was a 
wide and increasing gap between housing needs and housing programmes. 
Moreover, the cost of dwellings built by conventional methods was too 
high (in most countries the 'low-cost' house was 2.5 to 4 times the 
annual income of the skilled worker and 5 to 8 for a non-skilled worker). 
The gap between needs and means had resulted in the creation of 
'unauthorised' settlements. 
Turin observed that the building industry in Africa was embryonic, 
badly organised, under-equipped and short of skills at all levels. The 
larger construction firms were expatriate; the emerging African 
\ 
contractor lacked experience, finance and managerial know-how. 
As a consequence of past colonial policies, Africa relied on 
imported building materials, which accounted for 6 per cent of total 
African imports, although the continent had sufficient raw materials 
which, if suitably exploited, could serve its present and future needs. 
It was clear that 
" ... in many African countries a satisfactory human 
enviroIllller.t in urban areas could be obtained at 
half the present cost,"8 
But this could only be achieved ~n the long term, after research into 
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functional requirements, quality standards, better designs, more 
economic services, better layouts, high densities, and so bn. 
Since up to 60 per cent of building costs was due to materials, 
most of which were imported, local production of materials would reduce 
the materials component of building costs, as well as have mUltiplying 
effects on the economy as a whole. At the same time, efforts should be 
devoted to It ••• reducing the labour component, characterised by an 
extremely low productivity which more than offsets the low level of 
wages as compared with deveil:oped countries."9 
In a discussion of his paper, however, Turin admitted that the 
application of industrialised methods was limited by a shortage of 
foreign currency for the acquisition of the essential production 
machinery, comparatively small Sl.zes of national building programmes, 
and relative abundance of cheap unskilled and semi-skilled labourlO. 
Energy would also be a major protlem. 
International financial aid could only make a marginal impact on 
the problem since it was limited, and tended to be directed to more 
obviously productive sectors. 
5.3.1.4. Summary and observations 
, 
The foregoing strategies were, essentially, 'growth-based' (see 
1.3.2-3), suggesting that the urgency of the housing situation called 
for an all-out effort on all fronts of the construction industry: the 
resources needed for such .an exercise could, and should, be provided by 
governments and international organisations; procedures were 
inappropriate but could, and should be changed. Altogether, the 
construction industry should produce more, and better houses: the 
obvious constraints acting on it only had to be removed for this 
objective to be achieved. Developing the housing sector would promote 
other sectors of the construction industry, and provide the impetus for 
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econom1c activity in the country generally. Therefore, it is said, 
matters concerned with housing (and hence construction) should be given 
priority by governments in their development plans. 
It 1S possible, here, to make some observations. 
The housing situation cannot be divorced from the economic 
characteristics of the developing countries. The countries are poor, 
and lack most of the resources required to mount the programmes 
suggested. This does not mean the programmes were logically wrong, nor 
does it mean that nothing can be done. The assumptions and premises of 
the studies relied on the experience of the industrialised countries, 
and S1nce the situation in developing countries was different, the 
programmes called for certain changes and the injection of certain 
inputs before they could be successfully implemented. 
Changes, however, are not easily achieved where traditions, 
cultures, history and peoples' acpirations are concerned. ( Se e 1. 4 • 6 ) • 
Alternatives to these 'growth' models have, therefore, been proposed, 
which consider the peculiarities existing in the developing countries, 
and attempt to utilise their greatest strengths. Some of these are now 
considered. 
, 
5.3.1.5. New frontiers 
11 Abrams observed, in 1964, that after studying and reporting on 
the housing problems of fourteen nations in four continents, he had 
identified no panaceas for the housing problem in the developing 
countries. The task was 
" ... great and the way 
productive frontiers. 
be damped down by the 
investment. 1112 
full of hazards as well 
The burning ideal must 
realities of enterprise 
as 
always 
and 
One of the productive frontiers appeared to be the salvaging and 
strengthening of the cooperative practices of tribal life. These had 
been disrupted by the sudden social changes that accompanied industrial-
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isation and urbanisation. 
There were no magic remedies: housing was a long-term, continuing 
development which required mobilisati,on of each country's own resources 
of land, skills, materials and finance mechanisms. It was necessary 
that experts have a comprehensive knowledge of the country's needs and 
priorities. 
lilt is not only what the aid expert feels is right for 
the country that counts - what he recommends must also 
be what the country can manage to do successfully. 
IIEach country has values, culture, c,ustoms and ways of 
life which, when built upon, can make the difference 
between a programme's success and failure. Tribal 
relationships and kinships, building traditions, 
cooperative devices,particular saving habits, and other 
characteristics must be discovered and, whenever possible, 
adapted and utilised in the formulation of assistance 
programmes. ,,13 
There was a dearth of research on the building industries of the 
developing countries. This tended to give those that were avai.lable the 
character of gospel, and to increase the temptation to standardi.se 
remedies: if a programme worked in one place it was regarded a 
precedent for other places. Unfortunately, 
"A formula that is simple and practical in England may bog 
down administratively in Ghana. Corruption, ignorance, 
l,.ack of skills, politics, opportunism, centralisation, the 
stubbornness of custom or disrespect for prevailing 
traditions, and other intangibles may doom the best 
findings ... "14 
Abrams made some recommendations. There should be a land policy 
that could make properly planned land available at reasonable cost, 
incorporating sound tenure, regulation, use, acquisition, taxation and 
financing of land. A financing or assistance scheme (eg the Roof Loans 
Scheme of Ghana) should be established to assist prospective building 
owners. Local building methods and the use of indigenous materials 
should be studied in building research stations. Technical training 
centres and trade schools should be established (or improved) to train 
professionals, technicians and tradesmen; there could also be on-the-
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job training on self-help projects supervised by trained foremen. 
Efforts should be made to reduce construction costs by: 
economising in design, standardisation and some prefabrication, more 
efficient organisation of labour and materials on the site, reducing 
the ~ost of materials in factories, developing and using cheaper 
building materials, economising on utilities, and reducing administrative 
costs and overheads. 
In the field of materials and techniques, ceiling heights could be 
reduced; lime mortar could be used for masonry and rendering i~stead of 
cement; stabilised earth blocks could also be used. A grinding plant 
for clinker could ensure a better synchronization of supply and demand; 
timber costs should be reduced; and simple earthenware sanitary 
fittings, as well as metal hinges, locks and bolts could be locally 
produced. Small local kilns for brick and tile production could be 
est~blished. 
Abrams admitted, however, that 
" ... These recommendations were all made in Pakistan, 
the Philippines, and Ghana by visiting experts. But 
recommending a programme is one thing, fulfilling it 
another. What these countries need besides advice 1S 
technical ability and administrative apparatus."15 
/ 
Ideally, the're should be, under the jurisdiction of the United 
Nations, a specialised agency for urban development with funds to 
finance missions by experts to the developing countries, and powers to 
implement the recommendations of these missions. There should also be 
an international bank with powers to borrow, lend, or guarantee 
investment in urban development and housing, its membership open to all 
countries. Eventually it should become the financing and implementing 
arm of the United Nations and other agencies. The industrialised 
countries should g1V~ more aid to aspects such as training, research and 
development of capital. The motivation for aid from such countries was, 
however, dominated by self-interest: there was, already, an 
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accumulating backlog of United Nations' recommendations 1n the urban 
fietd which could not be implemented for lack of funds, and of personnel 
who could put it to best use. 
5.3.1.6. A Comment 
Having mentioned the necessity for formulating programmes to 
harness peculiar cultural and traditional attributes, Abrams drew up a 
list of proposals which did not depart from those reviewed in 5.3.1.1-3, 
although, in his own estimation, such a programme would be difficult to 
implement, and is unlikely to have any impact on the housi~g situation. 
A common element in all the approaches discussed so far, and some 
of the forthcoming ones is their call for international financial and/or 
technical aid to the developing countries (cf. Nurkse and Rostow. See 
1.4.2). 
It is a fair corr~ent to make that it is unlikely for the volume of 
aid to increase considerably in the near future. (See Chapter 1, foot-
notes 32 and 39). Thus it appears a shaky foundation on which to base 
the success of a programme for any country. 
5.3.2. Growth with Equity Approaches 
In recent times, approaches to the issue of housing in 
developing countries have concentrated on the needs of the least 
privileged. In this sense, they are similar to the 'growth with equity' 
approaches to general socio-economic development. (See 2.4). 
5.3.2.1. Standards, Traditions, Aspirations 
A study of housing in developing countries (1977)16 referred to 
the cities in those ~reas as noisy, smelly, animal-filled, over-populated 
and poverty-stricken but observed that it was unwise to impose procedures 
and strategies from outside. Instead, 
" .•. aspirations, resources, standards, topography, 
construction techniques, history, culture, costs and 
finance - all these and more need to be ... absorbed 
into some rudiment of synoptic understanding .... "17 
There was an imbalance between traditional buildings. and official 
standards but traditions were an essential basic ingredient to the 
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formulation of a workable strategy for attacking the housing problems. 
Standards constituted the battleground for the struggle between 
aspirations and resources. Efforts should be directed towards 
achieving 
II maximum value from available resources, together with 
a sensible and balanced allocation of such resources. 
The allocation must reflect the priorities of the people 
... as well as environmental issues of concern to the 
nation as a whole. illS 
Few standards with performance objectives should be addpted rather than 
those that emphasised dimensional and technical peculiarities. 
An assessment of the expansion and increased capacity potential 
of the construction industry should be undertaken. This should consider 
such areas as: the structure of the industry in terms of size of firms; 
professional, managerial, supervisory and other skilled labour 
resources; the labour force and its output; sources and availability 
of materials a~ equipment; the technological level of the industry; 
and a survey of the informal sector. This examination would help 1n 
the formulation of measures to realise the industry's potential; for 
example, 
II incentives to encourage amalgamations, training 
schemes, exploitation of import substitution opportunities 
by developing new sources of materials and their 
processing, ensuring continuity of work, etc."19 
5.3.2.2. Current trends 
Models like the above (5.3.2.1) have become increasingly popular. 
As the difficulty of achieving inlprovements in housing conditions from 
tgrowth-based' approaches has become evident, the paradigms hctve shifted 
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from concentrating on expanding the capacity of the construction 
industry to reliance on the initiative and natural skills of prospective 
building owners, especially the poor in the 'unauthorised' settlements 
adjacent to the urban areas, and the rural areas; 
" ... the many whose basic material and spiritual needs 
are not satisfied and who have no real chance to 
change their circumstances." 20 
Governments in developing countries 'are urged to realise that for 
a long time to come, the majority of their peoples will live in the 
rural areas, and urbanisation is also likely to continue. Housing 
policy should recognise and reflect these2l . 
II this does not mean that housing policies should be 
abandoned. It means that these must be ... demystified, 
made to face up to the real country with all its 
differences in income, culture, ecology, and serve to 
support and orientate social progress ~ .. "22 
Thus, there should be a mixture of policies reflecting the 
different levels of incomes and the variety of ways in which housing 
needs could be satisfied. 
" ... the crux of the matter is how to strike a balance 
among various alternatives: public sector provision of 
infrastructure and services, subsidised conventional 
housing, aided self-help construction, upgrading of 
existing settlements, the involvement of the private 
construction sector, and the mobilisation of popular 
initiatives. 1123 
To help the poor in the urban areas the unrealistic building 
standard~ should be relaxed and assistance provided in the form of cheap 
land, secure tenure, and essential services (sites and services). In 
the rural areas, attention could be concentrated on improvements in 
planning and design, and in health and sanitation, as well as assistance 
1 . 1 24 to owners to secure more durab e mater1a s, . 
In Africa, it has come to be realised that; 
"(a) African society has a long and valuable tradition 
of co~nunal action; 
(b) traditional building materials can be used for 
build~ng conforming to adequate quality standards; 
(c) improvement of such materials is possible; 
(d) local production of building materials 1S possible, 
but not yet organised on a large scale; 
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(e) human potential is available but not yet organised; and 
(f) architecture is not new in Africa, but ignored in 
many countries."25 
Thus it was possible to adopt an approach to housing corresponding to 
specific needs and utilising these strengths. This did not mean that 
easy solutions were possible. 
" ... tremendous efforts and, even more, a lot of 
ingenuity are needed to achieve positive solutions 1126 
Finally, although solutions would have to be attuned to each country's 
specific conditions, information on approaches and experience elsewhere 
would be valuable~7. 
5.3.2.3. An Observation 
Thus, paradigms on the issue of housing in developing countries 
have become pragmatic, evolving along lines similar to those on socio-
economic development from the 'conventional' to the 'basic needs' 
approaches; from a concentration on the 'modern' sector to a 
comprehensive approach involving the whole of the society's attributes; 
from concern with the provision and/or expansion of certain 'missing 
factors' to utili~ation of the peculiar conditions existing in the 
developing countries, and from attempts to crystallise a blueprint to 
emphasis on country-specificity, although referring'to the usefulness of 
disseminating information on approaches and experiences in the various 
countries. 
The 'growth with equity' approaches, however, have concentrated on 
ways and means of satisfying the housing needs of the poor, and have not 
bEoadened their approach to the issue of impr~ving national construction 
industries. Thus, proposals on that issue can be found mainly in the 
'conventional' paradigms. 
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5.4. Construction in Economic Development 
5.4.1. Introduction 
The second group of models of construction industry development 
stem from the role the industry plays in the economy. There have been 
several attempts to theorise on the structural changes that occur in an 
economy as it develops. The contributions made by agriculture and 
manufacturing to national product and to employment have been held as 
reflecting a country's level of development. (See 1:3.4, 2.2.2 and 
2.3.2). Does the construction sector follow a similar pattern? 
28 Chenery (1963) analysed the contributions made by value added in 
major sectors of the economy to gross national product for fifty-one 
countries, and observed that construction was 4 per cent of national 
income at the $100 per capita income level, and about 6 per cent at the 
$1,000 level. 
29 Kuznets (1961) found that amongst a sample of thirty-four 
countries in post-war years up to, and including 1957, construction was 
about 8.5 per cent of gross domestic product in countries in the $100 
and $200 annual per capita income classes and the $270 to $400 classes. 
It was 11.0 per cent for the $650 to $1,000 classes, and 11.9 per cent 
of the national product for the $1,700 per capita income class. But in 
every country construction was just over half of all gross domestic 
capital formation. 
Strassman (1970)30 studied the economies of a sample which 
" includes all countries with a population of over one million for 
which virtually all figures needed had been published for most of the 
31 decade 1955-1964" and reported that in the countries which he had 
grouped as Poor (per capita income $80 - $350), Middle ($350 - $900) and 
Advanced ($900 plus), construction was, respectively, 4.6, 7.1 and 7.1 
per cent of gross national product on the average, and employe~ 3.9, 
6.7 and 7.2 per cent of the economically active population. 
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Strassman postulated that manumcturing had typically been given a 
bigger boost in early stages of development. Construction followed 
after at least two decades, catching up in the middle income period of 
rapid industrialisation. Low productivity in construction, coupled 
with higher wages, however, tended to retard the sector in advanced 
countries. Construction, therefore, experienced "a midd1e-income-
country bulge". 
A study by Chenery and Taylor (1968)32 also portrayed a similar 
bulge in the building materials production industries. Non-metallic 
products (including cement, bricks, tile and glass) were found to reach 
a peak share of gross national product at per capita incomes of $700 Ln 
19 relatively large countries, and to fall later byyabout a third. 
~,4.2. The Post-Industrial Era 
Since the war, the economies of the western countries have 
undergone a transformation of their dependence on manufacturing (see 
1.3.2) as the dominant activity to the emergence of the service 
industries as the major source of employment. The process of development 
has, therefore, been taken a stage further: 
\ 
" •.. more recently the industrial society ... has begun 
to give way to the post-industrial phase where the locus 
of employment ... shifts ... with a relative decline in 
the importance of the secondary or manufacturing sector 
in line with a corresponding increase in the importance 
of the tertiary or services sector.,,33 
This is seen as another challenge to the developing countries: if 
they are to catch up with their more advanced counterparts then they 
should even go beyond industrialisation. 34 Ga1enson (1963) ,for examp~e, 
compared manufacturing employment trends with tertiary employment and 
observed that manufacturing employment grew at higher percentage rates 
in developing countries but the absolute increases in tertiary 
employment were larger, and concluded that commerce and serVLces had 
to absorb most of new employment. 
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The construction industries of the developing countries had to 
play their part in the industrial, and post-industrial transformations. 
This formed the basis of some theories on the subject, which have been 
of two main kinds: 
(a) broad approaches: which consider the whole industry and endeavour 
to embrace all its aspects; and those that concentrate on 
(b) specific areas of the industry which they consider most important, 
or which are simply the focus of their study. 
5.4.3. Broad Approaches 
5.4.3.1. Turin 
35 Turin (1969 and 1973) analysed the role of the construction 
industry in the economies of developed and developing countries. In one 
36 
study he observed that: 
* value added in construction accounted for 3-5 per cent of gross 
domestic product in developLng countries, and 5-8 per cent ~n 
industrialised countries. 
* capital formation in construction represented 6-9 per cent of gross 
domestic product in developing countries, and 10-15 per cent in the 
I 
industrialised ones; and accounts for 45-60 per cent of all capital 
formation in all countries. 
* direct employment in construction was 2-6 per cent of total employment 
in developing countries and 6-10 per cent in more industrialised ones. 
* construction bought between 50 and 60 percent of its inputs from 
other sectors of the economy. 
* developing countries directed 30-55 per cent of construction investment 
to civil engineering, whereas in developed areas it is 25-30 per cent. 
" ... one. can therefore appreciate the scope for development 
of the industry in the less favoured countries of the 
world [and] .00 the distance to be covered in order to 
bring construction ta a level comparable to that of the 
more industrialised countries."37 
Generally, with increasing development construction output, value 
118 
added per person employed and per capita, and their share in national 
product increased; the gap between construction and manufacturing 1n 
terms of output and earnings tended to close; and employment in 
construction per thousand population increased. 
These gener1c relationships should be considered in the formulation 
of policies for the construction industry in developing countries: 
inaccuracies in the data would not invalidate the general trends. Turin 
essayed a list of 'invocations' 
" ... not addressed to anybody in particular, although by 
their very nature they are obviously aimed at 'policy 
makers': international agencies, national governments, 
professional elites, employers' federations - in brief 
all those who can influence the future of the construction 
industry. 1138 
Governments should recognise the importance of construction in the 
national economy, and establish a Ministry to deal with it; the variety 
of possible technologies in construction should be recognised and related 
to the availability of materials, human and financial resources; the 
relative labour intensity of construction and hence its potential for 
useful and sustained employment generation should be recognised. The 
fragmentation of the construction industry should be accepted as a direct 
consequence of the nature of its products and inputs, and construction 
programmes used to promote local variety, encourage local skills, 
materials and techniques. 
The reliability of national products, and the network of 
distribution of human and material resources should be improved. Efforts 
should be made to provide loans to building contractors, as is usually 
done to other producers, and to facilitate the flow of finance by 
simplifying approval procedures, streamlining contract documents, and 
ensuring prompt payment for work done. The public client should be used 
to introduce and encourage the utilisation of adequate technology, for 
setting up or strengthening small and medium-sized local contractors, for 
establishing suitable training schemes, and for promoting innovation. 
119 
Meaningless statutory instruments and regulations should be abandoned; 
" ... imaginative policies could be evolved which, by 
recognizing the unique features of construction activity, 
would utilize them for specific economic and social 
objectives ... "39 
The industry experienced technical, administrative, financial and 
legal constraints which operate in such a way that, 
" •.. in most developing countries the construction industry 
falls short of providing the services the society 1S 
entitled to expect from it. "40 
This failure of the industry to provide adequate building and civil 
engineering works tended to hinder the achievement of a more rapid and 
more equitably distributed social and economic progress. However, 
" ... each of these constraints can, if wanted, be removed; 
but the process will take time and.require considerable 
efforts. ,,41 ' 
The problem was made more difficult by the fragmentation of the 
construction industry, the variety of participants involved in the 
process, complexity of statutory requirements, and the social and 
political implications underlying major construction programmes. 
Governments could promote the use of local materials indirectly through 
fiscal controls, and directly by insisting that they were used on public 
projects. 
Local production of modern building materials and components should 
be tackled within an industrial perspective and in terms of effective 
demand and commercial outlets, investment in ptant, financial credit, 
better management, raw materials and plant location, labour and capital 
requirements, and existing patterns of use of materials. Better design 
would enable developing countries to obtain a higher yield from a more 
rational use of resources. 
Government's efforts could be supplemented by those of other 
institutions. Professional bodies, provided they were legally and 
financially strengthened, and were prepared to playa leading part 1n 
construction development, could initiate research and ensure its 
I, 
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application through their members. Trade associations should transmit 
knowledge on methods and procedures to their members; trade un10ns, too, 
had an important role to play. The problem, however, would require 
concerted national action and well-directed international technical 
assistance. 
5.4.3.2. Planning 
Drewer (1975)42 reiterated the possibility of meeting the demand 
for construction through a wide range of technologies. The developing 
countries required construction activity to create the infrastructure 
and the industrial and productive facilities that were crucial to their 
development. Since the 
" spread of work types and input requirements to sustain 
construction activity in developing countries is far in 
excess of that required in the now developed countries at 
similar levels of development,"43 
It was possible that the scarcity of resources in the developing country 
would make it necessary for the additional output to be met through 
imports or changes in technology. Should this happen, construction 
could have a negative impact on development. 
, 
Priorities for different kinds of construction output should be 
identified in relation to national plans and resources, and because of 
the important role the construction industry played in every nation's 
economy, plans for its development should be considered in all national 
plans. 
The importance of planning construction development was also 
44 
emphasised by Ganesan (1976) . Although fluctuation in construction 
output was normal in all countries due to policy and seasonal changes, 
misallocation of available resources could also constrain construction 
activity. Planning should aim at: increasing output through appropriate 
technological, institutional and financial frameworks; and improving 
overall industrial productivity, as well as those of scarce resources 
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such as foreign exchange and capital. The productivity of capital may 
be constrained by inadequate foreign exchange for the purchase of raw 
materials and spares,· and lack of demand for the finished product. This 
could only be remedied through resource-planning of the industry. 
Labour productivity could be improved through investment in plant 
and equipment, and through technical progress 
" ... advanced engineering knowledge, better management, 
better organization, training of labour, etc .... Where 
capital equipment is in short supply, one alternative is 
to enhance the quality and capacity of human capital. "45 
Developing countries should exchange information and expertise On matters 
such as the modernisation of the indigenous building materials sectors; 
research and manpower training; policy formulation for. the construction 
sector; and growth strategies. 
5.4.3.3. Computers 
Moavenzadeh (1974 and 1978)46 suggested that the indigenous 
construction industries should concentrate on the repetitious and routine 
building and civil engineering projects to fulfil volume needs, and 
leave out the more specialized and sophisticated jobs like dams and 
.... 
power stations (ie 'international' projects. See 4.4.2) to multi-
national firms. 
Local planning and design capabilities were inadequate, and needed 
improvement. The use of computers could enhance these capabilities. 
Designers' sensitivity to local conditions should be increased, designs 
should be standardized, and plans, specifications and building 
regulations should be performance-based in order to encourage the use of 
design strategies compatible with local needs. 
Management personnel was scarce in the developing countries but 
their training was time consuming and difficult; local educational 
centres should be developed, using expatriate instructors. The shortage 
of manpower in this area could also be eased by the use of computers. 
Contractual arrangements and bidding practices should be improved. 
Finance posed problems: 
"High interest rates, lack of adequate credit with 
equipment and materials suppliers, the unavpi1ability 
of rental equipment l lengthy delays in payments, and the 
practice of withholding a portion of the payment as a 
guarantee against poor workmanship are serious issues 
facing local contractors in most developing countries.,,47 
Efforts should, therefore, be made to make it more feasible for 
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contractors to borrow working and investment capital, and to increase 
their ability to manage financial resources through training programmes 
and appropriate incentives. They should also be encouraged to merge, 
and to form associations which could help individual members (especially 
with finance). 
The development of local building materials industries was subject 
to the availability of manpower, capital, markets and necessary raw 
materials. Rather than limit such development to those materials in 
standard use in industrialized countries, innovative consideration 
should also be given to the use of locally abundant raw materials such 
as rice straw, bagasse and bamboo. The neglect of the maintenance of 
constructed facilities was costly, and tended to reduce the life of the 
, 
facility. Properly organised maintenance could generate employment for 
unskilled workers. The staging of construction could result in the 
more effective use of resources and lower costs. 
There should be centralized agencies or institutes in the developing 
countries to encourage, support and perform research into all aspects of 
construction, and to collect, evaluate and disseminate information to the 
industry. The construction industry could only develop if demand and 
supply fluctuations were lessened. This called for comprehensive planning 
of the resources and products of the industry. It was important for each 
country to develop programmes for its industry based on its own 
peculiarities and resources. 
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5.4.3.4. Training, Employment and Technology 
48 Edmonds (1979) emphasised the place of construction in the 
economy of every country and its role 1n development. He noted that 
construction technologies tended to be more capital-i'ntensive in 
developing countries whereas unemployment was high and wages low. 
"Whilst standards of efficiency anq quality certainly have 
to be maintained, it is paradoxical in view of the 
industry's undoubted potential for employment creation 
that on average the proportion of the population employed 
in construction is five or six times lower in thz least 
developed countries than in the developed ones." 9 
The procedures used in developing countries affected the efficiency of 
the local construction industry, limited its growth and affected its 
choice of technology and hence its level of productive employment. 
(See 5.4.4.3.2). The nature of the industry, and the difficulties 
encountered in delineating and defining it, hindered the collection of 
data on it, and consequently, the planning of its growth. There were 
far fewer construction firms in the developing countries than in the 
industrialised ones, and the gulf between the larger and the smaller 
, 
firms was also larger; there was a dearth of medium-sized contractors. 
The small indigenous contractor operated under the most difficult 
...... 
conditions characterised by a number of vicious circles; he could only 
be helped through training schemes organised in an imaginative manner. 
Small contractors could be organised into cooperatives; a public-owned, 
large construction firm could also be formed. 
"Whilst large foreign-owned construction companies will, 
of necessity, have to be used on major projects in many 
developing countries, this should be viewed as a short-
term exped1ent until such time as the domestic sector 
can effectively undertake such work. ,,50 
Training in the field of multi-project programming would enable 
engineers to plan more effectively the inputs required by the industry 
to meet its target output or budget; and, at the level of the enterprise, 
equip the local industry with the ability to develop its potential. 
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5.4.3.5. On Balance 
The paradigms reviewed 1.n 5.4.3.1-4 are also growth-based: the 
comments made in 5.3.1.4 apply to them. Furthermore, 
(a) their consideration of the place of construction in the economies 
of the developing as compared to the developed countries, and their 
call for the former to be enabled to move towards the latter are 
reminiscent of Rostow's approach to development (see 1.4.2), and 
may be criticised along the same lines. mlereas, despite the 
difficulties in obtaining reliable information on construction (see 
3.6.9) the generic relationships may be correct, it is not 
sufficient evidence to conclude that a minimum level of national 
income is necessary to support take-off in construction (Edmonds 
(5.4.3.4) suggests 300 dollars per capita per annum) or that a 
particular perpentage of construction output to national income 1.S 
a condition for take-off in the economy, considering the various 
ways in which an economy might grow (see 2.2.1). Finally, were 
either or both of the foregoing to be true, there would be little 
hope for the developing countries to make much progress in the near 
future, S1.nce prospects for their economic growth appear bleak 
(see Chapter 2) and construction is a particularly difficult sector 
to develop (see 3.7-9); moreover, growth in construction could 
aggravate inflation or balance of payments problems (see 3.5); 
(b) they are mainly 'balanced growth' strategies (see 2.3.1) calling 
for effort on several fronts, although the paucity of the required 
resources in the developing countries makes such an approach 
impractical; 
(c) by presenting proposals without attempting to indicate an order of 
priorities the paradigms neglect the diffusion and complexity of 
the const'ruction industry, the 10''1 probability for all the measures 
to have equal successes at the same time and the likelihood that 
" 
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success or failure in certain parts of the industry would create 
problems of a different nature in others; (see 3.6.3. and 3.7-9). 
(d) some of the specific proposals may also be briefly considered: 
(i) planning for construction is more hazardous and can be even 
more of an academic exercise than national economic planning 
(see 2.2.1 and 3.6.8) .. Drewer (1975) suggests that: 
" ... in many developing and western market economies 
it is often assumed that such is the diversity of 
the outputs that the planning exercise is of little 
us~ except in the identification of a loose 
strategical framework."5l (See also 3.6.8). 
(ii) institutional arrangements in construction are not easily 
alterable; (see 3.4) nor are public attitudes and values. 
Hence new contractual procedures and the development and use 
of local materials are more difficult than the paradigms 
seem to suggest; (See 3.7-8 and 5.3.2.2). 
(iii) to Moavenzadeh's (5.4.3.3) suggestion that computers could 
be used, it is necessary to point out that not all 
construction operations can be computerised at the moment, 
site assembly is one example. Computer techniques in 
construction are yet to be widely developed, even in the 
advanced countries. Moreover, in the developing countries, 
they can only be applied 1n a small section of the industry 
(the international and conventional large). (See 4.4.1). 
Hence, the scope for computers is limited, their applicability 
depending not only on the skills they can replace, but also 
their suitability to local conditions. Indiscriminate and 
hasty use of computer technology in the developing countries 
would create industrial problems such as unemployment, 
disparity in the balance of related skills, and labour unrest. 
(iv) in supposing that the industry can be rid of all its problems 
the authors overlooked the fact that several of its problems, 
such as unstable demand, and casualisation of labour, are 
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endemic, stemming from its nature (see 3.7); and 
(v) finally, the suggestion that governments should accord 
construction special priority because of its place in the 
economy and its role in development is overoptimistic. Turin 
(1978) advised: 
"Let uS at least stop assuming things, for instance, 
that human settlements should be given priority 1n 
national planning. Priority above what: work? 
health? national security? Law and Order?"52 
(e) with the limited resources at their disposal and the necessity to 
adopt a cautious approach that would avoid their making too many 
mistakes at the same time, it is wise that the developing countries 
concentrate their efforts on a few major aspects of the complex 
issue of developing construction at anyone time. (See 3.8). 
5.4.4. Specific Area~ 
Some paradigms on construction 1n the developing countries have 
been concerned with certain specific aspects of the issue. 
5.4.4.1. Contractor development 
Andrews et al (1972)53 studied the construction industries of 
three developing countries: Ethiopia, Kenya and Sri Lanka, and noted 
that the industries in these countries lacked a sound structural base on 
which to build major expanS1on. The industries were characterised by an 
extreme dichotomy: 
" ... at one end, a large number of small and very small 
indigenous contractors or self-employed artisans, at 
the other a small number of large and very large private 
or public contracting organisations. 1154 
But construction had a part to play in the process of national develop-
ment: by providing more employment, by adding to the stock of 
investment goods, and by economising 1n the use of imported materials 
and machinery. This could best be done by encouraging local contractors 
to increase their capabilities, and by enlarging the capacity of local 
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materials industries. 
Three changes were required: 1n the way in which demand was put 
to the industry, in the structure of the industry, and in the type of 
inputs available. Labour-intensive types of construction should be 
chosen so that the plentiful unskilled labour could be used, to 
economise on imported plant and materials. Work should be in smaller 
·packets to enable medium-sized contractors to gain experience on 
projects that they could handle. Fluctuations in demand should be 
reduced, so that contractors could plan and train for continuity. 
Procedures of design, letting contracts, costing and the like should be 
simplified. These improvements in the nature of demand would effect 
changes in the structure of the industry but there should be efforts to 
improve upon the usefulness of the available resources; manpower should 
be trained for supervisory and management positions; and the financial 
requirements of the contracting and materials industries should be 
examined. 
It was mainly the responsibility of clients, especially government 
and the large contractor organisations, to ensure that improvements were 
made in the efficiency of the construction industry. 
5.4.4.2. Foreign Firms 
The apparent neglect of the construction industry by economic 
55 planners worldover was lamented by Cockburn (1970) . The industry 
provided a vitally important service to development, but was beset by 
peculiar problems. There should be continuity of demand for the industry 
and its specialised trades. Government should make employment in 
construction more attractive to a higher level of manpower, and should 
invest in research and ensure that its results were utilised. 
Foreign firms had an important role to play to advance local 
enterprise, skills and management in the developing countries. 
consultants influenced the construction process through their design and 
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specification, and should consider local skills and patterns of 
relationships with clients in their work. Contracting firms should 
adopt measures such as: 
" ... a training policy for local managers, site agents and 
operatives; a supporting policy towards local sub-
contracting enterprises; the development of continuing 
local component manufacturing units; an introduction 
to the public client ... of construction planning, 
programming and development expertise."S6 
Manufacturers should also invest in local industries, and lend production 
and management skills. 
Foreign firms tended to have short-sighted profit-oriented ad-hoc 
trade practices but it was time these were modified to achieve an 
alignment of the commercial interests of these firms with the long-term 
development goals of the poor nations: 
"Trade ethics will change. Those firms that change y;ith 
them, help them to change, will build up that confidence 
in their client countries that cannot but stand them in 
good stead in future tr.<'lding years."S7 
Developing countries would, in future, welcome firms which had new ideas 
of construction to sell, instead of individual buildings. 
S'8 Neo (1976) ,in a study of international contracting, observed 
that it was characterised by firms of the industrialised countries 
expanding their operations predominantly into developing countries as 
well as other developed countries. There was immense potential for 
construction in developing countries, and: 
" ... international contractors of industrialised 
nations should ... meet this challenge."S9 
The improvement in the terms of trade that would result from higher 
prices for their expats would enable developing countries to embark on 
industrialisation programmes which would create opportunities for foreign 
contractors. Although the risks involved in working overseas were high, 
competition was keen. Overseas construction contributed to the balance 
of payments of the industrialised countries both directly and indirectly, 
through the export of plant, equipment and specialised materials, as 
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well as invisibles such as consultancy and insurance services. It 
constituted 5 to 8 per cent of the United Kingdom's domestic industry, 
and 3 to 6 per cent of the French, Dutch and American industries. 
The practices of the foreign firms were often harmful to the 
economy of the host nation. For example, 
" •.. international contractors tend to work from one 
contract to the next, having little regard to the local 
industry of countries, particularl~ the developing 
countries, in which they operate." 0 
Neo's study, however, was limited to ways in which the inter-
national contractors could reduce their risks and maximise their 
earnirtgs, and ways in which they did, or could, repatriate these 
earnings in the face of increasing controls imposed by the developing 
countries. 
Rossow and Moavenzadeh6l reviewed the nature and behaviour of 
multi-national construction firms in developing countries and concluded 
that they were in business for economic rather than social reasons. 
This attitude was a direct response to market forces, and was unlikely 
to change except effort was made to induce particular changes in local 
conditions. 
The developing country's government ,could impose rules and 
regulations, provide incentives or adjust existing conditions to promote: 
" ... the use of joint venturing and subcontracting, use 
and training of local manpower, and the use and 
development of local materials and equipment by multi-
nationals.,,62 
If comprehensive plans for construction were prepared and the inter-
national firms ensured of reasonable job continuity they might be 
inclined to establish permanent local offices, or have greater interest 
in the local industry. 
International bodies, governments of the developed countries, and 
agencies ~n these countries, 
II through their provision of project 
associated policies and their support, 
dissemination of relevant information, 
financing and 
execution and 
may also serve 
to positively influence the operations of multi-
nationals in the direction of assisting in the development 
of the indigenous construction industry.,,63 
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But it was apparent that the local industry needed to be at a certain 
level of development before multi-nationals could effectively help it to 
grow further. 
5.4.4.3. Technology 
5.4.4.3.1. Indus~rialisation 
The United Nations (1974)64 considered it essential 
that governments in all countries, and especially the developing countries, 
adopted policies for the gradual and progressive industrialisation of 
their construction industries. The process of industrialisation would 
follow an irreversible trend in this century, and would eventually reach 
the least developed areas in the world. The generalised and complex 
nature of construction required that change in this field be gradual, and 
be in accordance with the peculiar conditions existing in each country. 
"Rejection of industrialisation may lead to further under-
development; adoption of extremely advanced techniques 
has proved in the past to be the reason for tremendous 
failures.,,65 
The essence of the problem was the adoption of the 
right measures at the right time in the development process. Industrial-
isation of building, which could broadly mean the application of modern 
industrial, organisational and production methods, also included that of 
other sectors of the economy which supplied and supported construction. 
The nature of the problem called for direct government action in defining 
measures and enforcing policies. Developing countries needed to endeavour 
to industrialise their industries: 
"Nothing is more fallacious than believing the improvement 
of productivity to be unimportant simply because labour 
is still inexpensive and plentiful in the developing 
countries. If building activity increased to the level 
required to satisfy immense needs of housing and comm4nity 
facilities, even carried out under the most advanced 
techniques it could alone absorb a large proportion of the 
masses of the unemployed. In some developing countries, 
for example, there are but two construction workers per 
thousand population) compared to ten per thousand in the 
developed nations. ,,06 
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It was equally erroneous to equate jndustria1isation 
with the adoption of the latest technological achievements, symbolised 
in construction by complete prefabrication. This was a target· which 
could only be reached through a number of indispensable changes. The 
economics of building, particularly costs, were vital in determining when 
each step leading to industrialisation was justified. At present, when 
labour costs rose above forty per cent of overall building costs 
industrialisation in building could be said to be~lagging. 
There were three stages of the industrialisation 
process: early, intermediate and advanced, and its success depended upon 
the sequential or simultaneous consolidation of measures such as: the 
inclusion of building in the national development plan; development of 
building materials production; institution building; updating of 
building legislation; standardisation and modular coordination; 
establishment of research and development institutions; strengthening 
of education and training facilities; application of rationalisation in 
building; investment in tools and equipment; and partial prefabrication. 
" 
Before any major technological change was attempted: 
a strategy and programme for industrialisation 
should be elaborated on the basis of a careful study 
and analysis of all factors bearing upon the 
development of the building industry."67 
5.4.4.3.2. Appropriate technology 
Most of the writers referred to in preceding parts 
of this chapter mentioned the need for each developing country to develop 
an appropriate technology. Much research has been undertaken into the 
development of efficient, cheap and progressive labour-intensive 
technqiues in construction. 68 A11a1 et a1 (1977) quoted a number of 
these; and observed that in several cases, much increase l.n labour 
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productivity could result from improvements in tools and simple 
equipment, organisational innovations and payment of incentives. 
In most developing countries, however, capita1-
intensive techniques borrowed from advanced countries predominated, 
although they were often unsuitable and unrealistic. This tendency was 
reinforced by existing quality standards, design principles, methods of 
pricing which neglected certain hidden social costs and benefits, 
governments' fiscal and monetary policies, contracting procedures, the 
use of foreign consultants and contractors, tied foreign loans, and the 
tendency of construction firms to mechanise as they grew, thereby losing 
the experience in labour-intensive techniques. Each of these could be 
overcome if governments adopted and implemented specific measures. 
" ... the governments of developing countries need to take 
steps to eliminate the present institutional biases 1n 
favour of capital-intensive techniques. It is also clear 
that a great deal of effort will have to go into providing 
the necessary training at all levels, setting up suitable 
administrative and managerial systems, and developing 
improved labour-based tools and equipment.,,69 
5.4.4.4. International Cooperation 
The Economic Commission for Europe (1976)70 suggested 
that progress towards the improvement of the construction industries of 
the poor countries could best be made through the acceptance of new 
contracting practices, and the encouragement of joint ventures between 
qualified exporting finns and local organisations with a potential 
learning capacity. The Commission realised, however, that the 
opportunities for international trade in construction were limited by 
constraints imposed by an adverse balance of payments on the rate and 
stability of economic growth. 
In 'periods of high and rising unemployment, high rates of 
inflation and large trade deficits there was pressure for greater 
restrictions on international trade. Since most developing countries 
were in such adverse econom1C circumstances, 
II the prospects for international trade in construction 
will be heavily dependent on the success of international 
cooperative measures, in both trade and monetary policy, 
in overcoming the imbalances between surplus and deficit 
countries. 1171 
5.4.4.5. Comments 
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A few brief comments may be made on the paradigms reviewed ~n 
5.4.4.1-4: 
(a) the development of local contractors is considered in later parts of 
this thesis (14 .l~ and Chapter 15) as the aspect of the problem ~ost 
likely to lead to overall success, since by improving the efficiency 
of the executing part of the industry it enables it to cope with 
its constraints; 
(b) foreign firms have a role to play in developing the construction 
industries of the developing countries but they do not present an 
easy solution. Measures in this area can only succeed if 
imaginatively formulated and effectively implemented: they will call 
for the willingness and cooperation of the foreign companies and the 
appropriate attitudes in local trainees or partners; (See 15.10). 
(c), The adoption of an appropriate technology should be based on an 
industry-wide long-term strategy (as in 5.4.3.3.1). Current 
considerations, too often, concentrate on lower levels of the 
technology continuum (as in 5.4.3.3.2); thus neglecting the need 
for certain advanced techniques in certain subsectors such as the 
international and conventional large (see 4.4.1-2) and the need to 
promote the long-term development of the efficiency and adaptability 
of the industry (see 3.8); and 
(d) comments are made on international econom1C cooperation ~n 5.3.1.6. 
Generally, apart from references to the need to develop local 
materials and techniques, paradigms on the development of construction 
from the· approach of its role in socio-economic development have remained 
'conventional' and mainly determinist and have concentrated on the 
formal, modern sector of the industry. 
5.5. Conclusion: A General Appraisal 
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The modern sector of the construction industries of ~eveloping 
countries is usually a carbon-copy of the industry of the former 
metropolitan power. The industries of the developed countries evolved 
gradually in direct response to the demands placed upon them as the 
socio-economic circumstances of the nations changed (see 3.4.). The 
developing countries are at a very early stage of development, and have 
socio-cultural environments that are evidently different from those of 
the advanced nations. The environmental conditions that are necessary to 
support the implementation of most of the tactics usually proposed are, 
at best, scarce or undeveloped, if not non-existent in the poor 
countries. (See also 1.4.5-7), 
Like the 'conventional' models of economic development (see 2.2.1-2), 
most of the recommendations made for the improvement of the construction 
industry draw mainly from the exper~ence of the advanced countries, 
heI).ce they -P~1-~s:!: the traciitio_naLsec;!~_.r_. Unlike the models of economic 
development which worked ~n some rich countries, the recommendations for 
the improvement of construction have not always worked even in the 
developed countries: some of the problems facing the construction 
industries of developing countries stem from the nature of construction 
activity itself, and can be found to be plaguing the industries of the 
more advanced countries (see 3.7). But the recommendations assume that 
all the constraints acting on the construction industries of the poor 
nations can be removed. 
By taking for granted the resources and conditions necessary for" 
their successful implementation' the recommendations tend to be in the 
nature of "mIAT IS TO BE DONE", rather than "~VHAT CAN BE DONE".. As the 
Tanzanian government advised: 
. : 
"A poor man does not use money as a weapon ... we have 
chosen the wrong weapon ... We are trying to overcome 
our economic weakness by using the weapons of the 
economically strong - weapons which we, in fact, do 
not possess.fl 72 
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Quite apart from the scarcity of human and material resources, there are 
~<:ull:,:!~~_~~lctors in the developing countries which tend to 
frustrate the successful implementation of the usual recommendations. 
The differences in the environmental variables of the developed and 
developing nations imply that they have different sources of strength and 
weaknesses. It is necessary that an attempt is made to utilise each 
nation's peculiar factors of strength while trying to remove some of its 
weaknesses, as most of the recommendations are meant to do. 
Moreover, the proposals are not arranged 1n an order of priority, 
nor are the implications of the success or failure of particular 
measures for others considered. None of the paradigms adopted a time-
based appro8ch (see 3.8) which would have indicated how soon or easily 
certain issues could be resolved and what would or should happen after 
that, especially how the results of earlier stages could be used 1n 
later ones. 
There should be a reappraisal of the sense of direction in the 
light of the realities of the situation in which the developing countries 
find themselves. 
It 1S important that a model that is realistic, practical and 
feasible is developed, one that enables the country to marshall all its 
endowments: human, material, traditional and cultural, as well as any 
external assistance that might be forthcoming. 
The socio-economic characteristics of the developing countries are 
not going to change in the foreseeable future. The international 
economic system is even less likely to undergo any major transformations. 
Resources will be in short" supply 1n the developing countries for some 
time yet. 
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The question then is how, with the limited resources at its 
disposal, the developing country can develop a construction industry to 
make the best use of present resources and procedures, while inducing 
and· reacting to changes in the industry itself, and in its environment 
(see 3.8). To quote Murie et a1 (1976): 
"The complexities of the ... system call for equally 
sophisticated policy measures to control it. A ... 
'strategy' composed of a number of actions, each subject 
to revision as side effects become apparent may be more 
realistic than a 'policy' offering once-and-for-a11 
'solutions'."73 
5.6. A Synthesis 
Although an attempt was made to study all major existing writings 
on the subject of improving the construction industries of the developing 
countries, those reviewed in preceding sections of this chapter are not 
necessarily all that there are, nor are the points crystallised from them 
necessarily those the authors themselves would consider most important. 
For the purpose of this thesis, however, the sample reviewed above 
is adequate, and the main ideas drawn from them very relevant. To obtain 
a basis for further discussion, a 'synthesis' is offered, using the 
iss'ues and solutions most frequently referred to by the writers. 
Such a synthesis, like most of the paradigms reviewed, is based on 
the premise that local construction capacity can, and should be improved 
through the removal of constraints acting on it, and provision of its 
vital inputs. The strategy would be: 
(1) government should pursue a reasonable rate and stability of econom~c 
growth to support construction programmes directly and indirectly; 
(2) government should recognise the importance of construction in 
development and establish a ministry or department to manage it; 
(3) tactics for improving the local construction industry should be 
incorporated in national development plans: not only should demand 
for construction be reasonably stable to enable the sector to plan 
'for its growth but also, strategies to increase its resources 
should be formulated; 
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(4) the procedures, regulations, codes, bye-laws and contractual 
arrangements are inappropriate in the environments in which they 
are employed, and should be reviewed; 
(5) the dependence on imported materials should be reduced through 
research into, production and utilisation of local materials; 
(6) personnel should be trained for skilled supervisory and managerial 
positions; 
(7) appropriate technologies should be adopted in construction; and 
(8) measures to ensure the development of small- and medium-sized 
indigenous contractors should be formulated and implemented. 
Figure 5.1 indicates the relationship between these tactics, 
and their individual and combined effect. 
In the following part of the thesis (Part III) the situation in 
Ghana ~s reviewed in the context of the above strategy. The experience 
of Ghana between 1951 (when it attained self-governing status) and 1979 
in the field of trying to enhance construction capacity and/or 
efficiency will be considered in detail to find out whether, and how any 
of these measures have been, or can be implemented, to identify reasons 
for success or failure, to suggest issues that need to be concentrated 
upon in future, and propose any change~ that should be made in existing 
ideas on the issue, 
FIGURE 5.1. Schematic Diagram of the Synthesis of Current Strategies for Developing Construction 
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PART THREE 
GHANA AS A CASE STUDY 
6.1. Introduction 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONSTRUCTION AND THE ECONOMY 
"Many countries have experienced that shortage of 
buildings and of construction capacity for 
comparatively short periods have had a rather strong 
negative influence on economic and social development." 
- Economic Commission for Europe, Long-term Prospects 
and Policies in the Construction Sector, United 
Nations, New York, 1976, p. 1. 
"When considering alternatives for increasing the flow 
of funds for new houses the economic potential of the 
country should be kept in mind ... the high import 
content of construction constitutes a severe constraint 
on the economy's ability to cater adequately to the 
housing needs." 
- Government of Ghana, One Year Development Plan 
July 1970 - June 1971, Accra, September 1970, 
pp. 142 and 143. 
Most writers on construction Ln developing countries refer to the 
important place of the industry in each nation's economy and urge the 
expansion of construction capacity to support socio-economic development 
and the expansion of the economy to aid the development of the industry. 
(See 5.3.1.1, 5.4.1, 5.4.3.1 and tactic (i) in the 'Synthesis' 5.6). 
Furthermore, programmes proposed for improving the industry in these 
countries usually adopt a growth-based 'balanced' approach which can only 
be sustained by a buoyant economy. (See 5.3.1.4 and 5.4.3.5). 
After establishing the role of the construction industry Ln Ghana's 
economy, this chapter considers the characteristics, history and 
prospects of the economy, thereby showing how and why 'conventional' 
approaches to development (see 2.2.1-2) have not worked in Ghana. The 
bleak prospects for the economy will demonstrate that the country cannot 
support increasing levels of construction activity, nor can it finance 
growth-based, balanced approaches to the solution of the industry's 
problems. 
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The chapter also identifies some of the factors which determine 
the level of construction activity (apart from growth of the economy), 
and shows, therefore, that the level of output alone cannot be an 
adequate assessme~t of construction capacity or of the success of 
measures aimed at improving the industry. Specifically, a study of the 
pattern of government's expenditure over the years indicates that it is 
naive to expect construction to be given priority over other sectors. 
Since the industry relies on imported inputs, foreign exchange is an 
important constraint which will not necessarily be relieved, and may be 
worsened, by economic growth. 
The currency unit used in this part of the thesis (Part III) is 
the cedi <t), the \,reighted average exchange rate of which was i1.0285 = 
US$1.00 in 1965-66, iO.8263 = US$1.00 in 1967, /1.0204 = US$1.00 in 
1968-71, i1.3295 = US$1.00 in 1972, i1.1753 = US$l.00 in 1973, and 
/1.1538 = US$1.00 in 1974. At various times these official rates have 
overvalued the cedi. (See 8.2.4.). 
6.2. Construction Output and Economic Growth 
A comparison of gross output in construction in Ghana with GDP 
(see table 6.1) shows that, over the years, the level of activity in 
TABLE 6.1. Gross Output from Construction Activity and Gross Domestic 
Product (1965-74) (Constant 1968 Prices) 
(i million) 
Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Construction Output 226 177 147 133 138 160 197 142 161 208 
GDP 1717 1644 1694 1700 1802 1929 2029 1978 2088 2196 
Construction Output 
as a Percentage of 
GDP 13 11 9 8 8 8 10 7 8 9 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey 1972-74. 
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construction has fluctuated roughly in line with the economy. 
The figures (table 6.1) indicate, too, that the share of 
construction was higher during years in which the economy grew markedly 
(1965, 1971 and 1974). This would seem to authenticate the advice that 
governments should endeavour to pursue economic growth in order to 
support stable construction programmes, as well as implement policies for 
improving the efficiency of the industry. (See 6.1). 
A study of the performance of Ghana's economy reveals the fact that, 
despite persistent government effort attended by clear intentions and 
elaborate planning, the economy has failed to make any major headway, and 
the outlook for the future looks even bleaker and more desperate. Thus, 
improvements in, and expansion of construction should not be conditioned 
by growth of the economy, if the industry is to make any meaningful 
contribution to socio-economic development. 
6.3. Basic Characteristics of the Economy1 
Ghana's economy is mainly agricultural; over 40 per cent of the 
GDP is derived from this activity which employs about 60 per cent of the 
working population. Some 70 per cent of the country's export earnings 
are also due to agricultural goods, especially cocoa, which alone accounts 
for 60 per cent of all export earnings. 
Farming is mainly for subsistence, and uses traditional methods. 
More' than half a century of well-organised agricultural extension services 
has failed to result in any major changes in farming practices: most 
peasant farmers cannot obtain credit facilities - despite the estab1ish-
2 
ment of special banks - and modern inputs. In recent years commercial 
farming of rice and other grains, and industrial crops like cotton and 
oil palm has become ~ignificant, especially in the savanna plains in the 
north of the country. 
Manufacturing industry 1S dominated by modern enterprises, most of 
them state-owned. The sector depends upon imported raw or intermediate 
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materials and equipment, and the level of capacity utilisation is 
closely related to the balance of payments. 
Even agricultural production relies on imported inputs like 
insecticides, fertilizer, and high-yield seeds. It has become clear that 
lithe single, most important constraint on the growth of 
the economy is the availability of foreign exchange 
The structure of the economy is such that "growth in output 
tends to require a corresponding and sustainable increase 
in related imports. Thus, it is estimated that the 
realisation of a 5.5 per cent annual growth in output over 
the Plan period needs an increase in imports of more than 
6 per cent per annum. "3 
The level of investment has been falling - from a peak of 22 per 
cent of GDP in 1965 to 6 per cent in 1972. Technical progress has also 
been slow. The economy has, thus, been unable to create new employment 
opportunities, in the face of a rising population - a growth rate of 2.7 
per cent per annum - and urban unemployment in 1975 was estimated to be 
between 400,000 and 500,000 or about 10 to 13 per cent of the labour 
force. At the same time, labour shortages were experienced in the 
agricultural sector during periods such as harvest time. Despite 
increases 1n skilled personnel after independence, continued shortage of 
managerial and supervisory personnel has resulted in the inefficient use 
of scarce resources. 
A sound infrastructural base was developed for the Ghanaian economy 
by the middle of the 1960's, but balance of payments difficulties did not 
permit its optimum use, and the capital stock has depreciated 
considerably. 
Government revenue is heavily dependent on import and expo!"t duties, 
and, since the volume of trade fluctuates, 1S unpredictable. (See also 
1.4.3). 
"Revenue from cocoa alone forms about 26 per cent of 
total tax revenue, so that the tendency for short booms 
in the industry to be followed by longer periods of 
stagnation has a destabilising effect on revenue.'~ 
Furthermore '" tax collection is inefficient. Increasing current 
expenditure, lack of budgetary control, losses by state corporations and 
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stagnant revenues have meant that since the mid-1950's the economy has 
been characterised by persistent and growing government budget deficits. 
6.4. Political and Economical History 
·6.4.1. Periods 
The growth of Ghana's economy since it attained self-governing 
status in 1951 can be discussed under four periods in which the 
constraints on the economy, and hence policies, were distinctly 
different. These are: between 1951 and 1966 (the First Republic); the 
period under the military government of the National Liberation Council, 
1966-69; the duration of the Second Republic 1969-72; and the period 
after 1972. 
6.4.2. The First Republic 
The policy of the government of the First Republic was to shift the 
structural base of the economy from agriculture to industria1isation5 . 
This was not only in accordance with the dominant theories of development 
at the time 6 , but also seemed sensible in view of the difficulty that the 
country's reliance on primary exports, whose prices fluctuated wildly, 
and imported goods which, it was hoped, could be made locally, was 
creating for the economy. The government adopted an ~nterventionist 
policy aimed at the predominance of the public sector in the key sectors 
of the economy. This had some initial successes but problems soon arose: 
" ... production, which grew rapidly between 1957 and 
1960, slowed down in 1961-62 and stagnated in the 
following three years. 117 
The economic decline was precipitated by the fall in export 
earn1ngs, caused, in turn, by the fall in the export price of. cocoa and 
the fact that most of the industries relied on imported inputs. By 1966, 
the economy 
II was characterised by severe shortages of foreign 
exchange, a large external debt, declining domestic 
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savings, substantial unuti1ised industrial capacity, 
growing unemployment and a stagnant agricultural sector."B 
6.4.2.1. Capitalisation 
But the country had succeeded 1n establishing a fairly high level 
of capitalisation. By the mid-1960's 
~'It was generally believed that Ghana's capital stock 
per capita was among the highest in the under-
developed world. 119 
Investment in construction had provided the country with 
" an infrastructure considered advanced even by the 
standards of some developed countries."IO 
It was thus believed that if resources were switched to the directly 
productive sectors, and the capital capacity fully utilised, the economy 
could grow rapidly. The country had reached the theoretical "take-off" 
point (see 1.4.2). But reality differed from theory. 
"Due to balance of payments related difficulties 
the expected take-off was stultified, and the level of 
new investment declined to a point where it was hardly 
sufficient to keep the capital stock intact. 1111 
Thus experience in Ghana showed that 'conventional' models of 
development were unsuitable to the conditions in the country. 
6.4.2.2. "What Went Wr-ong?" 
Several reasons have been proposed as to why Ghana's economy did 
not make any remarkable strides after the mid-1960's. 
Some questioned the industrialisation policy itself; Lewis 12 had 
warned that rapid industria1isatio~ would take labour away from agri-
culture without increasing productivity, leading to food shortages and 
balance of payments crises. In the event, the food 1ssue was attended 
to by the government's creation of state farms in several areas but the 
balance of payments problem proved critical. This was recognised by some 
to be the result of lack of effective linkages between manufacturing 
. d' 1 13 1ndustry an agr1cu ture 
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Others attacked the inefficiency of a state-dominated economy, 
maladministration and political patronage in making appointments to high 
., . h . 14 pOS1t10ns 1n t e enterpr1ses Finally, some economists thought that 
resources had been misallocated: 
" a large share of capital expenditure in 1960-65 was 
devoted to projects of doubtful economic value and to 
overheads which in the short-run could yield only rather 
low economic returns ... for example, prestige projects 
such as the Accra-Tema motorway (£4 million), the 
conference buildings fOT the Organisation for African 
Unity meeting ... the construction of unused cocoa silos 
(£8.5 m), on public buildings (£40 m), military instal-
lations and equipment (£15 m). It is estimated that these 
items accounted for about 30 per cent of the total govern-
ment capital expenditure of £300 m from 1960-65. In 
addition some £37 m was spent on capital expenditure on 
educational facilities which although social1Yrgesirab1e 
could produce only long-run economic returns." 
While not attempting to whitewash an economic programme which was 
not without error, not the least of which was the haste with which such 
a scale of investment was undertaken, the priority accorded to politics 
over economics in the siting of projects and the inadequacy of qualified 
personnel to manage the enterprises, it must be pointed out that it 
succeeded 1n creating for Ghana a base for economic expansion. Some of 
the items that were considered luxurious or prestigious at the time have 
come to be recognised as prudent economic, though rather long-term 
. 16 1nvestments . 
6.4.2.3. Education 
The education programme in the period included the introduction of 
compulsory, free universal education, a substantially expanded secondary 
school system with free tuition, and the establishment of two new 
universities and the extension and upgrading of the existing university 
college. The government's' 'Africanisation' policy was carried out with 
some success: 
"In 1953 there were 1350 expatriates and 809 indigenous 
civil servants: by 1958, 289 expatriates and 1984 
Ghanaians; ~nd by 1962, only 39 expatriates and 3294 
Ghanaians ... 17 
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This is not to say, however, that the country could meet all its 
requirements of skilled personnel. It was remarked, as late as 1975, 
that: 
"At the managerial and superV1.sory level, shortage of 
personnel has been an important factor in the 
inefficient utilisation of scarce capital equipment. 
Although the level of management skills among 
Ghanaians increased during the 1960s there is still a 
shortage of specialised skills. ,,18 
In short, although the economy reached the brink of the proverbial 
'take-off' in terms of investments in human and material capital and in 
infrastructure, it failed to show any substantial growth. 
"According to official information, some part of private 
manufacturing industry, and possibly also private 
construction industry, were forced to reduce production 
because of shortages of raw materials and spare parts. 
Private investment was also adversely affected by a 
worsening of business expectations due partly to political 
and economic uncertainty and partly to the general 
stagnation in aggregate demand."l9 
Shortages of consumer goods and increasing pr1.ces engendered econom1.C and 
political instability which culminated in the overthrow of the 
government in 1966. 
6.4.3. The National Liberation Council 
Ghana has not been without its share of the effects of the 
dichotomy between the world's major ideologies. The military takeover of 
February, 1966, sought to reverse the socialist leanings, policies and 
programmes of the previous regime. Aid agreements signed with Eastern 
countries were abrogated, personnel from such nations were expelled, and 
even on-going projects suspended. The latter included a large brick and 
tile factory and a unit for producing components for industrialised 
buildings. 
Massive cuts 1.n public expenditure and strict import controls were. 
imposed as a means of stabilising the economy and reducing the balance of 
payments deficits. These led to high unemployment and a depression in .... 
econom~c activity (see table 6.1). However, 
"Although one of the objectives of the stabilisation 
programme had been the restoration of equilibrium in 
the balance of payments, the structural weaknesses and 
imbalances in the economy made this unattainable. 
Persistent trade deficits in the face of high external 
indebtedness led to a 30 per cent devaluation of the 
cedi in 1967."20 
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Cutting public expenditure reduced, but did not eliminate, the 
budget deficit. In 1969, the deficit of t95.5 million recorded was 
referred to as "the lowest since 1962 (with the exception of 1967),121 • 
Improvements in export earnings in 1968 and 1969 led to the 
cessation of the stabilisation period and the introduction of a Two-Year 
plan (1968)22 aiming at: 
" stimulating growth by reducing the 
the utilisation of available resources 
reduce unemployment levels."23 
constraints on 
and thus 
Import restrictions on essential raw materials and spares were 
relaxed in an effort to accelerate production. The same basic 
principles were adopted by the second civilian government of 1969. 
6.4.4. The Second Republic 
The elected government, which assumed office in October, 1969, 
followed import liberalisation and expansionary economic policies. These 
seemed possible in the light of the favourable developments in the 
export price of cocoa, and expectations and/or promises of fo~eign aid. 
The government was 
" ... committed to the task of accelerating the pace of 
the nation's economic and social development and to 
ensuring that the fruits of development accrue in an 
equitable fashion to all sections of the population in 
all regions of the nation."24 
It initiated an extensive prograrrnne to provide basic needs, especially 
water, health facilities and roads, to the rural population. 
The sudden deterioration 1n the price of cocoa on the world market 
, 1" 25 in 1971 dealt a crippling blow to the government s po 1C1es . (See 
also 1. 4.3). 
lithe current account for the year [1971] recorded a. 
deficit of i202.4 million which was financed by the 
use of reserves and a build up of arrears of current 
payments ... On December 27, 1971, the cedi was 
devalued ... by 44 per cent in terms of the dollar, 
the effects of which, among other things, led to the 
change in government on January 13, 1972."26 
6.4.5. After 1972 
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The second military government (the National Redemption Council 
later renamed the Supreme Military Council) revalued the cedi, reducing 
the effective rate of devaluation to 26 per cent27 . It reintroduced. 
strict import control, suspended the payment of trade debts, and 
unilaterally abrogated certain specific loan agreements. The last 
measure led to the suspension of export guarantees to Ghana by Some 
Western governments, the scaring off of private foreign investnlent and 
the abandonment of any intended aid programmes. The government responded 
by adopt ing the po licy of 'se 1£ reliance' which 
" ... requires that we make conscious effort to change 
positively our attitudes and tastes, reduce our heavy 
dependence on the central government, revitalise local 
and regional initiative ... "28 
On the part of government, the exercise involved attempting to 
II cut our coat according to our cloth and, should 
any aid come, this becomes a bonus to the economy."29 
The policy saw practical implementation in the "Operation Feed 
Yourself' Programme which, under favourable weather conditions and 
supported by the euphoria and public enthusiasm that marked the first few 
years of the military regime, raised the volume of agriculture production. 
The GDP showed real growth in 1973 and 1974 (see table 6.1). 
In terms of the balance of payments~ 
"For the first time since 1958, the current account 
showed a surplus amounting to 1143.3 million (in 
1972) ... and 1146.9 million in 1973."30 
But this was not to last: massive increases in the prices of imports, 
especially oil (but more so a result of the world-wide recession) and the 
collapse of the import control system brought about a sharp worsening of 
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the balance of payments in 1974 and succeeding years. Moreover, 
internally, unplanned expenditures and inability to collect revenue 
created large budget deficits, and net borrowing by government from the 
banking system to finance these deficits rose from t17 million in 1973 to 
t78l million in 197731 . 
Furthermore, adverse weather conditions reduced the volume of food 
produced, making it necessary for the country to import food items. The 
,crop failure, coupled with smuggling, cut the volume of cocoa exports 
dramatically, and, for the first time, Ghana lost its position as the 
world's leading producer of cocoa32 . 
By 1978, government had to admit that: 
" ••• at present, the economy is in an extremely critical 
condition. Inflat-ion as measured by changes in the 
Consumer Price Index has rapidly risen from less than 
10 per cent per annum in the early years of this decade 
to a current rate of over 100 per cent per annum for the 
past financial year. The tempo of economic activity as 
measured by the Real Gross Domestic Product has been 
declining over the period since 1974. The external 
accounts are grossly out of balance, with the best 
estimates showing that reserves are at a very low level. "33 
But government was determined to take appropriate measures. The 
cedi was devalued from il.15 to the U.S. dollar to ,2.75 in August, 
197.834 • In the atmosphere of high inflation, 
"There was no positive advantage in saving; indeed 
since the value of money was declining by 10 per cent 
each month it was more lucrative to be a user of funds 
than to be a saver '" at the going interest rates.,,35 
Monetary policies introduced at the time included measures which 
resulted in the banks charging a rate of l8~ per cent on loans. 
Control of the money supply had been lax: it became necessary, 1n 
March, 1979, to demonetise the currency at a rate of exchange of '0.70 to 
each cedi in circulation for SumS less than '5,000, and iO.50 to each 
cedi for amounts over i5,000. Deposits in the banks were not affected 
by the exercise. 
Also during this period, the accountability of public officers fell 
considerably, most persons used state property and resources for their 
" 
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personal comfort, and corruption was rife. The high rate of inflation 
was accompanied by acute shortages of basic consumer goods, subsidised 
and rationed by government but sold at exhorbitant prices unofficially. 
A section of the military staged an. uprising against the government 
in June, 1979, forming the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council which, in 
a "house-cleaning" exercise, sought to rescue the image of the forces 
from the depths to which it had sunk. It was an exercise which lasted 
only a few months, but witnessed considerable social upheaval (revival?) 
with summary trials and sharp, severe punishment, including some 
executions, of "economic saboteurs" and other "corrupt persons". Within 
this period elections were held for a return to civil government. 
6.4.6. Future Prospects 
The government of the Third Republic assumed office on 24th 
September, 1979, and took over an economy in a very hopeless coudition. 
The country was said to be bankrupt36 . Figures released by the Bank of 
Ghana show that the rate of inflation for the 12 months before September, 
1979 was 68 per cent, compared to 77.4 per cent for the same period in 
19~8, that the money supply rose by 23 per cent in the period as against 
66.4 for the same period ~n 1978, and that arrears of external payments 
was tl,184.82 million at the end of September 197937. 
Any observation that the situation is improving ~n view of the 
falling rates of inflation and the money supply, and expression of 
optimism, are dampened by the fact that the accumulation of short-term 
payment arrears had: 
" . ,. more than 
confidence in 
being refused 
and bankers 
anything else undermined foreign 
the country's economy ... Ghana IwasJ 
further credit by foreign exporters 
" 38 
Another o~nous sign ~s the effect that further increases in oil pr~ces 
will have on the country's economy. A Minister recently warned that if 
its suppliers raised prices to $35 per barrel as some oil producing 
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countries had indicated, Ghana would have to pay $460 million, or 
approximately i1, 000 million for its oil. This meant, in effect, that 
liThe foreign exchange earned by cocoa exports would 
be totally consumed by the oil imports bill.,09 
6.4.7. Depreciation 
Not only has the .economy been unable to grow, hence losing the 
momentum generated by the post-iridependence programme, but also, with the 
continued neglect of the capital stock and over-emphasis on new projects, 
as well as, shortage of foreign exchange needed to import spare parts and 
replacement machinery, the country's stock of infrastructure and 
production units have deteriorated considerably. Under the current 
development plan, 
" ... it is estimated that no less than 6 per cent of 
the GDP should be set aside for replacement, 
especially for the rehabilitation and maintenance 
of the transport infrastructure."40 
The economy is faced with the burdens of expanding, at least, to 
keep pace with a rising population, creating employment opportunities for 
an increasing number of persons, and also attending to the repair, 
maintenance or replacement of obsolete or delapidated machinery and 
infrastructural facilities. 
6.5. ~conomic Growth and the Level of Construction Outp~ 
With the bleak economic prospects that appear to be in store for 
Ghana it becomes unrealistic to presuppose or suggest stable or adequate 
econonuc growth to support the development of the local industry. It is, 
however, important to note that economic expansion is not the only 
determinant of the level of construction activity. The very nature of 
construction gives rise to a number of parameters. 
The industry cannot produce and stock its goods 1n anticipation of 
demand (see 3.6.4): its output is only measured in terms of fulfilled 
present demand, which in turn is conditioned by a number of factors. 
157 
These are now conside"red. 
6.5.1. Level of Output 
Experience in Ghana, as 1n many other countries, has shown that 
the level of construction activity in any particular year, is determined 
by factors such as: 
(a) the volume of demand for construction; 
(b) the availability of key constructional inputs; 
(c) the capacity of the industry; and 
(d) weather conditions and other uncertain natural occurrences. 
These factors are, themselves, interrelated: the volume of demand 
and availability of inputs may affect, for better or worse, the capacity 
of the industry; natural occurrences may increase or reduce the volume 
of demand, and so may the ability of the industry to execute past or 
present orders (ie efficiency), and so on, and so forth. 
6.5.2. Volume of Demand 
The way in which the level of demand for construction affects 
construction output in Ghana can be understood by studying the behaviour 
of the public sector client, especially central government. Figures of 
gross output (see table 6.1) show that the level of activity in 
construction went down sharply in 1966, continued to decline 1n the 
tstabilisation and consolidation' period until 1968, and then started to 
rise again, only for the upward trend to be arrested in 1972. 
1966 and 1972 were years in which the military seized power, and 
suspended or terminated construction projects as a means of reducing 
public expenditure. For example, government declared in 1972 that: 
"On capital expenditure the objective is to continue 
to halt the construction of neT,y government offices 
and living accommodation ... The construction of big 
hospitals has been suspended ... '~l 
The reduction in public sector orders affected the level of construction 
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activity in view of the dominance of government among the industry's 
clients (Table 6.2). 
TABLE 6,2. Gross Output from Construction versus Government's 
Development Expenditure (1969-74) (Current Prices) 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Construction Output ( t106) 149.2 179.1 226.6 186.5 239.5 403.9 
Central Government 
Development Expenditure 
(t106 ) 65.3 84.0 108.4 103.8 95.8 169.3 
Government Development 
Expenditure as a 
Percentage of Construction 
Construction Output 44 47 l~8 56 40 42 
Sources: Economic Survey 1972-74 and 5-Year Development Plan 1975-80, 
Part I. 
In addition to its influence as the major client of the industry, 
the government's economic and other policies affect the level of demand 
in the private sector (see 3.6.1.2). But this behaviour is unlikely to 
change, since government is preoccupied with ensuring general economic 
growth and stability, and does not, and is not likely to in future, pause 
to ~onsider the effect that measures it considers appropriate for the 
whole economy will have on individual sectors. 
For example, in 1979, in the face of galloping inflation and huge 
budgetary deficits, government abruptly suspended almost all public 
projects,. introduced a credit squeeze and raised interest rates. When 
the i~dustry (particularly the Contractors Association) protested, 
especially against the first measure, it was told that such an exercise 
was necessary to inject "sanity" into the economy42. 
Expenditure in construction is relatively easy to cut since the 
industry's products are not always seen to be directly productive. \-.1hen 
the going gets tough~ short-run objectives become prevalent, and economic 
and political goals are kept free of others that may be socially 
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desirable. Thus it is not likely that government will g1ve expenditure 
in construction priority over that in other sectors. (See also 
5.4.3.5(d)(v)). 
Furthermore, in periods of economic difficulty, it would be naive 
to expect government to support stable construction programmes. And such 
periods are more likely in Ghana's foreseeable future. It may be argued 
that fluctuations in demand are advantageous to the industry in that they 
. d' . 43 1n uce 1nnovat10n . Changes in the level of demand, however, pose 
difficulties to individual (especially the small) firms44. However, 1n 
Ghana such fluctuations will continue to occur, often suddenly 'and 
drastically, and it behoves the industry to develop the flexibility to 
enable it to survive such vicissitudes45 . 
6.5.3. Input Availability 
Regardless of the rate of economic growth and/or the level of 
demand, the construction industry can only attain such outputs as the 
availability of the key resources it requires for its operations allow. 
The industry needs materials, plant and equipment, finance, skilled 
personnel and the professional and managerial knowledge to marshal and 
utilise these resources. Growth of the economy does not imply, and may 
not necessarily result in 1ncreases in the volume of these vital inputs: 
each requ1res conSC10US policies and effort to expand its availability, 
and not all of them may attract government's attention at anyone time. 
Of special importance are the items that need to be imported. The 
country has nearly achieved the complete indigenisation of qualified 
construction personnel and of contracting and consulting firms but all 
its plant and equipment, and most of its materials and components, are 
imported. As shown in table 6.3, gross domestic product in construction 
is seldom higher than 60 per cent of gross output, although the figures 
indicate that it showed an upward trend in 1972-74 (see table 6.3). 
Unless any economic growth is accOmpanied by an absolute increase 
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TABLE 6.3. Gross Output versus Gross Domestic Product in 
Construction (1965-74) (Constant 1968 Prices) 
<t million) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Gross Output in 
Construction 226 177 147 133 138 160 197 142 161 208 
Gross Domestic 
Product in 
Construction 100 84 81 73 73 89 111 85 100 130 
GDP in Construc-
tion as a 
Percentage of 
,Gross Output in 44 47 55 55 52 56 56 60 62 63 
. Construction 
Source: Economic Survey 1972-1974. 
in the amount available to import construction items, which implies 
increases Ln export earnings or in borrowing from external sources, or 
reduction Ln consumption of other imported items, the industry's output 
cannot Lncrease in the short run. Strict import controls are partly 
responsible for the lower levels of construction activity in 1966 to 
1969, and 1972 to 1973, and high volumes of imports supported the high 
output levels of 1965, 1969 to 1971, and 1973 to 1974. (See table 6.4). 
TABLE 6.4. Imports of Materials for Construction versus Gross Output 
in Construction (1965-74) (Current Prices) 
t million 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Imports of 
Materials for 
Construction 49 40 30 27 37 41 55 37 53 105 
Gross Output Ln 
Construction 172 152 134 133 149 179 227 187 231 404 
Source: Economic Survey 1972-74. 
The r.eduction of this reliance on imported materials has been an 
objective of government, and effort has been expended in its connection 
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but it is, at best, a long-term solution (see Chapter 10). The current 
plan document expected that: 
II the construction sector will obtain increasing 
proportions of input requirements from domestic 
sources. This optimism is based on the expected 
increasing domestic production of such key inputs 
for this sector like iron rods, cement, bricks and 
tiles, angles and shapes and ceramic products.,46 
As will be shown in a later part of this chapter (see also Chapter 
10), this optimism was ill-advised. The industries producing the very 
items mentioned in the above quotation need to import vital plant and 
raw materials. In the event, these were not forthcoming, and the 
factories operate under their installed capacities. 
In the short and medium term, the availability of foreign exchange 
should be considered a major constraint on the expansion of the capacity 
of the construction industry of Ghana whether or not the local economy 
grows, and especially if it grows. (See also 3.8). 
6.5.4. Capacity 
'The capacity of the industry is mentioned here on a general level 
only: its total output in money terms or the extent to which it can meet 
existing demand. In Ghana, although the economy has not shown any 
consistent growth over the years, a study of government records shows that 
the construction industry has not always been able to execute all the 
projects initiated: and this has meant both the delayed completion of 
some projects and non-commencement of others. 
In 1965, a report on the first year of the 7-Year Plan stated: 
"In this financial year 1965 we must catch up with our 
construction and production time-tables for all major 
enterprises and the educational progrannne. "47 
Again, in 1974, it was revealed that: 
" ... low constructional capacity has led to another 
situation where projects have remained in the Estimates 
for a long time without being implemented."48 
Similar observations were made in 1978. 
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This implies one or more of a number of conclusions: 
(a) that the local industry is not big enough to execute even the small 
volumes of demand put to it, and hence, despite economic growth, 
demand for construction should be reduced; 
(b) the local industry, though quite capable of fulfilling the 
requirements made of it, cannot obtain the necessary inputs; and 
(c) the industry is capable and equipped to meet existing demand, but is 
constrained by procedures involved 1n the construction process and 
other government policies. 
In Ghana, each of the three conclusions has been true at various 
times: (a) during the boom years of the period preceding and succeeding 
independence (see 6.4.2), (b) during the consolidation and stabilisation 
period, 1966~68 (see 6.4.3), and after 1975 (see 6.4.5) and (c) in 
1974~75 (see 6.4.5). In discussions of the level of demand, therefore, 
emphasis should not be put only on the ability of the economy to finance 
additional output, but the capacity of the industry should also be 
considered, 
6.5.5. Natural Phenomena 
Natural occur.rences such as adverse weather conditions, hurricanes 
or earthquakes may affect the level of construction output. Among these, 
the weather 1S the most important. 
Ghana has two seasons: the dry season between November and April, 
and the rainy season in other months. Construction activity goes on 
during the whole of a normal year. In some years, heavy, prolonged rain~ 
fall may interrupt this schedule. This happened in 1968 and accounts, 1Il 
part, for the very low level of construction output for th~ year (see 
table 6.3). The weather, therefore~ has come to be recognised as a major 
determinant of the level of construction output. For example, it was 
reported that during 1969, 
"The rise in ... building activity was greatly aided by 
the sharp increase in local production of cement, ... 
the increased imports of building materials and the 
favourable weather conditions during the year.'~9 
6.5.6. Formulation and Assessment of Policies 
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With output in construction depending on so many factors other 
than economic growth it is inappropriate to base the formulation of 
policies for developing the industry solely on econom1C growth. 
Similarly, it is incorrect to use changes in output as the measure of 
the success or failure of specific measures aimed at improving the 
indus~ry. The assessment of such programmes, therefore, cannot be on the 
basis of gross output only, but rather the extent to which the 
specifically stated objectives of any measures are met. 
This is the approach adopted throughout this part of the thesis 
(Part III). 
6.6. Conclusion 
Construction output constituted an average of 9 per cent of GDP in 
Ghana over the period 1965-74. Periods of econom1C growth were marked by 
high levels of construction output but the country's economy has certain 
basic weaknesses, has failed to grow despite planning and much effort, 
and its future prospects are minimal. Hence Ghana cannot implement any 
growth-based models for improving the' construction industry. Some of 
the factors which determine the level of construction output include: 
vo1ulue of demand, which depends upon government's expenditure; 
availability of inputs, much of which are imported; the capacity of the 
industry; and natural phenomena. Hence economic growth alone will not 
lead to increased output. As a result, in order to formulate or appraise 
policies and measures for construction , it is not possible or correct to 
use the level of output alone as the yardstick of success or failure. 
Thus programmes for improving Ghana's construction industry {and 
those of countries with poor econom1c prospects) need to be less 
demanding of economic resources and shaped to promote efficiency, 
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without necessarily increasing output or even in the face of decreasing 
output, through more intensive use of existing resources and institutions, 
and ultimately to engender the development of a fitter and more 
adaptable industry. 
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7.1. Introduction 
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CHAPTER 7 
GOVERNMENT AND CONSTRUCTION 
"Governments all find themselves relating ,to the 
construction industry at SOme point, even if 
involuntarily ... there is a limit to the 
effectiveness of government until the moment at 
which it accepts responsibility ,for construction 
planning as a comprehensive activity ... Only 
the public sector in, a developing country can 
afford investment in technological research and 
development; as a rule only government employs 
the high-calibre staff capable of carrying it out; 
and only governments have the power to see it 
introduced into everyday practice." 
- C. Cockburn, Construction in Overseas 
Development., Overseas Development Institute, 
London, 1970, pp. 18, 19 and 21. 
"The Ministry of Works and Housing is the central 
controlling machinery of Government in the 
housing and works sector. It directs, supervises 
and coordinates the programmes and activities of 
eleven separate organisations within the frame-
work of government po1icy."1 
- M. Danquah (ed), Ghana: An Economic Revie~, 
1973-75. Editorial and Publishing Services, 
Accra, 1975. 
Governments of the developing countries are often advised to 
recognise the importance of construction, formulate clear policies for 
it, an,d establish a ministry or department to deal with it. (See 5.3.3.1, 
5.4.3.1 and tactic (2) in the 'Synthesis', 5.6). All writers (see 
Chapter 5) suggest that the formulation and implementation of 
programmes for improving construction industries are mainly the 
responsibilities of governments. 
This chapter discusses, in broad terms, construction policies in 
Ghana, and shows that the government of Ghana has always been aware of 
the role a strong, viable and efficient construction industry can play 
in deve lopment . 
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Ghana has had a Ministry of Works and Housing for several decades 
now, overseeing the development of the industry (not only concerned with 
public projects as is the case in many countries). The experiences of 
this Ministry are considered in this chapter after briefly discussing 
construction policies. The policies are discussed more fully under 
'Planning for Construction' in Chapter 8. It is shown that 
1) construction is of such a nature that it is impossible to place 
effective control of all its aspects under one ministry; 2) problems of 
coordination arise as the volume of construction grows, as various bodies 
are created to deal with parts of the industry, and as the industry 
develops (hence the need for a dynamic approach which merely starts 
with the creation of a ministry); and 3) the relationship between the 
ministry and its subordinate organisations, among the smaller bodies 
themselves, between the ministry and other government ministries and 
agencies and within each organisation are important. 
It is also made evident that creating a ministry ~s not as 
difficult as staffing it adequately, giving it the necessary status and 
ensuring that all other bodies on which it relies for the success of 
its operations also perform satisfactorily. 
7.2. Construction Policies 
The attention of the government of Ghana has been drawn to the 
local construction industry by two issues: 
(a) a serious and constantly worsen~ng urban housing shortage; 
(b) the need to develop the infrastructural base of the economy and 
to provide amenities for the people. 
Public reaction to an inefficient industry (which had led, among 
other things, to high construction costs, delayed projects and 
unfulfilled prom~ses of social facilities by politicians) has also 
continually brought the matter to the fore. (Compare these with 3.5 
and 5.2). 
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7. 2. 1. Hous ing 
Housing ~s one of the government's priorities, and it receives 
detailed coverage in all national plans and budgets. Most of the 
references made to construction ~n official documents appear under 
the chapter headed 'Housing'. Policy statements on housing have always 
included programmes for promoting the growth of the local construction 
industry. The 1951 development plan illustrates this: 
"The government wishes to see every family living in its 
own comfortable home ... Cheap yet strong and decent 
homes are to be provided ... government is determined to 
end the uneconomic methods of building houses in the 
country. Its policy is to introduce power machines into 
the building industry and it will also experiment in 
houses that can be mass-produced ... people will be 
trained in . ,.building principles so as to supply more 
efficient labour ... to the industry. ,,2 
Under the same Plan there was also to be local production of key 
constructional materials, use of traditional materia~s, and attempts to 
d h h · h f b '1' 3 re uce t e ~g cost 0 u~ d~ng 
The basic ideas ~n the above policy are similar to those in the 
'synthesis' (see 5.6) of current ideas on construction in developing 
countries, The limited effect they had on the problem ~s borne by the 
fact that by 1970, whereas it was estimated that 16,000 urban dwellings 
• • • 1+ 
were needed annually at preva~l~ng occupancy rates, only 6,000 un~ts 
were being produced, and it was remarked that: 
"If a serious attempt is to be made to improve the urban 
situation the capacity and efficiency of the gonstruction 
industry will have to improve significantly." . 
Efforts have not.been limited to the supply side: when the above pledge 
was made in 1970, government also declared that it would: 
" .. , make more capital for housing available through 
building societies, housing cooperatives, banks, 
insurance companies, private financiers and housing 
finance consortia ... [and] propagate the advantages 
of savtng or investing ",ith a building society. ,,6 
There is, as yet, no national housing policy document 7 but this 
has not prevented government from formulating and implementing 
appropriate measures to ameliorate a housing situation which threatens 
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to assume crisis proportions. In the event, policies have been 
disjointed and unsuccessful but the sensitivity of every government in 
Ghana to the problem has increased the awareness of the need to have the 
wherewithal to deal with it, and hence the construction industry and 
its vital inputs have attracted much official attention over the years. 
'7.2.2. Construction and Development. 
Although Ghana's construction industry is most comprehensively 
~reated when its role in the housing situation is considered, the 
essential part it plays in development- has been clear to government. 
For example, housing which is not clearly directly productive and is 
seldom seen as a good investment8 , has been considered in Ghana not only 
as a means of raising living standards but also as a means of generating 
activity ~n other sectors of the economy. 
"A good housing progrannne provides substantial employment 
opportunities and builds up a reserve of skilled labour 
and artisans who would be available for other related 
constructional works. It also stimulates the development 
of natural resources which are basic to the housing and 
construction sectors and has a multiplier effect on the 
economy. 119 
The factors contributing to the effective growth of the construction 
industry and the determinants of construction capacity are also under-
stood. In 1977, for example, government regretted that the growth of 
the nation's infrastructure had been: 
" ... seriously hampered by a number of factors. Prominent 
among these are inadequacy of quarry capacity, bitumen, 
building materials and equipment and frequent shortage of 
labour. As a result, even though in money terms the 
sector exceeded the year's allocation, in physical terms 
not much was achieved." lO 
This .shows that construction has failed to grow despite elaborate 
policies formulated for it, a point· most particularly evident in the 
road construction and maintenance progrannnes where inadequate 
performance of the industry has contributed to delays in new projects, 
deterioration of the existing system, and with the limited haulage 
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capacity, 1S hindering the evacuation of export goods and food items 
from the hinterlands, leading not only to loss of revenue to government, 
but genuine hardship of the people in the urban areas. (See also 3.5). 
Furthermore, targets for housing programmes are not being met, schools, 
hospitals, offices and so on are not completed on schedule, and persons 
wishing to build cannot obtain the necessary materials; even if they 
could get finance. 
7.3. Government's Responsibility 
Realising the importance of a viable local construction industry 
government has assumed direct responsibility for the management of the 
industry, and apart from formulating policy guidelines for it) 
participates 1n various aspects of construction itself, in addition to 
its role as the main client. (See 6.5.2). The management function 1S 
performed by the Ministry of Works and HO'lsing. 
7.3.1. The Ministry of Works and Housing 
There has been a ministry in charge of public construction works 
in Ghana since the colonial days. The present Ministry of Works and 
Housing 1S charged with the planning and control of the construction 
industry. It 
(a) advises government on developments in the construction sector and 
provides a basis for the formulation and review of national policy; 
(b) directs, supervises and monitors the implementation of policy; 
(c) controls the award of contracts or consultancy work; 
(d) promotes research and innovation in the industry; and 
(e) liaises with local and foreign organisations to remain abreast with 
national and international trends in construction. ll 
The nlinistry directs and coordinates the operations of ten separate 
organisations. 
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7.3,1.1. Technical Directorates 
• Technical directorates were created 1n 1974 to 
• 
complement the administrative structure of the ministry. There are 
directorates for Roads, Housing and Services, headed and staffed by 
experienced professionals. This reorganisation has enabled the ministry, 
a normal civil service organisation, to perform its technical duties 
with greater efficiency and confidence. Appointing experienced 
professionals to such positions enabled the nation to make use of their 
expertise at the policy-making level, and also raised the morale of 
professionals in government service by creating avenues for genuine 
self-advancement within the service. 
Final decisions within the ministry, however, are taken by the 
Minister, a politician, and he has the power to set aside the advice or 
recommendations of professional or technical committees or individuals. 
Inevitably, on many occasions: policy 1S made on political expp.ndiency 
rather than technical effectiveness. Added to this are the usual 
bureaucratic chains of command and channels of communication within 
any civil service organisation. 
7.3..1.2. Overcentra1isation 
The Ministry of Works and Housing is one of the few government 
ministries without branches in the regions. Its activities are 
centralised in Accra; the Public Works Department (PWD) (see 7.3.2) 18 
assigned the responsibility of executing the ministry's duties in the 
regions. This, in the main, implies the PWD's supervising the 
operations of organisations over which it has no statutory authority, 
and with which it is, at best, hierarchically, equal. As is to be 
expected, the ministry's duties in the regions are hardly attended to; 
anything of importance is done in Accra. 
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7.3,1.3. Influence and Success 
The Ministry has been unable to perform the advisory role 
government expects of it. This may either be because its advice is 
never given, or 1S wrong, or that its advice, though correct, 1S not 
heeded. The ministry's influence over other ministries or departments 
controlling or determining various aspects pertaining to construction is 
minimal, due to the present allocation of duties and organisation of the 
various ministries. This is discussed later in this chapter, but to 
cite only one example, whereas in 1975 it was suggested that: 
"With reorganisation of 
is possible to draw up 
ensure that the burden 
comfortably spread out 
[the construction] industry it 
long-term national plans to 
of capital investment is 
,,12 
the capacity of the industry was seldom taken into consideration in the 
inception of development projects, and it was reported 1n 1978 that: 
"Over the years, a large number of projects have been 
started allover the c0untry which have not been completed 
and are likely to remain on the books for quite some time 
••. constraints such as input availability have contributed 
to this situation ... ,,13 
The ministry had also not been able to perform its control 
function, especially in terms of contracts and consultancy work (see 
7.3.1., point (c) in its duties). There were allegations that collusion 
between contractors and consultants enabled the former to make dubious 
financial claims: 
" ... the lack of effective superv1s10n and monitoring 
. made it possible for expenditures to be incurred for 
work which had either not been done or been shoddily done. ,,14 
The control function had been given to the Ministry of Economic Planning 
(see 7.5.2) some years back but it now seemed that even this arrangement 
was not working. It was announced, therefore: 
" •.. Government has directed the Ministry of Finance* 
to arrange periodi~ visits to project sites to ascertain 
progress of work." 5 . 
* See 7.5.1 
• 
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This system of contract administration had implications for contractors' 
operations (see 9.7.3). It also placed economl.C planning officers and 
administrators l.n supervisory positions over professional construction 
consultants, creating a situation pregnant with conflict, delays and 
inefficiency. Finally, it detracted from the status and prestige of the 
Ministry of Works and Housing. (See Fig. 7.1) 
7.3.1.4. Subordinate Organisations 
In addition to, and to help it perform, its duty of managl.ng the 
development of the construction industry, the Ministry supervl.ses the 
activities of ten separate organisations within the framework of 
government policy. These are: 
The Public Works Department 
Ghana Highway Authority 
Architectural and Engineering Services Corporation 
State Construction Corporation 
State Housing Corporation 
Town and Country Planning Department 
Tema Development Corporation 
Ghana Water and Sewerage, Corporation 
Pre'fabricated Concrete Products Limited, and 
Rent Control Unit. 
7.3.1.5. Reorganisation 
The subordinate bodies have increased l.n number over the years, and 
much reorganisation has taken place. 
Out of the old Public Works Department (PWD) , which existed in the 
colonial days as a planning and executing agent for government projects, 
have grown several organisations. Soon after independence it was 
enlarged, particularly in the physical construction sphere, and renamed 
the Ghana National Construction Corporation (GNCC), with 
II charge over the planning, design, construction 
and maintenance of roads and bridges, public buildings, 
as well as to act as civil engineering and 
architectural consultants to the government. 1I16 
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In 1966, the new military regime split the GNCC into the Public 
Works Department, responsible for consultancy services and the 
maintenance of the existing facilities, and the State Construction 
Corporation (SCC), a public-owned commercial contracting organisation. 
The inadequacy of the PWD's executive capacity was recognised by 
government, in 1970, to be hindering the implementation of development 
programmes, and measures were taken to improve conditions of service 
within it to make it more attractive to qualified personnel, and also to 
17 train additional personnel. These achieved little. By 1972, 
government had cause to state that: 
" ... development projects are not carried out at the 
required pace because the PWD complains of lack of 
adequate manpower, for example, engineers and 
architects Consultancy services are still being 18 
passed out to outside consultants at very high fees," 
Another reorganisation exercise was initiated, which resulted, ~n 1973, 
in the carving up of the PWD into the Architectural and Engineering Services 
Corporation (AESC), the Ghana Highway Authority (GHA), and a residual PWD. 
Thus the duties of the old PWD are now being performed by four 
different organisations: SCC, AESC, GHA and PWD. Moreover, the 
Hydraulic Division of the old PWD was merged with the Department of 
Rural Water Development to create the Water Supplies Division, which 
later became the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation. 
7.3.1.6. Need for, and Effect of Reorganisation 
Public construction needs expanded progressively after independence, 
and there was need for the planning, design and executing agencies to 
grow with them. Whether a single bigger entity could have handled them 
with sufficient effectiveness and efficiency is arguable but the 
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proliferation of organisations created problems of coordination, and was 
excessive, calling for new offices, workshops and storage facilities, 
additional salaries for new administrative staff and newly created high 
positions, departmental vehicles, and so on, 
Furthermore, the reorgnisations were usually exercises 1n shuffling 
the same people into different, independent bodies, serving to create or 
strengthen inter-personal animosities amongst the heads of the various 
bodies, and hence intensify the problems of coordination, There are real 
. I' 1 'b h .. 19 jealous1es and 1tt e cooperat10n etween t e organ1sat10ns 
Chambers (1974) believes that, while there may be good reasons for 
setting up new organisations, 
" ... the costs are likely to be high - in new overheads, 
in staff transfers ... in the energies devoted to creating 
the new organisation, overcoming its teething troubles, 
and establishing its position in the community of 
organisations. But weighing against recognition of these 
costs is the ease with which a new organisation can be 
recommended by a commission, committee or adviser, and its 
attractiveness to civil servants for whom it often provides 
an opportunity for advancement. ,,20 
Frequent reorganisation, moreover, destabilising peer groups and 
personal ambitions for advancement, especially amongst middle-level 
personnel, serves to lower workers' morale, and reduce their 
d .. 21 pro uct1V1ty 
7. 3 . 1. 7. Change 
Thus, not only has the Ministry of Works and Housing itself 
altered in structure and outlook over the years but as new organisations 
were formed to reduce strains on existing bodies caused by increases in 
the volume of public demand for construction, the situation has arisen 
where the Ministry has the difficult task of integrating the closely 
related activities of several rival organisations jealously guarding 
their spheres of activity and influence and struggling to establish their 
independence. 
178 
7.3.1.8. Technical Arms 
Of the ten subordinate bodies of the Ministry of Works, only three 
help it directly in its management of the construction industry. These 
three: PWD, GHA and AESC, are the technical arms of the Ministry. They 
initiate programmes, provide consultancy services, represent public 
sector clients throughout the construction process, and administer 
contracts. Being more closely involved in industry, they should also 
provide accurate data on developments in the field to the Ministry. 
Their success or failure, therefore, considerably helps or ha1~s the 
ministry's effectiveness. Furthermore, being the most closely related 
amongst its subordinate organisations, the smoothness or otherwise of 
their relationships with one another, and of each with the ministry, 
should be a pointer to the ease or difficulty of the ministry's duty of 
coordinating the activities of the ten bodies. The three bodies are now 
considered in detail. 
7.3.2. The Public Works Department (PWD) 
Th bl ' h h' 22 e present Pu ~c Works Department, among ot er t ~ngs 
(~) registers and maintains records on contracts and consultants; 
assigns work to and certifies work from contractors and consultants; 
and arbitrates between contractor and/or consultants on the one 
hand and the employer on the other; 
(b) serves on tender committees as the technical representative of 
departments whose works are financed from the Consolidated Fund; 
(c) plans and designs minor works, and administers and maintains public 
utilities, including such roads as are delegated to the district 
councils by the Highway Authority. 
7,3.2.1. Organisation and Constraints 
The PWD, headed by an Engineer-in-Chief, is not only the oldest 
public construction organisation, but ~s also the best organised 
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geographically, with regional and district offices allover the country, 
each with consultancy and direct labour divisions, as well as joinery 
and mechanical workshops, and materials testing laboratories. 
Unfortunately, however, the PWD is the "Cinderella" of Ghana's 
construction industry. Although it had been the medium in which most of 
the country's more senior professionals acquired experience, and has 
directly tr,ained several technicians and tradesmen, being part of the 
civil service, its levels of salaries and wages and conditions of 
service are below those of other parastatals and private organisations 
in the industry. The PWD is, therefore, unable to attract or keep 
qualified and experienced personnel. 
The effect of this lack of executive capacity is most serious where 
the obligations of the PWD as the technical arm of the district councils 
are concerned. Structural designs and specifications of materials have 
to be vetted by the department, tasks which are vital to public safety 
and the development of the construction industry, and should be entrusted 
to adequately qualified persons. (See 9.4.3) 
Annual budgetary allocations to the PWD have been inadequate, and 
since, moreover, it obtains little additional funds for repair and 
maintenance work resulting from natural hazards, it is seldom able to 
perform over 40 per cent of its programmes each year. The department is 
also unable to obtain sufficient allocations of foreign exchange to 
import equipment, vehicles and spare parts that it needs for its 
nation-wide operations. 
Furthermore, the PWD 1S prone to all the usual difficulties faced 
by organisations belonging to large bureaucracies. Its efficient 
operation is hampered by frequent radical changes in the administrative 
instructions it rece1ves from government. For example, in April, 1979, 
the Ministry of Finance issued a directive forbidding the advance orders 
of goods by public departments 23 This means that the PWD cannot now 
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stockpile essential materials and components to protect itself from 
frequent shortages, as it used to. 
7.3.2.2. Potential 
The rich and wide experience of the PWD and its ideal distribution 
of branch offices are not being utilised, and as time passes, not only 
is the wasted opportunity unfortunate and expensive, but qualified 
personnel continue to leave the PWD for more challenging appointments ~n 
other organisations, further weakening the department. 
7.3.3. The Ghana Highway Authority (GHA) 
The Ghana Highway Authority, which began its operations in 1974, 
24 is responsible for : 
(a) planning, developing, maintaining, protecting and administering 
public highways and related ferries, road camps, road traffic 
control devices, and so on; 
(b) classifying and laying down design standards on the different types 
of highways and ferries, and controlling vehicle usage on the 
highways; and 
(c) undertaking research or collaborating with any research organisation 
with a view to facilitating its planning, development and 
maintenance activities, 
The GHA also keeps registers of consultants and contractors. Its 
direct labour activities are limited to maintenance: contractors do all 
new work. Some of its consultancy works are delegated .to private 
consultants and the AESC. 
The Authority is controlled by a government-appointed Board of 
Governors. Its administrative head is designated the Chief Executive. 
It has branches in the regions and a few districts. 
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7.3.3.1. Operations and Effectivene~ 
The GHA does not charge fees for its services: its recurrent 
expenditure is met by funds from annual government budgets. Funds for 
capital development are controlled by the Ministry of Finance (see 7.5.1). 
The decision as to which project to actually implement at any 
particular moment is political. The Authority is merely advisory, 
although it has been the target of much public and official criticism 
for the condition of the road network. In 1974, when the GHA became 
functional, government regretted that in infrastructure: 
" ... emphasis .. , has been on new constructional works 
while little attention has been paid to the maintenance 
of existing projects. This has led to a sitQation where 
because of lack of maintenance, ... roads and water 
schemes have so deteriorated that government has had to 
spend large sums of money on their rehabilitation.,,25 
In 1979 this situation had worsened: a newspaper editorial described 
the roads as not "car-worthy,,26, blamed this for the short life-span of 
vehicles in the country, rejected the explanation given by " ... those 
whose duty it is to put our roads into good shape and condition," and 
suggested that "All these could have been avoided through proper 
planning which is woefully lacking in this country."27 But the GHA, in 
a 'press statement, placed the issue in a wider perspective and stated 
that: 
"To be able to maintain [the] roads to appreciable 
standards certain conditions have to be met. The 
conditions involve the supply of basic inputs, 
namely, equipment,materials and labour to help carry 
out the work efficiently. It is, however, regrettable 
that the work of the Authority had been hampered for 
lack of most of these inputs."28 
7.3.3.2. Problems 
The GHA faces several internal problems: iLs executive capacity 
1S inadequate, the deficiency lying mainly in Quantity Surveyors, 
Materials Engineers, Civil Engineers and instructors for its training 
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division. This issue is not helped by the fact that the Authority does 
not have sufficient vehicles; executive mobility is low, and 
performance by contractors on projects is hindered. 
, The Authority's jurisdiction over the country's trunk roads is 
undisputed but some of the roads within the cities and towns are under 
the local authorities (and hence the PWD, see 7.3.2), and some feeder 
roads are controlled by the Ghana. Cocoa Market Board. The areas of 
responsibility are not clearly defined, and there have been occasions 
when contracts have been entered into for the same road project by two 
different client agencies, when a finished road has been awarded to a 
contractor by one of them, or when important matters are not attended to 
because of lack of agreement as to whose obligations they are. To 
illustrate the last point, the access road to the "Hall of Technology", 
head office of fue GRA and AESC is still untarred (a rarity in the centre 
of Accra) because neither the City Council nor GRA feels responsible fur 
it. 
Unless the Authority ~s given more executive power, greater control 
over funds for development and maintenance pr@grammes, and unless the 
necessary inputs are available, it cannot achieve the a~ms set for it: 
the provision of safe and adequate infrastructure for road transportation 
commensurate with the economic development of Ghana. 
7.3.4. The Architectural and Engineering Services Corporation (AESC) 
. 
The government, in 1973, intended creating a pool of professional 
construction expertise to act as consultants to government, and to 
compete with the private firms for work in the private sector. Thus the 
AESC was formed as a self-supporting, fee-charging corporation whose 
services 
" were meant not only for development projects in Ghana 
but also eventually for projects in sister African 
countries where shortages of skilled manpower become 
obstacles in the implementation of development projects.,,29 
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The main objectives of the corporation were, therefore: 
(a) to provide consultancy services ~n respect of all works required by, 
or on behalf of, the Government ~n the field of engineering, 
building and architecture, urban and regional planning and 
development; 
(b) to carry out technical studies ~n planning, designing and the 
supervision of such infrastructural works as will assist the econom~c 
and social development of the country; and 
(c) to undertake the investigation, survey, design, administration and 
management, both in Ghana and elsewhere, of all kinds of 
architectural and engineering consultancy works whether public or 
private. 
The Corporation keeps registers of contractors and professional 
consultants, and provides the technical manpower for the tender boards, 
and urban planning committees. Theoretically, the AESC has complete 
jurisdiction over all public projects: 
". t' no Ministry or Department of State, Government 
agency or statutory corporation shall engage the services 
of any consultant for any work falling within the objects 
of the Corporation or within its competence without the 
prior approval in writing of the Commissioner of Works 
and Housing. 1130 
In 1978 it initiated over 400 building projects allover the country at 
an estimated cost of more than tlOO million3l . It has a Board of 
Governors appointed by government, and its executive head has the title 
of Chief Consultant. The corporation has a branch in each of the n~ne 
regions, 
7.3,4.1. Effectiveness 
Despite the lofty ideals that prompted its formation, the AESC is, 
as yet, unable to handle all publ ic projects, and continues to pass 
several jobs to private consultants. On only one occas~on, ~n 1977, has 
it tried, unsuccessfully, to win a job outside Ghana 32 . Several public 
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institutions and parastatals refuse to route their requirement for 
consultancy services through it, and some often accuse it, with Some 
justification, of being too slow. 
The AESC 1S in danger of being dragged into insolvency by the 
massive debts owed to it by clients. The Chief Executive pointed out in 
1977 that: 
"Our earnings remain largely paper earnings. Much 
of our fees are yet to be settled by some Government 
Departments. Presently clients owe us to the tune of 
about /6 million. ,,33 
The outstanding debt had r1sen to /12 million by 197834 , and to ~18 
35 
million by 1979 . The ironical and increasingly desperate situation 
exists whereby government departments are effectively throttling to 
death. a public-owned corporation which lacks the power to enforce 
payment of its fees . 
. 7.3.4.2. Constraints 
The AESC 1S a multi-disciplinary consultancy organisation 
providing a variety of professional services, and employing, or needing 
to employ: architects, structural, mechanical, civil and services 
engineers, land and quantity surveyors, planners, valuers, materials 
scientists, geotechnicians, economists, and so on. It has to compete 
with the private sector and other public institutions for these persons, 
most kinds of wh0l1'l- are scarce in Ghana. But, as a public corporation, 
there is a limit to the level of remunerations it can offer, and hence 
it has been unable to attract sufficient qualified personnel. 
Within the AESC there is a curious situation whereby architects 
appear to enjoy a favoured position. In a corporation which employs 
such a variety of skills, 8 out of the 9 positions of Regional Consultant 
h ld b h · 36 are e y arc 1tects T~e special status of the architect is further 
emphasised by the authority assigned to him in the forms of conditions 
of contract the AESC now uses. (See 9.5.6). Inevitably, there are 
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intra-organisational strains and conflicts, which bode ill for the 
efficiency of the corporation. 
The AESC's effective operation is hampered by the insufficiency of 
transport facilities. This contributes towards the delays in inspections, 
certification and issuing of instructions, all of which have adverse 
effects on contractors' operations. 
7.3.5. The PWD, GHA and AESC 
The PWD, GHA and AESC are different in several respects and similar 
in others. Together, they constitute the technical arms of the Ministry 
of Works and influence its ability to advise government on policies 
related to the industry. 
7.3,5.1. Administrative Interferenc7 and ~~gal Status 
The PWD is part of the civil service, the GHA is a body corporate 
relying on government for all its finance, and the AESC is a commercial 
profit-making corporation. But none of them operates independently of 
government, the difference in their statutory classifications mean 
little. A11 the organisations are subject to frequent administrative 
interference, in addition to the fact that they must generally operate 
under the provisions of government policy. Furthermore, the bodies lack 
the power and the facility to enforce the statutory rights they have 
been given. For example, although the AESC " ... may charge fees in 
f f . k ,,3 7 . h d 1 k 1 'I . respect 0 any 0 1tS wor s .,., 1t can ar y ta e ega act10n to 
enforce payment of its fees: the defaulters are state departments or 
central government itself. Again, although 
"The laws of Ghana demands that landlords and other 
interested organisations and individuals should inform 
the Ghana High"my Authority in writing of their 
intention to cut any portion of the couutry's roads,,,38 
organisations and individuals show scant regard for the law and roads 
e ften defa ed 'n an ""a s The GHA cannot do more than "deploI'e" ar 0 c ~ m ly ~ Y . 
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the practice, expressing its "concern" and appealing for cooperation. 
It is, obviously, unwise to create organisations without giving 
them the machinery and ability to enforce rules vital to their efficient 
operation or even survival. 
7,3.5.2. Team Structures 
The three organisations are fossilised 1n their procedures. Their 
project teams are usually led by the architect (or the engineer 1n the 
case of GRA), following the old British practice adopted during the 
colonial era. 39 New ideas on the nature of the construction process 
and of the use of flexible organisation structures for construction 
projects, such as involving the contractor in the design or the 
employment of a project manager, have not been tried. Yet all three 
bodies are multi-disciplinary consultancy organisations which have scope 
for experimenting in alternative team structures. The mix of the 
various skills called for by different projects are not the same40, and 
methods for selecting project teams and their leaders should be 
pragmatic instead of the adherence to the dubious yardstick of convention. 
7.3.5.3. Rules of Thumb 
The staff of the three bodies are overworked, and they have, 
subsequently, adopted various short cuts and rules of thumb in their 
work. Drawings and other production information are usually scanty, 
specifications are duplicated from previous copies and bills of 
quantities are seldom prepared (see also 9.5). Government has had 
cause to lament that~ 
"In spite of the slow growth [in physical construction 
output], expenditure on construction increased 
remarkably. Among others, this was the inevitable 
result of the proliferation of projects and the award 
of contracts for projects some of which had not even 
been well designed at the time of tender.,,41 
The rules of thumb create difficulties at the construction stage: 
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contracts are held up while important details are clarified, there are 
disputes over payments, and estimated costs are exceeded, causing 
strains on budgeted funds, and leading to delays in payments to 
contractors. 
7.3.5.4. Duties 
The three organisations still retain some professional links: the 
AESC does some road and civil engineering design for the GHA, and the 
PWD maintains the official residences of the personnel of both the GHA 
and the AESC. Thus the break up of the old PWD did not result in the 
formation of separate, self-sufficient bodies. 
There are, inevitably, instances of duplication: each body is 
authorised to register consultants and contractors. This has resulted 
in the maintenance of three separate registers, each organisation 
insisting on dealing only with the contractors or consultants 
registering with it. 
Doing little research, none of the three bodies is able to 
advise the Ministry of Works and Housing on trends within the 
construction industry. Official policy, therefore, lacks the basis of 
informed investigation and is unable to make the desired impact on the 
problems confronting the industry. (See also 3.6.3. and 3.7). Despite 
genuine efforts to solve them, the problems remain, getting worse by 
the day. 
7.4. A Ministry? 
By its very nature (see 3.6.1-8), it is impossible to place all 
of the aspects of construction activity under one ministry. Qoite 
apart from the fact that no single ministry can be independent, the 
facets of the industry under the other ministries can be so vital that 
the Ministry of Works itself has little overall control of it. The 
Ministries which control various aspects of construction in Ghana are 
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now considered. 
7.5. Demand and Finance 
The public sector is responsible for the majority of total demand 
for construction activity (see 6.5.2). Again, apart from the fact that 
the Ministry of Works and Housing receives its operational funds from 
central government chests, public sector projects are paid for through 
the machinery established to control the disbursement of public funds. 
This machinery is, thus, of direct and indirect consequence to the 
construction industry. 
7.5.1. Ministry of Finance 
The Ministry of Finance formulates government's financial 
policy, advises it on budgetary, investment and insurance matters, and 
controls credit, investment, state revenue, banking and currency issues. 
It prepares the annual estimates of revenue and expenditure for the 
public sector. 
Under present legislation, the Minister of Finance is the final 
signatory of all drawings on the public exchequer. For the construction 
industry, this means that all payment certificates for projects, 
financed by central government, have to pass through the Ministry 1n 
Accra before payment can be effected. This entails long delays42 
7.5.1.1. Demand 
In its control of budgetary allocations, the ministry ultimately 
determines what type of projects are initiated, where and when, and thus 
influences the nature and size of demand for construction. Its power to 
manipulate lending rates and the availability of credits are also of 
significance to the industry (see 3.6.2). 
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7.5.1.2. Balance 
Because of the time lags in construction, if the control of 
expenditure and interest rates are not to have adverse effects on the 
development of the industry, considerable skill is needed to arrive at 
h b 1 " 43 ( 3 6 3) t e proper a ance at appropr~ate t~mes see... Not only does the 
Ministry of Finance not possess the personnel with this type of skill, 
but also, being more concerned about managing the economy as a whole, it 
does not pay any detailed attention to the growth of the construction 
industry (see 6.5.2). This is an area where an influential Ministry of 
works, armed with relevant data from its technical arms, could be very 
useful (see 7.3.1.3). 
7.5.2. Ministry of Economic Planning 
After existing as a separate entity, then being merged with, and 
later hived out of the Ministry of Finance, Ghana-' s national planning 
unit is now a separate Ministry. It formulates government's general 
economic policies, prepares and reviews development plans, and advises 
government on the day-to-day management of the country's economy, 
setting and reviewing priorities and advising on the allocation of funds 
for development. -In this way, the Ministry determi.nes the long-term 
prospects for the industry in Ghana. 
The Ministry also coordinates, negotiates for, administers and 
evaluates all foreign aid and technical assistance of whatever kind to 
Ghana. 
7.5.2.1. Project Implementation 
The Implementation Unit of the Ministry of Economic Planning with 
branches in each of the regions, controls and supervises the effective 
execution of development projects. Its officers undertake physical 
inspection of projects for a dual purpose: firstly, it provides feed-
back for planning, identifying problems and storing information on 
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execution to help future planning or the rev~ew of present plans. 
Secondly, it enables the officers to confirm or challenge the stage of 
construction shown on interim certificates before they are endorsed by 
the Regional Commissioner, serving to delay payments due to contractors, 
and hence affect the efficiency of the construction industry. (See 
9.7.3) . 
7.6. 1ill!i. 
Government's policies on land and machineries for implementing 
them determine the ease with which prospective developers can obtain 
land, and the length of time it takes them to do so. The Ministry of 
Lands and Mineral Resources is the agency for formulating and effecting 
land policy in Ghana, The organisations under its control include the 
Department of Lands and the Lands Commission. 
7.6.1, The Department of Lands 
The Department of Lands administers all statutes ",hich affect land 
in Ghana. It registers and keeps all documents and records on land 
transactions. It acquires land on behalf of government, controls the 
payment of rents, grants and annuities in respect of land leased or 
acquired by government, and provides advice on land values and estate 
management to public organisations. It is headed by the Chief Lands 
Officer, and has branches ~n all the reg~ons. 
7.6.2, The Lands Commission 
Under the Lands Commission Act (1971), all government plots of 
land, grants of timber, mining and other concessions and leases, are 
allocated by the Lands Commission. It comprises the Minister of Lands 
and Mineral Resources as Chairman, and representatives from·the regions. 
These allocations had, prior to the Act, been made by the Lands 
Department which was accused by the public of irregularities and 
. 44 
malpract1ces 
7.6.3. Land Costs 
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The high rate of development, especially 1n the urban areas, in 
recent years, has led to an escalation of the price of land. The Five-
Year Plan (1975-80) lists among the difficulties facing the 
construction industry, " ... the high cost of land ... and the 
difficulties involved 1n securing title to land. ,.45 
7.6.4. Construction and Land 
It is instructive to paraphrase the remarks of the chairman of 
. 1 l' 46 a comm1tte on and use p ann1ng He called for an end to "the free 
for all approach to the use of land". The way in which land was 
apportioned needed serious review. Urban land had become very scarce, 
and land disputes abounded. Existing regulations and the misuse of land 
had led to the ironical situation whereby, in the midst o·f abundance of 
land, the country was experiencing hunger, This was frustrating 
prospective developers. (See 9.3.1-5 for a detailed discussion of land 
issues in Ghana.) 
7.7. Materials 
Since construction is essentially a serV1ce industry which 
requires a variety of materials and components (see 3.1), the 
availabili~y, distribution and level of prices of materials have much 
bearing on its efficiency. These important aspects are under the 
control of certain public agenc1es. 
7.7.1. Ministry of Trade and Tourism 
The Ministry of Trade and Tourism is responsible for promoting 
and controlling Ghana's internal and external trade. It superv1ses the 
distribution of goods within the country and controls their prices. It 
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also administers the country's import control policies. 
All plant and equipment used in Ghana, and most of the construction 
materials and tools are imported (see 6;5.3), and licences have to be 
obtained for them. In the country's.present economic situation (see 
6.4.5-6) there is the need for a system which channels the scarce 
foreign exchange to the most important items. But the allocation of 
import licences is not always rational. It was reported in 1979 that: 
"There are ... examples of important local factories 
lying idle, like the Tema Steelworks and cement 
factories, while import licences go to people to import 
the goods which the factories should be producing ... 
[it urged government] to put its foot down against those 
who grant the letters of credit.,,47 
This haphazard allocation of import licences is detrimental to the 
development of the local construction industry since it has an adverse 
effect on the present and future availability of construction materials. 
7.7.2. The Prices and Incomes Board 
I 
Established in 1972, the Prices and Incomes Board, comprising a 
Chairman and seven members, is responsible for: 
(a) formulating an appropriate incomes and prices policy for the 
successful development of the country's economy; and 
(b) recommending to government policy measures required for the 
regulation of wages and salaries, interests, profits, dividends, 
rents and prices. 
7.7.2.1. Black Market , 
In the face of ser10US shortages of goods, pr1ce control has not 
worked in Ghana. It has spawned a thriving black market in which 
hoarded goods are sold at multiples of the official prices. (See also 
10.7.2) There are indications that price control measures worsen the 
situation: the dealers quickly detect and exploit loopholes in any new 
arrangements to force prices further upward. A member of the government 
admitted (1979) that: 
"Experience ... has shown that the more stringent price 
control the government introduces, the more the goods 
vanish from the markets, to the disadvantage of the 
public, thus causing artificial shortages.,~8 
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First fines, then short prison sentences, longer sentences and threats 
of death by shooting failed to deter would-be offenders. At one stage 
(May 1979) it was commented: 
"The control price of cement is ril3.80 per bag but it 
is common knowledge that dealers ... sell cement 
between r/.50 and /:.60 per bag. "49 
7.7.2.2, Effect on Construction 
.. 
It is virtually impossible to work out realistic estimates for 
construction projects, and claiming for fluctuations and settling rates 
for new items of work are hazardous tasks fraught with arbitrariness 
. and conn ic t. 
The inability to check the upward trend in prices has tended to 
depress the demand for construction from all sectors and constrained the 
output of the materials and components manufacturing concerns. At a 
general level, it has reduced workers'purchasing power, lowering their 
morale, reducing productivity and encouraging demands for higher wages 
to WOLsen an already serious inflationary situation in the country. 
(See 6.4.6). 
7.7.3. Ministry of Industrie~ 
The Ministry of Industriee formulates, interprets and supervises 
the implementation of government's industrial policies. The 
Manufacturing Industries Act (1971) provides that the estaplishment of 
any new manufacturing industry or the expansion of an existing one must 
be approved by the ministry. The affairs of all existing industries are 
regulated by the ministry, which also advises government on the 
preparation and implementation of the country's industrial import 
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progrannne. 
7.7.3,1. State of Manufacturing Industry 
Industrial development in Ghana occurred at a rapid pace after 
independence, with the state playing a key role (see 6.4.2). But the 
public enterprises lost money persistently until 1968 when the Ghana 
Industrial Holding Corporation (GIHOC) was created to manage the 20 
. . . d . 50 
eX1st1ng 1n ustr1es Since most of the factories need imported inputs 
(see 6.4.2), and the Ministry of Trade has not adopted a rational 
approach to the allocation of import licences (see 7.7.1) most of them 
lie idle for long periods, and some have now been shut down temporarily. 
A direct illustration of the Ministry of Industries' ineffectiveness 
in the performance of its licensing and control functions 1S the over-
capacity 1n certain sectors of industry, at the same time as other 
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sectors such as building materials are relatively unexplored (See 
Chapter 10 for detailed discussion of materials.) 
Under government's current attempt to rationalise the nation's 
industrial base, it will now only accept applications for the establish-
ment of new factories in the following categories: agricultural 
enterprises I food processing, small-scale or export-oriented enterprises 
using local raw materials, development of local building materials, 
d . d .. 52 foun r1es an eng1neer1ng works . 
7.8. Manpower 
Skilled and unskilled labour constitute, arguably, the construction 
industry's most important resource. The quality of this resource 1S 
therefore of> paramount importance. In Ghana, manpO\,ler development and 
labour policies are under the control of various ministries. 
7.8.1. Ministry of Education and Culture 
Pre-university education, universal and free, is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Education and Culture. Present 
policies for the sector aim at: 
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(a) expanding and consolidating facilities for educating both children 
and adults; 
(b) reforming the structure and content of education to align it with 
the country's manpower needs; 
(c) making education meaningful and practical, with emphasis on 
acquisition of skills, qualities of leadership, self-reliance and 
creativity; and 
(dj raising the quality of teachers and teaching in educational 
institutions. 
Actual administration and coordination of pre-university education 
rests with the Ghana Education Service, established in 1973/74: the 
Ministry retains the policy formulation and financial control duties. 
Direct management of primary and secondary schools is discharged by a 
matrix of central government, local authorities, religious and 
phi1antropic organisations, private bodies and individuals. 
7,8.1,1. Higher Educatio~ 
The National Council for Higher Education, set up in 1969, has 
administrative responsibility for all universities and other institutions 
of higher learning in Ghana. It advises government on, and coordinates 
the academic and research programmes of the various institutions. 
7.8.1.2. Training 
Formal and informal craft training 1S administered by the National 
Vocational Training Institute (see 11.5) and management development is 
the responsibility of the Management Development and Productivity 
Institute (MDPI) (see 11.7.2) .. 
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7.8.1.3. Diffusion 
The government has assumed full and direct charge of manpower 
development in Ghana; it bears almost all educational expenditure of 
both public and private education and training institutions. Unlike the 
situation in some countries, there is no independent body (like the 
Construction Industry Training Board of Great Britain) in charge of 
training for the construction industry. Training is, therefore, under 
several institutions without adequate coordinating links, and the 
institutions are mainly out of touch with industry, which makes training 
53 internally out of balance (see Figure 11.1) 
7.8.2. The Department of Labour 
The Department of Labour, under the Ministry of Labour, Social 
Welfare and Cooperatives, enforces legislation relating to labour, and 
oversees matters pertaining to industrial relations. Its functions 
include: 
(a) registration of labour; operation of employment centres; and 
collection and publication of information on employment trends and 
opportunities; 
(b) inspection of workplaces to ensure safety, health and welfare of 
workers, and to ascertain wages and service conditions; and 
(c) maintenance of peaceful relations between employers and workers 1n 
the country and conciliation 1n industrial disputes. 
There have been few strikes 1n Ghana, and fewer still in the 
construction industry. Industrial disputes have been over salary/wage 
demands, medical, canteen, housing or transport facilities or allowances, 
or over delays by employers in implementing collective agreements. 
Officers of the Labour Department have been successful in defusing 
several tense situations, although, on some occasions, central government 
has intervened. 
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7.8,2.1, Wage Policy 
In addition to fixing the salary structure for its· own employees, 
government stipulates a minimum wage to be paid to workers in both the 
public and private sectors. This becomes the basis used to establish 
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wages for all categories of workers . 
The Articles of Agreement and Conditions of Contract.for all types 
of public projects (see 9.5.6) require that contractors pay their 
workers at the rate fixed by government. The cost of labour in Ghana 1.S 
thus not dictated by market forces: the wages are not related to 
productivity nor to the relative scarcity of labour as compared to plant 
and equipment. (See 12.2). 
7.8.2.2. Labour Policy and Employment Practices 
Government can also dictate the conditions of service of all 
workers, issuing directives on medical care, housing and transport 
facilities, safety at work, and so on. Most important, it can exercise 
overt or covert control on the number of employees a firm may employ. 
For example, in 1972, in the face of a high level of unemployment, 
government declared that in the public sector, 
"In view of our declared policy against retrenchment of 
labour, and the high level of personal emoluments, 
recurrent expenditure cannot be cut down without creating 
additional unemployment. This we will not do. ,,55 
And for the private sector it issued: 
" •. , an order forbidding employers to layoff any number 
of workers for any reason whatsoever without the 
written permission of the Commissioner for Labour, 
Social Welfare and Cooperatives."S6 
In response to situations like these, the construction industry 
has adopted flexible employment practices; its workers are, 
predominantly, casual employees who enjoy few rights. (See also 3.6.5). 
The use of casual labour by the industry thwarts the successful 
creation and nurturing of a pool of manpower gaining experience and 
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improving its quality as it works from one project to another. The 
importance of manpower as a resource of construction puts the Labour 
Department ~n a very sensitive position in relation to the industry. 
7.8.3. Cooperatives 
7.8.3.1. Tradition 
Ghanaian traditional life is socialistic in nature, and involves 
much cooperation amongst members of the extended family, the village, 
the district, clan or tribal group. This manifests itself in farming, 
caring for infants or the elderly, housebuilding, and communal 
construction of common facilities. (See also 1.4.5-6 and 4.4.2). This 
tradition is, however, weakening in the 'modernisation' of the society 
attended by the institutionalisation of individualism, competitiveness 
and reliance on materialism. (See 1.4.6) 
7.8.3.2, Benefits 
The potential gains from the communal spirit could be enormous. 
In construction, its effect could occur on both the supply and demand 
sides: on the one hand leading to the formation of building 
cooperatives, self-help project teams, or even commercial village-
financed construction or building materials manufacturing firms, and on 
the other, credit unions, housing coop~ratives, or even client consortia. 
7.8.3.3. The Department of Cooperatives 
The Department of Cooperatives is charged with the development, 
supervision and extension of all cooperative activities in Ghana. It 
has been involved in the formation of societies of farmers, small 
industrialists, traders and builders; consumers, prospective house-
owners, credit unions, and a Cooperative Bank. 
The department has formally assisted few builders cooperatives, 
such as the Brong Ahafo Builders Cooperative and the Tema Cooperative 
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which builds the houses of the Tema Cooperative Housing Society. 
By 1975, the department had organised several hundred credit 
unions allover the country, with total savings of about 315 million 
cedis. It has not been so successful in the area of housing 
cooperatives, although the current development plan stated that more of 
these would be established58 . 
The executive capacity of the Department acts as a constraint on 
the 'Self-help Projects' subsector (see 4.4.2) of Ghana's construction 
industry: it hinders the formation of builders cooperatives in a bid to 
expand contracting capacity. (See 15.9). 
7.9. Conclusion 
Ghana has had a Ministry of Works since the colonial days and, over 
the years, organisations subordinate to it have been created to help it 
perform its task of managing the local construction industry. However, 
because of the diffuse nature of construction activity, aspects of the 
industry come under the control of various other ministries and 
departments (see Fig. 7.2); The issue in Ghana, as 1n many other 
developing countries which already have Ministries of Works performing 
duties in excess of their supervision of public projects, is not one of 
creating a Ministry for construction: it involves the following points, 
which would also apply if a new ministry were to be needed. 
7.9.1. The Macro Level: Inter-Ministerial Relations 
Since no one ministry can control all aspects of construction, 
it is important to consider the place of the Ministry of Works in the 
governmental system ie its status in the community of organisations, its 
links with other bodies, and the extent of its cooperation with them. It 1S 
necessary for the ministry to be empowered to formulate, and financially 
enabled to implement policies specific to the industry. (See Fig. 7.1). 
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FIGURE 7.1. A Theoretical Construct of the Place of the Ministry of 
Works and Housing and its Subordinate Bodies in the 
Comity of Organisations 
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7.9.2. Micro Level: Intra-Ministerial Relations 
Construction is a specialised field, and any ministry in charge 
of it would require professional personnel. lbis would lead to conflicts 
between such persons and the administrators who are members of the larger 
civil service. In Ghana, as in most other countries, the senior 
positions in the service are held by a close-knit group of conservative 
and self-preserving administrators with a gr1p on government's policy-
making machinery. Moreover, final decisions are taken by po1itician-
Ministers. The professional, usually in an advisory rather than 
executive position, faces frequent frustration. Establishing technical 
directorates in Ghana has not resolved the problem. It is an issue 
which calls for imaginative measures from government. 
7.9.3, Staffing 
Obtaining qualified, experienced and reputed professionals for 
high technical posts within the ministry is important. Where 
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FIGURES 7.2. Major Government Organisations Involved in Construction 
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professionals prefer the private sector or parastatals to the civil 
service and hence the ministry, or where such persons are simply 
unavailable, this will be a problem. 
7.9.4. Subordinate Bodies 
Organisations will be created within or under the ministry to 
help it with its task of administering the industry. The efficiency of 
these subordinate bodies, the relationships between them, their 
collective ability to provide the ministry with a sound basis for policy 
formulation, and the ability of the ministry, in turn, to coordinate 
their activities are also worthy of consideration. 
7.9.5. Difficulty of the Task 
Construction is a multi-faceted industry: it ~s difficult to 
legislate for desirable effects in all its sectors at anyone time (see 
3.6.1-8). Seemingly harmless and unrelated policies tend to have severe 
repercussions for the industry. Formulating and timing measures to 
achieve specific results is a complex and hazardous task. For a ministry 
for construction to be really effective and to achieve the respect of 
its compatriot bodies (see 7.9.1) it needs to be able to perform this 
unenviable task (see also 7.9.3-4) as well as coordinate the activities 
of ministries and departments whose normal operations, overtly or by 
implication, are of consequence to the industry. 
203 
7.10. Notes and References 
1. "Government" here and elsewhere in Part III 
a collective for the number of governments that 
it was given internal self-government in 1951. 
is used broadly as 
Ghana has had since 
2. Government of the Gold Coast. The Development Plan 1951: Being a 
plan for the Economic and Social Deyelopment of the Gold Coast 
1951-5~, Accra, 1951, pp. 20-21. 
3 .. Note that Ghana was called the Gold Coast until it attained 
independence on 6 March 1957. 
3, Ibid, p, 11. 
4. Government of Ghana, One Year Development Plan, July 1970 - June 
1971, Accra, 1970, p. 141. 
-
5. Ibid., p. 142. 
6. Ibid., p. 142. 
7. Although a working party was established in 1976 to formulate 
guidelines for such a policy, its report has not been acted upon 
by government. 
8. Abrams, for example, cites a number of different attitudes to 
housing, (a) that which holds that housing competes with the 
productive sector for resources, and thus investment should be 
focused on the latter and on items that increase productivity and 
directly promote economic growth - as in Kelly, B. (ed), Housi~g an~ 
Economic Development, The Report of a Conference at the Massachusetts 
- 1 
Institute of Technology, April 30-May2, 1953, Cambridge University 
Press, 1955. p.l8. 
(b) that which suggests that investment in housing, though desirable, 
should be limited to 'musts' - as in M.F. Milikan, The Economist's 
View of the Role of Housing". in ibid., p. 26. 
(c) the attitude necessitated by socia-political realities 
which have made it imperative (in most countries) for comprehensive 
national housing programmes to be formulated and implemented - C. 
Abrams, Housing in the Modern Horld, Faber and Faber, London, 1964, 
p. 113._ " 
9. Government of Ghana, Five Year Development Plan 1975/76-1979/8~ 
Part II, Accra, 1977, p. 409. 
10. Government of Ghana, Budget Statement for Fiscal Year 1.978-79, 
Accra, 12 September 1978, p. 30. 
11. The duties of the Ministry of Works are paraphrased from M. Danquah, 
(ed), Ghana: An Economic Review, 1973-7~ Editorial and Publishing 
Services, Accra, 1975. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Government of Ghana, op. ci.t (ref. 10), p. 22. 
14. Ibid, p. 24. 
15. Ibid., p. l6~ 
16. Information Services Department, Ghana: An Official Handbook 
1972-3, Accra, 1974, p. 198. 
17. Government of Ghana, op. cit, (ref. 4), p. 118. 
204 
18. Government of Ghana, Economic Measures for Financial Year 197~-74; 
Ministry of Finance, Accra, 1973, p. 23. 
19. A visit to the "Hall of Technology", headquarters of both AESC and 
GHA (built for the old PWD but completed after the reorganisation) 
illustrates this. The building has, physically, been divided into 
. two with separate entrances, security 'services, lifts and canteens. 
It is unheard of for office space, equipment or vehicles to be 
shared by the two bodies. 
20. Chambers, R., Managing Rural Development. Ideas and Experience from 
East Africa, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsa1a, 
1974, p. 26. 
21. Modern organisation theory views formal systems as complemented by 
the informal set which comprises, for example, " ... cooperative 
systems of people with career aspirations competing for advancement, 
and a political system in which individuals and departments compete 
and cooperate for power". - Pugh, D.S. et al (eds), Writers on 
Organisations, 2nd Ed., Penguin, 1971, pp. 46-47. See also 
15.4.1.-3. 
Frequently destabilising these systems has repercussions for the 
various organisations, tending to reduce efficiency. 
22. Unless otherwise stated, the duties of the organisations in this 
part, of the thesis (Part III) are paraphrased from: Government of 
Ghana, An Official Handbook 197~, Information Services Department, 
Accra, 1977, p. 245. 
23. Public Works Department, Engineer-in-Chief's Annual Report for 
1978-79 (unpublished). 
24. Government of Ghana, op. cit. (ref. 22), p. 257. 
25. Government of Ghana, Budget Statement for Fiscal Year 1974-75, 
Ministry of Finance, Accra, 1974. 
26. Daily Graphic Editorial, The State of Our Roads, The Daily Graphic, 
27 March 1979, p. 2. 
27. Ibid., p. 2. 
28. Ghana Highway Authority, The State of Ghana's Roads, Advertiser's 
Announcement in the Ghanaian Times, 5 January 1979, p. 10. 
29. Government of Ghana, op. cit. (ref. 22), p. 259. 
30. Ibid, pp. 259- 260. 
31. Ministry of Works and Housing, A.E.S.C. Forges Ahead with Building 
Projects, in Works and Housing Today (the Ministry's journal), 
Vol. 1, No.2, August 1978, p. 32. 
32. A.E.S.C., Re-examination of the Consultant, in Ibe Consultant, House 
Journal of the AESC, Vol. 2, No.1, May 1977, p. 10. 
205 
33. Ibid" p. 10. 
34. Nyame-Kumi, E., Work Harder than Before, Chief Consultant's New Year 
Message in The Consultant (AESC) , Vol. 3, No.1, May 1978, p. 3. 
35. This figure was disclosed to the author in a discussion with the 
Chief Executive in May 1979. 
36, The only non-Architect is a very senior Structural Engineer. 
The sudden elevation of architects (in many cases over their 
seniors in terms of experience) over the other professions at the 
formation of the AESC was a cause of bitter dispute within, and 
some staff resignations from the organisation. 
37. AESC, Journal Introducing the Corporation, AESC, Accra, 1973, p. 6. 
38. Ghana Highway Authority, op. cit. (ref. 28), p. 10. 
39. Such as the work of the Tavistock Institute, see Interdependence 
and Uncertainty, Tavistock, London, 1966; Higgin, G. and Jessop, 
N., Communications ,in the Building Industry, Tavistock, 1975; and 
Turin, D.A. (ed), Aspects of the Economics of the Construction 
Industry, Macmillan, 1975. 
40. Special requirements of clients differ, and change with time; site 
conditions and non-availability of particular resources might also 
call for different approaches to the construction process. Some-
times aesthetic considerations are paramount, sometimes the 
structural; on some occasions costs need to be strictly controlled, 
Ull others time is the most important parameter. 
41. Government of Ghana, op. cit (ref. 10), p. 24, 
42. See Chapter 9 for a detailed account of the payment procedure for 
central government projects. 
43. See also, Hil1ebrandt, P.M., Economic Theory and the Construction 
Industry, Macmillan, London, 1974, Chapter 2. 
44, But the LandsCommission has not been faultless. A committee (1978) 
appointed to examine some of its lease allocations observed that: 
"Some of the areas were acquired by Government 'in the interest of 
the public' but the allocation of such plots do not sincerely 
appear to be 'in the interest of the public' as there are instances 
of Government organisations requiring residential plots but not 
having them; and yet these ... plots are allocated to individuals." 
- Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources, Statement on Revesting 
of Lands Decree, Advertiser's Announcement, The Ghanaian Times, 
17 April 1979, p. 5. 
45. Government of Ghana. op. cit. (ref. 9), p. 414. 
46. Gyimah, K., Land Use Committee Sits in Accra, The Ghanaian Times, 
5 January 1979, p. 3. Reporting the remarks of the chairman of 
the committee, Professor E,A. Boateng. 
47. Ghanaian Times, Can You Pay Ten Percent? Editorial, 27 March 1979, 
p. 4. 
"Ghana t s experience \<lith exchange and import controls has not been 
happy. In the 1960's the control system produced such dissatis-
faction that a serious and prolonged attempt was made to liberalise 
206 
[it] . t. Yet in the end liberalisation collapsed .•. Several 
serious consequences of the system emerged. First, the restrictive 
regime contributed to the economic atrophy of the 1960's ... Second, 
the broad objective of industrialisation was almost completely 
obscured in the indiscriminate distribution of protection ... 
Third, the administrative system proved incapable of consistently 
careful management of foreign exchange." - Leith, J.C., Foreign 
Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Ghana, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1974, p. 163-4. 
48. Major-General N.A. Odartey-Wellington reported in Price Control: 
Help Government Enforce Effective System, Daily Graphic, 27 March 
1979, p. 1. 
49. Daily Graphic, Why, oh why Cement Factory? Editorial, 18 May 1979" 
p. 2. 
50. Some of the reasons given for the failure of these enterprises 
include poor location, poor design, obsolete machinery, poor quality 
of products, political paironage in appointing staff, overstaffing 
and bad debts owed to them by individuals and parastatals. 
See Jones, T' I 9hana's First Republic 1960-66, Methuen, London, 1976, 
and Government of Ghana, op. cit. (ref. 22), p. 156. 
GIHOC, through corporate planning and a policy of consolidation and 
rationalisation, has been able to make some profits since its 
formation. 
51, An inter-Ministerial committee appointed to analyse and appraise 
applications "for manufacturing licenses reported in 1977 that: 
" ... a considerable number of manufacturing enterprises are already 
in existence with combined installed capacity well above the normal 
requirements of the local market, and in some cases with a margin 
for the export market, provided the necessary inputs could be made 
available. It is, hm.ever, well known that the foreign exchange 
situation of the country has imposed unavoidable limitations on the 
ability of these establishments to produce to any appreciable level 
of capacity." - Government of Ghana, op. cit. (ref. 10), p. 20. 
52. Ibid., p. 20. 
53. See Chapter 11 for a detailed discussion of the manpower situation 
and manpower development in Ghana. 
54. Through collective bargaining agreements between un~ons and 
employees. See 11.11.2 and 12.2.2. 
55. Government of Ghana, Budget Statement 19Z1., Hinistry of Finance, 
Accra, September 1972. 
56. Government of Ghana, op. cit. (ref. 22), p. 353. This was one of 
government's measures to reduce unemployment. See Chapter 12, The 
State Construction Corporation~for a consideration of how this 
policy has affected parastatals who are unable to resort to 
flexible employment practices. 
57. Government of Ghana, op. cit. (ref. 9), p. 416. 
8.1. Introduction 
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CHAPTER 8 
pLANNING 
"The po1icymakers in the developing nations should 
pay attention to the possibility of considering 
construction as a part of their national economic 
planning and thus provide continuity in its 
operation." 
- Moavenzadeh, F., The Role of the Construction 
Industry in the Development Process, Public 
Policy, Vol. XXII Spring 1974, No.2, p. 240. 
"The Seven-Year Plan provides that the gr,owth 
target for Ghana during the period till 1970 
should be not less than 5.5 per cent per annum. 
In 1963 the economy of Ghana grew hardly at all 
... actual production grew by just 1.2 per cent 
as against a growth of over 2.5 per cent in 
population ... In 1964 ... there has been no 
general resumption of economic growth. 
Industrial production has been practically 
stagnant and commerce and other activities dull 
The economy has not shown a rate of growth 
in 1963 a~d 1964 commensurate with the sacrifices 
which the country has made in order to undertake 
these investments." 
- Government of Ghana, Seven-Year Development 
Plan, Annual Plan for the Second Plan Year 
1965 Financial Yea&, Office of the Planning 
Commission, Accra, January 1965, pp. 9 and 11. 
Developing countries are usually advised to formulate plans for 
their construction industries in two ways: 
(a) to plan the volume of construction; determine the amount of the 
major types of construction that would be required in each region 
. . . h 1 
or d1str1ct, 1n eac year; (see 5.4.3.2, 6.5.3.3 and 5.4.4.1) 
(b) to plan the resources that would be needed to meet such levels of 
construction activity. (See 5.3.1.1. and 5.4.3.2). 
Writers also often suggest that governments should publish in 
advance their programmes for construction to enable the industry to 
prepare for the projected demand, and should also endeavour to keep 
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demand for construction relatively stable2 (This is an extension of 
point (a)). (See also tactic (3) in the 'Synthesis' 5.6). 
This chapter considers the nature and history of national econom~c 
planning in Ghana, shows that: 
(1) construction has always been considered in such planning; 
(2) the industry is often mentioned in annual budget statements and 
other official publications, 
(3) construction has been the subject of some government-appointed 
committees; and ultimately, 
(4) Ghana does its construction sum and plans for the industry's vital 
inputs. 
It demonstrates further that the nature of the construction 
industry makes planning for it difficult 3, and underlines the importance 
of strong, efficient data-gathering and implementation machineries in 
addition to the planning unit. It also shows how the administrative 
juxtaposition of various personalities and departments promotes or 
.frustrates planning and plan implementation. By showing the similarity 
between construction policy implemented or prevailing in Ghana and the 
proposals usually made for the developing countries it is concluded 
that the mere existence of plans and policies will not guarantee success 
and that, since most of the proposals will be shown to have achieved 
limited success in Ghana, there is need for some modifications or 
changes in emphasis or direction. 
8.2. Planning in Ghana 
Beginning with the lO-Year Development Plan of 1919, Ghana has had 
programmes for national socio-economic development for 1, 5 or 7 year 
periods. The introductory paragraphs of the 1951 plan outlines the 
major motivation and objectives of planning ~n Ghana: 
"In a world of uncertainties and constantly changing 
circumstances it is impossible to lay down a plan 
for the future which states in minute detail all that 
it is hoped to achieve ... The most that can be done, 
therefore, is to set down a statement of objectives 
which, if circumstances allow, can be attained in the 
years ahead .... It must remain flexible, for it will 
require constant review and modification as the years 
pass but its existence will ensure that development 
proceeds as a balanced whole rather than a series of 
uncoordinated projects. This will result in the best 
use being made of the available resources ... "4 
The various plan documents are mainly a review of prevailing 
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socio-economic conditions, a statement of national aspirations, and 
detailed consideration of programmes and projects by economic sectors, 
that would permit the achievement of the defined targets. 
8.2.1. History 
Ghana prides itself with being: 
II the first government to adopt modern long-term planning ... "5 
The various plans have placed emphasis on different sectors of the 
economy to reflect the requiremen~s at the particular stage of economic 
development. (See also 6.4.1-7). 
The lO-year Plan of 1919 (The Guggisberg Plan) aimed at creating 
toe infrastructural base of the economy and saw the building of the 
Takoradi Harbour, the railway and road networks, with the intention of 
., 
promoting pr1mary production, especially of cocoa and minerals. 
The 1951 Plan, mainly an example of the 'shopping-list' method, 
stressed the productive services, with particular attention to agri-
culture " 6 in its widest sense". It was followed by a consolidation 
plan 1n 1957, which was to 
", .. provide 
development 
provide for 
reg10ns 
carried out 
for the completion of the first [1951] 
plan projects, to sustain employment, to 
reasonable development activity in the 
and to consolidate development work already 
under the first development plan.,,7 
The Second Five-Year Plan of 1959, while recognising the importance 
of agriculture, had industrial development as an objective. This was 
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also the principle of the Seven-Year Plan of 1963; which sought the 
modernisation of agriculture and the promotion of industrialisation 
based on import substitution. This plan: " ... followed the modern 
technique of planning ... "8 The policy of industrial production, 
relying on imported raw materials, led to severe balance of payments 
problems which necessitated strict controls on imports. 
The Two-Year Plan (1968) soughtfue acceleration of econom1C growth 
and the reduction of unemployment which had become a major problem. 
The liberalisation of imports to support industrial expansion was one of 
the important measures. The same basic principles underlined the 
succeeding One-Year Plan of 19709 . 
The current Five-Year Plan (1975-80) a1ms at building 
" .•. an independent national economy, firmly structured 
on the- resource potentials of our land and the culture 
of our peoples ... Planning will thus be directed to 
the expansion, in the shortest possible time, of the 
total amount of real resources in order to create a 
strong and progressive society based on equal 
opportunity for ci'tizens ... "10 
In terms of construction, major capital projects are listed and 
programmed under each industrial sector, and their estimated costs shown 
for each year of the plan period. The development of the construction 
industry's input requirements is also considered. (See 8.4). The plans 
are generally an outline of public-sector programmes with an indication 
of projects that government expects, or will assist, through subsidies 
and the like, the private sector to initiate. 
8.2.2. !he Planning Process 
At the beginning of the planning process guidelines are issued 
to various ministries and de~ments by the Ministry of Economic Planning, 
to form the basis for the preparation of the various sector programmes. 
Thus local, regional and national agencies who ylould eventually execute 
the projects are involved in the preparation of the plans. The final 
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document is prepared by the Ministry of Economic Planning which, 
together with the Ministry of Finance, oversees the implementation of 
the projects and programmes, reviews progress, and makes any necessary 
adjustments. 
8.2.2.1. National Economic Planning Council 
The current Plan (1975-80) was prepared by the National Economic 
Planning Council, established in 1974 by government proclamationll The 
Council has 33 members, with the Head of State as Chairman. Other 
members include the Ministers of Economic Planning, Agriculture, 
Industries, the Governor of the Bank of Ghana, Director of Budget, the 
administrative heads of all the key ministries including Works and 
Housing, representatives of theT:ades Union Congress, the Manufacturers 
Association, Chamber of Commerce, Cooperatives, Houses of Chiefs, the 
Universities, and well-recognised economists, bankers, business~en and 
12 
others of high repute 
The council is charged with advising government on general econom~c 
development objectives and priorities; mobilisation and allocation of 
resources; preparation, implementation and monitoring of development 
plans; and measures for directing and stimulating the initiative ,of the 
citizenry. Six of its 33 members are designated permanent members, and 
have full-time responsibility for the yar~ous sectors and regions of 
the economy. 
8.2.2.2. Regional Planning Committees 
Each region has a Regional Planning Committee with the Regional 
Commissioner as Chairman and the Regional Economic Planning Officer as 
secretary. Other members include the Regional Administrative Officer, 
Regional Heads of Departments, representatives of the district councils 
.. h' Th' d' . 1 d 13 and persons of prom~nence ~n or from t e reg~on. e~r ut~es ~nc u e : 
(a) the development of human and material resources by identifying main 
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areas of growth, bottlenecks hindering various productive sectors, 
and opportunities for ne~ ventures; 
(b) the coordination of development programmes of different government 
agencies to make them harmonious and consistent with each other 
and with those of private enterprises; 
(c) the monthly review of progress in the implementation of the national 
development plan and budget and submission of quarterly reports; 
and 
(d) the encouragement of the growth of new centres of economic 
activity in the region. 
There are also, in each of the key ministries, planning units which 
act as points of contact with the Ministry of Economic Planning. 
8.2.3. Implementation 
Despite the long experience ~n modern long-term planning and 
the existence of well-written, voluminous national development plans, 
" planning efforts in Ghana have failed as guidelines 
for government actions ... The major factor that has 
served as a constraint is the reluctance of policy 
makers to adhere to the discipline required to sustain 
successful development planning."14 
The problem in Ghana has not been the under-utilisation of pledged funds 
since, over the years the projected spending targets have been reached 
15 
or sometimes substantially exceeded . 
The authors of the 1975-80 Plan underlined two sets of obstacles 
to plan implementation. 
"The first set of f9rces may be classified as beyond 
the control of those charged with plan implementation. 
They include inadequate political commitment, political 
instability, natural disasters and severe unanticipated 
adverse movements in the terms of trade. 
"The second set of forces are relatively more within the 
ambit of planners and include inadequate involvement of 
the agencies expected to implement the plan in the process 
of plan preparation, inadequate institutions, shortage of 
skilled manpower and inadequate policy instruments and 
projects." lb 
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8.2.3.1. Political Change 
Priorities and programmes for development have to be initiated 
or approved by the government, and should, essentially, be in harmony 
with the political and social aspirations of the existing government. 
(See 1.3,6. and 1.4.8). The latter have changed over the years as 
different regimes have assumed power (see 6.4.1-7). The industrialisation 
and expansionary policies of the first post-independence government 
involving substantial state participation in economic activity, were 
radically altered by the military government of 1966 which reduced public 
expenditure and actually suspended or closed down on-going or operating 
projects and enterprises. After a period of stabilisation and 
consolidation it launched a new programme (the 2-Year Plan) to seek 
further economic growth. 
The second civilian government (1969-72) continued the policies of 
the outgoing military regime but ~mbarkeu upon an ambitious rural 
development programme, which was a marked departure from previous 
policies. The main economic philosophy of the second military government 
(1972-79) was self~reliance and the utilization of the cultural 
institutions and attitudes of Ghanaians in productive activity. 
The rapid, often radical changes in political direction have robbed 
the development programmes formulated in Ghana of the benefit of long-
term continuity. 
8.2,3.2. Rivalries, Personalities, Executive Capacity 
Government officials and politicians can withhold vital support 
from particular projects for various reasons. Personalities become 
important at the implementation stage: the blend among planners, 
administrators and politicians necessary for successful plan execution 
has not always been achieved in Ghana. There are also the institutional 
rivalries among the Ministries of Economic Planning and Finance, and the 
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executLng agencLes (See Fig. 8.1) 
FIGURE 8,1. The Planning and Budgeting Processes 
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Add to these the shortage of qualified personnel, the lack of 
liaison between economists and professional design, construction and 
cost consultants, which results in insufficiently defined and estimated 
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projects, the divorce of the citizenry from planning decisions and hence 
the absence of its support or even emergence of its opposition at the 
implementation stage (see 1.3.6), and it becomes clear the sort of 
formidable obstacles that plan execution is up against in Ghana. 
8.2.4. Parameters 
Planners are held in a straight-jacket as government policy 
determines the parameters within which they should plan. As one 
government admits, 
"A combination of policies based on political pressures, 
tardiness and reluctance to review policies even when 
they have been found to be ineffective or harmful has 
led to unnecessary retardation of growth in a country, 
which by all accounts, is well endowed with both 
natural and human resources."18 
To give but one example of this, the second military government (1972--79) 
refused to devalue the currency despite expert advice from home and 
abroad, when it was clear that the cedi had lost its 'value. An 
unofficial market dealing in foreign currency developed, smuggling of 
goods increased and the economy suffered. lbe government also had to 
forego foreign assistance because it would not abide by the guidelines 
of the International Monetary Fund which prescribed a package including 
devaluation of the cedi and cuts in expenditure. Meanwhile, it could 
be seen that: 
"While on the official market the cedi was equivalent 
to US $0.87 on the unofficial market individuals sold 
the cedi for between US $0.12 to US $0.14."19 
Apart from uncertainties such as weather changes, natural disasters 
and developments in the international economy that disrupt national 
plans (see 8.2.3), local politics are also important imponderables in 
planning. Many factors vital to successful plan implementation cannot 
be legislated for, and the planning exercise tends to become little more 
than academic. 
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8.2.5. Targets 
One of the reasons why planning has failed to make any 
remarkable impact on the economy in Ghana IS that the machinery for 
collecting and analysing statistical data is weak. Targets have been 
proved inaccurate in several instances. To cite only two examples: 
(1) "The Seven-Year Plan provides that the growth target 
for Ghana during the period till 1970 should not be 
less than 5.5 per cent per annum. In 1963 the economy 
of Ghana grew hardly at all ... actual production grew 
by just 1.2 per cent as against a growth of over 2.,5 
per cent in popu1ation"20, and 
(2) "The Two-Year Plan projected a pr1ce increase of only 
4 per'cent. By contrast the consumer price index 
increased by nearly 16 per cent over the period 
1967 to 1969."21 
The data-collection system is now considered. 
8.2.6. Data Collection and Analysis 
The systematic collection of statistics has a long history in 
Ghana. There was a population census in 1891, and trade and other data had 
been collected until the establishment of the Office of the Government 
Statistician in 1948. This later became the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS) under the Ministry of Economic Planning. Its duties 
are to: 
(a) collect, compile, analyse, abstract and publish statistical 
information relating to the commercial, industrial, agricultural, 
social, financial, economic and general activities and conditions 
of the people of Ghana; 
(b) advise government on policy relating to statistics; and generally 
organise a coordinated scheme of economic and social statistics 
relating to Ghana. 
The Bureau, headed by the Government Statistician, and based In 
Accra, has no branches in the regions. It publishes a number of 
bulletins, amongst which is the annual "Economic Survey", in which data 
on construction output, value added, employment, capital formation and 
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so on, are presented. It also publishes annually building cost index 
numbers. 
8.2.6.1. Problems and Effectiveness 
Although the Statistics Act (1961) defines sanctions against any 
persons refusing to cooperate with the Government Statistician or his 
. staff in the normal execution of their duties 22 , the Bureau's activities 
are frustrated by delays and lack of cooperation from the organisations 
h · h' 11 23 from w ~c ~t co ects data . For some reason, the penalties for such 
"offences" have never been applied. 
The CBS has also been unable to attract or keep qualified 
24 personnel Furthermore, the low printing capacity in the country 
causes delays ~n processing the Bureau's publications. The result of 
these factors ~s that the CBS has been unable to fulfil the duties 
entrusted to it. Present statistics are outdated. Current data on 
national accounts and construction are up to 1974; the last issue of 
the "Economic Survey" covers the period 1972-74, and was published in 
1977. The one for the period up to and including 1976 is now (1980) 
being prepared. 
This means that there is no accurate scientific base onwfU~ to 
base targets for national development plans, annual budgets, or policies 
for particular sectors like trade or manpower. 
8.2.7. Planning with Poor Data 
Where plans and budgets are based on 'educated' guesstimates, or 
pure conjecture, the consequences can be economically damaging. For 
example, there have been serious divergences between credit guidelines 
issued by the Bank of Ghana for public··sector borrowing from the banking 
system, and what was actually needed: 
"In the 1976/77 financial year for example, actual credit 
to Government from the banks was i719.2 million and 
exceeded the projected limit by over 500 per cent. \\Iorse 
still, by the end of the first six months of the 1977/78 
fiscal year, Bank of Ghana credit for financing the 
deficit had already exceeded the figure of l735 million 
which was more than the record of l7l9.2 million reached 
for the whole of the 1976/77 fiscal years. "25 
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Socially, wrong data might encourage government to make promises 
to the populace that it cannot fulfil. This has been a common occurrence 
in Ghana. For example, the 
" ... Two Year Plan aimed at 8,000 low cost houses in the 
period. Out of these 1776 were buil t. ,,26 
Such phenomena can fuel social unrest. 
Considering the construction industry, government revenue is over-
estimated, it overcommits itself by initating too many projects at a 
time, and having carefully itemised them (see 8.3), gives them out on 
contract. Then shortfalls in projected funds become apparent, and 
government either has to resort to deficit financing, or call a 
mandatory halt to some of the projects. Each of these measures has 
actually been used on occasion: both have been harmful to the industry. 
Inflationary deficit financing has tended to increase demand for 
construction in both the public and private sectors, leading to severe 
shortages in the industry's resources, and an escalation of building 
costs, Suspending projects under construction or 1n the pipeline has 
created operational difficulties for individual firms and tended to 
depress the industry. (See 6. 5 . 2) . 
Even when projects are not terminated or suspended, inaccurate 
financial planning leads to delays in payments that should be made to 
contractors working on public projects. Moreover, lack of data on 
foreign exchange receipts for ensuing fiscal years does not permit the 
advance importation of essential constructional materials, nor does the 
absence of accurate estimates of present and future requirements of 
vital human and material resources help the formulation of appropriate 
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measures for their continued development. (See 6.5.3 and 8.4). 
Generally, government does not have sufficiently reliable 
information on the performance of the economy as a whole, or of its 
various sectors. Where the targets in plans are questionable, it 
becomes difficult to institute adequate control mechanisms, and 
indiscipline and inefficient performance result. As the authors of the 
1975-80 Plan made clear: 
"With the flow of very poor information or the absence 
of such flows, policies and programmes are ad hoc and 
very difficult to assess '" the very poor data base 
contributes towards an inability to establish clear 
goals, functional or operational division of 
responsibilities and the associated personnel and 
supporting services required for efficient performance 
for the achievement of ... over-all targets ... ,,27 
8.3. Annual Budgets 
The prevailing development plan provides the basis for the 
preparation of government's annual budgets. These are in two parts: 
the first is a statement of economic policies and a brief outline of 
major programmes with details of estimated revenue and expenditure for 
the public sector, and an account of funds provided for the various 
ministries and departments, as well as major development projects. The 
second is an itemised list of projects, by Ministries, and the amount 
of money allocated to each of them in the fiscal year. This is called 
"the Estimates", a voluminous collection of every single public project, 
no matter how small, in every part of the country. Thus Ghana does its 
"construction sum" each year (see 8.1). Yet this has nothelpeJ to 
stabilise demand: several problems plague the budget preparation, 
implementation and control exercises. 
8.3.1. The Budgeting Process 
The preparation of government's annual budget begins when the 
Ministry of Finance circulates a letter which outlines financial policy 
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and priorities for the coming year, and hence schemes most likely to 
be approved by government. 
8.3.1.1. Regional Level 
Each department in the regions prepares its estimate of capital 
arid recurrent expenditure, and the regional office of the Ministry of 
Economic Planning, having already helped in the preparation of the 
departmental estimates, arranges a regional budget hearing at which 
heads of the departments present their budgetary estimates. This is to 
allow the Ministry to coordinate the var10US development schemes. But 
since it 1S merely advisory, with no real enforcing authority, the 
Ministry's advice is usually ignored, and schemes are often presented 
. 1 A 28 d1rect y to cera (See Fig; 8.1). 
This situation has resulted in unbalanced or unisectora1 
development in several parts of the country. For example, hospitals and 
estate houses remain unoccupied for several years pending the supply of 
one or the other, or both, of water and electricity because the Housing, 
Water and Sewerage, and Electricity Corporations have separate, 
29 
uncoordinated schemes . 
8,3.1.2. Head Offices 
he 
At the head offices of the departments the regional heads defend 
their estimates, which are, invariably, too high. Officials usually 
underestimate projects and tend to spread a small financial figure over 
a large number of projects with the hope that, once the project has 
begun, government would finance it to completion. Again, at this stage, 
not even the senior officials of the department are aware of the financial 
constraints on the economy (see 8.2.7), and hence what the rea1~stic 
size of the budget or number of projects should be. Furthermore, many 
projects (except those using standard drawings) would not have been 
.' 
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designed (even sketchily) at this point, nor would an accurate cost 
estimate have been prepared. 
8.3.1.3. The Ministr~ 
The departmental estimates are presented to the Ministry of 
Economic Planning which compares the~stimates with what the economy can 
bear, and suggests which projects should be implemented. It then phases 
the projects out, preparing a programme for each, and proposing a 
financial allocation to it. The final budget and estimates are prepared 
by the Ministry of Finance. But the 'listed' projects are not the only 
ones initiated in practice. 
8.3.2. Pirate Project~. 
In addition to the 'approved' list of projects for which funds 
are allocated in the annual estimates others can be awarded to contractors 
by high government officials, especially regional commissioners, as a 
means of ingratiating themselves or the government with the local 
.. 
population or with contractors lobbying for work. This has served to 
increase pressure on the public exchequer; the money runs out before 
the end of the fiscal years: interim payment certificates go unhonoured 
for months, and friction between client and contractor mounts. (See 
7.5.1-2 and 9.7.3). 
In 1978 government decided to act against this practice. Rather 
than trying to enforce discipline amongst its own senior members and 
officials, it put the onus on contractors: it refused to pay for any 
. d 30 
un11ste contracts There is the ironical arrangement whereby any 
contractor, after having been awarded a contract by government, has to 
enquire~y writing to the Director of Budgets, Ministry of " Finance) 
from the government whether provision has been made for that project 1n 
the ~overnment's) budget. 
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8.3.3. Bureaucracy and Arbitrariness 
The phenomenon of unlisted or pirate projects is but one aspect 
of the weakness of the budgetary control system. Public sector finances 
can only be disbursed by the Hinistry of Finance, and this after a 
devious bureaucratic process deliberately prolonged and comp1icated31 
to establish a measure of accountability through a large number of checks 
d h k b ff " 1 32 an counter-c ec s y 0 lCla s . 
On construction projects, the annual budgetary allocations, ideally 
the amount of work that the average contractor would do in a year, are 
arbitrarily established: they are unrelated to prepared construction 
programmes, 'being figures arrived at by administrators on considering I 
the total sum granted the particular department, and the number of 
projects approved for that sum. On some occasions, smaller allocations 
are made to deliberately slow down work on the project, and projects 
already in progress may be suspended by being excluded from the list. 
When a conscientious contractor execute~ work above the amount provided, 
the normal procedure is to continue to pay him in the hope that not all 
projects will exhaust their budgetary allocations. The purpose of the 
financial planning exerCise is thus defeated33 . 
8.3.4. Evaluation 
The government of Ghana has, for several years, done its 
"construction sum" but this has not succeeded in ensuring that demand 
for construction is stable, due to poor assessment of the performance of 
the economy, weakness and lack of coordination in the budgetary control 
system, unwi11in[ness of government to follow its own policy guidelines, 
or dogmatic adherence to inappropriate ideas, bureaucracy, inter-
organisational conflict and non-cooperation, and clashes of personalities . 
• 
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8.4. Resource Planning 
In most of the country's development plans and budgets, planning 
for the improvement and expansion of the local construction industry has 
mainly involved an indication of government's broad policies for the 
construction industry. These have included: the creation or 
strengthening of institutions, production and supply of materials, 
development of human resources, prov~s~on of finance for the industry 
and its clients, and the review of procedures and regulations. 
8.4.1. Policy and Circumstance 
Like general economic policies (see 6.4.1-7) those for 
construction have been guided by prevailing socio-economic conditions 
and priorities (see also 3.3-4). In 1951 the country had considerable 
reserves of foreign exchange but its desire to expand the infrastructure 
and provide housing for the people was being impeded by inadequate 
docking facilities at the country's ports, and hence shortages and long 
delays in the supply of materials, most of which were imported. 
Government intended to produce materials locally, to introduce 
mechanisation as a means of increasing the capacity of the industry, and 
to train personnel ~n construction skills. 
This policy was pursued until 1966, and saw the establishment of 
factories for producing items such as cement, steel, paints, aluminium 
sheets, precast concrete, ceramic sanitary fittings, and bricks and 
tiles. Courses for training professionals and technicians in 
construction were also introduced. This same period witnessed the 
reorganisation of the Public Works Department into the more effective 
Ghana National Construction Corporation. (See 7. 3. 1. 5) . 
The Two-Year and One-Year Plans of 1968 and 1970 respectively 
emphasised the need to reduce reliance on imports and use labour-
intensive methods of production. The demand for construction was to be 
kept at reasonable levels: 
"Road improvement and reconstruction work,will only be 
undertaken when such activities are considered essential 
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in terms of their economic returns and to the extent that 
public administration can cope with the additional demand." 34 
Specific measures included the easing of import restrictions, especially 
on cement; at the same time, it was declared that: 
"Government will encourage research into the extensive 
use of local building materials. ,,35 
Indigenous contractors would be encouraged; the better ones among them 
would be given more contracts. It was also 
I' ••• the policy of the Government to seek the full and 
proper utilization of the nation's human resources in 
order to achieve economic progress ... this ... can only 
be attained if there is an effective and coordinated 
adaptation and application of our educational systems and 
facilities to the task of raising the skill lev~ls of the 
labour force through formal training as well as learning 
on the job ... accompanied by an adequate incentive system 
to stimulate our skilled workers to contribute adequately 
to the development effort. ,,36 
8.4.2. Current Programme 
The most comprehensive attempt to plan the development of the 
construction industry's resources was made in the current plan (1975-80). 
Production targets for key constructional materials were established 
(see Table 8.1); generally, government would seek: 
" ... the expansion and rehabilitation of existing building 
materials industry ... the encouragement of research into 
new materials; promotion of the use of local materials 
through demonstration projects, The dissemination of 
research findings through [regional] information centres, 
and the effective regulation of building materials 
distribution. ,,37 
The standardisation of building components would also be pursued, and 
attempts would be made to reduce building costs. 
A programme for training was formulated: this would involve: 
" ... an expansion of the programme for artisans and 
technicians offered at the polytechnics ... at other 
technical institutes ... [and] increases in the intake 
of ... professional categories."38 
As for local construction firms, the aim was to increase 
TABLE 8.1: Five Year Development Plan (1975-80) Production Targets for Selected Building Materials 
Estimated Production Targets 
Material Unit Production 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Cement Tons 550,000 600,000 660,000 700,000 750,000 
Pipes Tons 26,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 
Roofing Sheets Tons 50,000 55,000 60,000 80,000 80,000 
Burnt Bricks Pieces 1,000,000 10,000.000 18,000,000 20,000,000 . 20,000,000 
Wall TUes Pieces 40,000 48,000 58,000 75,000 80,000 
Water Closets Pieces 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 
Hinges and Door1ocks Pieces 3,000,000 3,300,000 3,600,000 4,000,000 4,000,000 
Window and Door Frames Pieces 500,000 550,000 600,000 700,000 800,000 
Paint Gallons 1,000,000 1,200,000 1,400,000 2,000,000 2,000,000 
Source: Five-Year Development Plan, 1975/76 - 1979/80~ 
1980 
800,000 
60,000 
80,000 
I 
20,000,000 I 
80,000 I 
30,000 I 
I 
I 
4,000,000 
I 
I 800,000 
2,000,000 I 
N 
N 
\..n 
" contracting capacity by encouraging professional 
personnel to enter the ... industry while efforts will 
be made to improve the managerial and technical 
competence of existing contractors."39 
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Some of the legal and technical constraints on the industry would 
be removed through the formulation and implementation of: 
" ... policies and strategies ... to streamline and 
strengthen the physical planning system [and] 
Revision of ~he national building code ... to allow for 
the use of local building rnater~als.'~O 
8.4.3. Ad Hoc Group of Experts 
The government appointed,~n 1976, a working party to prepare 
guidelines for a national housing policy. The group observed, in their 
report, that the housing problem had persisted ~n spite of isolated 
efforts to deal with it, and that a projection of future demand showed 
an alarming picture which called for determined and urgent action to 
increase housing production and reduce building costs. But it was 
". ,. not possible for the building industry to grow 
rapidly unless some infrastructural facilities are also 
simultaneously developed. These include facilities 
required for material production and for the production 
of plant and equipment necessary for the construction 
industry. "41 
The strategies to be adopted to achieve increased efficiency 
within the industry should include: 
"Assistance to private contractors; organisation of 
training courses for supervisors; promotion of 
systematic industria1isatiori of various construction 
operations; application of most appropriate technology 
in construction operations; ... ,,42 
Trai~ing programmes should find ways of utilising productively the 
abundant unskilled labour in an economically viable way. Physical 
planning legislation and land management procedures were defective and \ 
needed reviewing. Research should be supported, especially studies of 
a socio-economic nature which would ensure that a better understanding 
of the people's cultural heritage would permit optimum utilisation of 
the available human and material resources. 
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The group also suggested that data on construction should be Illore 
effectively collected by strengthening and staffing the Central Bureau 
of Statistics at the national and district levels, by increasing the 
technical staff of local authorities to enable them collect statistics, 
and by encouraging research institutions to pursue statistical surveys. 
8.5. A Comparison 
There is a remarkable similarity between, on the one hand, the 
past and present construction progrannnes and policies of the government 
of Ghana and the advice of its own experts, and on the other hand, the 
recommendations made by the international experts on the subject. (See 
Chapter 5, especially the 'Synthesis", 5.6). 
The clear implication is that whereas the general belief is that 
developing countries lack any long-term plans, programmes or policies 
for their construction industries 43 , Ghana has not only had these for 
decades, but has actually been trying, or has been and is being advised 
to, and is intent on continuing to, do basically what the experts have 
been prescribing for the solution of the problems of the construction 
industries of developing countries. Thus it is pertinent to use Ghana's 
exper1ences to assess the current ideas on construction 1n developing 
countries, as this thesis attempts to. 
8.6. Evaluation 
. 
A measure of the limited success of all the elaborate plans and 
programmes for construction 1S underscored by the persistence of the 
problems they were meant to solve. The issues facing the industry in 
1951 were outlined as: the reliance on imported materials, high cost 
of building materials, shortage of skilled labour and the lack of 
mE\chanisation in the indu·stry44. 
In 1975 there were the same problems and more: the undeveloped 
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state of local building materials and dependence on imported materials, 
high cost of construction and land, obsolete planning legislation and 
building codes, ineffective land management systems, shortage of sta.ff, 
and a lack of coordination between institutions which had been created 
to deal with the problems of the industry45 
It may be argued that with the volume of construction activity 
increasing over the years, the problems were bound to become more 
numerous or more serious. But plans and programmes are drawn up 
essentially to anticipate, and try to alleviate future developments. 
A detailed appraisal of the policies formulated for the development 
of each resource is essayed in following chapters, but generally the 
plans for construction have foundered for the same reasons as national 
development plans: poor data base, rapid political changes, lack of 
commitment on the part of politicians and administrators, inter-
organisational conflict and personal rivalries, and shortages of 
professional staff (see 8.2.3.1-2). The failure of the economy to grow, 
and in particular shortages of foreign exchange, has also impeded the 
implementation of some vital programmes such as the expansion of 
materials producing industries. 
Most important, the inability of the industry to improve its 
efficiency has also had implications for it: construction projects such 
as educational facilities, factories and roads, needed to support the 
supply to the industry of its own vital resources are delayed, 
accentuating the shortages and other difficulties. 
8.7. Consideration of Objectives 
Thus, even at this early stage 1n the thesis, and b~fore particular 
issues are considered 1n detail, it is clear that measures not dissimilar 
to those found in current theories for the improvement of construction 
1n developing countries (see 'Synthesis" 5.6) have had limited success 
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in Ghana. This thesis will endeavour to identify, in detail, factors 
that hindered the successful implementation of these measures, and those 
that might have helped. This will help in the formulation of a 
practical programme for developing Ghana's construction industry, and 
also in the suggestion of modifications to current ideas on the 
construction industries of developing countries. 
8.8. Conclusion 
8.8.1. Construction ln Development Planning 
P'rogrammes for the construction industry ln Ghana's development 
plans are not grouped under a single chapter for construction, but are 
to be found under sector headings such as manufacturing (materials 
industries), transport (road projects and road contractors), housing 
(the whole industry) and manpower development (skilled personnel). In 
the budget, construction is covered under infrastructure and hOl1sing. 
The casual observer may mistakenly conclude that the industry is 
neglected in the plans and budgets. 
The annual estimates are, essentially, an attempt to do the 
"construction sum" for the public sector. 
8.8.2. Plans not Ends 
The existence of construction programmes, plans and lists of 
Drojects has not made much difference to the prosperity of the local 
construction industry since they have not succeeded in influencing 
day-to-day actions which are more ln the form of reactions to crisis 
situations. Th~ political commitment and the machinery needed to 
implement and control such measures are lacking. 
Plans and classified lists of projects are not ends in themselves, 
and will remain academic unless the will, system and resources for their 
implementation are available. These have been lacking in Ghana. The 
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economy has failed to reach the levels of expansl.on expected of it, 
and its various sectors have, therefore, been unable to obtain the 
wherewithal on which the programmes for their development rely. (See 
6.4.2-7). 
8.8.3 .. factors to Consider 
The foregoing (8.8.2) does not mean that planning should not be 
undertaken: what it suggests is that planning alone is not sufficient. 
In calling for planning and the virtues thereof one should attempt to 
assess whether the circumstances and machineries for obtaining accurate 
and realistic plans, for successfully putting the plans into operation 
and for monitoring, controlling and reviewing them are available and 
whether the data base for long..,.term planning exists. Otherwise, planning 
is, at best, a window-dressing prestige exercise and the document merely 
an addition to the mouldy volumes on official desks and library shelves: 
worse, a plan with erroneous targets can be harmful. 
8.8.4. Suitability of Ghana 
Without having considered all the aspects in detail it is clear 
that, generally, the main proposals in current theories on construction 
in developing countries have not had significant success over some three 
decades of application in Ghana. This indicates that there is a case 
for assessing them, which this thesis tries to do. The similarity 
between these main proposals and policy in Ghana makes the country's 
experience particularly suitable for the purpose. 
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9.1. Introduction 
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CHAPTER 9 
PROCEDURES 
"What is needed is a thorough reappraisal of 
performance requirements in terms of local 
conditions and a drastic change in the '" 
regulations and standards obstructing construc-
tion development. Unstable contractual practices, 
restrictive and antiquated statutory requirements 
and cumbersome administrative procedures -
especially in the public sector - must and can 
be removed through concerted national action 
and well-directed international technical 
assistance." 
- Turin, D.A., The Construction Industry: Its 
Economic Significance and Its Role 1n 
peve10pment, Part 1, Text 2nd Ed., BERU, 
UCERG, September 1973, p. C14. 
U[Ghana has a] weak information and research base 
for planning, resulting out of lacking resources 
... [therefore] questions of planning standards 
(densities, space ratios, service capacities, 
etc) have hardly been touched upon ... People's 
attitude towards density, over-crowding and 
privacy differ considerably from culture to 
culture; and even in one culture there may be 
marked and sometimes subtle differences and 
variations in such attitudes among different 
sub-cultures and social classes. Therefore ... 
account must be taken of the social, cultural and 
even historical· factors that affect social needs 
of people." 
- Ministry of Works and Housing, Report of 
Working Party on Guidelines for a National 
Housing Policy, Building and Road Research 
Institute, Kumasi, pp. 22 and 37. 
Most writers on the construction industries of the developing 
countries paint the picture of industries caught in a web of legal and 
technical constraints as a result of obsolete and inappropriate documents 
. d . 1 and pract1ces adopte from more advanced countr1es The usual 
suggestion is that these procedures can and should be changed. (See, 
for example, 5.3.1.2; 5.4.3.1; 5.4.3.3-4; 5.4.4.1 and tactic (4) 1n 
the 'Synthesis' 5.6). 
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The procedures and documents used in the construction process ~n 
Ghana will be discussed in this chapter, especially 
Land Acquisition 
Planning Permission 
Tendering 
Contract Documents and 
Contract Administration. 
9.2. The Process and Problems 
The formal part of Ghana's construction industry (see 4.4.1) ~s 
organised along lines similar to those of Great Britain2 . (See 3.4). 
The construction process basically follows the stages of: client's 
decision to build; acquisition of land; appointment of consultants; 
designing; application for planning permission; tendering; 
construction; and maintenance. The participants include clieuts; 
planners; architects; land and quantity surveyors; various kinds of \ 
engineers; contractors and subcontractors, the duties of each of which 
are clearly stated in the conditions of contract 3 . As ~s to be found ~n 
ma~y other countries, there are technical difficulties involved ~n 
organising any construction project, not the least of which is the 
inevitable conflict of interests, jealousies and professional snobbism 
h .. 4 of t e part~c~pants (See 3.6.6.). 
Everywhere, drawings are insufficient in terms of detail; clients 
are impatiertto see work commence and end on site, not appreciating the 
nature of the consultants' work; tendering periods are too short to 
allow contractors to price the bills of quantities accurately; 
contractors do not receive vital production information on time; and so 
on. These arise from insufficient executive capacity and the very 
peculiar characteristics of and arrangements ~n, the construction 
5 process . (See 3.7). 
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This chapter discusses 1.n detail the procedures and documents 
listed above as each relates to Ghana. It becomes c12ar that in 
addition to the above difficulties, the procedures and documents u.sed 
1.n the country have a long history or are caught up 1.n traditional law 
or central government's machinery and are so de~ply embedded, or so 
complicated in extent, that they cannot be altered successfuUy in the 
short or medium term. It is also shown that the multi-disciplinary 
effort and cooperation, vital to any exercise of radical change, are 
unlikely to be forthconling. Moreover, the machinery for enforcing such 
measures may be difficult to establish. 
The weakness of existing machineries 1.S revealed to show that not 
only will the enforcement of new procedures be difficult, but also that 
since present provisions are not usually followed they cannot be 
entirely blamable for the constraints on the efficiency of the industry. 
9.3. Land Acguisition 
Acquiring a plot of land in Ghana is a hazardous and lengthy 
process which has frustrated many public and private development schemes. 
In such a situation the logical proposal would be to attempt to 
rationalise and simplify the transactions and procedures pertaining to 
land (see 5.3.1.5, 5.3.2.2 and tactic (4) of 5.6). When the isstie 1S 
studied in detail, however, it becomes clear that solutions cannot be 
so simple. 
9.3.1. Ownership 
6 Land is held under four categories of ownership 1n Ghana : 
(See also 7.61-4) 
(a) Private or family land: ancestral land belonging to the whole 
(b) 
extended family group or accredited individual representatives; 
7 Stool or skin land ; 
vested in the chief; 
land belonging to the traditional area, 
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(c) Stool or skin land ves ted in the State: traditional land vested 
in the President on behalf of.the.Republic; and' 
(d) Government land: land acquired by government. 
Under each system of ownership the procedure for negotiations 
bet,,,een the prospective buyer and the rightful owner of the land is 
different, so is the tenure of o\mership. 
9.3.2. Transactions 
Transactions for the purchase of private land are conducted on 
behalf of the family by a representative, but has to be approved by all 
the elders or other members of the family. Land disputes and litigation 
are most connnon ill this category of ownership. The accredited 
representative is difficult" to identify, and the same plot of land 1S 
frequently sold to different individuals or organisations by different 
members of a family. Where government wishes to acquire land, haggling 
over who should rece1ve compensation has tended to delay projects. 
The chief has the powe~ to lease or sell plots of stool or skin 
land. The practice differs from one part of the country to another: 1n 
certain areas land cannot be sold at all: it can only be leased out. 
TIle vesting of stool or skin land in the state was part of 
government's effort to ensure even development and to prevent hoarding 
of valuable urban land. Government does not pay compensation for and 
does not own all of this categQry of land, and. the purchaser has to 
negotiate with and "pay" the family or person owning the land before, or 
in addition to, applying for a government lease. 
Government; under present legislation8 , has the power to acqu1re 
land in any part of the country subject to the payment of adequate 
compensation to the rightful owners. It can uti.lise such lands directly 
for public projects, or lease it out to pri.vate developers (see 7.6.2). 
Disputes over the value of compens.'Ltion, 'Nhich is di fficult to deterrl1ine 
especially in this period of galloping iriflation, or refusal to move for 
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traditional or emotional reasons hav~ disrupted many a development plan. 
In 8everal instances persons have had t~ be forcibly ejected from land 
9 purchased by government 
These issues were summarised by Abrams (1964): 
"In Ghana, ... Builders, individuals who wanted to build 
houses, and government agencies that wanted to make 
mortgage loans all found it difficult to go ahead with 
their plans because of the uncertainty of titles ... 
'~urchasers also encountered trouble over defective or 
undecipherable conveyances, and over tracts 
which had been conveyed by two separate 
chiefs, one of .whom had no right to sell. Sorlle land was 
held by so many individuals that it was impossible to find 
them all."lO 
Obtaining title to land is a complex issue which makes the 
acquisition of land a major bottleneck in the construction process. 
(See also 7.6.4), 
9.3.3. Rationalisation 
The government of Ghana has attempted to reduce the present 
confusion in matters pertaining to land. It requires that all documents 
on land should be deposited with the Lands Department (see 7.6.1); all 
grants of land made under customary law should be registered at the 
district courts; and all titles to land (including leases signed by the 
Minister of Lands and Mineral Resources) should be filed with the 
Registrar of Deeds in Accrall . 
However, not only has this centralised procedure further 
"lcccntuClted the land situation, but the measures have had little ~mpact 
ror a number of reasons: 
(a) the Lands Department ~s bound, under the law, to process and record 
11 1 d . 12 a an aocuments . The measures hav'c not' reduc.ed the occurrenee 
of different persons registering the same plot, and litigating over 
it; 
(b) there is no means of checking, physically, rightful ownership of 
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land ~n the absence of a national cadastral survey system. Survey 
b b 1 d . 1 13 ase maps are 0 so ete an 1ncomp, ete, ; 
(c) Ghana has no well-developed property mat"ket, and special ists like 
lawyers and estate agents pursuing an active practice in land 
matters are rare; a~d 
(d) the general public is ignorant of the correct procedures of land 
. .. 14 
acqul.sl.tl.on 
Under these circumstances, attempts at rationalisation have not 
been successful. A government committee observed that 
" ... the acquisl.tl.on of land within the present legislative 
machinery is rathel." chaotic, time consuming and ... c~n 
result in financial losses to those acquiring J.and . .,l.:> 
In August, 1978, government declared its intention of declaring all 
districts planning areas arid hence bringing all land under central 
control (ievesting them in the State). But this, if done, is bound to 
compound the present confusion. The difference in land acquisition 
practices from one place to another within the country will make the 
success of such a monolithic system limited. Morecver, the inefficiency 
which has characterised previous acquisitions of " land makes one 
sceptical about the success of such a large-scale venture. 
9.3.4. 
"Whilst the occasional land acquisition for public 
projects is nowhere near the massive expropriation 
implied in declaring all districts as planning areas, 
even such minor acquisitions have been unfair in 
many cases. 
" many of the Government officials entrusted with 
the job do not do it honestly or properly . .,l6 
Metaphysical Values 
Traditional Ghanaian society considers land the property of the 
ancestors, the present genenttion and those unborn. Present occupiers 
are mere custodians responsible for preserving the land and enhancing 
its value. Land is not just a factor of production, as the European 
, 
would see it, but part of the history J culture and religion of the 
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people. Economics is not allowed to interfere with such values, and a 
person OT persons may seem to behave irrationally by ~efusing tb accept 
more attractive (to others) alternati.ves in terms of better accoITL'Ilodatior: 
a.nd/or high financial compensation. (See also 1.3.6). This has 
occurred on several occasions 1n Ghana: it happened during the Volta 
River Project, and is evident in the refusal of the inhabitants of the 
Keta area to move to safer places from their "ancestral land" 
17 threatened by the sea 
Land policies, tlHorefore, need to consider the non-econom1C 
aspirations of the people if they are to have any success. As an 
editorial warned: 
9.3.5. 
"There are many things to consider in any measure 
involving major changes in the land tenure system 1n 
the country. The' first is to recognise that given the 
present traditions of land tenure there is no simple 
way to bring the system under centr.::tl control. ,,18 
Conclusion 
~------
Natters pertaining to land in Ghana are complex, reflecting 
history, tradition and culture. No easy approaches to the issue can 
make any real impact on the situation. Despite the impression gl.ven by 
s~veral Hriters on the subject (see 9.3), issues pertaining to land in 
Ghana cannot be approached in a simple, rational way. The availability 
of land for development will continue to be a constraint in the short 
and medium term. Realisti.c solutions can only be evolved through 
cooperation by traditional rulers, government, lawyers and the people. 
Land reform cannot be achieved easily and quickly in Ghana, or the cost 
of land reduced,.or land released to prospective developers more 
smoothly than at present (see 9.3 and 5.3.1 .. 5) until all the factors 
related to the issue are considered. 'Economic' or autocratic, albeit 
apparently rational, approaches to such a complex issue are unlikely to 
succeed. 
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9.4. ~lanning Pe·fmissi ..sm 
To ensure control in the use of urban land, pub.1ic safety and 
sound environmental conditions ~n urban development, governments have 
established physical planning and related units l9 to administer 
regulations, bye-laws and codes. (See 3.6.7). 
The planning procedures and building regulations, bye-'laws and 
codes in use in the developing countries are usually described as 
inappropriate (see 9.1-2 and tactic (4), 5.6). The situation in Ghana, 
with respect to these, is now considered. 
9.4.1. ConwJittees 
In Ghana, applications for permission to execute development 
schemes are made to the district statutory Planning Committees, 
composed of: 
District Chief Executive - Chairman 
Regional or District Town Planning Officer - Secretary 
An Architect (from the PWD or AESC, or the City Architect) 
Regional or District Lands Officer 
Regional or District Engineer of PWD or the City Engineer 
District Medical Officer of Health, and 
Representatives of the Department of Social Welfare and 
Community Development, and the District Council. 
Together w'ith the application, details of the proposed scheme: site 
layout, design drawings and structural drawings for buildings of two 
storeys or above are submitted. 
9.4.2. The Process 
The Town and Country Planning Department has the responsibility 
of processing the applications, first checking with the Lands Department 
to ensure that the applicant has registered ownership of the land to be 
developed. Before the formal meeting of the Planning Committee technical 
subcommittees, made up· of its professional members, consider the scheme 
in detail and relate it to existing building regulati.ons and bye-laws. 
The planning aspects exa:nined include the zon1ng and density 
criteria for the area of the proposed building. Those of design include 
wind direction, cross ventilation, room heights, daylighting, materials, 
the topography of the site, and the new building's relationship with 
its environment. 
h . h b h f l' . 20 Sc emes pass1ng t ese tests: a out tree-quarters 0 app 1cat1ons, 
are approved by the award of Development Permits to applicants. Rejected 
schemes may be resubmitted after the faults which are stated on the 
drawings by the committee are -rectified. The committees sit mont~ly 
(fortnightly 1n Accra) and theoretically, each development schewe should 
be approved within a month. But the process.does not end after this 
approval. 
9.4.3. Building Permit 
Development schemes passed by the Planning Committees are 
submitted to the PWD or City Engineer's Office, who check all electrical" 
wiring and plumbing and any mecaanical installations. They also check 
the design ,,,here reinforced concrete work is involved, or where the 
building is more than one storey tall. Finally, the office of the 
Ministry of Health inspect drainage, sewerage and other environmental 
aspects of the scheme. 
The PvlD then assess the rateable value of thE property (a 
percentage of estimated total cost), end a Building Permit is awarded 
the applicant by the building inspector at the Pw~ or City Engineer's, 
on payment of a determined -fee. 
The seemingly simple vetting exercise takes a considerable length 
of time because the PWD or City Engineer's do not have sufficient 
personnel "of the requisite calibre to execute the specialist duties. 
(See 7.3.2.1). But the need to safeguard public safety and health 
makes these checks important. As obse.rved by a government-appointed 
committee: 
II. t' the vetting of drawings and calculations takes a 
very long time, sometimes even more than a year, 
mainly due to the fact that the process is cumbersome 
and also that there are not enough trained personnel 
to do the job "21 
For this reason, designers and clients who can, especially professionals 
at the AESC and PWD, avoid the inconvenience of applying for planning 
permission. That they are able to build, anyway, is an indication of 
the weakness of the enforcing machinery; a point further underlined by 
widespread lunauthorisedldevelopment throughout the country. 
9.4.4. Building Regulations 
The building regulations used in Ghana are outdated. Each city 
or large urban area has such a document} with a recent date of 
b"l' . 22 h' hi" . b f pu. 1cat10n ,w 1C , on c oser exam1natlon, turns out to e a copy 0 
the one drawn up by expatriate architects of the colonial era. (See 
3.4). The regulations are specific about the types of materials to be 
used, rather than indicating the performance standards required, and 
have, on occasion, prevented or delayed the utilisation of well-
researched materials and components such as landcrete blocks (see 10.5.6). 
But they are not as restrictive in practice as they appear on paper 
because: 
(a) they are not strictly enforced due to the inability of the officers 
of the Town and Country Planning Department (see 9..'LS) and 
Building Inspectors of the local authorities to keep pace 
with the rapid rate of urban development; 
(b) there are no effective alternatives to the materials and procedures 
"b 23 ( 10 r) they prescr1 e see .0; and 
(c) designers accept them as reasonable: the presedregulations do not 
conflict with the designers' training background and their 
personal aspirations (see 11.8.1:0. 
Where "unauthorised development" has occurred, they have been ~n 
the suburbs and have not involved the formal part of the industry. 
Furthermore, the building regulations are applicable only in places 
designated statutory planning areas (see 9.4.5), thus their geographical 
extent is limited. 
Several architects interviewed in Ghana could not pin-point a 
clause in the regulations that they wanted changed, although one of them 
criticised the laid doym building/plot ratio. Another architect 
believed that standards should, of necessity, be high to indicate ~he 
level to which persons should aspire and yet another warned that just 
because something was old did not mean it was inappropriate. Thus 
architects generally supported the status quo. (See Appendix B. 2.5). 
It would be difficult in operatio-qal .~nd execut ive terms, to 
formulate separate regulations and bye-laws for each district but it ~s 
also no mean task to attempt to draw up a document that would be 
applicable allover the country, considering the differences in terrain, 
soil conditions, weather, purchasing power, culture and history of the 
various peoples. 
It is clear that building regulations can only remain guidelines. 
Their enforcement requ~res an exerc~se of judgement and technical 
pragmatism on the part of planning officers and building inspectors. The 
operations of the Town and Country PlanningDepartment are now discussed to 
show the weakness of the planning machinery, the dichotomy between 
planning and execution, and the limited effect that new planning 
legislation and building regulations can have unless other changes, vlhich 
will be difficult in the short- and medium term, are made. 
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Matters pertaining to physical planning and ~and use in Ghana 
are entrusted to the Town and Country Planning Department. It is 
d . h24 charge W1t 
(a) formulating and rev1s1ng goals, objectives and standards relating 
to the use and development of land, particularly for towns and 
cities with high rates of growth; 
(b) providing planning services to the public authorities and private 
developers with the aim of achieving the highest possible measure 
of health, efficiency and order in the physical environment; and 
(c) preparing or revising as well as implementing town and village 
development plans. 
The department 1S part of the civil serV1ce, with a Director as 
its head; and with branch offices in each of the 60 conurbations 
designated statutory planning areas. 
The physical planning process l.n Ghana derives its legal backing 
from the Town and Country Planning Ordnance, Cap 84 of 1945, and 
subsequent amendments: the Town and Country Planning Act, 1958 (Act 30), 
and the TO\vn Planning Amendment Act, 1960 (Act 33). The governnient 
admits that: 
"The physical planning system is weakened by obsolete 
planning legislatio~ and building codes, a defective 
urban planning machinery, ineffective land management 
system ... ,,25 
The powers available to the planning department under existing 
.]. 1" • d26 leg1s at10n are 1m1te ; this, and inadequate executive capacity, 
have reduced the effectiveness of the physical planning machinery. The 
Land Use Planning Con~ittee will make proposals for a new planning 
legislation. (See 7,6.4). 
The 'sterility of toe Planning Department stems from its lack of 
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administrative and executive pot"er, lack of prestige and t.henumerous 
problems it faces. 
9.4.5.2. 1be Physic_al Planning Process 
As a first step in the planning process, the district planning 
office prepares a master plan for the statutory area on which it invites 
comment from specialists or interested parties such as the PWD, 
Electricity Corporation and the Water and Sewerage Corporation. The 
plan is then exhibited in conspicuous places in the locality for public 
'view and reaction, after which it is sent to the regional planning 
office and then the head office of the planning department for its-
technical implications to be checked. Finally, it is submitted to the 
Minister for Works and Housing for approval. 
Under Cap 84 (see 9.4.5.1), district and area schemes have to be 
approved by the Minister. This approval. of a document prepared, checked 
and counterchecked by professionals, is not always a foregone conclusion. 
Some Ministers have insisted on certain changes or he.ve rejected some 
""hole schemes out of hand. This last stage of the physical p1anuing 
process entails the longest delay. Furthermore, as a committee observed, 
"Plan-making is restrictive in what it embraces and lags 
far behind the development momentum. ~~Jb.ere plans are 
made, they cannot be more than guide plans."27 
Plans usually bear little relation to the needs and aspirations of the 
people and are, therefore, difficult to implement. Planning is almost 
irrelevant; zoning laws are often ignored, not only by the general 
. b' .. 28 public but also government agencl.es and reputa Ie prl.vate organl.satl.ons. 
9.4.5.3. Development ~ontrol 
Bailding inspectors at PWD or City Engineers' and planning 
officers are required by Cap 84 to visit projects to enSure that 
materials and workmanshi~ are in a~cordance ~ith the building regulations. 
(See 9.4.4). Furthermore, no new works are to be occupied except a 
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certificate of completion has been issued by the inspecting agenc~es. 
These duties call for mobi1eins~ecting teams of requisite 
qualification and exper~ence but the dearth of vehicles and spares, 
as well as personnel have reduced the ability cf the agencies to 
f h · f' 29 per orm t ese ~mportant unctLons . 
9.4.5.4. Plan Execution 
The prestige of the Planning Department 1S further depressed by 
the arrangement for executing plans in Ghana. 
The Town and Country Planning Department lacks the power and 
funds to implement its schemes. Hany of its plans turn out to be " 
academic. 
"Physical planning at the local level is divorced from 
execution, central government being the tmom planning 
authority and the local authority remaining the principal 
authority to execute town planning proposals .. , Most 
urban planning schemes are never implemented, because 
the local planning establishment has no implementation 
fund (or power to raise one); n£ither are the planning 
schemes related to the budgets of local authorities \-lho 
principally have to implement them . .,30 
9.4.5.5. Constraints 
On the whole, the Town and Country Planning Department has been 
weak and as a result, 
" physical planning in the country has not evolved 
to a status and strength to operate effectively at 
national level ... "The lack of comprehensive physical 
planning legislation, as well as the non-existence of 
a strong, effective organisation at the national level 
for making physical planning policies, is a major 
obstacle to· the effective execution of government's 
policy: ,,31 
The department is not only constrained by inappropriate 
legislation, but also it is unable to obtain most of its vital inputs. 
Present survey base maps are inaccurate or outdated, and there 1S as yet 
no nation·a1 cadastral survey syste~l. (See also 9.3 . .3(b)). The 
department lacks a strong research and information base: hence it does 
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not have appropriate standards of densities, space ratios, service 
capacities and so on. 
The planning departmer..t used to be the sale employer of graduates 
~nd diplomates in planning but it now has to compete for these with a 
number of public and private organisations. With its low bidding power 
(being part of the civil service) and paucity of exciting and challenging 
job opportunities, it is fighting a losing oattle. Worse, in recent 
times experienced personnel of the department have resigned their posts 
to establish private consultancy firms and are now doing an increasing 
share of its work. 
The department ~s also starved of office acconunodation, equipment 
and vehicles. Furthermore, its lack of status among the community of 
organisations in Ghana, ste°ID1!ling from its obvious steril{ty, hinders 
the coordination of its activities with those of other bodies iilVolved 
in various aspects of planning and dOevelopment. 
9.4.6. Conclusion 
In Ghana building codes and regulations and planning procedures 
are effective only in the urban areas, and cover only part of the fermal 
sector of the industry. They are, therefore, not as restrictive or as 
great a hindrance on construction as they appear at first sight and as 
writers on construction in developing countries suggest (see 5.6). 
Changing these regulations ~s not only difficult, but will not achieve 
much,. considering the weakness of the implementing machinery. 
Thus approaches to the question of regulations, bye-olaws and codes 
should not be restricted to calls for their removal or revision (as was 
the case in most of Chapter 5) but should aolso consider to what extent 
new regulations and bye-laws will contribute towards the development of 
the industry, and how they are to be implemented. 
, 
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9.5. Contract Documents 
--. 
(For an introduction to this se~tion see 9.1-2). The documents 
to be used on a construction project in Ghana are listed in the 
~onditions of Contract, 
On building projects incorporating quantities the documents are: 
contract drawings, bills of quantities and the conditions of contract. 
Those without quantities use contract drawings, schedule of rates, basic 
materials pr1ces and wages list and the conditions of contract. 
Specifications do not constitute a contract document but main 
descriptions of standards of materials and workmanship are included 1n 
the bills and schedule of rates. The articles of agreement are added 
to the conditions of contract as a preface. 
Roads and civil engineering contracts have the £ollm'ling docume'nts: 
the tender, acceptance of the tender, articles of agreement, conditions 
of contract, specifications, drawings, priced bill of quantities and 
day works schedule, and schedule of rates and pr1ces, if any. 
Where external funds are involved additional contract documents 
may be used, for example, Conditions of Contract (International) FIDIC, 
on World Bank projects, or the General Conditions for Works on those of 
the European Development Fund. 
9.5.1. Performance Bonds 
Performance Bonds are ,required in Ghana only on projects under-
taken by foreign firms, or where the external financing agency insists 
on them, and also on projects of a special ~ature or those involving 
payment of foreign exchange to the contractor. 
They are easily obtainable from local banks, and since only large 
firms are required to acquire them, they do not constrain the operations 
of many contracting firms, as they do 1n many developing countries, for 
1 S', '1 d32 examp e, waZ1 an . 
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The level of quality, and amount .of detail in production drawings 
are a source of irritation and frustration to consultants, apart from 
designers, and contractors alike ~n most countries. The observations 
made ~n this section on the nature of dr'awings used on construction 
projects ~n Ghana.may 'l1ell apply ~n any other country, industrialised 
I . 33 or deve op~ng (See 3.7. and 9.2). 
The involvement of the contractor in the design is still a very 
rare practice in Ghana; drawings seldom provide sufficient solutions 
for constructional problems. Host building projects are commenced and 
completed on the sketchiest of dra<"ings, in some cases two sheets pf 
Al sized paper with planes), two elevations, a section or two, and a 
few structural details, if ~ny. 
To cite only one implication, the qu.antity surveyor not obtaining 
on time sufficient infonnation on \olhich to base the bill of quantities, 
and remaining uncertain of what , . ,ould actually happen on site, makes 
allowances to account for the 'unknowns'. The quantities in the bill 
thus become the result of guess\oi'Ork. 
Discrepancies between architeCts' and engineers' drawings are 
common, and the design can be changed, sometimes radically and 
substantially, at an advanced stage in construction. In several 
instances projects are begun before the design is finalised. (See also 
7.3.5.2-3). 
The observations made above indicat'2 areas where conflicts and 
disputes can arise during construction. Contractors wait long periods 
for vital infonna.tion, variation orders are numerous, costs soar, and 
disputes over settlement of reasonable unit rates for the extra work 
arise. (See also 8.2.7). 
In this context, the contractor needs considerable skills of 
prediction' as well as much tact and.patience in addition to technical 
and managerial expertise. 
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9.5.3. Specific~~~ 
Standard specifications ,,,ith few modifying cl"auses are used for 
n~st building and all civil engineering projects in Ghana, and they 
contain descriptions of items of work that may not be part of the 
proposed works. 
Although there 1S a Ghana Standards Board, it has done little 1n 
the field of construction, and specificatio~s continue to refer to 
British Standard Specifications (BSS) or Codes of Practice (cp). (See 
3.4. and 9. 2) . 
Specifications have been conservative for a number of reasons: 
(a) the nature of the existing building regulations and bye-laws -with 
which they comply; (See 9.4.4). 
(b) clients', including central government, bias tm.,ards conventional 
materials; 
(c) the training background of practis~ng designers; (See 11.8.1) 
Cd) general lack of knowledge about alternative materials. (See also 
10.6) . 
Specifications directly dictate the materials and quality of workmanship, 
and also go a long way to influence the choice of the method of 
construction, and ultimately, costs. (See 3.3). 
Present specification documents bear scant relation to the country's 
climatic and economic conditions, and have institutionalised the national 
overdependence on imported constructional inputs. (See 6.5.3). 
Government has had cause to complain that: 
"In many instances construction standards have been set 
too high for the requirements ... and costs have therefore 
been higher than they could have been.,,34 
Yet the factors listed above, governIng the nature of specifications 
used in Ghana, cannot be altered in the shqrt .. or medium - term. 
\ ,.~. 
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9 . .5 ,4. ~.~11 of Quantities 
There is a general rule of thumb,:in the constru'ction industry in 
Ghana that projects costing ~n excess of t500,OOO should incorporate 
bills of quantities. Because of the haste with which construction is 
carried out, however, this rule is not always followed: some multi-
million cedi projects are awarded on schedules of rates. Bills used 1.n 
Ghana are usually in the traditional format " a much criticised form 
considered difficult to price and use and to be wasteful in effort, by 
35 
experienced surveyors and estimators in Britain and elsewhere . 
9.5.4.1. Management Aid 
Idea.11y, the contract bill 1.S not only to provide a basis for 
awarding the contract and for estimating costs~ but also to help th~ 
h ' f h ,36 contractor l.n 1.S management 0 t e project , specifically to prepare 
items such as schedule of materials, 'labour requirements, cash flow 
statements, constructi.on programmes and production cost control systems, 
Unfortunately, however, few construction firms in Ghana can pr1.ce the 
existing bills, let alone use them as an aid to management. (See 13.5.3). 
Thus the opportunity a bill should provide for more efficient and 
economl.c execution of projects is seldom made use of. 
9,5.4.2. New Fo~ 
It seeres reasonable to suggtst that a new bill format that most 
Ghanaian contractors can understand and use effectively should be 
formulated, (See 9.1 and tactic (4) of 5.6). 
37 A study conducted by the author (1975) indicated that the most 
app~opriate form of bill of quantities Tliould be one in which quantities 
were broken up into components of labour, ma~erials and plant (where 
possible), and the units for materials were the same as obtained on the 
market. For example; inst,earl of referring to concrete in a column in 
cubic yards of placed concrete, the quantities of cement, sand and coarse 
aggregate v;rould be given separately. Again, as much as possible) the 
location of the item would be indicated. 
It was also found advisable that specifications could be provided 
as notes on the drawings rather than in voluminous seldom-read documents. 
However, any attempt to introduce a new bill format faces 
obstacles such as: 
(a) The ,Ghana Government Conditions of Contract for Building Works 
(with quantities) states in Clause 11(1) that bills of quantities 
shall be measured according to the prov1s10ns of the Standard 
Method of Measurement issued by the British Royal Institute of 
38 Chartered Surveyors 
This clause should be amended or deleted before any new format 
can be introduced. Furthermore, an al ternative method of measure·-
39 
ment should be developed to guide the preparation of the novel 
form of bills. 
The solution cannot be realised l.n the short or medium term, 
considering the time it will take to work out the new standard 
method and bill formats, the sort of opposition to be expected from 
established surveyors, and the period that participants in the 
construction process need to acquaint themselves with the fiew 
documents. 
(b) The scale of fees of the Ghana Institution of Surveyors specifies 
higher charges if bills other than the traditional format are 
prepared. Clients would, therefore, have to be convinced to pay 
more for the surveyor's services if the scheme should work. If 
that fails, ·there is the danger that several clients will dispense 
with surveyors' services, and the practice where designers provide 
sketchy, yet acceptable (to clients) cost advice will become more 
widespread. 
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9.5.5. Schedule of Rates 
The schedule of rates 1.8 essentially a short'version of the 
traditional bill but without quantities set against the descriptions 
of the key constructional items. 
It is no easier for contractors to use than bills of quantities, 
and holds the additional danger that it tends to oversimplify issues, 
appears an easy and ready solution to all pre-contract problems, yet 
leads to disputes during construction. Nevertheless, it has become an 
ubiquitous contract document in the search in Ghana for short-cuts 1.n 
the construction process. (See 7.3.5.3). 
9.5.6. Conditions of Contract 
Three types of standard forms of conditions of contract are used 
1.n Ghana: 
(a) Government of Ghana, Articles of Agreement and Conditions of 
Contract for Building Works (applicable only where quantities form 
part of the contract). Form A. 
(b) Government of Ghana, Articles of Agreement and Conditions of 
Contract for Building Works (applicab Ie v:here quantities do not 
form part of the contract). 
(c) Government of Ghana, Articles of Agreement and. Cond.itions. of 
Contract for use 1.n connection with Road vlorks and Civil 
Engineering Construction~ Form B. 
The origina.1 editions of these documents \-,ere published by 
pre-independence PWD. They have since been reprinted under a number of 
"editions" by the AESC and Highway Authority. At present, the PWD and 
AESC use a 4th Edition of (a) Form A, published in 196640 , whereas the 
Highway Authority uses a 1st Edition of the. same document, published in 
197741 , both editions similar in content to the original in every respect. 
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A comparison of the various forms with their Eritish counterparts 
reveals a remarkable similarity, all the clauses being substantially 
the same, except in cases where those that do not clearly apply to 
. l~2 ~ Ghana, for example those on lev~es and taxes ,have been removed, and 
a few necessary additions made, for example, to indicate that payment 
43 
would be ~n local currency (a) and (b) are, 'more or less 1 carbon 
cop~es of their equivalents, the Forms of Contract of the Royal Institutt~ 
of British Architects (1963 Edition) and (c) that of the Conditions of 
Contract for Civil Engineering Construction issued by·the Institute of 
Civil Engineers of Britain (Edition 9). 
The clauses of the British documents present a formidable 
challenge even to experts in contract law and their interpretations are 
frequently subjects of dispute44 Unfortunately, the Ghanaian documents 
have not been revised since they were first published, although the 
British vers~ons have been revise.d several times. A fe\o, private 
surveying firms in Ghana use (on private projects) the latest edition 
of the Form of Contract issued by the Joint Contracts Tribunal in 
Britain45 . The· documents ·are particularly a problem for the small 
contractor. 
In general, the terms of the contract appear to be aimed at safe·' 
guarding the client's interest at the expense of the contractor. The 
powers of the participant's arE) also not commensurate with their 
responsibilities: architects or engineers, especially, have very wide 
powers, although they have no financial liabilities (see also 3.6.6). 
9.5.6.2. Consultants 
Consultants have often acted in ways .which prejudiced the 
successful execution of the project and resulted in losses to the 
contractor or client. Although placed in a position of arbit~ation 
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between the parties to the contract, consultants havp. tended to favour 
the client, being often preoccupied with ensuring that he gets value 
for his money. 
They also, usually, fail to create the atmosphere conducive to 
46 
smooth project execution, usurping one another's powers or failing 
to cooperate as the conditions of t.he contract imply. 
Since most contractors in Ghana cannot understand the clauses of 
t he contract) they are at the mercy of the professionals and the 
attitude of the latter becomes important. On several occasions it 
behoves the consultant to explain to or remind ~ontractors about some 
of their rights, especially on matters relating to finance. For 
example, claims for variations and fluctuations47 . 11'lere is, however, 
the need for a balance to he struck between, on the one hand, the amount 
of help a consultant can give to a contractor without arous1ng 
suspicions of collusion48 and, on the other hand, the possibility that, 
unless the contractor avails himself of all his rights under the contract, 
he may be unable to complete the project, or may even court bankruptcy. 
9.5.6.3. Clients 
Most clients, especially government, do not honour their 
obligations under the contract: payments due to the contractor are 
delayed, or contracts suddenly suspended or terminated at the client's 
pleasure. (See 8.3.2-3). The public sector client is so unpredictable 
that many of the larger, better established firms refuse to. tender for 
its projects. 
Government. can be said to be in breach of the contract at all 
times because, having assumed responsibility for the distribution of 
k . 1 49. f . .. l' . d . 1 . '1' 50 ey mater1a.s ,1t has B11ed to ma1nta1n tle1r cont1nue ava1 aC1 1ty . 
Although remedies are prescribed by the conditions for the 
contractor in cases of a.breach by ·the client, these have, as yet, not 
always been made use of because: 
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(a) most of the affected firms are not aware "of their rights; (see 
(b) the clauses of the conditions are vague 1n certain parts. For 
example, although they specify that if the client interferes 
with the issuing of a certificate, the contractor may terminate 
h · . 51.. d' ff' l' . . d 1 1S appo1.ntment , 1.t 1.S 1 1.CU t 1.n pract1.ce to J11 ge exact y 
when a client's representative "interferes with or obstructs the 
issue of any certificate". For instance, when an official. does 
not sign a certificate because he is "too busy" or away on tour, 
does this amount to "interference"? 
(c) government 1.S usually the guilty "party, but because many 
registered contractors rely on it for their work they would be 
reluctant to assume positions antagonistic to it; and 
(d) the ultimate remedy for the contractor is the termination of his 
contr::lct, but this becomes difficu~t for firms, which are often 
job-starved, to effect52 . 
9.5.6.4. Contractors 
Most construction firms 1.11 Ghana are small, and few knmol theiI. 
rights and obligations under the contract. It is common for contractors 
to do extra work on the instruction of persons other than the architect. 
All too often, contractors consider fluctuation or even variation 
payments gratuitous or as unearned profit. 
Their relative ignorance has given them a feeling of false 
security or even invincibility. For example, in the present situation 
of frequent, severe shortages of materials (see Chapter 10) some small 
contractors continue to accept contracts without fluctuation clauses 
(in Ghana projects of less than six months duration do not have such 
clauses) or those with high penalties for delayed completion, whereas 
the more knowledgeable ones would ~void such contracts. (See 9.5.6.3) 
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Contractors are often unable to fulfil their part of the contract: 
53 
many projects are delayed or abandoned . Disputes with consultants 
and clerks of works over the quality of materials and workiaanship are 
~lso common. 
Rigid enforcement of the remedies at the client's disposal has 
resulted 1.11 several project suspensions and terminations allover the 
country. The picture therefore emerges of a construction industry 
largely unable to seek redress for ills done to it but severely and 
publicly penalised for its faults, many of which are attributable to 
the environment in which it operates. 
9.5.6.5. The Environment 
Derived from British "experience, the conditions of contract 
assume a socio-economic environment that does not exist in Ghana. Many 
of the clauses are academic and impossible to implement. For instance, 
due to the inefficiency of the postal system, correspondence amongst 
the parties cannot occur with the expected speed and reliability: the 
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"seven days rule" and other minimum periods set in the documents are 
difficult to adhere to. 
In addition, non-availability of materials and equipment or their 
high prl.ces, lack of executive capacity and inadequate transport 
facilities in the client organisations (see 7.5.1-4) all tend to 
hamper the effective enforcem~nt of the conditions of contract. 
9.5.7. Conclusion 
The cont"ract documents used in Ghana are of British or1.g1.n and 
are considered difficult even by qualified "persons. They lead to 
delays, conflicts and increased costs and t;end to frustrate, in 
particular, the development of small contractors. They appear unsuited 
to "the environment of Ghana's construction industry. It is, however, 
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not possible for appropriate documents to be de.veloped for the country 
without much effo.:-t, multi-discipl inary cooperation, 'support from 
government and other clients, including some sacrifices and much time. 
In the short and medium term, the .prob1ems connected with the contract 
documents will persist, 
9.6. Tendering 
(For an introduction to this section see 9.1-2). 
All existing forms of tendering have been or are being used in 
Ghana. The most common are Open, Selective and Negotiated Tendering, 
but there have also been Serial, Two-Stage, and "Turnkey" Tendering. 
The method chosen depends upon the type of client, as \>Jell as upon the 
usual criteria of time, size and sophistication, and location of the 
project, 
Central government is usually called upon by \vriters on 
construction in developing countries to use its tendering procedure to 
. d' 55 encourage 1n 1genous contractors It 1S, thus, instructive to 
consider the normal practice of this type of client in Ghana. 
9.6.1. PoU:,.£Y 
196 7 . ., 56 1 11 . In I government 1ssued a d1rect1ve t 1at a projects 
costing more than r/.2,l~OO should go to tender. Those exceeding t300,OOO 
in cost were to be awarded by.the Central Tender Board, those costing 
between 616,666 and r/.300,OOO were to be handled by the Regional 
Advisory Tender Committees, and those below tl6,666 but over i2,400 by 
Departmental Advisory Committees. 
The Central Tender Board, with headquarters 1n the Ministry of 
Finance, is an inter-departmental committee which makes recommendations 
on the award of contracts to government, thr,')ugh the Minister of Finance. 
\ 
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The members are senior officials of the Minis tries of fin;lnce, Economic:: 
Planning and Works and Houf'ing, and a.few other persons appointed by 
gove rnmen t . 
Professionals of the PWD, AESC, Ghana Highway Authority or any 
relevant specialised agency, are coopted to advise the board ,.,hen the 
need arises, 
9.6.3. ~egional Tender Committees 
On being joined by the Regional Commissioners as Chairmen, the 
Regional Advisory Tender Committees have become executive. Members 
include the Regional Administrative Officer, the Regional Economic 
. Planning Officer, the regional heads of the AESC, PHD, High,.,ay 
Authority and client ministries, and of any specialised agency whose 
advise may be considered necessary, such as the Electricity Corporation. 
Smaller projects are delegated to departmental committees for 
consideration. These committees make recommendations to the Regional 
Tender Committees or their chairmen. They may either be formed at the 
departmental level, ie within the AESC, Highway Authority or Water and 
'~ewerage Corporation, or at the district level, where the members 
include the District Chief Executive as chairman, District Labour 
Officer, representative of pwp, coopted officers of AESC or Highway 
Authority, and a representative of the client department. 
9.6.5. Exceptions 
.. 
The 1967 directive stated reasons thQt could justify a departure 
from the laid-down tender procedure. These included: 
(a) an urgent need to commence work quickly; 
(b) where ,",ork is of su,ch a specialised nature that selective or 
negotiated tendering is advisable; and 
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(c) where extra works involved in au existing contract are too large 
to be covered by a variation order and which, for technical 
reasons, it is desirable that the main contractor should execute. 
In all such cases, permission should be sought from government by 
the client ministry concerned. 
9.6.6. Awarding the Contract 
The AESC, FWD or Highway Authority or a private consultant for 
the client ministry, prepares an estimate of· the project and, comparing 
it with the bids submitted, writes a tender report .for consideration 
by the tender board. 
Generally, tender figures lying within 10 per cent above or below 
the estimated cost are thos'e considered for selection. The best tender 
is decided upon by consensus at the board, with an asses·sment of the 
bidders' estimate of the duration of' the project, their present work-
load and their past reputation. Normally the lowest amongst those 
considered wins the contr&ct. 
9.6.7. Practice 
Public sector tendering procedures differ from the laid-do~m 
policy. Open tendering plays a less dominant role; selective or 
negotiated tendering are more important, both as a means of ensurlng 
value for the tax-payers' money and also of encouraging the more 
promlslng indigenous contractors. 
The importance of geographical location (see 3.6.5) in construction 
has come to be appreciated by the agencies, and through the a"tard of 
further contracts in the same locality the more dedicated construction 
firms are being encouraged to stay in districts within which they are 
most profitable, Some contracts may also be awarded simply on the 
basis of an attempt to ensure some equity 1n the distribution of jobs. 
263 
Contractors may obtain vlOrk through lobbying. With things being 
done in a rush, time is ablays of essence. Fe,., tenders are advertised 
in the media: most contractors maintain constant contact with the 
~warding or processing agencies, especially AESC, PWD and HighH8Y 
Authority. 
Tender periods are never long enough for proper estimates to be 
calculated, with obvious implications at th~ construction stage. 
Furthermore, the chairmen of the tender boards have the power to set 
aside the advice of the other members in choosing the contractor. 
Finally, since the award of contracts, especially the large ones, 1.S 
often the subject of media comment and public debate, usually favouring 
h · f' d' 57 h h' f . the c O1.ce C 1.n 1.genous contractors ,t e c O1.ce 0 . contractors 1.S 
not based wholly on economic criteria, nor are laid-down provisions 
usually followed. 
The questions of corruption and nepotism are also constantly 1.n 
the picture. Abrams (l96!f) wrote: 
'~ublic works in particular, have always provided 
vast opportunities for pelf and power ... The fine 
line between the 'contact', 'connection', 'contract' 
and 'fix' tends to grow fuzzy."S8 
9.6,8. Conclusion 
Official arrangements for the award of contracts are often 
disregarded, not only fo~ conven1ence but for several unorthodox 
reasons including conuption. Nerely changing formal guidelines on 
tendering, as implementing the suggestions in chapter S (see S.6 and 
9.1-2) would involve, will not alter the way in which contracts are 
actually awarded in practice in the short or medium term. 
9.7. Contract Administration 
9.7.1. Introduction 
Contract administration 1n Ghana 1.S characterised by all the 
2M 
usual inefficiencies that can be found elsewhel'e, such as: delays on 
the part of consultants to inspect vital stages of co~struction, to 
issue written instructions or to provide important detailed inforraation; 
alteration.s in design as clients or designers change their mind; and 
disagreements amongst the participants (see 3.7). Although all these 
affect the contractor's operations on the site, the one contract 
procedure most frequently referred to as fru~trating the effort of the 
contractor in the developing countries is the way in which work 1.S 
valued, certified and paid for, especially public sector work 59 
This particular procedure has been criticised for its length and 
complexity, and there have been calls for more rational and simpler 
syst.ems. (See 9.1-2 and tactic (4), 5.6). Andrews et al (197 ld wrote: 
" ... contractors 
delay while the 
government vets 
... are paid ... oft~n after a long 
cumbersame bureaucratic machinery of 
every claim on the public pu:::'se.,,60 
In Ghana, government's paymen.t system has come under fire froni 
individual contractors and the Contractors Association but it has not 
been radically altered and has even been lengthened in recent years 
(see 7.3.3), It does not st.:md on its own but is part of governraent's 
budgeting and expenditure-control mechanisrns (see 7.5.1). It is 
necessary to study the process for valuing, certifying and effecting 
payment for work done to understand what any change 1.n the system 
would involve. 
9.7.2. The Process 
The path of a certificate for a typical governrc .. ~nt contract 
under the supervision of the AESC 1.S of the fo11m"ing nature: 
~l) Construction firms who can do so present a claim, and those who 
cannot invite the regional quantity sur:veyor of the AESC to unde-c-
take a site valuation. Officially the period for interim valuation 
. 61 
is monthly but due to the AESC's limited executive capacity and 
the present slow pace of construction in Ghana, engendered by the 
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frequent shortages of materials as well as a stipulation 1n the 
contract of ,1 minimum value of inter'lm certificates.1 the period 
has become lengthened and variable. 
(2) The certificate, prepared by the surveyor, is signed by the project 
architect and the Regional Consultant of AESC, and by the regional 
head of the client department or ministry who officially applies 
for the release of funds, This application and the certificate 
are then attached to a progress report (which gives an indication 
of the percentages of the main elements of the 'vlorks that have been 
completed) and. sent to the Regional Economic Planuing Officer. 
(3) The Economic Planning Officer, or his representative, visits ·the 
site to ascertain the validity of the progress report as well as 
record the stage of work, as part of the'Qffice's project 
implementation and monitoring duties. (See 7.5.2.1). 
(4) The certificate, progress report and the economic planning 
officer's note are then endorsed by the Regional Administrative 
Officer and the Regional Connnissioner, and sent to Accra. 
(5) In Accra the documents are processed by the head office of the 
client Ministry, from whose budgetary allocation funds ,vill be 
drawn to pay for the project, and forwarded to the Ministry of 
Finance. 
(6) At Finance the first step is a check to see if the project is 
included in the annual es.timates. (See 5.3.2-3). Then the 
documents pass through progressively more 8em.or persons: frolD 
the Scheduling Officer to an Assistant Secretary, to a Principal 
Assistant Secretary to the Director of Budget, the Principal 
Secretary, until it reaches the Minister who. signs a warrant 
aftached to the certificate. This co~stitutes an authority to 
release the stated amount of public funds. (See 7.5. 1 ) . 
(7) The papers go back to the head office of the client ministry for 
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further administrative processl.ng, and then to its regional 
office where payment vouchers are .prepared. The .Regional 
Administrative Officer signs the "financial encumbrance", with 
\ 
which the contractor can collect from the regional treasury a 
cheque to the value of the certificate. (See Fig. 9.1 for a 
diagrammatic representation of the process). 
The situation is considerably more complex than outlined: each 
signatory attempts to ensure the veracity of the claim on the public 
exchequer and may adopt any appropriate measures. Tne process, there-
fore, shows variations from region to region, from one client Ministry 
to another, or even from one incumbent officer to the next. Moreover, 
the steps do not follow one another as smoothly and expeditiously as 
they seem on paper, Long delays may occur at any stage as signatories 
attend to other duties. Officials are often reluctant to delegate 
what they consider a sensitive duty to their subordinates. Stages (3) 
and (6) are crucial: the checking and monitoring exercises may result 
in the value of the certificate or the status of the project (ie 
planned or unplanned) being questioned and the documents returned to 
the AESC for revaluation, or completely rejected (in case of wOl~k not 
listed in the estimates). (See 8.3.2). 
The process ~s the same where a private consultant is involved 
and also similar for the PWD and the Highway Authority, except that ~n 
their case the client is central government and the head offices of the 
PWD and GHA replace that of the client Ministry, and their Chief 
Accountants vet the certificates and apply for the release of funds. 
9.7.3. Effect on Contract~rs and Others 
The certification and payment process is cumbersome and highly 
centralised. The poor postal system and the unreliability of the civil 
service's record-keeping ~ystem (some certificates have been lost) have 
made it imperative that contractors or their representati.ve personally 
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FIGURE 9.1. The Path of a Typical Certificate Issued to a 
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These may personally 
visit the site to check 
actual progress 
carry the certificate from one stage to the" other, and also ensure that 
at each s~age their personal influence mlnlffiJ.S2S delay. This involves 
. 
the contractor Hi direct costs such as time lost ch':lsing the certificates, 
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as ",ell as travelling costs and hotel bills. Moreover, the involvement 
of a large number of persons in the process and the p'ersonal contact 
h h · hI' h . . d f . 62 t e contractor as W1t tlem 1ncreases t e 1nC1 ence 0 corrupt10n , 
especially as most of the officers have little knowledge of the 
construction process and view all pajlllents made to the contractors as 
profits or consider contractors well to do because of the ostentatious 
way of life of many Ghanaian contractors. (See 13.8.3). 
The actual length of the process depends on the personal influence 
of the contractor. Certificates may be held up at any stage; and 
especially at the office of the Minister of Finance when government's 
funds run out prematurely. (See 8.2.7). The period just before the 
end of the fiscal year in July is very critic~l. Payments may be 
delayed for up to three months after certification, putting contractors 
unde.r enormOus strain, especially since many of them are starved of 
working capital and rely on interim payments to order essential 
materials and pay their wage bills.· (See 13.6.1-3). 
Needless to say, the client also suffers because, when payments 
are not forthcoming, contractors suspend work on their on-going projects, 
making them more expensive in the long run in the atmosphere of high \ 
inflation, not to mention the lost opportunity of using the completed 
work. 
Consultants, including the AESC, also experience delays in the 
payment of fees due to them: the process for such payments is similar 
to that for contractors. On occaS10n it has become apparent that 
adequate provision is not made in the budget for consultancy fees. 
(See 8.3.3). 
9.7.4. Justification 
The nation I s planning and b,udgeting systems are to ensure a 
balanced development allover the country. (See 8.2). The Regional 
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Commissioner.s have no control over public funds, drawings OIl which only 
the Ministry of Finance can authorise., (See 7.5.1). ' 
The length of the payment process and numbers of .people involved 
i~ it are considered necessary as a means of building accountability 
into the system through the several checks and counter-checks. Whereas 
contr~ctOrs and their association see the process as too bureaucratic, 
civil servants tend to defend it 63 . Governu{ent seems to side with the 
latter, and in a recent attempt to check corruption and collusion 
amongst contractors, consultants and officials, introduced stept. (3) 
and (4 ) 64 in the precess (See 9. 7. 2) . 
9.7.5. Conclusion 
Ghana's construction industry appears destined to be required 
to contenj with a long and centrally-controlled payment system for 
public projects iu the near future. Government and its officials tend 
65 to favour present arrangements 
I 
In the long term it 'Vli 11 be necessary 
to formulate ne'Vl procedures that satisfy government I s desire to obtain 
value for its money by ensuring accountability and contractors' wish to 
be paid expeditiously for the work they do. \ It is important to 
re'member that any change in the present procedures will be possible only 
after alterations in government's policy relating to the control of 
public funds. (See 7.5.1 and 9.7.4). 
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CHAPTER 10 
MATERIALS 
"Ghana has many materials suited to local 
manufacture such as baked clay prodncts and wood 
and precar;t components of various kinds. The 
country could produce wOC1d shingles, grass and 
reed matting for ceilings, bamboo matting for 
verandahs and fences and other materials. 
Native lime could be used a.s a stabiliser and 
raITnTled earth techniques could be pursued. 
Substantial economies could be achieved by 
importing cement clinker in bulk to be mixed 
and ground in Ghana. II 
- Abrams, C., Housing in the Hodern World, 
Faber and Fab;r:-:-Lon-don, -i974-,---p-:--64-:-··--
"The building materials that will be developed 
during the plan period are: brick and tiles, 
steel products, timber products, lime products, 
pozzolana, roofing materi.als, and fittings ... 
A Committee has been appointed to lool~ into the 
building materials' problem and to draw up 
comprehensive programmes for the development of 
local building materials '" The resources of 
the financial institutions will be mobilised 
for the financing of the progranun""s ... stock 
will be taken of all research findings with a 
view to making them available for practical 
application." 
- Government of Ghana, Five-Year Development 
Ylan 19i1l.76-1979/S0, Pa~:·t--iI :t~-ccr;:·1977, 
pp. 417-8 and 421. 
Most ltTriters on construction ~n deve loping countries urge the 
nations to produce construction materials locally, reduce their relianc2 
on imported materials, and intensify research into the development of 
alternatives to the conventional materials .. (See 5.3.1.1-3; 5.4:3 .. 2 
and 5,4.4.2 and tactic (5), 5.6). They also urge governments to 
propagate local materials, especially by using them on public projects. 
(See 5.3.2.2 and 5.4.3.3). 
This chapter considers the experience of Ghana in the development 
of building materials industries and shows that (1) Ghana relies on 
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imported materials like most developing countries, (2) attempts have 
been made to develop and popularise lo~al alternatives, (3) the 
establishments tllhich manufacture material s face several difficul t 
problems, (l~) local alternatives are still unpopular, usually expensive 
and not easily available, (5) historical and cultural factors underlie 
the obvious preference for conventional materials, (6) programmes for 
developing and propagating local materials need to be devised 
imaginatively if they are to succeed, and (7) the 'network for 
~istributing materials is also worth consi~ering. 
10.2. Classification 
Materials used ~n Ghana can be broadly classified into two 
groups: 
(a) conventional materials 
(b) indigenous materials. 
The former group comprises imported or locally manufactured materials 
of foreign origin and the latter, naturally occurring or traditionally 
processed materials, or those developed by combining conventional with 
traditional inputs or technologies. 
10.3. Conventional Materials 
According to government's own estimates (1975), 
" ... about sixty per cent·of the building materials 
arc imported every year both directly and indirectly 
as inputs."l 
Table 10.1 shows that imports of finished, semi-finished or raw 
building materials were seldom less than 10 per cent of the total 
import bill for the period 1965 to 1976. Conventional materials may 
be subdivided into two groups: import'ed, and locally-manufactured 
materials. 
TABLE 10.1: Imports by End Use: Construction Materials (1965-76) (¢ 103). (At Current Prices) 
I I I I I Material 1965 1.966 1967 1968 1969 1970 ·1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Cement 6,603 6,894 4.976 I 3,993 4,315 5,680 7,116 6,437 8,707 19,259 26,539 22,860 
I Steel & Structural 
7,216 1 
I I Manuf ac ture 12,368 8,340 2,914 2~762 3,161 8,725 4,825 8,902 17,194 31,753 21,274 I I 
Roofing Materials 4,870 2,618 2,48LII 2,218 3,242 2,951 3,951- 1,829 3,573 6,927 4,642 6,856 I 
1'V]ater Supply Materials I 3,2l3 4 ~ 146, 1,659 1,776 4,884 3,314 3,573 1,249 1,693 5,620 8,563 5,195 I i 
Railway Construction ! I 
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I 
Hateria1s 153 140 771 89 l30 306 152 284 582 1,798 1 451 I I 
Road Making Materials 345 246 136 297 239 343 372 82 129 120 64 129 I 
Building Materials 5,818 4,740 2,039 1,984 2 t 548 3,118 3~562 1,943 2,410 5,165 6,896 5,648 I Miscellaneous Building ! I 
13,989' 9,207 I Haterials 3,450 4,486 2,275 2,924 4,046 4,905 6,798 5-,9971 8,196 11 ,021 I , 
I i Other Durable Materials 12,519 8,287 12,225 10,709 14:441 13,394 20,863 13,951 19,180 36,200 -37,940 40,610 
.Total Imported Haterials I I 36~4651 53,0751105,056 127,402_l114,044 ifor Construction 49,3391 '39,8971 29,479 27,294 I 36~965 41,051 54,860 
i 
. !! I ' 393,292 525,950 943,707 909,2961990,932 I 1272,2591250,6491261,017 314,~"1 1354,491 !419,047 1443,043 ITotal All Imports 
I ! 
IMaterials for ! I 
9 10 11 14 I 12 
I 
18 16 11 I 9 10, 10 I 12 I !Construction as a 
I ,Percentage of all , I Imports I _ J I _ .__ _ ____J ______ 1 ____ 
___ __ I I I I 
N 
Source: Economic Survey 1969 and 1972-74. .....) 
-..J 
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10.3.1. Imported Materials 
Construction materials import;ed 1n their finished state 
include bitumen, special types of cement and steel reinforcement, 
,teel sections, and electrical and mechanical installations 1U buildings 
such as lifts, fans and workshop and leboratory equipment. Of these, 
bitumen is the most important with regard to the effect its availability 
or otherwise has on the construction indust'ry. 
10,3.1.1. Bitumen_ 
Ghana's annual requirement of bitumE;n is estimated at some 2.2 
million gallons or 20,000 tonnes. Its importation, hm17ever, has I).ot 
been regular and there have been long periods during which there was 
. 2 practically no bitumen 1n the country . 
Plans to establish a bitumen plant to utilise the by-products of 
. . .. 3 
the 011 ref1nery at Tema are yet to be 1mplemented Thus, whereas 
processed bitumen is imported, the residue of the local refinery is 
disposed of, creating environmental problems, but even more serious, 
draining away the opportunity to achieve self-sufficiency in bitumen. 
Operationally, the non-availability of bitumen is a major 
bottleneck in the road development and maintenance progranunes. Holding 
back the laying of the final sealing cover on constructed roads, it 
involves the contractor in much extra work making good damage caused by 
the rains or vehicular traffi~, and means additional costs to clients 
and users of the roads. 
10.3.1.2. Other Items 
Shortages of other imported constructional materials and equipment 
are common, delaying the completion and use of buildings and works. 
The uncertainties in the import licensing and control system JT\ake it 
impossible to schedule ~he ordering of such items. (See 7.7.1 and 8.2.7). 
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Evidence abounds in Ghana of hospitals, laboratories, workshops and the 
like which are several years behind sohedul.e, or even if physically 
fi~ished remaining unoccupied for want of important fittings and 
equipment, in most cases ordered well ahead of schedule. 
Furthermore, w'here equipment and fi,ttings such as lifts are 
concerned, once they break down they become difficult to repair since 
spare parts are not easily available. Thus the items themselves, and 
the buildings in which they are installed, are used uneconomica11y. 
10.3.2. Locally .~~anufactured Mate~ial~ 
A variety of conventional materials and components are 
manufactured in. Ghana, including cement, steel reinforcement, aluminium, 
asbestos and corrug~ted iron roofing sheets, glass, concrete products, 
sanitary fittings, plastic pipes and components, electrical fittings, 
nails and screws and paints. 
The enterprises producing these items rely on imported 
machinery as well as semi-finished or raw material inputs. (See also 
6.3. and 6.5.3). Their annual outputs are determined more by the 
availability of foreign exchange to import equipment, spares or raw 
materials than by market forces and their installed capacitiea. As 
Table 10.2 indicates, most of dlem operate below capacity. With the 
. 4 
outlook for the economy so bleak , it is unlikely that this picture 
TABLE 10.2, Production by~~~e Building Materials F3ctories~2-75 .. 
-----
Division of Ghana 
Industrial Holding Unit Installed 
Corporation Capacity 
Paints Division Tons 3,570 
Metal Industries Tons 51 ;000 
Steelworks Tons 8,300 
-----_._----_._--
* 
1972 1973 
1,212 2,3411 2,409 
29,268 47,000 39,000 
2,964 8,398 8,488 
~--Target for' 1975 ~ 1980 
1,812 4,000 
37,000 50,000 
2,820 25,000~!:i 
----'--------------'---_._-, 
Expansion of installed capacity planned. 
Sour~: Five-Year Plan 1975-80, 
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'-lill change ~n the short or medium term. 
10.3.2.1. Cement 
------
Cement is the most popular and by far the most important 
construction material in Ghana. It is !llanufactured by two joint stat€:-
private factories at Tema and Takoradi us~ng imported clinker. The 
importation of finished ordinary cement is banned, although some 
quantities are allowed in when shortages, which are frequent, become 
severe, The shortages have been due to lack of forward planning of the 
importation of clinker, which, because of the country's precarious 
econom~c position s~nce the mid-seventies (see 6.4.5-7), has occurred 
~n bursts as the state of foreign exchange eartnngs allowed. 
The demand for cement ~s high and rising: it 1-8 expected to 
exceed a million tons by 19805 Under the current development plan, 
the exist ing factories intend to increase their capacity to l. 2 r.1ill ion 
tons, but as Table 10.3 shoHs, cement production is so dependeut upon 
imports that even if this projected expansion can be realised in time -
which is doubtful - the availability of clinker will continue to be the 
deciding fa~tor in annual outputs. At present, about 500,000 tons of 
7 
clinker are imported annually 
TABLE 10,3. Imports and Domestic Product 
Current Prices 
1969 1970 1971 
Imports 4.3 5.7 .7.1 
Gross Domestic Product 2.5 1.9 1.4 
Source: Economic Survey 1972-74 
~n Cement Manufacture 1969-74 
t million 
1972 1973 1974 
.-----
6.4 8.7 19.3 
1.4 1.8 2.0 
Imports of cement and clinker .alone constituted an average of 25 
per cent of all imports of materiais during the period 1965-76 as table 
10.4 shows, and the trend has been upward ~n recent years (eg. 1974-76 
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1.n Table 10.4). This may be due to the dramatic increases in the unit 
cost of clinker since 1970 rather than an absolute increase in volumeS. 
TABLE 10.4. Imports of Cerne~t Materials v~rsus Total Importe~ 
Construction Materials (1965-76) (Current Prices) 
t million 
Year Cemegt All Construction Cement as a Percentage 
(i10 ) Materials of all Construction 
Cement • Materials 
(tl06 ) (i106 ) % 
--------
-
1965 6.6 36.8 18 
1966 6.9 31.6 22 
1967 5.0 17.3 29 
1968 4.0 16.6 24 
1969 4.3 22.5 19 
1970 5.7 27.7 21 
1971 7.1 34.4 21 
1972 6.4 22.5 28 
1973 8.7 33.9 26 
1974 19.3 68.9 28 
1975 26.5 89.4 30 
1976 22.9 - 73.4 31 
Source: Economic Survey, 1969, 1972-74. 
The situation will be eased when the tripartite cement project 
between Ghana, Togo and the Ivory Coast in Lome starts production (in 
1980). But Ghana's share of 400,000 tons of clinker per annum from this 
9 
venture will not satisfy its total needs. 
The nation, however, has limestone deposits and feasibility 
studies are being conducted into the possibility of exploiting these, 
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especially those at Buikpe-Baka. Considering the shape of the economy 
(see 6.4.6-7) a~d the perio~ of gestat~on 0f such a project, this can 
only he cons idered a long" terra solution. Furthermore, the Building and 
Road Research Institute (BRRI) is 'vorking on .3 method of making cement 
from limestone with 1mv-1eve1 technology in small production units 10 
Meanwhile, the cement-making factories produce below capacity or 
remain idle for long periods, the material is frequently in short 
supply, and a rationing system has had to be developed for it. (Sec 
10.7.2.1). The non-availability of cement has been a major constraint 
on construction OULput 1n Ghana. (See 7.7.2.1 for developments 10 the 
price of cement). 
10.3.2.2. Cement and Concrete Products 
Sandcrete blocks, about 1:6 and of standard S1ze 225x450 em and 
various thicknesses, ho110\vor solid, are the most cownon "la1ling 
m2.teria1 in Ghana's urban areas. They are produced in sma ll-sca 1e 
units allover the country using mechanical or manual equipment by 
construction firms or other enterprises. The difficulties involved in 
obtaining c~ment have led to a deterioration in the quality of blocks 
and increases in pr1ces. Transportation costs, as well as the poor 
quality of roads (see 10.7.1.2) and the danger of breakage limit each 
enterprise's (geographical) ~rea of effective operation. 
Asbestos cement ceiling boards, corrugat~d roofing sheets, p1pes 
and fittings are produced in Ghana from imported rmv materials by 
Fu1gurit (state-private) and Kettaneh Limited (private), both in Accra. 
The brittleness of asbestos and the care needed in handling and 
transporting it have made it less popular than its alternatives, 
although it is usually cheaper. 
Ready-mixed concrete is produced by a company in Accra, a joint 
venture between the Bank for Housing and Construction and private 
investors. 
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Precast Spun Concrete Products Limited, owned by the National 
Investment Bank and a foreign company, and the privately-owned African 
Concrete Products Limited, both based in Accra, produce concrete 
components: lintels, beams, floor elements, large diameter water pipes., 
electricity distribution poles, and the like, and distribute them all 
over the country. Spun Concrete Products has plans to establish a 
second factory in Kumasi. 
The state-owned Prefabricated Concrete Products Limit,~d produces 
elements for their complete house systems ll (See 12.4.2). 
The difficulties faced by the concrete products factories are 
the same as those outlined for the sandcrete blocks units. 
10.3.2.3. Steel Reinforcement 
Mild steel reinforcement rods are produced by the Ghana 
Industrial Holding Corporation's roIHOC) Steelworks Division (see 
7.7.3.1) and Ferro Fabrick Limited (private), both based at Tema. They 
use scrap as the basic raw material. 
Total domestic requirements of steel reinforcement were estimated 
at 35,000 tons in 1975 and expected to n.se to 60,000 tons 1.n 1980 and 
75,000 tons by 1982. Out of these, the two factories could only manage 
22,000 tons l.n 197512 , and plans to raise the level of production to a 
total of l.5, 000 tons under the current deve lopment plan, and also to 
establish" a third steel mill in Kumasi, have not got very far. Worse 
still, the Steelworks Division has been idle for some time now due to 
the breakdown of its vital plant and its inability to obtain the 
wherewithal to import replacements and spare parts. (See 7.7.1). 
An integrated iron and steel plant to utilise the l.ron ere 
deposits at Oppong-Hcrui (Western Region) 1S under construction. It 18 
expected to establish the basis of heavy industry 1.ll Ghana. In the 
long term, therefore, Ghana can pr~duce not only its requirements of 
steel but also, with the completion of a ne\" foundry at Takoradi, 
spare parts and machinery for its industries. The steel project also 
iricorporates the production of blast-furnace slag cement, a building 
material. 
10.3.2.4. Aluminium Roofin~ Sheets 
A subsidiary of GIHOC13 manufactures aluminium roofing sheets of 
various sizes, gauges and trough shapes and sizes, using imported sheet 
aluminium. The aluminium industry in Ghana portrays an ironic picture. 
The country has large bauxite deposits at Kibi, Nyinahin and 
Awaso, in the Eastern, Ashanti and Western Regions respectively. "It 
exports the mineral 1n bulk form. The giant aluminium smelting factory 
at Tema: - the Volta Aluminium Company VALCO (foreign ow~ed) imports 
alumina and processes it into ingots for e<~port. The missing links 1n 
the chain are a plant to process raw bauxite into alumina and a rolling 
mill to make sheets out of the ingots. 
Government has tried to interest VArious foreign investor-s in an 
integrated aluminium industry at Kibi, and the current development plan 
reported that negotiations were far advanced and the project would be 
d d · hI' d14 execute urlng t e p an perla 
Aluminium is the most popular roofing material in Ghana, as its 
durability, non-corrosive na"ture and attractive appearance have become 
IS" 
evident . High demand for the material and the non-availability of the 
imported- raw material has often led to shortfalls in supply and an 
escalation of prlces. 
10.3.2.5. Other Metal Products 
Nails, screws, rivets, bolts and nuts, W1res and steel plates 
and the like are produced by the Metalworks Division of the GrHOC in 
Accra. 
Corrugated lron roofing sheets, locks, hinges and metal gates 
--' 
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and furniture are manufactured by several private enterprises in the 
Accra"Tema area such as Pan Metal Proqucts Limited and Union Trading 
Company. But none of these metal products is produced in sufficiently 
large quantities to meet local demand; some are imported. 
10.3.2.6. Ceramic Ware 
Clay products such as sanitary fittings and accessor1es and wall 
tiles are manufactured at the Saltpond Cer'amics 'Factory (joint state-
private) from local kaolinitic deposits. Other small-scale 'units 
produce seme ceramic or concret~ sanitary fittings such as sinks and 
wash-basins. 
Local production falls short of demand and large quantities of 
ceramlc ware have to be imported. Casting certain sanitary fittings 
like urinals and sinks in concrete in-situ is also becoming popular. 
The poor quality of locally produced ceram1C items 1S often complained 
about by users. 
10.3.2.7. Paints 
The Paints Division of CIHOC at Tema and a number of private 
enterprises produce oil and emulsion paints from imp0i.ted raw materials. 
In recent times there has been an acute shortage of all kinds of 
paint in the country as a re~ult of the foreign exchange situation. 
10,3.2.8. Miscellaneous Materials 
A large number of other construction materials and components 
such as plastic ,products, sheet glass, metal-framed glass doors and 
windows and electrical fittings are produced in Ghana by private 
enterprises based mainly in the Accra-Tema area. Almost invariably, 
they use imported raw materials and produce in very small quantities. 
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10.4. Features of Conventional Building Materials Industries 
From the discussion, the mS1TI ~eatures of industries manufacturing 
materials for construction are: 
(a) their reliance on imported inputs; 
(b) their inability to fulfil national requirementi due to production 
below installed capacity; 
(c) the delapidation or obsolescence of saine plant; 
(d) both (b) and (c) are caused by the shortage of foreign exchange, 
and (a), (b) and ec), together with increasing world prices, result 
1n acute shortages of key materials and the need to ration most of 
them; 
(e) the overconcentration of the production units 10 the Accra-TEmn 
area and other coasta1 towns; 
(f) lack of linkages between related industries and between industry 
and local raw materials (resulting directly in (a) and indirectly 
in (b) and (d). 
10.4.1. Relationships 
Thus the industries' production are constrained and the 
operations of the construction industry affected. lbe logical suggestion 
seems to be that the effects of the above issues should be minimised: 
(b) can be relieved if (a),· (c) and (d) are removed or alleviated. 
Points (d) (shortage of foreig~ exchange) and (f) (lack of linkages) can 
only be tackled in the long term by improvements in the economy and by 
the establishment of integrated industries such as for steel and 
aluminium. Thes.e same measures vlOuld deal with (c) (obsolescence of 
plant) . 
Points (a) and (e) have prompted government to encourage the 
development and production of indigenous materials using appropriate 
technology, 1n units loc~ted 1n the districts. (See 10.5). This would 
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not only reduce reliance on imports but provide employment, stern the 
rural-urban drift of the population, and reduce the cbst of tran~porting 
constructional materials. This is the basic philosophy of the 
indigenous materials development programme. (A I gro,,,th with equity' 
approach.) (See 2.4). 
10.5. ~ndigenous Materials 
The programme for the development of local materials involves 
research and studies into propagation, production and utilisation of 
. existing and new materials using locally available inputs and inter-
mediate technology. All phases of the programme are supported by. 
government. The programme was launched, although not formally as a 
long-term package, in pre-independence days arid the development of 
16 indigenous materials has been mentioned in every development plan 
(See 8,1). 
10.5.1. Research Institutions 
The three research institutions which study aspects of Ghana's. 
. . d 17 construct10n 1n ustry are 
the Building and Road Research Institute (BRRI) 
the Department of Housing and Planning Research (DHPR) of the 
Faculty of Architecture, University of Science aud Technology, and 
the' Forest Products Research Institute (FPRI). 
All three institutes are based on the university campus in Kumasi and 
are directly financed by government. The oldest is the BRRI, which was 
established in the 1950's as the West African Building Research 
. . A 18 Inst1tute 1n ccra . 
10.5.1.1. Links 
---
The activities of, these institutions have been domirt.:lted by 
research into local building materials and technologies and they have 
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produced a mine of val~able information which needs correlation and 
coordination. There is, at p~esent, much duplication. of effort and 
lack of complementarity in their activities because their programmes 
are not effectively related and controlled. There are clashes of 
personalities among the heads and a constant struggle for independence 
and survival among the bodies. Each body, and particularly BRRI and 
DHPR, believes that the others should be under its control. These have 
tended to reduce the links amongst the institutes, despite their 
geographical proximity. 
10.5.1.2. Implementation of Results 
In addition, their links with the construction and materials 
manufacturing industries have not been sufficiently strong to allow the 
wide dissemination and implementation of research findings, an anomaly 
\llhich government hoped to remove by establishing information centres for: 
" ... the organisation of ... exhibitions of models of 
house-types, samples of buildings materials and 
equipment, the publication and dissemination of 
information on house-types, building codes and 
regulations , .. and the collection of data on the 
present state of the ... construction industry.,,19 
However, although one of these centres waS to be established ln each 
reg10n during the current plan period 1975-80, none had been set up by 
1979. 
The approach to the implementat ion of the results of r<::search 
into local materials had been ~d hoc and half-hearted until the economic 
situation made it imperative in 1976 for more attention to be paid to 
the production and use of alternatives to the import-based materials. 
h . . d . 20 In t at year, government app01nte a comm1ttee to: 
II examine critically and submit realistic and 
practical recommendations on how best and hm·, 
effectively local building materials can be developed 21 
and used extensively in national building programmes." 
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10.5.2. The Corrnnittee on Local Haterials 
22 The connnittee all. local build~J: ... g materials reported that 
lIlaterials which could be produced in the short term included cement, 
lime, pozzolana, clay bricks e.nd tiles, timber and stabilised soil 
blocks and bricks. In the medium and long term, materials such as ~ron 
and steel products, blast furnace slag cement, stone products, secondary 
timber species and woodwool could be produced. 
The technology to be utilised would also be in three stages: a 
labour-intensive first stage, an intermediate technology stage, and a 
capital intensive stage after the seventh year. Each stage would 
require different proportions of finance, technical promotion and 
political backing for the materials. 
Production units should be sited 1n all the regions to reduce 
transportation costs, and appropriate technologies should be used 
wherever possible. (See 10.4). The quality of the materials should be 
strictly controlled to inspire public confidence, and personnel should 
be trained in the manufacturing and construction industries. 
Government should give active support and encouragement to the 
.programme, and a Building Materials Development Secretariat should be 
created to oversee its execution. 
These are sound proposals addressed to the existing peculiar 
situation in Ghana. It is early days yet to review their progress but 
an indication of their chances of success can be obtained by considering 
a few of the local materials used in Ghana. (See also 8.5-7). 
10.5.3. Timber 
Ghana ~s rich 1n timber resources, and timber is one of the 
nation's major exports, There are many say,7'ffiills and wood-processing 
plants, most of which use capital intensive methods. The small-scale 
pit-sawin"g industry, which lIsed to" be significant, is in decline (see 
table 10.5). 
J 
TABLE 10.5: Production of Timber 1965-1974 (Million cubic feet) 
1965 1966 I 1967 I 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 I 1973 1974 
Logs: I 
Sawmill Intake 33.71 29.48 26.66 26.65 29.10 30.94 29.03 28.14 29.92 30.43 I 
.Veneer/Plywood Intake 1.61 1.59 2.39 2.80 2.72 2.68 3.02 4.29 4.49 4.75 I 
I Pit-Sawing ! 1.17 I 1.17! 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.30 I 0.40 I 0.30 I I Total Output of Logs -1 56 • 21 49.06 47.41 49. 05 1 56. 92 1 55.24 1 57 •1,0 66.33
1 
73.29 I 50.80 I 
I I I. . I I I 
Sawn Timber: _/ I 
Sawmills Recorded Exports 8.11 7.24 6.69 7 .. 60 I 7.73 8.50 I 6.56, 8.84 8.46 I 5.97 
Local sales I 5.32 3.44 3.02 3.38 3.29 3.32 3.93 I 4.02 3.79 I 6.99 I 
Own use by Mills and Mines I 1.22 0.88 0.93 0.86 0.82 0.89, 0.87 I 1.67 1.05 I 0.99 , 
Additions to Stocks I 0.67 +1.90 +1.00 -0.24 +0.81 -0.23 1 +0.63 -2.40 -0.45 I +1.90 I 
(b) Pit-s.wing ~58 0.581 0.25 j 0.251 0.25 0.20 I 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.15 
I I i I' I I 
; Total Output of Sawn Timber 115.90 i 14. 04 1 11.89 11. 83 / 12.90 12.68 _I 12.19 1 12 . 28 13.05 I 16.00 i 
Source: Economic Survey 1969, 1972-74. 
N 
,.0 
o 
TABLE 10.6: Out-Turn of Veneer and Plywood, 1965-1974 (Million cubic feet) 
1965 1966 1967 ~8 1969 1970 I 
Veneer: I I Exports 19.80 19.10 5.47 I 3~12 16 •. 92 14.80 . 
I I I 
I 
-, 
I Local Sales - - 0.16 ! 1.16 2.,55 0.98 
I 19.10 I 17.99 I Own Use 19.60 13.56 - -
I 
,+ 1. 30 I + 2. 76 I I Addition to Stocks - + 0.88 + 3,57 - 0.43 
Lotal Output of Veneer 
I I I 40.20 I 39.85 25.23 18.72 23~04 16.21 
Plywood: I , 
Exports 459.25 479 .. 34 635 .. 39 730.94 668 ... 53 766 •. 34 1 
, Local Sales 221.40 209.00 I 246.35 222.74 196.35 281.99 
I Own Use 11.35 I 19.82 12.66 24.67 4.25 4.28 
I I 
J Addition to Stocks 6.59 14.00 53.26 -21.40 +19.82 +52.98 
I , 
!Total Output of Plywood 1698.59 722.16 947.66 956.95 SR8.95 i1105.59 
' ____ --- .-L 
~~~: Economic Survey 1969, 1972-74. 
I~_-
1971 1972 
36,42 17.02 
0.84 0.47 
- -
- 7.82 + 6. 09 1 
i 
29,,44, 23.58 
I 
909 .. 75 890.86 
474.12 478.76 
8.77 9.20 
-13.96 273.51 
I 
1,378.6811,652.33 
1973 I 1974 
144.30 310.11 
4.31 .2.85 
0.06 2.32 
+89.92 ~334:80 
238.59 
1,656 .. 67 I 
439.45 I 
I 16.31 " 
-235.22 I 
I 
1,877.21 
650.09 
659.05 
! 
446.03 
75.97 
904. 27 1 
2,085.32 I 
I 
,"-' 
\0 
I-' 
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Wood products manufa.ctured 1n Ghana include plywood, veneers, 
particle board, wood blocks and parquet flooring p1eces (sec tables 
10.5 and 10.6). All the major timber enterprises operate below 
installed capacity because of their inability to obtain spare parts or 
replacements for their broken-down machinery. They also face shortages 
23 
of skilled personnel 
Despite government's attempts through the Forestry Department 
and the Timber Marketing Board to propagate them, timber buildings are 
not popular in Ghana for several reasons: 
() . b . "h 24 a t1.m er l.S expens~ve 111 v ana . This l.S a result of the export 
orientation of the industry (see tables 10.5 and 10.6) and the 
concentration on few of the know""ll tree species. Of 200 or more 
timber species only 36 are now being used; 
(b) seasoning techniques and facilities, essential if the material 18 
to be able to withstaad the weather, are undeveloped in Ghana: 
furthermore, necessary seasoning and preservation, especially 
impregnation, would increase costs; 
(c) a timber building calls for attention to detail in design to 
provide insulation and protection . . from dampness, term1.tes and 
fire. Not all designers have the required skills. There is also 
the need for continued maintenance of the building that few 
clients \'lOuld be prepared to undertake; 
(d) failure to achieve (b) a~d (c) has led to a cr1.S1.S of confidence 
in the durability and safety of timber as a major building 
material. This is not helped by the widespread traditional use of 
firewood for fuel, which psychologically associates fire risks 
with timber; and 
) " I hI" h :i" b 25 " (e there 1.8 a genera pu 1C apat y towar(s t1m er ,cons1.dered 
inferior to cement-based materials. This is in spite of, and even 
reinforced by, the .decreasing'gap between the costs of the two 
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types of materials: timber is catching up fast. 
As a result of these fact.ors, fcv timber buildings exist ~n 
Ghana; these are mainly luxury middle-class dwellings and offices26 , 
the most well-known being the American Embassy building in Accra. 
The Forestry Department is establishing seasoning, preservation 
and testing depots.in the regions 27 and the Forest Products Research 
Institute is endeavouring to improve the scientific data on the country's 
. 28' 
tree spec~es It has, to date, compiled information on some 70 species. 
Research on the use of timber in building is led by the DHPR, which ~s 
trying to develop timber components as alterna.tives to the more 
conventional and popular ones. 
'29 In March, 1979 government banned the export in log form of 
fourteen of the major timber species to relieve the pressure on the 
material at home. But this has not reduced prices. Processed timber 
is still exported, and both logs and wood products are smuggled out of 
the country. Timber is also ,.,asted: sawn hardwood is used for props 
where rough poles or bamboos would do, and valuable trees are felled 
for use as firevlOod or to make charcoal. Moreover, there ~S, as yet, 
no comprehensive programille for the regenerat.ion of the nation I s timber 
resources: ff 1 b 1 · 30 present e .orts are on y sym 0 J.C 
To sum up, timber can only be a practi.cel alternative to cemen.t-
based materials if large quantities of good quality, well-seasoned 
timber ar~ available 3l , if the properties of the-material are propagated 
to allay public fears, if designers improve their knowledge of 
appropriate timber detailing, and ultimately, if the Ghanaian public 
becomes more tolerant of the material. 
10.5.4. Bricks and Tiles 
Hand-moulded clay bricks are a traditional walling material' ~n 
many parts of Ghana. Burnt bricks ~ere introduced by the early 
Christian missionaries, but despite the existence of several suitable 
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clay deposit.s allover the country, bricks have not been popular 1n 
Ghana. 
Brick-making factories exist in several parts of the country, 
d b 1 32 owne y government agenc~es and parastata s Under the current 
development plan, at least one major brick and tile factory is to be 
bl ' h d . 1 . 133 esta 1S e 1n every reg10na cap1ta Collectively, the existing 
factories cannot satisfy the present demand, low as it 1S. 
The factories use capital-intensive methods and face import 
licensing difficulties in connection with their acquisition of plant 
and spares. Skilled manpower to manage the production units is also 
scarce in Ghana, 
The effective and widespread use of bricks for constructi.on 18 
hindered·by: 
(a) the public's ignorance of the material, attractive and durilble 
though it is; 
(b) the limited quantity, high cost and low quality of bricks pro~uced 
at the moment, and the necessity to transport them over long 
distances because of the limited number of production units; and 
(c) the de~rth of bricklaying skills in Ghana 34 . 
Bricks are nmol most widely used for. ornamental and decorative 
35 purposes Efforts to popularise their uses are continuing and courses 
for bricklayers have been introdnced at some of the technical and 
vocational institutes. (See 11.4). If, and especially when, these 
efforts are successful, the demand for bricks \-1ill r1se and the ffi.3jor 
constraint will remain the non-availability of the material. In 
addition, the high energy consumption of brick manufacture \\lill, 1n the 
face of escalating fuel prices, bring energy-conservation considerations 
to the fore, unless the industry is able to utilise alternative sources 
such as industrial or agricultu~al wastes. 
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10.5,5. Mud 
Mud is a traditional material'used for ",TalIs, floors and roofs. 
There ~s a variety of constructional techniques such as: the Atakpame 
(unreinforced mud walls built in layers), wattle and daub and mud blocks 
or bricks, modifications being made to refLect the availability of raw 
materials, as well as local skills and climates, and the client's 
purchasing power. 
Mud buildings are cheap and involve simple, labour-intensive 
methods of construction ",hich are amenable to communal or cooperative 
efforts. (See 4.4.2 and 7.8.3.1). On the other hand, plain mud walls 
are unattractive, not durable, subject to penetration by raim-later' and 
erosion by s.tormwater and, unless well constructed, may not be 
structurally sound. Mud floors need frequent maintenance to prevent 
wear, and roofs need special treatment to make them l;7atertight. 
Finally, mud is not permitted as a building I'1aterial in the statutory 
planning areas (see 9.4.4): it is used most extensively in the rural 
areas (the informal sector). (See 4.4). 
But even in these places, a movement a\'lay from mud is evident. 
Whereas 87.5 per cent of all d\Olellings in Ghana were of mud in 1960, 
this percentage had fallen to 78.0 by 197036 (See 4.4.2.5-6). 
Attempts to improve upon and rationalise the use of mud as a 
building material have been made by the BRRI and the DHPR. They have 
mainly considered improving the strength, appearance and durability 
without unduly increasing costs. For example, providing strong 
concrete and soil-cement foundations, rendering walls and floors with 
bitumen-sand mlxes or very ,.,eak mortar (1: 12), painting the walls, and 
providing adequate roof overhangs to keep storm and rainwater from the 
base of the building and the walls. 
The public has, so far, given. a cool reception to the well-
catalogued rationalised methods of mud construction and cOlnpleted 
37 
proto-types Moreover, skills l.n mud construction are being los t as 
2% 
the downward trend in demand continues (see Lf.4.2.5-6), although the 
DHPR is making some effort to impart its improved methods to traditional 
tradesmen at occasional courses. 
10.5.6, Landcrete Blocks 
Soil-cement, stabilised soil, earthcrete and landcrete are names 
applied to blocks made up of laterite and a small proportion of cement 
(1:20 to 1:30). The material has been the subject of much work by the 
BRRI and the DHPR, and the latter has developed a manual blockmaking 
machine, Tek Bldck Press, produc.ing 80 blocks per honr, and a pO~'er-
38 
operated verS10n making 250 blocks per hour . 
Landcrete blo~ks are more economical 1n the use of cement and 
thus much cheaper than sandcrete. But their quality is difficult to 
39 
control . Technical knowledge about the performance of the material, 
which is relatively new to Ghana, is inadequate. However, after a 
successful promotion exercise, it is a very popular constructional 
material. 
The restriction on its use 1n the statutory planning areas has 
been lifted 'after persistent lobbying by the DHPR and BRRI, and it was 
"Tidely used in the government IS low'-cost housing programme of the early 
1970·s. (See Appendix C.3.4). The material is 1n great demand in the 
urban areas where it has been' used on buildings of 2- and 3-'storeys 85 
well as in rural areas. 
The greatly-aroused interest, however, has ended in frustration: 
the privately-01oll.1.fd foundry at Tema, which used to produce the Tek Block 
Press, cannot obtain sheet metal and cannot meet the demand for the 
machines, the cost of \-'hich has escalated. Thus the non-availabili ty 
of th~ material is the one factor hindering its extensive use. The 
technology of manufacturing and placing is simple and si.milar to that 
for sandcrete blocks, 1"hich 1S widely-knowll. 
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10.5.7. Lime and Pozzolana 
Lime is not used in Ghana excep't as a painting material. There 
are, however, large deposits of limestone in Ghana, and although the 
largest at Nauli has been declared unsuitable for economic exploitation, 
others at Buikpe-Baka, Bongo-Da and Oterkpolu have been studied by the 
Geological Survey Department and the BRRI. The latter body 1S 
developing a labour-intensive method of producing lime 1n a simple kiln 
capable of producing about 2500 tons annually 40 (See 8lso 10.3.2.1). 
Lime is not yet produced in Ghana, and the nation is not 
realising the potential of a rlaterial which can be a substitute for, or 
an additive to, cement. On the other hand, lime production consul!les 
much energy; this will be CI. problem for the planned rural lime 
industries. 
Pozzolana is another material whose potential 1S being lost in 
Ghana. It is produced from bauxite waste, much of which can be found 
at AVlaso, w'ith more to be available after the conmlissioning of the Kibi 
aluminium project. Its most important use in the context of Ghana is as 
a substitute for clinker 1n cement manufacture. 
10.5.8. Natural Stone 
The Marble Division of GIHOC in Accra and a large number of 
small-scale rural units produce some dinlension stone. But it is not 
widely used as a building material, its utilisation limited to 
decorative purposes on walls. 
Dimension stone is not popular because of its non-availability in 
any significant quantities, its high cost, the difficulty in transporting 
and handling it, its inflexibility in use, the need for special skills 
to place it, and the non-availability of these skills Ln Ghana. 
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10.5.9. Chipping~ 
Coarse aggregate 1S 1n high demand for building and civil: 
engineering work but,although there are large deposits of suitable 
stone, out of estimated needs cf 428,000 cubic metres per annum, only 
41 191,000 cubic metres are produced . 
The gap between demand and supply, and the long distances over 
which the aggregate has to be moved to reach the sites, have pushed its 
price up. The quarrying capacity is inadequate and, as a report 
observed, not only is there the need to establish additional quarr~es, 
but also the existing ones should be rehabilitated: 
"In all cases the crushing plants are generally 111 a 
poor state of repair and with a severe shortage of 
spare parts the situation continued to d~teriorate. 
It is estimated that most quarries are operating at 
only 50 per cent of their rated output. A constraint 
on road construction is that in the remoter areas of 
the country where improvements are planned there are 
no existing quarries.,,42 
The inadequate quarrying capacity LS a bottleneck in the road 
development programme. The Bank for Housing and Construction and the 
National Investment Bank have been involved in the development of new 
. 43 quarr1es (See also 13.7.2.1.9). 
Its h'ard-wearing character and its ability to maintain ar< 
attractive appearance for a long time endeared terrazzo, previously 
considered a luxury, to many Ghanaian building owners and users. 
polished terrazzo floors ap..d washed terrazzo walls ere becoming common. 
However, most te:r-razzo chippings used in Ghana are imported, although 
deposits of stone suitable for their production have been identified 
and studied by the Geological Survey Department. 
10.5.10. '111atch 
Thatch 1.8 the traditional roefing material in certain parts of 
Ghana. It is, however, n0t durable, subject to insect attack and can 
be a fire hazard. The techniql.1es 44 developed in Ghana and elsewhere to 
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protect the material from these defects have not been effective and 
long-lasting and are expensive. 
In addition, the use of thatch is banned in the statutory 
planning areas and is almost confined to the rural areas (informal 
sector) . (See 9.4.4). The material is also not easily available in 
the urban areas where its use is limited to symbolic cultural gestures 
such as attempts at creating traditional environments on hotel grounds 
or in ITIuseums. 
In the rural areas a preference for conventional roofing 
materials like aluminium and galvanised iron is evident, and thatch 
(like mud, see 10.5.5) is rapidly fading out. Abrams obseJ:'ved that: 
"In Ghana's Northern Terri tOTies (as the Nort.hern and 
Upper Regions were called), where adobe and thatch 
have survived the march of time, imported iron roofs 
have become ep~demic."45 (See also 4.4.2.5-6). 
This development is recognised and encouraged by government, \.Thich has 
introduced a Roof Loans Scheme to help the rural folk acquire more 
durable roof covering materials. 
A USAID-sponsored programme to develop a low-cost roofing 
material from bagasse, natural rubber and phenol resin has involved 
46 
several institutions and has reached the sample-testing stage but its 
effective production and use is threatened at present by the non-
availability of rubber and resin in Ghana. 
10.6. Problems Facing the Use of Indigenous H.2teri~L~_ 
From the above discussion, some of the problems facing the 
identification, development, production and utilisation of indigenous 
materials are (see also Fig. 10.1): 
(a) the apathy of most Ghanaians to many local materials and their 
preference for conventional materials of proven quality and 
durability which are considered a mark of progress. 
This is the result of the country's cOlonial past and the proeess 
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of 'modernisation ' during which everything traditional or local 
was deprecated (see 1.4.4). It 1S also due to the obvious poor 
quality and n.on-durabi1ity of some indigenous materials; 
(b) the prohibition of the use of most local building materials 1n the 
statutory planning areas, due to the conservatism of existing 
building regulations and bye-laws, and the lack of knowledge about 
the performance of the materials (see 9.4.4); 
(c) the inadequacy of government support. Public sec tor clients, 
despite their declared aim to do so, have not g1ven the "leadership 
by insisting on the use of local materials on their projects. 
Attempts to propagate local materials have been ineffective, " 
limited only to the building of proto-types in isolated places 
like university campuses, suburban housing estates and some 
vi Hages; 
(d) the lack of impact of research due to the non-availability of 
research findings for pract..ical implementation, which, in turn, 
is caused by the poor status of research institutions and poor 
liaison between these institutions on one hand, and public and 
industry on the other; 
(e) the limited availability of the materials (for example bricks and 
landcrete blocks), sometimes in the face of high effective demand. 
Thus "the size of the market is not ahlaYs a constraint; 
(f) the orientation, because of their training, of designers towards 
conventional materials and technologies (see 11.8.1.1) and the 
present system of basing professional charges on percentages of 
. 47 h' h d' h 'f" f- 1 est1mated costs , w 1C 1scourages t e spec1 1cat10n a cleaper 
alternatives, together with points (d) and (e) above, hinder the 
specification of the local materials (see also 9.4.4); 
(g) the non-availability of related skills needed to utilise indigenous 
materials; the present 1abou~ force is conversant only with the 
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technology linked with conventional materials. The necessity to 
reV1ve or develop skills with each dev~loped material, an expen-
sive, difficult and long exerC1se, considering the capacity of the 
research and training institutions (seel1.9.l-2) hinders the 
introduction of rediscovered or newly developed materials; and 
(h) some of the local materials, such as bricks and tiles, call for 
capital-intensive methods of production, others, such as landcrete 
blocks, require high technology to produce their machines and tools. 
This involves the importation of equipment which, without real 
improvements in the economy, is difficult. Thus, 'intermediate' 
technology sometimes requires 'high' technology to produce its 
tools and equipment. (This underscores the need for a comprehensive 
approach to technology in the long term rather than_concentrating 
on certain levels or sectors. See 5.l~.I+.5(c) and Chapter 12.) 
10.7. Distribution of Materials 
Construction activity takes place allover Ghana and, hewing 
produced the material, there remains the necessity to convey it to thE 
site, except where' it is obtained or produced on site. There is the 
need, therefore, for effective geographical distribution. Construction 
materials are bulky by nature and expens1ve to transport over ~ong 
distances. If construction costs are to be kept low, then there should 
be either 
(a) widely distributed manufacturing units minimising distances over 
which materials are moved; or 
(b) an efficient nationwide distribution ne~work linking sites with 
few production units. 
• 
Considering the second alternative first, 1n Ghana materials and 
components for construction are transported by read and rail, and these 
two systems are nm07 discussed together with the emerging lake transport 
3P3 
which has much potential. 
10.7.1.1. Railway 
-----
The rai 1\"ay net\olOrk ~n Ghan,!!, developed before independence, is 
roughly A-shaped and links Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi with the leading 
mining, timber-producing and agri~ultural areas (~ee 1.4.4). It is a 
total of 950 kilometres. (See Fig. 10.2). 
A single track system, the raih"ay has numerous curves y,hich 
prevent trains from reaching high speeds. Derailments are also common. 
The locomotives are old and deteriorating, wagon capacity low and 
decreasing, and railway transportation entails delays which make it 
expens~ve. The efficiency of the railway is further constrained by 
1 · f ., .. 48 the poor qua ~ty 0 the nat~on s telecomnlUnl.cat~on system 
Plans for rehabilitating, modernising and extending the network 
and stock have been on the books for a long time but have not been 
implemented. Table 10.7 shows that the tonnage of goods conveyed by 
the railway system is decreasing, albeit erratically, although there 
has been nn increase in the volume of goods requiring movement in the 
country. For some time now, the railway has been making increasing 
financial losses, exacerbated by frequent unrest among its militant 
workers. 
3 (10 tonnes) 
1968 1969 1970 191'1 1972 1973 1974 
------------
Total Freight 1678 1523 1599 168!+ 1626 1649 2061 
Building Materials 25 4lf 41 33 23 20 36 
Source: Economic Review 1972-74. 
Of Ghana's building materials the railway conveys mostly cement 
Fig. 10.2. Ghana - Roads and Railways 
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and timber. It has not been able to compete with road transport. 
lO.7.1.2. Roads 
Most goods in Ghana are transported by r.oad. The network of 
32,000 kilometres the of 4 million of goods 49 supports movement tons 
But the roads have deteriorated considerably in tecent years and are 
mostly narrow and poorly designed. Shortage of funds and inadequate 
construction cap8city have prevented their improvement and extension. 
(See 7.2.2); 
Haulage capacity is also inadequate, and with the proliferation 
of vehicle types, (it has been estimated that there are 300 diffe~ent 
brands among the 90,000 vehicles registered in Ghana5~, it has been 
difficult to acquire adequate stocks of spares. Vehicles are also used 
beyond their economic lives, and hence with high operational costs. 
But almost all construction materials are transported by road, 
. b . d5l uS1ng trucks owned .y the contractor or h1re . 
The above factors, therefore, not only make the movement of 
materials essential to the smooth operations of the construction 
industry inefficient and unreliable, but coupled with rising costs of 
fuel, expensive. 
10,7.1. 3. Lake Transport 
The artificial Volta Lake (see Fig. 10.2) has an area of about 
780 square kilometres. Transportation on it was expected to be one of 
major benefits from the Volta Dam Project. The important role that 
lake transport was to play in the movement of goods between the north 
and the south of Ghana is yet tp take effect. 
The infrastructure necessary to support efficient movement on the 
lake, such as in-shore facilities, navigational and safety aids and 
maintenance services, are still undeveloped. The state-owned Volta 
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.Lake Transport Company has a small fleet of boats mov~ng passengers and 
goods between a fe,., towns along the lake. T'he private sector 1.S yet to 
warm up to the idea of lake transport as anticipated. 
10.7.1.4. Implications 
Ghana's inefficient, unreliable and expens1.ve transport system 
means that, even if sufficient quantities of constructional materials 
were available, it would still be possible for there to be shortages in 
·certain parts of the country far from the factories or the ports where 
imported materials are off··loaded. This brings into sharp focus the 
concentration of almost all of Ghana's factories producing conventional 
materials along the cost, and leads one to suggest, as did the 
Conunittee on Local Naterials (see 10.5.2), that production units should 
be as 'l1idely distributed as possible. This corresponds t.o the first 
alternative strategy stated in 10.7.1. 
But the feasibility of such an approach is doubtful considering 
Ghana's dire econom1.C situation (see 6.4.6). Apart from this are the 
usual practical questions of the size of the market, the m1.D1.mUm size 
of plant for econom1.C production, availability of raw materials, 
proximity to raw material sources or the ports, and sufficiency of 
managerial and technical skills to operate the number of plant. 
Thus problems of geographical distribution of materials "Till 
entail delays, local shortages and high transport costs to the 
construction industry in the short and medium term. 
10.7.2. Sale of Materials 
Another facet of the 1.ssue of the distribution of constructional 
materials is the way in which their sale is organised. Until the early 
1970's conventional materials were sold by the numerous co~nercial 
houses in the country. The shortage of key materials in recent times, 
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however, has necessitated the adoption of a rationing system for them. 
'1 h' f h' h h d' h . 52 The deta1 ed mec an1sm 0 t 1S system as c ange W1t t1me 
10.7.2.1. Rationing 
Key materials such as cement, steel reinforcement and aluminium 
roofing sheets are now rationed in Ghana. Allocations are made on a 
regional basis. Although the Regional Administrative Offices control 
the distribution, the actual storing and selling of the materials 1S 
done by selected commercial houses. They are sold to contractors 
engaged on public projects, direct labour organisations, registered 
manufacturers such as blockmakers, and private developers. On projects 
of a national character or of a high priority, such as the Kpong Hydro-
eleetric Project, the Ministry of Works allocates materials directly. 
The distribution, which should have been weekly, is often fort-
nightly or monthly. The size of regional allocations and hence 
quantities obtained by organisations and individuals varies with the 
total available nationally53 Public establishments do not enjoy any 
preferential treatment, and are often worse off. (See 7.7.1). 
Because of the laxity of control the materials are usually 
diverted onto the.black market where they sell at exhorbitant rates 
(see 7.7.2), whilst organisations and persons theoretically 'entitled' 
to them do not obtain their share. Thus the already insufficient 
allocations to builders are not always forthcoming. This has led to 
contractors unilaterally suspending some projects (see 13.5.1) and to 
54 long delays on others . 
10.7.2.2. Builders'Merchants 
The organisations which retail constructional materials and 
tools in Ghana are numerous and mainly small sole-ownerships. The bulk 
of the trade, however, is handled by the hardware departments of the 
. . 1 h 55 f h' h 1 S' Af' T d' major commerC1a ouses ,ow 1C on y one, W1SS r1can ra 1ng 
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Company, a subsidiary of the United Africa Company, specialises in 
building materials as such. The smaller retailers obtain their supplies 
from the major companies. Most constructional materials are among the 
category of goods whose prices are controlled by government. (See 7.7.2). 
Of the greatest significance to the development of the 
construction industry are the terms under which contractors obtain 
materials. In Ghana, the normal practice is for the purchaser to pay 
for items before they are delivered. The larger and more reputable 
organisations can, however, arrange credit facilities with the merchants. 
Hence, larger construction firms are more able to stockpile materials 
to protect themselves from shortages or price rises than smaller ones. 
10.7.2.3. Implications 
From 10.7.1-2, not only are materials in short supply in Ghana, 
bu~ also, those that are available are not efficiently distrib~ted, 
are expensive and are sold under terms which are unfavourable to 
contractors, especially small ones. These terms will not be easy to 
change: calling for merchants to advance credits to contractors is 
not reasonable, since the former are themselves usually starved of 
working capital. Thus, even if the shortages were relieved, it would 
still be possible for builders to be unable to obtain sufficient 
. . . 56 quant~t~es of mater~als . 
10.8. Conclusion 
Drawing from Ghana's three decades of persistent efforts to 
achieve self-sufficiency ~n construction materials, any programme for 
identifying, developing, promoting and utilising materials should take 
into account points such as: 
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10.8.1. Availability of Raw Materials 
This applies both to conventional and local materials. In the 
case of the former, if the raw material is not locally available then 
it becomes a matter of whether and how much the nation can import, and 
considering trends in demand, whether it can continue to import it, or 
attempts should be made to identify alternatives. 
With regard to locally available raw materials the considerations 
are: the amount available, whether efforts can be made to renew or 
increase the suppiy, and where the sources are located. 
10.8.2. Technology I (Producing the Material) 
The technology to be used in processing conventional raw 
materials arid in extracting or processing local raw materials is also 
worthy of serious consideration. TI1is will be deternlined by the size 
and distribution of the supply of raw materials, the level of technical 
sophistication in the economy, cost of alternative methods, their 
divisibility or otherwise, the government's policy on technology, what 
the economy can bear, and the smoothness or otherwise of distribution 
channels. 
10.8.3. Output 
TIle availability of raw materials, the technology employed and 
the size of the market will determine fue output of the industries 
manufacturing construction materials. Often it becomes a chicken and 
egg situation, whether to establish a large-capacity industry and hope 
that with promotional effort demand for the yet-to-be-popular material 
will r1se or to whip up enthusiasm for the material before increasing 
installed capacity. 
10.8,4. Attitudes 
--------
l~e attitudes of the public 1n general and clients 1n 
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particular are also important. Since construction is a real-world 
activity, the aspirations and perceptions of the people should be 
considered in choosing materials to develop and utilise. Although 
promotional efforts can achieve some favourable responses, some ideas 
rooted in history and culture can hardly be shaken. Thus in Ghana, 
rather than spend time and expense to popularise timber as a major 
building material, it might be more wor~hwhile to support landcrete 
blocks which are more similar to the popular sandcrete and closer to 
the people's perception of a progressive material. 
Promotional exerCLses should pay sufficient attention to 
behavioural traits in persons. Where government pays mere lip service 
to local materials without using them on any of its projects to a 
scale commensurate with its professed enthusiasm for them, public's 
response will be minimal. 
further,) 
10.8.5. Selection. 
(Sections 10.8.5-7 develop these arguments 
The mere availability of raw materials does not make it 
imperative that the materials should be developed and promoted. There 
is the need for selection, not only on the basis of economic feasibility 
and technological possibility, but also social acceptability. Thus, in 
developing indigenous materials, social research is as important as 
technical research. 
10.8.6. Differentiation 
It is pretentious and erroneous to adopt a nation~l outlook Ln 
the development of local materials. There are differences 1n the 
climatic and soil conditions, and the endowment of raw materials in the 
various parts of Ghana. 
Timber as the major building material wculd be unsuitable Ln the 
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north where variations ~n temperature are extreme and the material is 
not available. Similarly, there are differences in culture, perceptions, 
skills and purchasing power amongst the people in various parts of the 
country .. 
Thus different materials wou\d be appropriate and more likely to 
be acceptable in different parts of the country. Taking bricks as an 
example, burnt clay bricks would .be most easily introduced in areas 
where mud bricks are an indigenous building material. 
10.B.7. Categorisation 
Taking point 10.B.6 further, but in relation to categories of 
building types .rather than geography, it is clear that on some types 
of construction projects, especially major buildings and large civil 
engineering works, conventional materials will continue to be used 
because of the nature of present design criteria. It is also true that 
different types of clients and users prefer, or would tolerate, 
different materials. Thus the middle class would not be averse to or 
can afford timber buildings. These raise two points: 
(1) the attempts to reduce or eliminate the use of conventional 
materials should be specific in terms of types of projects; and 
(2) the promotion of local building materials should identify the 
types of clients at which various packages should be aimed. 
10.B.B. Training 
If there is to be a real shift from the use of conventional to 
the use of indigenous materials, the content, background and outlook 
of training courses for all kinds of construction personnel should be 
altered. This calls for the availability of technical data on the 
characteristics and performance of the indigenolls mate.rials and their 
relationship with conventional materials. It also necessitates the 
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will amongst lecturers and instructors to depart from existing syllabi 
and procedures. (See 11.8,1.1). 
10.8.9. Technology II (Placing the Material) 
Materials can only be placed in the building if the skills 
needed for such tasks are available. It LS sometimes possible to use 
the same skills (such as blocklaying) for conventional (sandcrete blocks) 
and local (landcrete blocks) materials. In other instances, introducing 
a material on a large scale (such as timber) would place considerable 
strain on the available skills (carpentry and joinery). Finally, 
certain materials (such as thatch) call for a departure from conventional 
skills or the resurrection or rationalisation of traditional skills 
(such as mud building) or the introduction of new skills (such as 
bricklaying). 
Thus, Ln the materials development programme, there are 
implications for the corresponding development of appropriate equipment 
and skills 
10.8.10. Distribution 
Programmes for materials should also consider ways of 
ensurLng their effective geographical distribution and rational 
schemes for their retail at reasonable prLces and on terms that balance 
the interests of merchants and buyers. 
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11.1. Introduction 
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CHAPTER 11 
MANPOWER 
"In most developing countries there appears to be a 
need for upgrading the existing professionals and 
their educational programmes, and ... to educate a 
greater number of local architects ... engineers ... 
managers for construction ... [and] better qualified 
workers in construction '" There is little question 
that [education and] training in developing countries 
needs improvement, both in terms of upgrading and 
expanding existing programmes and of developing new 
ones." 
- Moavenzadeh, F., Construction Industry in 
Developing Countries, World Development 1978, 
Vol. 6, No.1, Pergamon Press, London, 
pp. 103-4 and 107. 
"The Gold Coast [later Ghana] needs skilled men and 
women of all kinds - agriculturalists, engineers, 
builders, surveyors, dispensers, nurses, social 
workers, etc - and there are already schools 
catering for this need." 
- Government of the Gold Coast, Achievement in 
the Gold Coast, Public Relations Department, 
Accra, 1951. 
The shortage of skills of all types in the construction 
industries of developing countries ~s often referred to. Proposals 
made by writers towards the alleviation of the problem are usually 
orthodox: the establishment and/or intensification of education and 
training programmes (see, for example, 5.3.1.1-3, 5.4.3.1 and tactic 
(6) in the 'Synthesis' 5,6). Ho~ever, some suggestions have been 
unusual, such as the use of computers in design and management (see 
5.4.3.3). 
Ghana has an elaborate infrastructure of educational 
institutions and organisations, and has had a programme for comprehen-
sive and accelerated development of its human resources s~nce 
independence (see 6.4.2.3). TItis chapter will consider Ghana's 
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experiences 1n this field in recent times. After lookinOg widely at the 
manpower situation, it will then 1) show how, despite elaborate planning 
and much effort, problems rema1n at all levels of education and 
training; 2) show how additional constraints have emerged and been 
tackled; 3) identify some of the determinants of a successful manpower 
development programme; 4) point out that the problem lies less with 
quantity of qualified persons but more with the quality of training and 
intra-organisational factors, as well as the relationships between 
different organisations; 5) that training should be matched with 
reasonable levels of wages and salaries; and 6) that attitudes to 
training are important. 
11.2. The Manpower Situation 
Ghana's current manpower problems were outlined in the 1975-80 
Plan as: 
"Growing unemployment particularly in the urban areas ... , 
widespread underemployment ... ; critical and crucial 
shortages of strategic skills at all levels, professional, 
managerial, technical and ... skilled manpower; 
inadequacy of training, paucity of qualified instructors 
and physical facilities for practical training; low 
productivity and under-utilisation among certain segments 
of the olabour force, ,,1 
Particularly serious was the shortage of technicians and middle-
level personnel, which made it necessary for professionals to attend to 
several simple and mundane tasks. Moreover, certain skills existed in 
excess at the same time as there were severe shortages 1n others. In 
construction, the plan's authors observed that: 
"The limited data that are available on the number 
and distribution of construction workers indicate 
that there is a shortage, particularly of middie-
level artisans and technicians ... "2 
Totals of categories of skilled personnel employed 1n the industry, 
projected needs and total out-turn over the planned period are indicated 
1n Table 11.1. It is clear that, in all the categories, shortages of 
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skilled personnel were expected. Ghana, however, has a long history of 
manpower development, and the construction industry has not been ignored 
in the educational and training programmes initiated and implemented 
over the years. The country has an elaborate system for planning 
manpower needs and putting into operation the schemes to realise them. 
Education and training for construction occurs at both the formal and 
informal levels. The machinery for assessing manpower needs is now 
considered. 
TABLE 11.1. Manpower Situtation 1n Technician and Professional Grades 
in the Construction Industry 
(Number) 
Total Projected Estimated Shortages 
Category Employed Employment Output and 
1975 1980 1975-80 Surpluses 
Civil Engineers 508 761 100 -153 
Mechanical Engineers 566 920 100 -254 
Electrical Engineers 291 516 100 -125 
J\rchitects and Planners 422 1049 200 -427 
Surveyors 640 1623 200 -783 
Civil Engineering , 
Technicians 1182 1772 60 -530 
Electrical Engineering 
Technicians 1111 1863 711 - 41 
!Mechanical Engineering 
Technicians 1403 2281 805 - 73 
--
Source: Five Year Plan 1975-80. 
11.3. The Manpower Board 
The Manpow"er Board 1S a division of the Ministry of Economic 
. . h 3 Plann1ng charged W1t : 
(a) formulating plans and policies for the development of national 
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education and training schemes; 
(b) initiating policies, plans and programmes for periodic assessment 
of the manpower supply situation and requirements; and 
(c) coordinating the functions and activities of all agencies involved 
in the development and utilisation of the country's human 
requirements. 
The main objective of the Board is to achieve maximum and 
efficient utilisation of Ghana's human resources and training 
facilities 4 , the avoidance of wastes of skills, accurate placement of 
training personnel, and ultimately creating a mobile and dynamic labour 
force capable of adapting to occupational shifts, technological changes 
and industrial growth. 
The Manpower Board periodically studies on its own initiative or 
on government's instruction specific areas of the labour force. It 
assesses needs, relates these tc educational or training facilities or 
programmes, and advises government which, 1n turn, directs the 
institutions concerned accordingly. 
11.3.1. Effectiveness 
The nature of the Board's work demands a very smooth liaison 
with industry and educational and training institutes, but this has not 
been the case. In a recent study on the manpower situation in the 
. . d 5 f 1 1 h 30 f h construct10n 1n ustry, or examp e,. ess t an per cent 0 t e 
questionnaires sent out were duly completed and returned. This lack of 
liaison has reduced the Board's effectiveness and resulted 1n 
disparities in the country's manpower structure, as programmes and 
activities of training institutes are not coordinated and duplication 
in certain sectors of training exists with inadequacy in others. 
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11.3.2. Report on Construction 
The Board, in the study referred to above (11.3.1), observed 
6 1n 1977 that in Ghana's construction industry there were: 
(a) shortages at all levels, especially at the top managerial and 
middle technician levels; 
(b) high net loss of skilled personnel due to migration to neighbouring 
countries and movement out of the industry, caused by inadequate 
remunerations and insecurity of tenure of employment; and 
(c) ina~equacy of training facilities for the construction sector. 
It is, therefore, most probable that the levels of employment indicated 
in table 11.1 could not be maintained and that the shortfalls between 
needs and available numbers are even greater. 
The Board also found that in both consulting and contracting 
firms the shortage of personnel was accentuated by a trend, in the light 
of high inflation and inadequate wages and salaries, towards self-
employment. In particular, skilled tradesmen were organising themselves 
into labour sub-contractors and working, sometimes for their former 
7 
employers, on lump Sum bases There was also a tendency for workers 
to move from smaller to larger establishments where employment was more 
secure and conditions better. 
11.4. Tradesmen 
The formal training of Ghanaians 1n construction trades was 
sta~ted by the early Christian missionaries. There are at present a 
large number of vocational and technical institutes allover the country 
for the training of construction operatives, run by the Ministry of 
Education, the National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI), other 
government agencies, and philantropic, benevolent or voluntary 
organisations. Some of these are: 
(a) the Polytechnics and Technical Institutes (at least one in each 
region) and the multitude of Continuation Schools, run by the 
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Ministry of Education (see 7.8.1); 
(b) the pilot Training Centre in Accra, the Tamale Training Centre and 
the Accra Construction Machinery Centre of the NVTI (see 11.5); 
(c) the Ministry of Social Welfare and Community Development's 
Vocational Training Centres and its training programmes in the 
~orstal institutions, the joint Ghana/Canada Technical Training 
Centres 1n Accra and Kumasi and the joint Ghana/West German 
Vocational and Rehabilitation Training Centre at Biriwa (Central 
Region); and 
(d) Opportunities Industrialisation Centre, Accra, run by a joint 
Ghanaian/American philantropic body, the Young Hen's Christian 
Association's Trairiing Centre in Accra, and those of the churches, 
such as the Nandom Catholic Practical Vocational Training Institute. 
In addition to these, there are on-the-job apprenticeship schemes 
organised by contracting and direct-labour organisations. 
11.4.1. Constraints 
The training of tradesmen in Ghana is hampered by problems such 
as: inadequate facilities in terms of classroom and residential 
accommodation and 'equipment, shortage of teachers and insufficiency of 
funds. There is also a lack of effective coordination amongst the 
institutions, resulting in both the duplication of effort in training 
certain categories of skills and the neglect of some categories which 
has culminated in the existence of some skills in surplus at the same time 
as there is an acute shortage of some skills8 
Until the late 1970's there used to be a preference among 
Ghanaians for white-collar jobs, a trait which tended to limit ,entrance 
into the building trades both in terms of numbers and quality of the 
personnel'; 9 persons entered the trades only as a last resort. This 
trend is reducing as a result of: emphasis on practical training in 
pr1mary educationlO (see 7.8.1), the evident shortage of clerical job 
opportunities, increasing urban unemployment (see 6.3), and the 
relatively more lucrative prospects of the trades at present. 
11.4.2. Support Services 
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Some technical and vocational institutes go beyond formal 
education to provide other services for the welfare of their graduates. 
For example, some benevolent soci.eties and the Ministry of Labour, 
Social Welfare and Cooperatives organise trainees into cooperative 
groups, providing them with essential tools on loan and helping them to 
obtain contracts. Again, the Biriwa centre (see 11.4) insists on 
negotiating, on behalf of its graduates, salaries and conditions of 
service, especially security of employment. 
11.4.3. Apprenticeships 
Considering the inability of formal training to provide the 
country's needs of skilled personnel, it seems w~se to suggest that 
greater use be made of apprenticeships. In fact, most of the country's 
tradesmen were trained in this way, their illiteracy or semi-literacy 
dictating the use of touch-and-feel methods of instruction. However, 
not only will the scope of the exercise be limited by the number of 
organisations willing and able to provide it, but also, unless it is 
well-organised, there is the danger of its resulting in a situation of 
the .blind leading the blind, with mistakes passed on from one generation 
of tradesmen to another. 
11.5. The National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI) 
The National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI) was established 
in 1969 by the government of Ghana and the United Nations. Development 
Programme (UNDP). It is charged with coordinating all industrial and 
vocational training prograrrunes and activities i.n the country to ensure 
the availability in adequate numbers of skilled personnel 1n the 
industrial and clerical fields. Its duties inc1ude l1 : 
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(a) studying the country's skilled manpower requirements 1n relation 
to its expanding economy; 
(b) drawing up suitable training programmes to provide these needs; 
(c) organising apprenticeships and in-plant training; and 
(d) setting training standards and conducting trade tests. 
The NVTI does not run training courses itself: it regulates and 
supervl.ses such courses at various institutions. However, it has a 
pilot Training Centre in Accra and plans to establish one each in the 
regions. 
It has developed training syllabi and standards for building 
trades such as carpentry, masonry, electrical installation, plumbing 
and construction equipment maintenance. But its po\>ler over the training 
centres is limited. The differei1t institutes, obtaining finance from 
various different sources, are operationally independent. 
The NVTI requires that the trainees it is directly involved with 
are spons,ored by their employers for the duration of their courses. 
This limits its scale of operations. Table 11.2 preseds figures of all 
apprentices trained by the NVTI in 1975-78. 
TABLE 11~. Trained Personnel througp Ap~renticeship with the 
National Vocational TraininfLInstitute (1975-78) 
Year 
Number Trained 
11.6. Technicians 
1975 
1120 
1976 
1799 
~977 
1800 
1978 
2000 
Most of the artisans working as foremen and supervisors J.n Ghana's 
construction industry are tradesmen who were promoted after long, 
dedicated service. Similarly, several draughtsmen and building and 
engineering technic1ans have had no formal training at all: they 
acquired their. skills through apprenticeship schemes. 
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Formal training of construction technicians takes place at the 
Technical Institutes, of which there is one in each regional capital, 
and at the Polytechnics in Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi, Ho and Tamale. The 
Technical Institutes run certificate courses whose entrants are from 
the primary and secondary schools. The Polytechnics run diploma courses 
up to the equivalent of City and Guilds Ordinary Technicians Diploma 
for the products of the technical institutes and secondary schools 
(see Figure 11.1). The training centre of the PWD in Accra is Ghana's 
most important source of construction draughtsmen. 
A higher diploma course in civil engineering ~s run at the 
University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, turning out technicians 
with considerable versatility, able to work in civil engineering design 
and construction, building construction, quantity surveying and 
building services design and installation. The university also provides 
certificate and diploma courses in geodetic engineering. (See Fig. 11.1) 
Technical teachers and instructors are trained at the Technical 
Teacher Training Centres in Kumasi and Mampong. But this has not 
relieved the short~ge of qualified teachers which is one of the major 
factors hindering the development of technical expertise ~n Ghana. 
In 1976-77, the Polytechnics trained 963 persons of supervisory 
grade in building crafts, and the Technical Institutes trained 2105 
of supervisory and tradesmen grades12 Table 11.3 shows the actual 
enrolment in 1974/75 and 1975/76 and the projected enrolment up to 1980 
for the polytechnics, technical institutes and teachers training 
centres. The figures indicate planned expansion of intake Cup to 50 per 
cent for teachers centres 1978-79/1979-80) for all the institutions ~n 
each plan year, increases which seldom took place. 
The constraints on the expansion of the training of technicians 
FIGURE 11.1. The S'tructure of Training and Education 
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TABLE 11.3. Five-Year Development Programme (1975-80) 
Enrolment Projection for Technical Institutions 
Institution Actual Enrolment Projected Enrolment 
1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 
polytechnics 5,500 6,050 6,655 7,653 8,800 10,120 
Technical 
Institutions 4,700 5,250 5,857 7,l~93 10,911 14,200 
Technical Teachers 540 560 600 720 980 1,400 
Training Centres 
Source: Five-Year Plan 1975-80 
are similar to those outlined for the trades (~ee 11.4.1). In addition, 
technician training concentrates on the technical, to the exclusion of 
the managerial aspects of construction. 
11.7. Management 
11.7.1. ~anagement Development 
The development of management skills has received attention ~n 
Ghana's education programmes. A degree course in Business Management is 
provided at the University of Ghana at Legon, near Accra, and post-
graduate courses in Business and Industrial Management are run at Legon 
and at the University of Science and Technology, Kumasi. The Ghana 
In'stitute of Management and Public Administration at Greenhill, near 
Accra, is concerned with public administration and general management; 
it offers residential full-time courses as well as occasional refresher 
courses, The only' institutions which have tried to enhance the level 
of management skills in the construction industry are: the Management 
Development and Productivity Institute, which has branches in Accra and 
Kl.lmasi, and the University of Science and Technology, Kumasi. 
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11.7.2. The Management Development and Productivity Institute (MDPI) 
The MDPI was set up in 1967 by the government of Ghana, the 
UNDP and the International Labour Office (ILO), to succeed the National 
Productivity Institute which had been created in 1964. Its objectives 
13 
are 
(a) to improve and develop the standard of management in all aspects 
and at all levels; 
(b) to introduce suitable management practices and techniques; and 
(c) to promote increased efficiency and productivity in industry, 
commerce and other related fields. 
The MDPI organises short training courses for personnel 1n top 
management from all sectors of industry and commerce, provides 
consultancy services to industry, and serves as a centre for collection, 
analysis and dissemination of modern developments in the fields of 
management and organisation. It maintains a staff of qualified 
,consultants and instructors, 'although it recruits experienced personnel 
from outside to contribute to its courses as need be. 
11. 7.2.1. Construction Hanagement 
The institute does not have a unit devoted to construction, and 
none of its personnel has a qualification in construction management. 
Its activities in the construction sector have only been in the form of 
occasional seminars for contractors under its Ghanaian Business 
14 Bureau 
These sem1nars provided courses on subjects including: basic 
management, site supervision and bookkeeping techniques. They were 
organised not as part of the MDPI's own regular programme but at the 
request of the regional branches of the Contractors' Association (see 
13.8)., The institute's courses are advertised 1n the media: applicants 
have to be sponsored by their employers, and should pay a fee, which 1S 
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rather high for courses for contractors and engLneers. The response 
from contractors to invitations to attend the courses'has been far from 
enthusiastic because of the financial corrunitment involved, and also 
because: 
(1) many contractors do not see the need for training since they 
reckon they make adequate profits without it; arid 
(2) the difficulties facing the construction industry make sound 
knowledge of management principles irrelevant (see 13.5.3). 
The MDPI has also observed that its products are not able to put into 
practice their acquired knowledge due to the conservative nature of 
their superiors. 
11.7.2.2. Problems 
The Institute has its operational probKms: Ln Accra it occupies 
temporary accorrunodation at the moment, pending the completion of its 
head offices; its classrooms are poorly equipped; and, lacking 
suitable residential accorrunodation for participants, it has been unable 
to organise full-time cburses. 
11.8. Professionals 
Of Ghana's three universities only the University of Science and 
Technology in Kumasi provides training for professional and semi-
professional personnel for the construction industry. 
11.8.1. The University of Science and Technology (UST) 
The Kumasi College of Technology was established Ln 1951 and 
upgraded to full university status in 1961 to become the University of 
Science and Technology (UST). 
15 The Courses 
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The Faculty of Engineering, created in 1952, offers four-year 
degr~e courses in civil, mechanical, electrical and geodetic engineering, 
after which graduates can apply for membership of the Ghana Institute 
of Engineers (Gh.I.E.) after two years' post-qualification experience. 
The Faculty of Architecture was first formed in 1957 as the 
School of Architecture, Town Planning and Building. It trains 
Architects, Quantity Surveyors, Building Managers, and Planners. 
The course 1.n Architecture lasts six years: a four-year first 
degree course and two-year diploma. Two years' experience-qualifies 
graduates to take the membership examination of the Ghana Institute of 
Architects (GIA). The building course takes four years, students opting 
to specialise in either Quantity Surveying or Buildin~ Management. The 
graduates can take an examination to become members of the Ghana 
Institution of Surveyors (GIS) after two years in the field. There is, 
as yet, no professional institute for builders. The Planning courses 
are: a three-year semi-professional diploma which is being phased out, 
a four-year degree course in Urban Planning, and a two-year post-
g:r:aduate course 1.n Regional Planning. Holders of the planning degree 
can apply to be members of the Ghana Institute of Planners after two 
years' experience. 
11.B.l.L. 1raining at UST 
The content and background of training at UST have a distinctly 
foreign flavour. The textbooks, references and examples are usually 
from media other than Ghanaian (mainly British). The graduates are 
thus well-steeped in the "correct practice,,16 but out of touch with 
local conditions. Worse, with current difficulties involved in 
obtaining import licences (see 7.7.1), the books and teaching aids are 
out of date, with obvious implications, not tie least being that students 
. . 
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may be taught principles and procedures which are not only inapplicable 
.' b 1 1 1 . h' 1 f' . 17 1n Ghana, ut a so no onger app y 1n t e1r paces 0 or1g1n 
Attempts by lecturers at UST to write textbooks more appropriate 
to the Ghanaian context have petered out for want of encouragement from 
the authorities and the lack of incentive in view of the smallness of 
the domestic market for such books, not to mention imagined or real 
problems such as obtaining suitable publishers. 
11.8.1.2. Students Research and Industrial Training 
In their final year, ptudents are assigned research projects of 
academic or practical interest to report on as part of the requirements 
for their final examination. Some of these, like village development 
schemes and designs of particular buildings, have act~a11y been 
implemented. 
Industrial training for the students of UST takes the form of a 
three-month attachment to consulting and contracting organisations from 
July to September each year. In reality, it is difficult to place the 
students in positions in which they can learn anything because of the 
short duration of their tour and their tendency to overrate their 
ability. Their attitude to work has created problems of discipline for 
several organisations who have been unable to sanction malingering or 
absentee students over whom they have no powers of hiring and firing: 
the students' allowances for their training are paid directly by UST18 
Some of the more reputable private organisations refuse to accept 
d f . 1 " 19 stu ents or pract1ca tra1n1ng 
11.8.1.3. Multi-disciplinary Training 
A positive aspect of the courses at the Faculty of Architecture 
is their multi-disciplinary nature. This approach was necessitated by 
a shortage of personnel. For example, all degree sturlents at the 
---------
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faculty have a common first year, in which they study almost the same 
subjects. Again, third-year building and fourth-year design students 
attend the same lectures in building ec.onomics. More important, the 
students are assigned tasks of practical significance, the solution of 
which requires contributions from each 'professional category. For 
instance, planning students would formulate an area scheme, design 
students would design the buildings in the scheme, and the building 
students would provide cost advice, prepare bills of quantities, design 
the structures and propose solutions to problems of site management. 
The UST, therefore, has done much more than most institutions to 
give students an appreciation of the interdependence of the various 
participants ~n the construction process and to prevent excessive 
f . 1· 20 pro ess~ona ~sm 
11.8.1.4. 
(See 3.6.6.). 
Faculties' Research and Consultancy 
The Faculty of Architecture's Department of Housing and Planning 
Research has pursued extensive studies into aspects of Ghana's 
construct ion industry, part icu1ar1y in appropriate technology, housi.ng 
and socio-cu1tura1 factors of development (see 10.5.1.1-2). Being able 
to aa11 on the expertise of the staff at the faculty, it is better-
placed than the country's other research institutions concerned with 
construction. 
UST's Technology Consultancy Centre (multi-professional) is the 
means of enabling industry to tap the knowledge of the university's 
professional staff. It publicises research material suitable for 
practical implementation and has assisted small-scale industrialists 
to establish or improve upon their own production units, particularly 
. 1 1 . 1 21 those us~ng oca raw mater~a s . 
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11.B.l.S. Problems 
UST's annual intake of students to various courses ~n construction 
is low (see table 11.4) and has not been increased considerably in 
recent times despite the government's insistence (through the Council 
. h d . )22 forH~g er E ucat~on . Some of the reasons for this are: 
(a) University Education in Ghana is free and depends on government 
subvention which has been inadequate to support any programmes of 
expansion; 
(b) there is an acute shortage of classroom accommodation, teaching 
aids and vital laboratory and workshop equipment. Practically, 
the numerical size of the classes is limited by the physical sizes 
of the classrooms (a new central classroom block is several years 
behind schedule); 
(c) Universities in Ghana were, until recent years, wholly residential. 
Serious problems with residential accommodation caused ar. off-
campus accommodation scheme to be formulated. Provision of 
suitable transport for students living off-campus will soon prove 
a hindrance to this scheme; 
(q) there is a shortage of staff: the university is losing staff at 8 
high rate. Salaries and conditions of service are very 
23 
unattractive to suitably qualified personnel ; and 
(e) the unwillingness of the UST authorities to ~ncrease intake since 
they perce~ve that it would, 1n the face of the shortage of 
facilities and staff, lead to a dilution of standards. 
11.9. ponstraints on Training in Ghana 
11.9.1. Financ§, 
Finance appears to be the most important short- and medium-
term constraint on all training in Ghana, but there is a limit to what 
the overburdened national economy can bear (see 6.4.6). Introducing 
-~ 
", 
~ 
TABLE 11.4. University of Science and Technology, Kumasi 
or Related to, Construction (1962-76) 
Faculty/Course 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Faculty of Architecture 
B.Sc. (Design) - - 5 11 
B.Sc. (Building Technology) - - - 1 
B.Sc. (Planning) - - - -
M.Sc. (Architecture) - - - 10 
Post-Graduate Diploma in 
Architecture - - - -
M.Sc. (Planning) - - 1 1 
M.Sc. (Building Technology) - - - -
Diploma in Building Technology * 1:4 9 6 5 
Diploma in Physical Planning - - - -
Diploma in Community Planning - 17 13 13 
* Inter RIBA 4 12 8 -
Inter Town Planning Inst.Dip. * 
____ 5-' 
4 - -
--
* Course discontinued. 
1966 
3 
10 
-
3 
-
3 
-
1 
-
6 
-
-
Degrees, Diplomas and Certificates Awarded in Subjects ~n, 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Total 
19 7 5 14 26 17 20 19 17 12 115 
9 5 11 20 16 17 15 13 17 17 151 
- - - - - - 7 13 14 14 48 
4 5 13 1 - - - - - - 36 
- -
- - 6 12 26 13 14 71 142 
15 - 12 9 5 2 3 - 3 - 54 
- - - - - - - - - 1 1 
- - - -
- - - - - -
25 
18 24 12 13 11 15 17 16 19 17 162 
-
- - - - - - - - -
49 
- - - - - - - - - -
24 
- - - - - - - - -
- 9 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
w 
w 
+ ..... 
TABLE 11.4. (cont'd) 
Faculty/Course 
\Facu1ty of Social Sciences 
I B.Sc. in Land Economy 
I Cert. in Estate Management 
I 
IFacu1ty of Engineering 
I B.Sc. - civil 
- Mechanical 
I -"Electrical 
I - Geodetic 
IDip10ma - Civil 
- E1edtrica1 
- Mechanical 
- Geodetic 
\certificate in Geodetic Engineering 
19621196311964119651 196611967119681196911970119711197211973119741197511976 Total 
16 16 28 15 11 14 16 116 
19 12 8 6 7 6 17 16 19 110 
12 11 11 12 16 13 15 10 17 26 18 15 18 17 33 244 
7 2 2 $ 7 14 10 16 22 14 12 19 11 8 11 163 
7 8 9 12 10 12 11 12 19 17 17 14 9 11 12 180 
1 1 1 3 6 
3 3 8 14 18 15 61 
14 9 20 16 11 1 22 22 20 18 31 19 32 235 
4 9 12 14 17 I 3 18 20 14 3 30 23 19 35 221 
I - 7 3 12 6 28 
18 20 3 9 50 
!post-Grad.Dip. in Geodetic Eng. I I -I -_ I - . 2 I 2 I 2 3 I - I 9 
post-Grad. Dip. in Sanitary Eng. - I - I -~ I 31 5 
Source: University of Science and Technology, Annual Calendar, 1977-78. 
---
w 
w 
V1 
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fees for university students is not politically acceptable to government, 
at least for the time being, s~nce a similar attempt ~n 1971 led to 
public outcry and unrest on the campuses and was rescinded by the 
second military government when it assumed power in 1972. (See 
6.4.5). 
UST has tried to alleviate its financial problems, establishing 
an endowment fund to elicit contributions from individuals and 
organisations to help finance its capital expansion and research 
programmes. Response to the well-disseminated appeals has been less 
than enthusiastic. 
Some private organisations, such as the Pioneer Tobacco Company, 
award a number of scholarships to students in the universities but this 
makes little impact on the institution's financial burdens. 
The secondary schools, technical institutes and polytechnics, 
with less independence and influence then the universities, fa~e similar 
financial problems, about which they can do very little. 
Whereas the introduction of levies on contractors to establish 
a central training fund might appear a theoretical solution, its 
implementation will be difficult. Contractors will do their utmost to 
evade the payment of their contributions. Many of them do not pay the 
subscription fees of their own association. (See 13.8.4). 
11.9.2. Time and Other Resources 
Even if finance, including foreign exchange, could be obtained, 
it would be some time before the facilities were appreciably improved or 
expanded. This is the result not only of the long gestation of 
construction projects (see 3.6.3) but also the inadequate capacity of 
I " d 24 ( 6 ) the loca construct~on ~n ustry see .5.4. 
Again, if increasing the number of trained personnel ~s not to 
take place at the expense of their quality, the number of qualified 
337 
teachers and instructors needs to be increased proportionately. It 
takes much time to train such persons, and much effort and resource to 
keep them despite covetqus advances by the private sector and other 
countries. 
These problems account for Ghana's inability to meet its needs 
for most categories of skilled personnel despite persistent efforts at 
all levels (see Fig. 11.1). 
11.10. Employment 
Having completed a period of training it is necessary for 
qualified persons to obtain employment in the industry. The public 
sector accounts for the bulk of recorded employment in construction 
(see Table U.S), although as pointed out in Chapter 7 (see 7.3.2.1, 
7.3.3.2 and 7.3.4.2), levels of remuneration are lower in this sector 
than in the private sector and there is a tendency for skilled personnel 
tv move from the latter to the former. Data on employment in 
construction are particularly suspect due to the industry's reliance on 
casual labour and the widespread nature of self-employment. Thus only 
figures for the public sector are reasonably accurate. Employment for 
construction personnel exists in both public- and privately-owned 
consultancy and contractor organisations. Recorded employment in 
construction is of the order of 50,000 persons. The fluctuations 1n 
TABLE 11.5. Public and Private Sector Recorded Employment in 
Construction, 1965-74 
(Thousands) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Public Sector 52.7 31.0 33.3 38.3 L~l. 6 35.2 29.4 37.3 30.3 28.9 
Private Sector 20.1 15.2 14.3 16.4 15.7 14.6 14.7 12.8 16.0 18.5 
Total 72.8 46.2 47.6 54·.7 57.3 49.8 44.1 50.1 46.3 47.4 
Sou~ Economic Survey 1969, 1972-74 
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employment and factors causing them are discussed in 12.2.1. Contractors 
are considered in Chapter 13. Consultancies are now discussed. 
11.10.1. Consu1tancies 
The bulk of the nation's capacity in terms of consultancy lies 
in the public sector, ,in the AESC, PWD, GRA, Town and Country Planning 
Department and in other parastata1s and government departments which 
retain their own consultants, such as the State Housing Corporation, the 
Forces and the Universities. There are also a number of private 
consulting firms. 
The AESC is charged with the responsibility of registering all 
consulting firms in Ghana (see 7.3.4), and figures obtained from the 
Corporation indicate that 1n 1979 there were 30 Architectural, 32 
Engineering (the majority of them Structural Engineering) and 13 Quantity 
Surveying firms. It is likely, however, that these do not include all 
firms operating in Ghana: they indicate only those firms wishing to 
undertake contracts from the AESC. Apart from engineering firms which 
belong to the Ghana Consulting Engineers Association, the others are 
administered directly by their respective professional bodies (see 
11.11.1). Planning consultancy is a new phenomenon: only five firms 
had been formed by 1979 (see also 9.4.5.5). 
There are few expatriate consulting firms operating 1n Ghana, 
and these are not recognised by the institutions and associations which 
insist on each firm having at least on qualified Ghanaian as partner. 
Most consulting firms are small and almost all are based in 
Accra (27 of the 30 Architectural firms registered by the AESC, and all 
Surveying firms; one of the latter has a branch in Kumasi). Almost all 
consultancy firms 1n Ghana are partnerships. There are a few multi-
disciplinary firms; instances of firms of different professions 
maintaining a continuing though inforr~l and non-committal relationship 
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from one project to another are also becoming common. 
Apart from a few design contracts that are awarded after 
competitions, most consultancy jobs in construction are obtained by 
lobbying. The older, better-established and better-connected firms do 
a larger proportion of the work. New firms find it particularly 
difficult to break into the market. This has become a source of 
frustration to young, promising graduates, eager to set up their own 
consultancies. 
11.10.1.1. Implications 
Thus, whereas public sector employment is unattractive to 
qualified Ghanaian professionals, they also find it difficult to set 
themselves up in business. This has enabled the better-organised firms 
t"Q control the level of remunerations ln the private sector too, and 
has tended to make this sector an unattractive altern~tive for ~ewly­
qualified persons. Finally, these factors have fuelled the exodus of 
skilled personnel. (See 11.3.2). 
11.,11. Institutions 
The way in· which persons involved in construction are organi.sed 
is also important. As shown ln 3.6.6, professional snobbism and lack 
of communication can hinder efficient performance in construction. The 
nature of professional and other institutions ln Ghana are now discussed. 
(Some writers mentioned the role such organisations can play .1n the 
development of the construction, see 5.4.3.1:) The Contractors 
Association is discussed in Chapter 13. 
11.11.1. Professional Institutions 
P~ofessional bodies in Ghana are required to register with the 
Registrar-General on the condition that they represent more than three-
quarters of the number of persons in the country trained and qualified 
. 25 in the particular profess10n 
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Thus only one institution can represent 
any profession. The law also bars any person not duly registered with a 
recognised professional body from practising the profession in Ghana. 
Finally, it empowers each professional institution to appoint a 
disciplinary authority which would have some of ·the powers, rights and 
privileges of a High Court. 
The professional bodies 1n construction in Ghana are: 
Ghana Institute of Architects (GIA) 
Ghana Institution of Engineers (GhIE) 
Ghana Institute of Planners (GIP), and 
Ghana Institution of Surveyors (GIS). 
Each of them sets a minimum age of 21 for assoCiate membership. They 
organise examinations or interviews to admit new members (see 11.8.1). 
They readily recognise professional qualifications obtained in some 
foreign countries, especially Britain, but might insist on further 
examination of persons qualifying in other countries. 
26 Generally ,the institutions a1m at securing the advancement of 
knowledge 1n their fields, promoting the welfare and status of members, 
upholding standards of competence and etiquette among members, furthering 
relations between them and others engaged in re1at..ed fields in Ghana or 
similar bodies outside the country, and promoting the understanding of 
the profession by the public. They are represented on governing boards 
of institutions training students in their fields and have a say in 
syllabi and standards of instruction and qualification. 
11.11.1.1. Membership 
Table 11.6 indicates the membership of some of the institutions 
in March, 1979. The figures include foreigners practising in Ghana, 
~lthough there are few: of 171 members of the GIA only 7 were 
expatriate!, and registered members working outside the country (28 of 
341 
TABLE 11.6. Membership of Professional Institutions m }larch, 1979 
Ghana Institute of Architects 171 
Ghana Institution of Engineers 851 
Ghana Institution of Surveyors 174 
Source: From lists provided by the GIA, GhIE and GIS. 
the GIA's members}. Almost all of Ghana's professional persons work in 
Accra and Kumasi in public or private consultancy and contracting 
organisations, or 1n education and research. 
Professionals 1n Ghana do not enjoy the high reputation for 
competence and honesty associated with their counterparts in most other 
. 27 
countr1es They are often accused of colluding with contractors to 
defraud clients, of poor performance and of corruption in soliciting for 
consultancy services (see 7.3.l.3). The institutions are, generally, 
not able to maintain standards of competence and discipline. Government 
has complained that: 
" ... there is the need to re-design some projects to 
reduce costs. Buildings for schools, offices, 
workshops, Etc. are often so designed that their 
functional use is lost. Government has directed 
Ministry of Works and Housing to vet all designs 
the 
1128 
11.11.1.2. Activities 
The professional institutions 1n Ghana have not been active and 
have tended to be inward-looking. They have not been vocal about the 
issues facing the local construction industry and have seldom individually 
or jointly applied themselves to the solution of any of its problems. 
Inter-disciplinary links have been symbolic or manifest only on 
government-appointed technical committees, but professional snobbisIG 
is less apparent th~n in some other countries although the various 
institutions tend to pursue the interests of their members and protect 
29 
their fields of activity, defined in their constitutions and/or bye-laws 
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from infiltrators. Finally, within the institutions, there appears to 
be a split between the older, more conservative, and the newer members. 
(See 11.10 ,1.1) . 
11.11.1.3. Potential 
Thus, although Ghana has a number of professional institutions 
with admirable aims and several members, they have been generally weak 
and inward-looking, and the potential contributions they can make to the 
development of the local industry are yet to be realised. 
11.11.2. Trade Unions 
Unions in the construction trades date from the Carpenters and 
Masons Association in the 1920's30. Now most workers in the industry 
belong to the Construction and Building Workers Union, which is an 
affiliated member of the Trades Union Contress (TUC). The aims of the 
. 1 d 31 congress ~nc u e : the achievement of high living standards, improvement 
of wages and better conditions of service; attainment of shorter working 
hours, security against sickness, unemployment, old age or accidents and 
other hazards of life and work; support for national development efforts 
through efficient· workmanship and maximum productivity; and encourage-
ment of the creation of workers' cooperatives. 
It has branches 1n all the regions, finances its activities from 
members' contributions and represents individuals or groups of workers 
on matters affecting their welfare in discussions and negotiations, 
especially collective agreements, with government and employers. It has 
not done much in the area of increasing worker productivity, although it 
has. averted or settled some industrial disputes. 
11.12. Conclusions 
« 
Experience in Ghana has sho\m that education and training 
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programmes should not concentrate only on increasing the number of 
trained persons but should also consider issues such as: 
11.12.1. Content 
Turning out large numbers of persons unsuited to the peculiar 
conditions prevalent in the country is wasteful and deceitful. In 
practice, students might have to "unlearn"or- forget many of the facts 
they conscientiously imbibed at school, or to revise the opinion of 
themselves that their training had given them. (See also 1.4.7). 
It is possible that slight alterations in course content and 
background would have a more decisive effect on the inadequate executive 
capacity than numerical increases in the studentry. Under Ghana's 
present economic circumstances, the former is a worthwhile if not the 
only possible approach (see 6.4.5-6). 
11.12.2. Balance 
Rather than emphasise education and training l.n aU sectors; 
it is essential to identify areas of greatest need in which efforts 
should be concentrated. Above all, programmes should attempt to balance 
out the relative numbers of specialist skills if surpluses in some 
skills should not exist together with shortages in other, more vital 
ones. 
It is unWl.se to neglect the nature of the construction process 
while formulating training progran~es. For example, the number of 
assistants needed by each category of professional construction personnel 
should be reflected in the relative numbers trained if the situation that 
has resulted in Ghana, where professionals do tedious or administrative 
jobs on which they put little of their skills to use32 with its 
. . ' 1 d d .. . b . d d d d33 1mp11cat1ons on mora e an pro uct1VJ_ty, 1S to e avol. e or re resse . 
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11.12,3. Organisation 
Considering 11.12.2, there is the need for the effective 
coordination of education and training programmes for the various 
categories of personnel, and of the different institutions. Thus, ~n 
Ghana, there is a case for establishing a body, preferably within the 
Ministry of Works and Housing, to organise, coordinate and control all 
training for construction, (See Fig. 11.1) 
11.12.4. Need for Training 
Training or education should not be pursued as if it were a 
necessity for success in all ventures. Certain entrepreneurial skills 
such as risk-bearing cannot be developed ~n formal training, and there 
are situations in which the application of theoretical principles, such 
as trying to use management techniques in Ghana's present unpredictable 
construction environment, leads to frustration. It is also possible for 
persons unencumbered by formal education or training to perform well, 
like Ghana's self-employed labour-only contractors, in situations 
demanding ~n particular flexibility, informality and personal relation-
. 34 sh~ps 
11.12.5. Attitudes 
The attitudes of pr~mary and secondary school leavers to the 
. various professions determines the profession or vocation they opt to 
train for. Until recently, the prestige attached to office jobs in 
Ghana had reduced the number of persons entering construction training 
programmes. Such attitudes are traceable to society's values and, to 
some extent, the rewards to be obtained from var~ous areas of endeavour, 
as well as t.he orientation of primary education. 
In the field, the classical clash between highly-educated 
youth and not-so-well educated but experienced elderly persons can lead 
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to wasteful conflict. The attitude of government, organisations and 
sen10r personnel to training is, therefore, important if the trained 
persot?-s are to be put 1n positims 1n which they can be most beneficial. 
Also important 1S the trainee's humility. 
11.12.6. Remuneration 
A successful training programme should be linked with an 
appropriate incomes policy if qualified personnel are to be retained 1n 
the country. Failing this, the considerable mobility of skilled 
personnel will precipitate their exodus to places where conditions are 
manifestly better: in Ghana's case, to Nigeria in particular, but also 
to such far away places as Botswana, Zambia and Libya. The nation, 
35 thus, loses the personnel it has trained at much expense to others . 
11.12.7. ~mp10yment 
Notwithstanding the number of qualified persons in a country, 
it is possible for inefficiencies to occur if such persons are not used 
correctly. The deployment of personnel 1n positions 1n which their 
skills are most needed is important. It 1S also essential that no 
hindrances are placed 1n the way of persons wishing to enter particular 
fields of construction activity. 
Another facet of this issue 1S that of promotion on merit and 
the allocation of satisfying and chaLlenging duties to persons to 
enable them to 'mature' on the job, 
It is clear, therefore, that if training and education of 
construction personnel should be of maximum benefit, each should be 
tailor-made to suit the particular conditions of the country and also 
be accompanied by appropriate measures conducive to its success as well 
as the deplojlIllent of its products., Moreover, too much should not be 
expected of training since the construction industry arid the 
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administrative machinery of the country may possess in-built traits for 
inefficiency, no matter the number of quaLified personnel made available 
to it. To conclude, SOme of these traits are considered. 
11.12.8. Constraints on Efficiency 
The number of skilled personnel in Ghana's construction 
irdustry has not made any impact on its efficiency for a number of 
reasons: 
(a) the lack of effective cooperation amongst participants in the 
construction process, professional rivalries and jealousies. These 
are more pronounced amongst the older consultants than those trained 
at UST (see 3.6.6. and 11.1.2). Mistrust of the contractor by the 
client and consultants 1S also cownon: this is reponsible for the 
very long procedure of interim certification and payment of the 
contractor's work (see 9.7.2-4); 
(b) the lack of understanding on the part of most clients, and 
particularly government officials, of the nature of the construction 
process, and their impatience with the slow conventional 
construction'procedures, especially at the pre-contract stage, lead 
to the neglect of planriing anci programming and established policy 
(s ee 9. 6 . 7) ; 
(c) inter-organisational competition among bodies that are meant to 
36 
cooperate This is often the result of the vagueness of 
definitions of the bodies' spheres of influence or personality 
clashes amongst their heads (s.ee 8.2.3.2); 
(d) instances of obvious corruption, patronage, nepotism and all forms 
of favouritism have generated intra-organisation friction and caused 
much frustration and low esprits de corps; and 
(e) the occupation of the titular or ministerial headships of some 
institutions by politicians and similar laymen who are inclined to 
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disregard the advice of professionals; and the non-resolution of the 
old problem of the relationship between professionals and administrators 
in the same public organisations are also sources of conflict (see 7.9.2). 
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12.1. Introduction 
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CHAPTER 12 
TECHNOLOGY 
"There is widespread evidence that in all sectors 
of the economy devebping countries often utilise 
inappropriate production techniques, in other 
words, techniques which make less than optimum 
use of national resources, do not save scarce 
foreign currency, and last but by no means least 
aggravate the already serious problem of 
unemployment ... road construction ... is one of 
the sectors most amenable to the use of 
~ppropriate technology'. Various alternative, 
efficient, more labour-intensive construction 
techniques already exist ... " 
- Allal, M., Edmonds, G.A. and Hussain, M.I., 
Development and Promotion of Appropriate Road 
Construction Technology, International Labour 
Review, Vol. 116, No, 2, September-October 
1977, p. 183. 
"The government is determined to end the uneconomic 
methods of building houses in the country. Its 
policy is to introduce power machines into the 
building industry and it will also experiment in 
houses that can be mass-produced ... " 
Government of the Gold Coast (later Ghana), 
The Development Plan 1951: Being a Plan for 
the Economic and Social Development of the 
Gold Coast, 1951-56, Accra, 1951. 
The relative labour-intensity of construction technologies is 
often referred to (see 3.7). Ideas on the techniques of construction 
that should be used in the developing countries have been varied: some 
writers consider industrialisation inevitable and urge the countries to 
adopt policies for gradually achieving it (see 5.4.3.1), whereas others 
advise the adoption of intermediate technologies (see 5.4.3.2). Yet 
other writers recognise that certain items of construction calling for 
high-level technologi2s are needed by these countries at the early stages 
of their development: these, they suggest, should be left to foreign 
firms (see 5.4.2). Each approach to the issue justifies its choice on 
socio-economic cost-benefit grounds: generally, each country should 
352 
choose an appropriate technology (see tactic (7) in 'Synthesis'5.6). 
This chapter considers construction technologies utilised ~n 
Ghana, and shows that: 
(1) a wide range of technologies are used in Ghana for a number of 
reasons; and 
(2) choice of technology has not been influenced only by socio-economic 
cost-benefit considerations, but also by attitudes and politics and 
has, therefore, been variable. 
Starting with an appraisal of concepts of productivity and cost 
and economic determinants of technological choice, it demonstrates how 
and why these have not applied in Ghana, and identifies factors which 
have been more important. It concludes that, in the long term, the best 
approach should consider the whole industry and reflect desirable and 
applicable technologies in the different subsectors. Hence the 
'appropriat~' technology would, ill fact, be a matrix of technologies. 
12.2. Productivity versus Wages 
12.2.1. Productivity 
Productivity is a term, the precise definition of which is 
shrouded in controversy but its most usual, though not necessarily most 
1 
appropriate, definition as 'output per man employed' is assumed here. 
Productivity of labour, compared to wages, is used as a criterion to 
decide on the use of capital- or labour-intensive technologies, the 
former being most advisable where labour costs are high compared to 
productivity, and the latter when the opposite is the case (see 5.4.4.3.1). 
The productivity of labour, however, depends upon the equipment 
used, as well as the quality and motivation of labour, the latter due 
to incentives a~d the effectiveness of management. Figures of gross 
\ 
output per head in Ghana for the period 1965-74 are shown in table 12.1. 
These figures are not to be taken at their face value. Figures for 
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employment exclude casual workers and the self-employed, and those for 
output do not adequately cover subsistence and other informal 
construction. The data in the table are meant to give a rough indication 
of levels of productivity over the years, rather than as absolute values. 
The data in table 12.1. show no significant trend over the years, 
although productivity has remained at less than i5 per man per annum. 
Government has had cause to lament that 
" the productivity of the labour force is at present 
very low. This defect considerably hinders efforts 
to speed up the expansion of the economy.,,2 
TABLE 12.1,. Gross Output 1.n Construction Eer M~n (1965-7/+) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Construction 
Output (il06) 226 177 147 133 138 160 197 142 161 208 
"-
Recorded Employment 
in Construction 
(03 ) 72 ,8 46.2 47.6 54.7, 57.4 49.8 44.1 50.1 46.3 47.4 
Output per Man 
(i103 ) 3.1 3.8 3.1 2.4 2.4 3.2 4.5 2.8 3.5 4.4 
Source: Economic Survey 1969, 1972-74. 
Some of the reasons for the low level of productivity in Ghana's 
construction industry are: 
(a) labour laws which force employers to retain labour even beyond 
their requirements 3 (see 7.8.2.2); 
(b) poor quality of labour due to the inadequacy of skilled personnel, 
which in turn is caused by the paucity of training facilities 
(see 11.2); 
(c) poor superv1.s1.on and rigid manageme.nt styles which are inappropriate 
in the socialistic Ghanaian culture; resulting 1.n poor management-
worker relations and low morale (see 13.6.3); 
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(d) low wages, lack of incentives and hence poor motivation (see 12.2.2); 
(e) poor tools and equipment, obsolete or badly utilised plant (see 
12.6.3); 
(f) failure or inability to apply management techniques such as site 
layouts, materials scheduling or programming and control; causing 
double handling, delays and wastes (see 13.5.3); and 
(g) frequent shortages of materials which lead to under-utilised 
resources and delays on site (see Chapter 10). 
12.2.2. ~ages 
The m1n1mum wage for labourers is fixed by government (see 
7.8.2.1) and the wages and salaries for other categories of workers are 
established in collective agreements using the minimum wage as a guide 
(see 11.11.2), Wage levels for public sector workers over the period 
1961-77 are shown in table 12.2 a~d they portray an increasing trend, 
the largest single 1ncreases being in 1974 and 1977 ,·,hen the minimum 
wage was increased by 50 and 100 per cent respectively. Comparing 
table 12.2 with table 12.1, it becomes clear that wages have been 
increasing in Ghana without corresponding increases in productivity and 
that construction has contributed to inflation (see 6.4.5). 
It, therefore, appears advisable to replace labour with plant. 
It is instructive to examine the factors underlying ·these trends and, 
consequently, the reason why the theoretically correct shift to capita1-
intensive technologies has not occurred. 
Productivity in Ghana's economy 1S low for reasons stated above 
(12.2.1). Government has adjusted the minimum wage, and hence the basis 
for other wages and salaries in response to public and union demands or 
as a means of endearing itself to the citizenry. Wage increases have 
seldom been related to productivity, mainly because existing levels were 
already obviously too low to cater for the basic needs of the average 
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TABLE 12.2, Government's Minimum Wages for Daily-Rated Workers (1961-77) 
(Cedis) 
Category February February February July December July 1961 1969 1970 1974 1974 1975 1977 
. Labourer 0.65 0.75 0.75 1.28 2.00 2.20 4.30 
Senior Labourer 0.76 0.80 0.87 1. 39 2.04 2.24 4.34 
Labourer Headman 0.87J:z 0.92 0.99 1. 52 2.08 2.29 4.39 
Tradesman Grade II 1.12 1.30 1. 39 1.95 2.78 3.06 5.46 
Tradesman Grade I 1.49 1. 56 1. 63 2.13 2.99 3.28 5.78 
Watchman (Day) 0.70 0.75 0.93 1.45 2.04 2.24 4.34 
Watchman (night) 0.81J:z 0.86 1.03 1.56 2.08 2.29 4.39 
Messenger 0.70 0.75 0.81 1.33 2.04 2.24 l~. 34 
Blaster 0.70 0.75 1.00 1. 70 2.12 2.33 4.Q·3 
Concrete Mixer 
Operator O. 76 0.80 1. 07 1.62 2.12 2.33 {L53 
Driver Grade II 
(Group D) 1.26J:z 1. 33 1. 39 1. 95 2.33 2.56 4.76 
Driver Grade I 1. 37J:z 1.44 1.55 2.05 2.43 2.67 4.97 
Driver (Extra 
Heavy Vehicle) 1.71 1. 79 1.92 2.45 2.93 3.22 5.72 
Operator Grade II 
(Group C) 1. 37J:z 1.44 1.55 2.05 2.43 2.67 4.87 
Operator Grade I 
(Group C) 1.49 1.56 1. 63 2.13 2.53 2.78 5.08 
Operator (Group A) 1.71 1. 79 1.92 2.45 2.93 3.22 5.72 
Asst. Chief 
Operator (Group A) 2.0n 2.12 2.18 2.74 3.18 3.50 6.00 
Steel Bender 0.99 1.04 1.11 1. 74 2.12 2.33 4;73 
Storeman 0.81J:z 0,86 0.93 1.45 2.08 2.29 4.39 
Storekeeper 1.32J:z 1. 39 1.47 1. 96 2.33 2.56 4.66 
Timekeeper 1.10 1.15 1.23 1. 77 2.16 2.38 4.48 
Source: State Construction Corporation. 
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worker: food, shelter, clothing and health4 
Despite the phenomenal increase in wages in 1977, earnings have 
failed to keep pace with the rate of inflation, and c~lls for higher 
wages and industrial action to support such demands have been rife5 
(see 7.8.2). In construction, government's m1n1mum levels have become 
inapplicable as going rates are several times higher (see 11.3.2 and 
Chapter 11, footnote 7). 
12.3. Choice of Technology 
In Ghana, therefore, the choice of technology has not been based 
on theoretical comparisons of the costs of labour and productivity, but 
on a host of other criteria such as government's policy, clients' 
attitudes, contractors' attitudes, cost, availability of skills, 
availability of equipment, and the time available for executing the 
project. 
A very wide range of construction technologies are used in Ghana, 
from industrialised methods using mass-produced components at one end 
of the scale to labour-intensive ones utilising the lliinimum of essential 
tools and naturally occurring, or easily extracted or processed, 
materials (see also 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.7) at the other end. 
In general, road construction is highly capital intensive, heavy 
and medium plant and equipment being used on the simplest road project. 
The range of technologies in building construction is wider. 
12.3.1. Categorisation 
To obtain a basis for further discussion an attempt 1S now 
made to categorise the range of technologies used 1n Ghana: 
(a) industrialised building: this refers to methods of construction 
in which all components are mass-produced in a factory; 
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(b) component manufacture: where certain parts of the building are 
mass~produced to standard sizes to fit any type of design, but 
not for specific systems as in (a); 
(c) use of plant and equipment on site: where site operations 
involve conventional equipment or plant; and 
(d) intermediate technology: where methods are labour-intensive, 
and use only simple tools or newly-developed, low-technology 
equipment. 
12.4. Industrialised Building 
12.4.1. Introduction 
Government's desire to relieve the acute urban housing shortage 
has prompted it to seek the most expeditious ways in ~.,hich dwellings 
could be constructed. In 1951 it declared its intention to: 
" experiment in houses that 
can be mass-produced .•. "6 
The first attempt in this exercise was made ~n 1952. 168 houses were 
to be built in Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi, using imported precast 
concrete components of a system which had been marketed by a private 
firm of foreign consultants. The venture proved too costly and was 
7 
abandoned • 
In the post-independence programme, to establish an industrial 
base for the economy (see 7.7.3.1), building construction was g~ven 
due attention and a factory was built ~n Accra to produce components 
for concrete building systems. 
. ' 
12.4.2. Prefabricated Concrete Panel Factory 
The agreement for the establishment of a factory to produce 
large-span precast concrete elements for the construction of houses 
was signed between the governments of Ghana and the Soviet Union in 
1962. The building systems were designed in the USSR but were 
modified in Ghana to suit local conditions. Site assembly was to be 
undertaken by the Ghana National Construction Corporation (GNCC)8. 
By 1966 the buildings had been completed and the equipment 
installed, but the factory was not able to commence production as 
the new military regime suspended the project (see 6.4.3). It 
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stood idle until 1972 when the premises and plant were rehabilitated. 
At present, many of the items of plant and equipment are obsolete, 
9 
and some have broken down. The factory also experiences difficulties 
10 in obtaining cement and attracting qualified personnel 
produces at a very low level of its capacity. 
Thus it 
Having built its first complete house in 1978 and mounted a 
successful publicity campaign under the slogan "Own your house in 
30 days", the factory is unable to sati~fy the high effective demand 
for its 4- and 2-storey houses from the private sector. There is 
a long waiting list of paid-up applicants. It has also not been 
able to fulfil the role envisaged for it in the government's urban 
11 housing programme 
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12.4.3. African Timber and Plywood Limited (ATP) 
Based at Samreboi in the Western Region, African Timber and 
Plywood (ATP) is a firm of loggers, sawmillers and plymillers which has 
k b f · h· 12 been ta en over y government rom pr~vate owners .~p It produces 
components for timber-based house systems which are assembled on site by 
private contractors specially trained by ATP. Its houses are ~n demand 
allover the country, and it has delivered components for erection at 
places as far as the Upper Region. 
Although timber-based buildings are not popular in Ghana (see 
10.5,3), the ATP's houses are favoured by the middle-class and by 
certain public and private organisations such as the Universities, the 
Kpong Hydro-Electric Project, and the Upper Regional Agricultural 
13 Programme 
Because it has been unable to obtain sufficient licences to 
imp0rt replacement machines and spare parts, the factory prcduces at no 
h 30 14.. 11 d· 1 f· 1 more t an per cent of ~ts ~nsta e capac~ty, severa 0 ~ts pant 
having broken down. Difficulty in obtaining adequate supplies of certain 
spec~es of timber, especially those that could not be found ~n its own 
concess~ons, h 1 1·· d· 15 as a so tended to ~m~t pro uct~on 
12.4.4. Potential 
Although facilities for industrialised building exist ~n Ghana, 
this method of construction has not made any significant impression on 
.the industry because of its limited scale caused by economic 
circumstances. Its high potential is yet to be realised. 
12.5. Component Manufactur~ 
12.5.1. Standardisation 
Standardisation and modular coordination of components in Ghana's 
construction industry have not progressed beyond simple things such as 
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sizes of blocks and bricks, doors and windows, diameters of p~pes and 
gauges of wires or sheet metal. The Ghana Standards Board has concerned 
itself with the quality of goods (see 9.S.3), and the industry has not 
pursued efforts to standardise construction components to any 
16 
appreciable extent . Hence government's promise that: "Standardisation 
of building components ... will be given due emphasis,,17, is yet to be 
fulfilled. As a result the number of building components that can be 
produced off-site is limited. 
No serious attempts have yet been made to analyse the standard 
designs for public buildings, large numbers of each type of which are 
built} into aements which can be produced on a large scale. 
12.5.2. Manufacture 
Components manufactured for construction are mainly precast 
concrete, timber or metal elements such as lintels, beams, drainage 
pipes and electric poles; timber fittings, doors and windows and their 
frames; metal windmvs, gates and fittings. 
The productio~ t~kes place in large factories us~ng capita1-
intensive methods such as African Concrete Products in Accra, in a large 
number of small, privately-owned concerns using sitnple equipment, or 1n 
similar off-site units owned by construction firms. Production is 
usually on a speculative basis, in the absence of comprehensive 
'1 . 18 bu~ d1ng programmes 
The production units have difficulties in obtaining their inputs 
and in obtaining spares and repla.cement machinery. The difficulty in 
obtaining inputs 1S particularly serious in the case of enterprises 
requiring cement or imported items. 
12.6. Use of Plant on Site 
12.6.1. ~ 
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. Road and civil engineering construction 1n Ghana is capital-
intensive: bulldozers, scrapers and rollers are used even on feeder 
road projects. Civil works: dams. harbours, sea walls and the like 
are designed for and built with Some of the most modern technology. 
Some of them are undertaken by expatriate firms (see 13.4.1). 
Concrete mixers are one of the first items of equipment that the 
budding Ghanaian contractor acqu1res. Bulldozers may be u~ed to clear 
building sites, but the excavation of foundation trenches is usually 
done manually. 
12.6.2. Availabilitx 
All plant and equipment used in Ghana, and their spare parts, are 
imported (see 6.5.3). The contractor may buy machinery from local 
dealers or import them directly. Either way,and especially in the late 
197~'s (see 6.4.5), the items have been difficult to corne by, except 1n 
the few cases where projects were financed by external agenc1es such as 
the World Bank, in which case plant was imported as part of the 
contract. Items of plant are expensive, as table 12.3 shows. 
Plant and equipment may also be hired; there are three major 
enterprises engaged 1n plant-hire activity in Ghana: Plant Pool, 
belonging to the Bank for Housing and Construction (see 13.7.2.1.8); 
Mechanical Lloyd and Tema Plant Hire. Individuals and organisations, 
or contractors, owning a few items of plant also hire them out. Hire 
rates for plant are high. Figures shown in table 12.3 are the internal 
rates of the State Construction Corporation which were slightly lower 
than market rates. It is particularly instructive to note the 
diffirence between the rates for 1978 and 1979. 
Plant-hire facilities are concentrated 1n Accra-Tema. This implies 
TABLE 12,3. State Construction Corporation - Daily Hire Charges, 
C.I.F. and Market Values of Some Items of Plant - June, 1978 
Description 
Tipper Trucks 
Leyland Tipper Truck 
Benz Tipper Truck 
Fiat Tipper Truckl 
Nissan Tipper Truck 
Vibratory Rollers 
Bomag - BW 200 
Clark Scheid DV 100 
Dynapac CC 42A 
GNR - Series 20 
Wallis Road Rollers 
Hyster Pneumatic Compactor 1 
Bomag - BW 655 
Crar.3s 
Edilmac Tow'er Crane 
Self Erecting Crane 
Bantam Truck-Mounted Crane 
Excavators 
Excavator - (19122)RB 
Excavator - MF 450 
Excavator - MF Digger/Loaderl 
Excavator - 0 & K 
Dozers 
Caterpillar - D7G 
Caterpillar - D8K 
Caterpillar - D6C 
Motor Graders 
o & K 130G 
Caterpillar 120G & l40G 
Caterpillar 14G 
Avel ing Barford 
Daily Hire 
Charge 
158.59 
190.31 
249.21 
126.87 
269.42 
333.50' 
286.60 
172.19 
117.81 
171. 96 
44.08 
596.33 
229.28 
990.08 
507.50 
362.50 
303.59 
847.34 
833.75 
1172 .46 
640.44 
483.74 
569.94 
797.92 
488,52 
c . i . f. value 
t 
35,000 
42,000 
55,000 
28,000 
32,430 
73,600 
63,250 
38,000 
26,000 
37,950 
9,730 
111,600 
50,600 
218,500 
112, 000 
80,000 
67,000 
187,000 
147,200 
207,000 
121,900 
85,410 
100,630 
140,880 
86,250 
Market value 
t/. 
50,750 
60,900 
79,750 
40,600 
86,220 
106,720 
91,710 
55,100 
37,700 
55,030 
14,100 
190,830 
73,370 
316,830 
162,400 
116,000 
97,150 
271,150 
213,440 
300,150 
176,760 
123,840 
145,900 
20lJ.,270 
125,100 
cont'd 
TABLE 12.3 cont'd 
Description 
Air Compressors 
Holman - CR(200-275) 
Holman - CR(150-200) 
CPT (450-600) CFM 
Wheel End Loaders 
MF 66C 
Caterpillar 996 
Traxcavators 
Caterpillar 997L 
Caterpillar 933 
Caterpillar 941 
Caterpillar 951 
Caterpillar 955K & Cat 966 
Articulated Trucks 
Leyland Beaver 
Lowloaders 
Leyland Scammell & Seddon 
Wacon Dri lls 
Holman 
Road Finishers 
Barber Greene SF4l & Vogale 
Asphalt Plants 
Batching and Mixing Plant 
Stanstil1 Mobile Asphalt Plant 
Barber Greene Asphalt Plant 
Mixers 
Vulcan and Winget Concrete Mixer 
Truck Hixer 
Other.!. 
Perlini Dumper 
lvater Tanker 
Ashurst Bitumen Sprayer 
Daily Hire 
Charge 
65.00 
53.55 
148.29 
623.04 
640.03 
690.44 
363.03 
403.13 
429.85 
478.85 
385.15 
498.43 
240.15 
604.16 
767.19 
8,990.00 
2,265.62 
45.31 
317.18 
459.17 
172 .18 
201.39 
c.i.f. value 
¢ 
16,000 
13,000 
36,000 
110,000 
113,000 
121,900 
64,100 
71,200 
75,890 
84,550 
68,000 
88,000 
53,000 
80,000 
197,390 
992,000 
250,000 
10,000 
70,000 
101,330 
38,000 
40,000 
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Market value , 
23,200 
18,850 
52,200 
159,500 
163,850 
176,760 
92,940 
103,200 
110,040 
122,590 
98,600 
127,600 
76,850 
116,000 
286,200 
1,438,400 
362,500 
14,500 
101,500 
146,940 
55,1 00 
58,000 
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high transport charges for contractors requ1r1ng plant elsewhere. 
Moreover, the shortage of plant caused by limited importation in recent 
years and depreciation of existing plant makes it necessary for 
contractors to "queue" for vital plant. A study (1975) concluded that: 
" ... upwards of t40 millions worth of earth moving plant 
and equipment is at present in Ghana. At least 35 per 
cent of this equipment is estimated to be out of action 
at present, some awaiting spare parts but otherwise 
operational, some in need of rehabilitation following 
dereliction, and some too old for economic repair."19 
The same thing can be said of other types of plant. In road 
construction, which is capital-intensive (see 12.6.1), the non-
availability of plant has constrained project execution. 
12.6.3. Efficiency 
The shortage of plant, and the overutilisation of plant in the 
first few years of their lives, has engendered the use of available items 
of equipment beyond their economic life. There are few trained 
operatives 20 and plant is incorrectly used, this increa~es the frequency 
of breakdm-ms. Furthermore, servicing facilities are not available in 
the regions and few items of plant are regularly serviced or maintained. 
These factors, individually and together, lead to the inefficient use of 
plant and avoidable expense. 
In addition, as plant is tied up on the site waiting for the 
delivery of key construction materials~ which often run short (see 
Chapter 10), indirect costs, including the opportunity cost of the plant 
and depreciation, increase. 
12.6.4. Standardisation 
Another feature of Ghana's stock of plant and equipment is the 
variety of their makes. The SCC (see table 12.3), for example, has at 
least four different brands of trucks, six brands of rollers and three 
of graders, though dozers and traxcavators are more standardised. TIlis 
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applies not only to plant owned by one organisation, but the makes of 
one body's stock are different from those of another. The result is a 
confusing number of types of the same item of plant and equipment from 
different manufacturers in different countries, each with its own 
characteristics, This prevents operators and mechanics from developing 
their knowledge of each item, and also exacerbates the problem of 
acquiring adequate stocks of spare parts. 
12.6.5. Determinants 
The above discussion shows that the use of plant in Ghana's 
construction industry increases costs and involves much difficulty, not 
to mention its inappropriateness in a country with much unemployment 
(see 6.3). But there are no indications of a major shift away from 
plant. Their use tends to be determined or encouraged by: 
(1) clients' attitudes. The public sector client perceives tall 
buildings as a sign of progress, and is also impatient for projects 
to be completed. Only capital-intensive construction can satisfy 
the twin desires. 
(2) designers' background. Architects and eng1neers are trained to 
design uS1ng predominantly conventional materials such as concrete 
and steel, which usually call for the use of equipment (see 11.8.1.1); 
(3) registration. In registering contractors, government agencies 
insist on their possess10n of certain minimum items of plant (see 
. 
13.3.1), and contract-awarding agencies expect the use of machinery 
on projects; 
(4) skills. The shortage of skills (see 11".2) and non-availability of 
testing facilities (see 10.5.3 and 10.5.6) are Some reasons advanced 
for the insistence (in specifications) on the use of plant which 
can be relied upon to produce certain specific standards of work; 
(5) contractors' attitudes. A report (1977) observed: 
"The local contractors, being businessmen, adopt 
technologies that benefit them most; they resort to 21 
the indiscriminate use of capital-intensive methods." 
(This point is not particularly important in its effect, since 
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contractors are required to have plant anyway. But some contractors 
t,end to rely on plant as a way of compensating for their own lack 
of technical knowhow or their unwillingness or inability to employ 
qualified managerial or supervisory personnel.) 
(6) cost of labour. The current upward trend in wages (see 12.2.2) may 
price labour out of Qompetition with plant. This has not yet been 
apparent because of increasing costs of acquiring or hiring and 
running plant, as well as the sluggish tempo of construction activity. 
(7) national aspirations. Ultimately, what the government thinks is 
good for the nation becomes the most decisive factor. Despite the 
cost of using plant, and problems involved with it, government has 
not abandoned its desire to introduce modern technology into Ghana's 
construction industry. Since the nation or local contractors cannot 
acquire the key inputs necessary, the present policy is that: 
"Outside capital investors will be encouraged to team 
up with Ghanaians to ensure adequate supply of 
essential materials and equipment necessary for 
construction. "22 (See 5.4.4.2). 
Local efforts would also be intensified: 
"The Bank for Housing and Construction will be encouraged 23 to expand its plant pool facilities in all the regions." 
(8) external agenc1es, Finally, international organisations financing 
construction projects might insist on materials and technologies of 
a modern or conventional nature, regardless of the nation's own 
preferences. 
Ghana's approach to technology has been pragmatic, making use of 
the most modern ideas whilst developing and propagating appropriate 
local technologies or experimenting in labour-intensive methods. 
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12.7. Intermediate Technology 
With government's financial support and encouragement, the research 
. . . 24 h b d' h d 1 f . . 1nst1tut10ns ave een engage 1n t e eve opment 0 1nterrned1ate 
technology to match local materials such as the Tek Block Press for 
landcrete blocks (see 10.5.6) or to replace high technology such as the 
production of cement from local limestone deposits (see 10.3.2.1). 
That few of the large volume of research results have been 
implemented in practice (see 10.5.1.2) is due not only to the non-
availability of the results and/or lack of response from industrial 
entrepreneurs, but also because the "appropriate" equipment and tools 
such as the Tek Block Press have to be made by high technology, often 
from imported equipment or raw materials. Thus the problems hindering 
the high technology sector also tend to constrain their solution through 
the utilisation of appropriate technologies (see 10.6.(h». 
12.7.1. Distinction 
A distinction should be made between labour-intensive 
construction technologies using conventional materials, and those uS1ng 
traditional or improved-traditional materials, S1nce the skills required 
are different in each case. The former is referred to as "Labour-
intensive Methods" and the latter as "Traditional Methods". 
12.7.2. Labour-Intensive Methods 
By labour intensive methods are meant construction methods 1D 
which, although conventional materials are utilised, no plant and 
equipment are used on site. These are employed on smaller public 
projects 1-2 storeys high and the majority of private sector projects 25 
The construction unit involved may be that of a commercial contractor, 
a self-help project team or a labour-only subcontractor. 
Government's encouragement of labour-intensive technologies has 
been ocoasioned by one or more of the following reasons at any 
" 
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particular time: 
(1) econom1C reasons. In periods of severe ba~ance of payments problems 
government has acted to promote labour-intensive technologies. For 
example, in 1970 it declared: 
"More realistic prices for imports and exports will 
stimulate ... the use of indigenous raw materials and 
labour 1n construction ... ,,26 
To this end, government has made use of indirect taxation, pr1ces 
and wages, and import control po1icies27 (see 3.6.1-2 and 7.5.1-2). 
(2) to relieve unemployment. When the level of unemployment was too 
high, government has supported the use of labour-intensive 
technology through persuasion, direction or incentive, as witness 
its policy in 1970: 
"In order to encourage the proper utilisation of our 
factor endowments in proportions that reflect their 
scarcity value, the Government will instruct executing 
agencies to give preference to labour-intensive rather 
than capital-intensive ~ethods whenever such choices are 
technically feasible and economically reasonable ., .,,28 
Another instance was its order in 1972 which forbade employers from 
laying off any of their workers without the written perm1SS1on of 
the Commissioner for Labour 29 (see 7.8.2.2). 
(3) for political reasons. The infusion of a patriotic spirit 1n the 
youth was one of the motives behind the establishment of the 
Builders Brigade (1957-1966), an organisation which used labour-
intensive methods to build government projects allover the country 
(note that this was during the period when government was actively 
industrialising, the economy and construction industry) (see 6.4.2.1 
and 12.4. 1-2 ) . 
This attempt at large-scale labour-intensive construction failed 
economically because30 
(a) the Brigade was used to absorb the government's political 
supporters regardless of skill; 
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(b) the managers did not possess the expertise needed to 
effectively marshal large numbers of workers; and their job 
was made harder by the unorthodox, mainly political criteria 
used in recruiting personnel. Political patronage made 
discipline" difficult to enforce; and 
(c) several clients did not pay for services it rendered to them. 
The Brigade was dissolved in 1966 (see 6.4.3), thus ending 
'd' . 1 . 1 b " . 31 government s 1rect 1nvo vement 1n a our-1ntens1ve construct10n , 
except in self-help projects where the Department of Social Welfare 
provides extension services (see 7.8.3). 
12.7.3. Traditional Methods 
Traditional methods of construction are used in Ghana's rural 
areas and the 'unauthorised' suburbs of the cities. TIle materials and 
rel~ted skills differ from one part of the country to another, cependir.g 
on the local climate and customs 32 . People in the rural areas have the 
skills to build their own dwellings and other structures and may also 
cooperate to build communal facilities or take turns building one 
another's dwelling. In addition, there are teams of skilled tradesmen 
in traditional building who offer their services to clients for a fee. 
Thus building in this sector may be either non-monetary, subsistence, 
or monetary but informal (see 4.4.2). 
Together with its attempts to modernise methods of construction, 
government intended making the best use of traditional techniques and 
materials. In its housing programme, 
"Government will make the greatest use of the skills 
already acquired by the rural people to build houses 
for themselves by providing technical assistance ... "33 
It would limit its involvement in the rural housing sector to technical 
advice to achieve improvements 1n durability and strength at reasonable 
costs. This was both economically and administratively expedient, and 
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also a means of preserving the best of traditional construction methods. 
(Thus government has adopted a Igro\vth with equity' approach to housing. )34 
(See 5.3.2.2). 
The major obstacles to the use of traditional and rationalised 
traditional construction methods are the preference by the rural folk of 
conventional materials and the weakness of extension services needed to 
propagate improvement measures. The former has, particularly, spurred 
the rapid decay of traditional skills, leading also to an increase in 
demand for construction technologies and hence skills of a conventional 
nature, placing strains on that part of the industry (see 4.4.2; 7.B.3 
and 10.6(a». 
12.8. Conclusions 
The type of technology used on construction projects 1S determined 
not only by economic criteria or hJ the existence of certain procedures 
preventing the introduction of some techniques, but also by the 
preference of clients, as well as government policy, influenced by 
circumstance and its perception of progress. In this field) some of the 
issues that merit careful attention include: 
12.8.1. Time 
The question of technology necessitates a dynamic approach: it 
is not so much what 1S possible or needed now, as what might be feasible 
or needed in future. Whereas, at present, or in the medium term, it 
might be advisable to encourage labour-intensive techniques due to their 
cheapness and employment-generating potential, future needs might call 
for a different strategy. For a country, the best long-term approach 1S 
to adopt a mix of tec~niques which will enable the industry to take 
advantage of technological progress and to increase its adaptability. 
It is, obviously, unwise to advocate the creation of a completely 
moribund, even if not necessarily backward, industry, unable to advance 
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with the times. 
12,8.2. Sectors 
In pursuit of the point raised 1n 12.8.1, it is possible, after 
delineating the industry into sectors based on production methods, to 
identify areas where particular techniques can best be encouraged. Thus, 
using the matrix developed in 4.4.2 as a basis, it would be wise to use 
high modern technology in the international and conventional-large sub-
sectors but unwise to do so in others. It is alm, most pertinent to use 
labour-intensive methods of various kinds in the conventional medium 
or small subsectors and the informal sector. The nation should adopt a 
clear policy regarding the subsectors in which it would encourage the 
use of capita1- or labour-intensive methods of various levels of 
sophistication. 
Thus, technology should be approac~ed on the basis of tte whole 
industry and with long-term considerations, instead of concentrating on a 
particular sector or technique in relation to short-term requirements. 
12 .. 8.3. Present Resources 
The mix of technologies a nation can adopt 1S determined by its 
resources 1n terms of finance, especially foreign exchange; skilled 
personnel and types of skills; attitudes and preferences; and 
procedures. Since it takes time for any of these to be altered 
significantly, it is not likely that real change in technologies can 
occur quickly. Nor is it advisable to allow theoretical considerations 
alone to govern the choice of technology. In particular, industrialised 
building might be considered here: where a nation already has 
facilities for such types of construction it is imIlrobab1e that it will 
heed any advice to adopt labour-intensive technologies which might mean 
shutting down the industrialised building w·orks. Thus, it is wisest to 
seek strategies that enable present resources to be used most 
effectively and efficiently, rather than those that advocate or 
necessitate radical changes. 
12.8.4. Appropriate Technology 
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For each country, the appropriate technology for construction 
will be a mix of techniques depending on its history, its economy, its 
level of development, personal and governmental attitudes and preferences, 
and prevailing resources. What is appropriate will vary with time and 
circumstance, as well as government's policy. (Thus 'appropriate' 
technology, as used in this thesis, is not necessarily labour-intensive 
technology,nor 'intermediate' technology.) 
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There are 18 Soviet technicians and consultants: 
with obtaining Ghanaian professionals, of which 
one architect and two mechanical engineers. 
the problem lies 
there were only 
11. It is entrusted with the development of Community 3 at Tema (a 
sector of the industrial township) and was generally expected to 
relieve the urban housing shortage. 
12. The government acquired 55% share ~n the United Africa Company-
owned concern in 1972 and took it over when the private company 
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National Service Corps (1969-72) and the National Reconstruction 
Corps (1972-1979), but these were mainly utilised on non-contract 
rural projects. The major criticism against them, which led to 
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houses are built close to one another, and the 
is circular in shape. 
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To further this aim, 
settlement itself 
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the extended family (in recent times for rent), and each has a 
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like food preparation, which are part of Ghanaian culture. The 
wall acted as protection against enem1es and wild animals in the 
past. 
See Kyei, K.G., The Ghanaian Culture and Architecture, 1n The 
Consultant, Vol. 2, No.1, May 1977, pp. 17-18; and 
Ministry of Works, Ope cit. (ref. 21), pp. 15-16. 
33. Government of Ghana, Ope cit. (ref. 17), p. 422. 
34. A detailed account of housing needs and provision 1n Ghana can be 
found in Appendix C. 
13.1. Introduction 
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CHAPTER 13 
CONTRACTORS 
" small contractors in most developing countries 
, •. find themselves caught up in a succession of 
interlocking vicious circles: to obtain a contract 
they need fixed assets, but to obtain these they 
need credit, which is not forthcoming unless they 
are on a government tender list or already have a 
contract. To carry out contracts efficiently 
they need a reliable permanent labour force which 
they cannot afford unless they have some continuity 
of work. But they will only be awarded contracts 
if they can prove that they are efficient in the 
completion of jobs they have already done ... 
Certain developing countries have attempted to 
assist the development of the indigenous contractor 
which provide training to small contractors and 
assistance in obtaining contracts ... However, 
'these efforts are the exception rather than the 
rule and the tendency has been to ignore the 
small contractor's problems." 
- Edmonds, G.A., The Construction Industry in 
Developing Countries, International Labour 
Review, Vol. 118, No.3; May-June 1979. 
"Every business has its own built-in problems but 
in the Ghanaian context, contractor or anything 
to do with contractors has assumed pejorative 
connotations. This situation developed over so 
many years when the building and road construc-
tion business were invaded by opportunists whose 
only objective was to make fast money ... 
contracts were given to so-called contractors who 
did not have any knowledge as to what even a slide 
rule is for and did not have the requisite equipment 
to undertake jobs. When finally market women 
left their stalls and jumped on the bandwagon ... 
the 'contractors' profession went down hill and 
attracted a lot of opprobrium from the public." 
- Graphic View, Contractors and Public Works, 
paily Graphic, April 21, 1980, p. 2. 
The development of indigenous contractors 1S sometimes regarded as 
the crucial element in any programme for improving developing countries' 
construction industries (see 5.4.4.1). Even where a broad approach 1S 
advocated it is usually one of the proposed measures. (See most of 
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Chapter 5 and tactic (8) of the 'Synthesis', 5.6). Measures suggested 
in a strategy to develop local contractors include: provision of 
financial assistance (see 5.4.3.3); provision of stable demand in 
appropriate types and sizes of construction goods (see 5.4.4.1); 
rationalisation of contractual procedures (see 5.4.3.1 and 5.4.4.1); 
provision of training, especially in management, including informal 
training, for example, using foreign firms (see 5.4.4.2); encouraging 
small contractors to merge (see 5.3.2.1 and 5.4.3.3); and supporting the 
formation of contractors associations which could help individual 
members (see 5.4.3.3). 
This chapter considers the attempts to develop local Ghanaian 
contractors, identifies specific measures, which include all those 
mentioned above, assesses their results, and outlines factors which 
supported or hindered their implementation. It starts with the history 
of the contracting sector in Ghana, considers the characteristics of 
firms in Ghana and dis cusses the role government has .p1ayed ~n the 
sector, as well as that of other institutions. 
13.2. History 
Before independence demand for construction ~n Ghana was on a 
limited scale; the PWD built public bungalows and offices, expatriate 
contractors executed the larger projects such as harbours, and local 
firms, which were then mostly informally organised labour-only 
contractors, did private sector projects. 
Total demand for construction was increased suddenly and 
tremendously as the government, in the late 1950's and early 1960's, 
launched a massive development programme involving the construction of 
1 . 
factories, schools, hospitals, bungalows and roads (see 6.4.2; 
6.4.2.1-3). This boom drew expatriate firms to Ghana and spawned the 
2 
evolution of indigenous contractors (see 3.4), 
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There were few qualified Ghanaian professionals and technicians 
in construction; most educated persons preferred the old professions 
such as law, medicine, the priesthood and teaching. Moreover, the 
skilled personnel were in the civil service which was prestigious at 
the time, and held promises of secure, lucrative careers. Persons 
entering construction were, therefore, speculative entrepreneurs 
attracted by the profits they hoped to make. 
Many expatriate firms left the country when the boom subsided, 
and balance of payments problems prompted the introduction of import and 
exchange control (see 6.4.3) which made it difficult for them to 
repatriate their profits. The few who wished to plough back their 
profits locally remain to this day. 
Indigenous firms, owned and managed by persons with little or no 
knowledge of construction, are small in size, although they have become 
more numerous. The entry of professionals into construction is a recent 
phenomenon now actively encouraged by government, and some of the firms, 
though relatively young, are already able to compete with the largest 
and the best in Ghana. 
The dearth of firms able to undertake projects of a large and 
sophisticated nature (International and Conventional Large) (see 4.4.2) 
has constrained the performance of the construction industry (see 6.5.4) 
and of late, government has supported the formation of joint partnerships 
between Ghanaian and expatriate firms (see 5.4.4.2 and 12.6.5(7». 
13.3. Registration 
All enterprises operating ~n Ghana are required by law (the 
Companies Act of 1963) to register with the Registrar-General3 In 
addition, construction firms who wish to undertake public sector projects 
have to register with the Ministry of Works through AESC, GRA and PWD 
(see 7.3.2-5). Registration with the Ministry is also insisted on by 
the larger private client organisations 
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·Firms are placed in categories indicating the type of projects 
they want to or can work on. The categorisation has changed over the 
years,and ~s different for each registering agency. Firms are now 
grouped into those working on: Roads and Minor Bridges, Special Bridges 
(GHA) , General Building, civil Engineering Works, Electrical Installations, 
Plumbing Installations and Supply of Materials (AESC and PWD). 
Firms are also classified to indicate the size (by estimated 
cost) of construction projects they can undertake. Thus there are: 
Financial Class I Over '500,000 
Class II From '300,000 to '500,000 
Class III From '100,000 to '300,000 
Class IV Up to '100,000. 
Although these ranges are subject to revision, they have remained 
unchanged for some time and have been overtaken by inflation. Few 
contracts cost less than i300,COO now, and in practice the two lower 
classes should not exist. For this and other reasons the registration 
of firms .into these two classes has been suspended. 
A contracting firm performing to a satisfactory standard can be 
promoted to a higher class on application. It is also possible for a 
firm to be demoted; althougn this seldom happens. Blacklisting of 
offending firms (doing sub-standard work, delaying or ceas1ng work on 
a project or engaged in fraud) ~s more ·common. It 1S not necessary for 
every contractor to start from the lowest grade, although most of them 
do. 
13.3.1. Prequalification 
The criteria for prequalification for a financial class 
inciude: 
(a) number and qualification of personnel employed; 
(b) plant and equipment owned; 
.1 
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(c) total value of fixed assets and working capital; and 
(d) work executed in the immediate past. 
These criteria act as a barrier to entry into contracting in many 
ways: the need to own plant and equipment and some funds hinders the 
entry of professional personnel; the requirement that the firm should 
have done some work already before being registered is ironical and 
usually poses difficulties since most contractors rely on the public 
sector for work (see 6.5.2). The result is that many of the firms in 
the books are those whose proprietors have evolved ways of registering 
without satisfying the criteria for prequalification (see also 9.6.7). 
Government has expressed the concern that 
" with almost every contract award, the contractors 
concerned approach the import license authorities for 
allocation to import equipment, despite the criterion 
that qualification for contract award is the possess10n 
of the requisite machinery and equipment. ,,4 
A survey by the FWD (1975) of plant owned by the road construction 
firms on its register showed that few actually owned the plant 
required. Table 13.1 shows the results of this survey, with the number 
of plant required in brackets. The gap between the required and the 
TABLE 13.1. PWD. Number of Contractors and Number of Various 
Equipment, 1975 
Class of Number Dozer Scraper Traxcavator Roller Grader Contractor Regist'ered 
I 12 13 (24) 19 27 (12) 40 (36) 23 (24 
II· 14 2 (14) 1 19 (14) 10 (28) 5 (14 
III 67 2 1 23 (67) 24 (67) 24 (67) 
IV 85 3 0 29 29 (85) 21 (85 
Source,: Public Work~ Department 
actual 1S considerable in many cases. 
Tipper 
134 (72 ) 
52 (56) 
81C 134) 
105(170) 
The situation is no different with the number and qualifications 
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of firms' permanent employees, fixed assets and working capital. For 
example, although the smallest road contractor (class IV) is required to 
employ a foreman, bookkeeper, surveyor and mechanic, as well as have a 
permanent office, few class IV firms have any permanent employees or an 
office worbhy of the name. Government has pointed out that: 
"It has been observed that some contractors undertaking 
government projects do not keep proper accounts on their 
operations. It is an offence for a registered company 
not to maintain the pr"oper books of accounts. ,,5 
Attempts to enforce the prequalification criteria have included 
the centralisation of the registration exercise in the Accra head offices 
of the agencies, and physical viewing of assets the contractor claims 
to own. These have, so far, been unsuccessful, and the contracting 
6 
capacity of Ghana is much lower in practice than it appears on paper 
the criteria do not constitute as formidable a barrier as one would 
expect. (See also 9.4.4. and 9.6.7). 
13.4. Number of Contractors 
The list of contractors working in Ghana was first published in the 
Commercial and Industrial Bulletin in 1972 7. After the fragmentation of 
the PWD into the PWD, GHA and AESC (see 7.3.1.4-5), each body started its 
own register. It is, therefore, difficult to ascertain the actual 
number of construction firms at present, since the same company may be 
registered, often using the same assets and employees' particulars, 
with more than one agency. 
In 1972 there were 25 firms in Class I, 20 in Class II, 116 in 
Class III, 210 in Class IV, 16 Electrical Contractors and 209 Suppliers. 
Thus only 7 per cent of firms could undertake the larger projects (ie 
over t500,000) whereas 57 per cent could only take up work of not more 
than tlOO,OOO. Moreover, 42 per cent of all the firms, and all but 2 of 
the Class I firms, were based in Accra. 
The figures in table 13.2 g~ve an indication of the ~ncreases ~n 
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TABLE 13.2. AESC Registered Contractors, 1977 and 1978 
Year Class I Class II Class III Class IV Electrical 
Building 1977 27 71 376 577 210 
1978 32 79 428 681 241 
Civil Works 1977 10 27 60 65 
1978 14 34 63 79 
Source: AESC. 
numbers of contracting firms over the years: only lists for the 
consecutive years 1977 and 1978 could be obtained and this only for AESC. 
The data show the largest annual increase was amongst class IV building 
firms, where 104 additional contractors were registered, an increase of 
18 per cent. The numbers of building firms, as well as annual increases, 
were higher than their civil engineering and roads counterparts for 
reasons including the relative ease of entry into building contracting 
(see 13.3.1) and the greater number of building projects awarded each 
year. 
By May, 1979 the number of contracting firms registered in Ghana 
was as indicated in table 13.3. 
TABLE 13.3. ~egistered Contractors as at May 31, 1979 
-
Agency/Category Class I Class II Class III Class IV Total (Firms) 
AESC: Building 32 79 428 681 J. l220 n 
Civil Works 14 34 63 79 
Highway Authority (Roads) 37 51 143 207 438 
-
.. _-
PWD: Roads 6 20 126 ,. 83 
Civil Works 7 12 54 26 
Special Building 3 3 11 4 
General Building 9 46 475 581 
* Not an arithmetic Sum of Building and Civil Works firms, since some 
companies were registered in both categories. 
Source: Prepared from lists obtained from AESC, GRA and PWD. 
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. Considering the proportions of the var~ous sizes of firms, 56 per 
cent of the AESC's building contractors could do work of value only up to 
,100,000, and only 3 per cent· could undertake jobs over half a million 
cedis. Comparing these figures with the ratios in 1972 shows that whereas 
the proportion of small firms has remained roughly the same, though the 
number has trebled over the period, that of the largest firms has reduced. 
For the roads and special bridges contractors of the GRA, the proportions 
are 45 per cent Class IV and 8 per cent Class I, indicating a reduction 
in the proportion of small firms compared to 1972, and a maintenance of 
the level of large firms. 
13.4.1. Expatriate Firms and Joint Partnerships 
Expatriate firms, both those resident locally and those who 
come into work on one-off projects, have reduced over the years: ~n 
proportion, though not necessarily in totel number. There has b3en much 
flux amongst them; some are new on the scene whereas others have been 
operating for decades. Table l3.4.indicates that most expatriate firms 
are amongst the largest: they dominated class I in 1972 although their 
proportion had reduced by 1979. 
TABLE 13.4. Contractors Registered ~n Ghana, 1972 and 1979 
Agency/Type of Contractor !class. I Class II Class III Class IV 
Ministry of Works (1972): 
Expatriate 15 3 2 -
Ghanaian 10 17 114 210 
Total 25 20 116 210 
Highway Authority (1979 : 
Expatriate 5 1 1 -
Joint Expatriate-Ghanaian 3 - - -
Ghanaian 29 50 1.42 207 
'Iota1 37 51 143 207 
AESC (1979 : Expatriate 9 - - -
Joint Expatriate-Ghanaian 2 - - -
Ghanaian 21 79 428 681 
Total 32. 79 428 681 
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The ownerships of expatriate firms originate from Germany, such 
as Carl Ploetner; Italy, such as Michelletti Polla and Monta; Switzer-
land, such as A. Lang; Lebanon, such as Central Services; and England, 
such as Taylor Woodrow. Italian firms are the most numerous. 
The government's indigenisation policy8 excluded construction 
activity, ~hough it included the manufacture of cement blocks), in the 
sectors of the economy from which aliens were barred or Ghanaians 
required to have majority shares. Even more, government is now 
encouraging9 foreign firms wishing to work in Ghana to team up with 
Ghanaian firms, provided only that the Ministry of Works and Housing 
scrutinises the terms of agreement to safeguard the special interest of 
the Ghanaian partner. The intention is to provide a link between the 
expertise and equipment of the foreign firm and the goodwill and local 
knowledge of the indigenous counterpart. This would: 
(a) enhance Ghana's contractor capacity at the large or sophisticated 
project (international and conventional large) (see 4.4.2) end of 
the scale; 
(b) reduce the incidence of foreign firms coming to work on one pIoject 
and then demobilising their manpower and equipment after completion, 
displacing local workers and not enabling the country to benefit 
from their experience; 
(c) promote the introduction of modern technology into Ghana's 
construction industry (see 12,6.5); and 
(d) ensure effective training of Ghanaians at the operational and 
managerial levels. 
A number of such partnerships have been formed and negotiations, 
at the initiative of either the Ghanaian or the foreign firm, are 
underway for the establishment of some more. The m.ost intriguing of 
these firms is that owned by Taylor Woodrow and the Social Security 
Bank, a parastatal, (See 13.7.2.2). 
. : 
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13.5. Performance of Contractors 
13.5.1. Pr9gress on Projects 
The performance of contractors w'orking in Ghana can be studied by 
considering progress on some projects being undertaken. It was possible 
to obtain official reports on all the trunk and feeder road projects and 
a number of building projects. The remarks of the inspecting officers 
on progress on thede projects are represented in table 13.5. 
TABLE 13.5. National Feeder Road and Trunk Road Programmes, and Some 
Building Projects in Accra. Progress Reports as at 
31st December 1978. Remarks by Inspecting Official. 
Feeder Trunk Buildings 
Remark Roads (No) Roads (No) (No) 
Satisfactory Progress 170 22 31 
Slow Progress 82 11 85 
Work abandoned due to lack of 
materials or plant 22 11 -
Work 'abandoned by Contractor 70 14 4, 
Terminated and Reawarded 10 - 1 
Work not started 27 2 5 
Work suspended 5 - -
Contractor concentrating on another job 8 1 -
Work Completed 12 3 23 
Total 406 64 149 
Sourc~s: From information obtained from Ghana Highway Authority, Accra, 
and Architectural and Engineering Services Corporation, Accra. 
From the figures in the table (13.5) only 42% of feeder road 
projects, 34% of trunk road projects, and 21% of the building contracts 
were go~ng on at a satisfactory pace. 
Progress was slow on 20% of reeder roads, 17% of trunk roads and 
57% of the building projects. Shortages of materials or breakdown of 
. ' 
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plant had caused the abandonment of 5% of feeder roads and 17% of trunk 
road contracts, but none of the buildings. The major materials holding 
up trunk road projects were explosives and bitumen (see also 10.3.1.1), 
whereas those affecting the progress of buildings were cement, steel and 
aluminium sheets. The major constraint on feeder roads was plant (see 
also 12.6.2). The shortages of road construction materials were such 
that over long periods none was available in the country at all, whereas 
building materials were always obtainable, though in small quantities 
(s ee 10. 3 . 1. 1) . 
Contractors were, furthermore, more likely to abandon road projects 
when they found it difficult to obtain spare parts or plant, or when 
shortages of materials hindered the effective use of plant and equipment 
which had high hire costs (12.6.3). Thus, that fewer building projects 
were progressing satisfactorily and none had been abandoned is an 
indjcation more of the difference in technologies and hence production 
constraints rather than the lower competence of building compared to 
road contractors. 
Some contracts (10 feeder roads and 1 building) had also been 
terminated or suspended (5 feeder roads) by the awardi.ng agencies for 
reasons such as excessive delay and prolonged absence of the contractor 
from the works without reason. 
That work had not started on some awarded contracts (27 feeder 
roads, 2 trunk roads and 5 buildings) and that some projects were left 
unexecuted while the contractor worked on others (8 feeder roads and 1 
trunk road) indicates both the inadequate contracting capacity in the 
country and the willingness of contractors to tender for and accept jobs, 
and of clients to award them, regardless of their workload (see 9.6.6-7). 
Most of these feeder road projects were in the Upper Region where 
road. 
contractors are fewer. Two trunk"projects awarded in April and June, 
1978 had not started because the contractors' joint Ghanaian-expatriate 
firms were insisting on a revie\-/ of the contract sum because of the 
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devaluation of the cedi later that yp.ar. 
13.5.2 Dates of Completion 
Since progress on many projects was slow and s~nce several 
contracts had been suspended, terminated, abandoned or not started, most 
of the projects in Ghana were ·behind schedule. The dates of completion 
obtained from the progress reports are presented in table 13.6 for all 
the trunk roads and 40 of the building projects on which such dates 
were indicated. 
TABLE 13.6. Estimated Dates of Completion for some On-going Projects 
a~ at 31st December, 1978 
Year Trunk Roads Buildings Year Trunk Roads BuildinQ"s 
1973 1 - 1979 6 1 
1974 4 5 1980 9 1 
.. 
1975 10 7 1981 2 -
1976 12 3 
1977 7 15 Completed 3 2 
1978 10 6 Total 64 40 
.. Sources.: From information obtained from GHA and AESC, Accra. 
The data (table 13.6) show that at the end of 1978, 44 (69%) of 
all trunk road projects and 36 (90%) of the 40 building projects 
considered were delayed. Some were up to five years behind schedule. 
These delays had several socio-economic implications: users are 
deprived of the utilisation of the works; scarce capital is tied up ~n 
unfinished, unusable projects; costs rise due to contractors' inefficient 
use of resources, inflation, deterioration of the building fabric and 
f!.ecessary repairs. Most important, the non-completion of on-go~ng 
projects and the continued inception of others accentuate the materials 
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and plant supply problems, making it even more difficult to execute 
contracts (see 7.3.1.3). 
But contractors continue to be blamed for delays on construction 
. 10 1 h h f h' .., h" projects ,a t oug most 0 t e 1SSUes g1v1ng r1se to t e s1tuat10n 
are beyond their control. 
13.5.3. The Environment 
The nature of the contractor's operating environment affects 
his efficiency to a large extent (see 9.5.6.4). When materials and 
equipment needed for production are scarce, output is constrained, and 
firms cannot make optimum use of th6rmanpower. The present situation 
in Ghana's construction industry also involves contractors in additional, 
and usually abortive, efforts such as lobbying for materials (see for 
example 10.3.2.1-4) and plant (see 12.6.2) and chasing certificates 
(see 9.7.3), which increose overheads and zeduce profits 11 
13.5.4. Project Management 
The entrepreneurial ability of a firm's managers, if we11-
applied, can perceive opportunities and advantages even in difficult 
situations 12 . (See 15.4.3) 
The larger firms prepare and use site layouts, programmes of 
construction, .. materials schedules, cash flow and financial plans and 
site cost control systems, incorporating minimum levels of site output 
for broad types of work. The small firms, however, cannot use these 
management techniques, and had the environment of Ghana's construction 
industry been any better, this would have meant double-handling of 
materials, delays in delivery of materials, inefficient site production, 
high costs and stunted growth of the firms. 
However, theqretica1 management techniques appear inadequate as 
13 
an effective response to the present system. For example 
(a) the pre-construction period is usually too short for site layouts 
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and construction programmes to be prepared (see 9.6.7); 
(b) drawings are usually inadequate, nor are designs sufficiently 
finalised to permit programming and scheduling (see 9.5.2); 
(c) when programmes are prepared, materials shortages often throw them 
out of gear (see 13.5.3); and 
(d) delays in payments by clients (see 9.7.1) and rapid increases Ln 
prices (see 7.7.2) disrupt cash flows and financial plans. 
The more knowledgeable firms have become selective in the types 
of clients, awarding agencies and consultants for whom they work, and 
the number of projects and their geographical locatio~ they undertake at 
any time. The public-mmed State Construction Corporation is instructed to 
take on the least profitable and most unfavourably located projects. The 
small contractors take on such jobs out of Lgnorance and desperation. 
(See also 9.5.6.3). 
13.6. Characteristics of Contractors 
13.6.1. Dichotomy 
The above section (13.5.4) and previous chapters of this part 
• j 
of .the thesis (Part III) hint at a dichotomy of contracting firms 1n 
Ghana. Generally,' firms can be divided into the larger ones (classes I 
and II) and the smaller ones (classes III and IV). Broadly, the larger 
companies are more knowledgeable and are headed by or employ qualified 
professionals, although a few smaller firms have graduate builders as 
proprietors. The larger firms are as competent as can be expected of 
firms of similar size in other parts of the world. The smaller ones are 
not so competent and are owned and managed by proprietors with no 
knowledge of or qualification in construction (see 13.2). Such firms are 
too small to afford the full-time services of qual; fied professional staff. 
The larger firms have a monopoly over contracts worth over half 
a million cedis (see 13.3) and can also pick and choose from the rest 
f . 14 o projects They can obtain better terms of credit from the banks 
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and materials suppliers, and also· import directly items of equipment 
(see 10.7.2). Moreover, with their ability to offer a longer tenure of 
employment and, usually, better remuneration, they cream off the better 
supervisory and other skilled personnel, leaving the small firms to 
contend witt tne rest15 (see 11.3.2). 
These are a few examples of the ways l.n which the existence 
and operad ons of the larger firms impede the gro t '7th or threaten the 
survival of the small"'r ones. Not only is the ability of the former to 
respond to the present difficult situation greater, but the methods 
adopted l.n this response have unfavourable ramifications for the latter. 
13.6.2. Commitment 
The difference between the larger and the smaller firms is 
further manifest in the attitudes of their owners and managers to 
. 16 
constructl.on Whereas the former are dedicated to, and perceive their 
major field of activity to lie in, construction activity, the latter are 
usually owned by proprietors with no intention of remaining in the field 
for too long: they own businesses other than construction17 . 
Thus, the larger firms tend to expand vertically: any diversific-
ation involves the eetab1ishment of quarrying, joinery, b10ckmaking or 
similar facilities, or the acquisition of plant which they can also 
hire out. 
Most of the smaller firms are registered as "Trading and 
Construction Companies", "Trading, Transport and Construction Companies"· 
or just "Trading Companies". They enter, and remain, in construction 
only when prospects for profits are good and divert profits from 
construction into other fields of activity, particularly commerce, where 
returns are quicker and easier to make. Their construction units are 
therefore transient, with reliance on casual employees and emphasis on 
cost reduction, somet.imes at the expense of quality of workmanship and 
391 
~aterials18 (see also 3.7). 
Some small firms are owned by tradesmen or technicians, experienced 
in building and committed to building; but often these firms are 
starved of capital and unable to expand their operations. 
13.6.3. Management Style 
Whereas the" larger firms are more formal, bureaucratic and, to 
a large extent, de-personalised, the influence of the proprietor of the 
small firm is all-pervasive within the firm: he purchases materials, 
pays workers, chases certificates, lobbies for jobs and supervises his 
'foremen'. The extent of the firm's operations is accordingly limited 
by his inability to perform all these functions effectively. 
That entrepreneurs of construction firms prefer to take effective 
control of all important, especially financial, aspects of their 
operations is due to their suspicion of all persons other than their 
closest relatives 19 . Thus they are inclined to put their relatives in 
places of authority in the firm, irrespective of their qualifications 
for, or interest in, the job. This is, in itself, not bad; some 
studies have shown that entrepreneurial and family firms tend to be 
more successful than those managed by employees with no stock in the 
20 
company Moreover, most construction firms in Britain are family-
d 1 I
, ,21 
owned an management styes are paterna 1st1C 
Thus, provided that the trusted persons placed in high positions 
have the requisite training, the firm would have a bright future. TIl at 
some relatives of contractors 1n Ghana are undergoing training as 
professionals and technicians is a hopeful sign. 
13.6.4. Mergers 
Most construction firms in Ghana are sole proprietorships: 
those registered as limited liability companies are so only 1n name, the 
,/--, 
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so-called shareholders usually exist oniy on paper and have no stakes 
in the firm and no say 1n its operations. Most of the firms have 
remained small for decades, both as a result of a deliberate desire by 
their owners to keep them small, and their inability to grow (see 13.6.3). 
The continued dearth of large firms, as well as the greater success 
of larger firms in coping with the present difficulties in the operating 
environment (see 13.4 and 13.6.1), seems to make it advisable that the 
small firms merge or are encouraged to merge (see 13.1). But few mergers 
have taken place amongst contruction firms in Ghana because: 
(a) most Ghanaians are ignorant of the way in which formal partnerships 
work. Informal relationships are smoother and longer-lasting than 
rigid arrangements and traditional cooperatives are more enduring 
(eee 11.2.4 and 15.9). 
(b) the absence of laws on intestate inheritance hinders the formation 
of mergers. Under customary arrangements, the family assumes direct 
ownership of a person's property on his death, and they may do as 
they please with their portion of a firm's equity and assets. Some 
have been known to withdraw suddenly from partnerships, creating 
difficulty for the surviving partner(s) of the firm; and 
(c) there is deep,suspicion and mistrust among Ghanaians of one another. 
(see 13.6.3) This is even more marked between persons of different 
backgrounds. Thus the well-to-do entrepreneur is not likely to 
enter into business with a qualified professional. 
The few partnerships and mergers that have remained intact are 
those between qualified professionals. Even among these persons clashes 
of personality have led to the dissolution of some firms. 
13.7. Contractor Development 
~overnment's attempts to increase contracting capacity 1n Ghana 
have taken three forms: 
(a) direct involvement 
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(b) support serV1ces, and 
(c) encouragement. 
13.7.1. Direct Involvement 
The involvement of the government in the execution of 
construction projects started with the PWD and, passing through phases 
which saw the formation of the Builders Brigade (see 12.7.2), culminated 
in the PWD, GRA and the State Construction Corporation (see 7.3.1.5-6). 
Some departments and parastata1s have their own constructi"on units 
undertaking small works and maintenance, such as the Armed Forces' Works 
Services Engineers and the Maintenance Units of the universities. There 
is also the (direct-labour) State Housing Corporation, but the State 
Construction Corporation is the only state-owned commercial contracting 
organisation. 
13.7.1.1. State Construction Corporation (SCC) 
The State Construction Corporation (SCC) was formed in 1966 as 
a commercial, profit-making and sel£-:supporting organisation, to: 
" ... undertake, plan, carry out, construct, execute, 
improve, administer and manage, both in Ghana and 
elsewhere, all kinds of construction projects and 
civil works, whether public or private or otherwise, 
... to manufacture, ... or in any manner transform 22 
clay, wood, stone, marble, cement, ornamental products; ... " 
It has quarries, carpentry and joinery ·shops, precast concrete and 
b10ckmaking units and a large plant pool. It 1S one of the largest 
const~uction organisations in Ghana, operating on a nationwide basis 
with regional branches, and undertaking both building and road projects. 
13.7.1.1.1. Aims 
In establishing the SCC, government's aim23 was to have 
(a) a Ghanaian construction organisation capable of competing with the 
existing expatriate-owned large firms and able to execute 
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construction projects of any sLze Ln any part of the country; 
(b) a public organisation which, through realistic estimating, would 
act as a stabilising force in the construction market and break 
the oligopoly of the large foreign firms; and 
(c) a construction organisation which could be called upon by government 
to undertake any job anywhere in the country at any time, 
especially in case of emergency. 
13.7.1.1.2. Operations 
The see receives no preferential treatment. It operates like any 
other construction firm Ln Ghana and is subject to all the constraints 
faced by such firms, including allocation of materials and payment for 
work done (see 13.5.2-4). As a public-owned enterprise, the sec faces 
further problems: there is considerable administrative interference in 
its operations (see also 7.3.5.1). 
It does not have complete control over the projects that it 
undertakes: it is often called upon by government to take up work that 
no private firm wishes to do, or projects that are needed as a matter 
of .urgency or emergency (see 13.5.4). It executes about 60 per cent of 
all public projects24 
The sec's financial problems have increased as public clients 
have delayed payments due to it. In May, 1979 central government alone 
owed it some ill millions 25 . 
Nor are the corporation's manpower policies entirely in its own 
hands. In May, 1979, it had 13,000 employees, 4,000 of which the 
26 
management reckoned to be redundant . These were mostly unskilled 
persons or those in non-essential skills such as steel-bending. But 
government refuses to allow it to layoff its workers, although its 
projects are not spared during unilateral suspensions of public projects 
(see 6.5.2). 
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The corporation's objectives are usually blurred, the economic 
with the social. Until 1976 it made losses on its operations each 
27 year This vagueness or non-definition of its real objectives notwith-
standing, the SCC is the subject of frequent criticism by government and 
the public. 
To a large extent the SCC has achieved the aims set for it: it 
has constructed most of Ghana's more sophisticated structures and has 
undertaken a road project in the neighbouring Republic of Togo. 
13.7.1.1.3. Potential 
Some specialist portions of the SCC's contracts are sublet. Hence 
private subcontractors do plumbing and electrical installations and 
terrazzo works, among others. There is no comprehensive scheme under 
which these small contractors are trained during their association with 
the SCC. This is a potential that is not realised. At the moment it is 
only hoped that the corporation will be an example to the smaller 
indigenous firms. The difficulty of arranging formal training for 
contractors (see 11.7.2.1) can be compensated for by making use of the 
opportunities provided on the site, especially where main contractors 
can pass on some knowledge to the smaller ones. 
13.7.2 Support Services 
The only form of formal support serV1ces that contractors 1n 
Ghana are provided with is offered by the Bank for Housing and 
Construction. Small contractors may also be given advice by the AESC, 
GRA or PWD, or by private professional consultants on an informal, non-
obligatory basis (see 9.5.6,2 and 9.5.6.4). The Civil Engineering and 
Building Contractors Association, to which most contractors in Ghana 
belong, also acts as a pressure group, protecting and promoting the 
vital interests of all contractors. 
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13.7.2.1. The Bank for Housing and Construction (BRC) 
The Bank for Rousing and Construction (BRC) was set up by the 
government in 1973 to attend to the special needs of the construction 
sector. It operates as a commercial (accepting savings from depositors) 
and development (financing projects) bank, its functions consisting 
28 broadly of 
(a) providing mortgages for developers and investing in public and 
private development projects on its own or in partnership; 
(b) offering pre-financing loans to contractors; 
(c) organising training for contractors and their employees; and 
(d) investing in enterprises which produce or provide the special 
needs of contractors. 
13.7.2.1.1. Work 
BRC's mortgages (up to 80 Fer cent) are offered to customers 
satisfying the normal conditions such as income, age and a satisfactory 
saving habit. By the end of the 1977/78 fiscal year it had given 265 
mortgages valued just over i8 million29 . The decree establishing it laid 
stress on the BRC's undertaking projects that would promote tourism30 
Its investments ih commercial projects have, therefore, mainly been ~n 
the leisure industries such as hotels and beach resorts. It has also 
helped finance social projects on behalf of government, parastatals or 
district councils, 
Such efforts to enhance demand for construction is as far as the 
BRC goes in trying to ensure that work is available for contractors. 
Even here, however, it does not influence the client's choice of a 
contractor. 
The use of rigid, orthodox conditions in considering mortgage 
applications, and the rigorous tests of feasibility in appraising 
conunercial projects h~ve limited the impact of the BUC's loan-giving 
and inve~tment operations on total demand for construction activity. 
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Furthermore, its operations are not evenly distributed. Greater Accra 
(82%) and Ashanti (5%) had almost all its mortgage loans by 1978. The 
Northern and Upper Regions did not have any of such loans. Moreover, 
much of the mortgages (65% by 1978) are used to purchase existing 
facilities rather than initiate new work. 
13.7.2.1.2. Aid to Contractors 
The BHC offers financial assistance to contractors on terms that 
are more liberal than those of the commercial banks. Its service is, 
however, not without certain conditions. It offers: 
(1) hire-purchase facilities under which contractors are assisted to 
acquire plant; 
(2) pre-financing loans, 
13.7.2.1.3. Qualifying for a Loan 
To qualify for a prefinancing loan the contractor must b~ a duly 
registered firm (see 13.3) and must have won a contract from central 
government, a department, parastata1 or reputable private organisation. 
The bank examines the firm's past record, its assets, the type of project 
and the contractor's competence to undertake it and the profitability of 
the project, and assesses any necessary additional support service that 
should be provided to the firm, BHC would also, if it is a public 
project, ascertain that it is listed ~n the estimates (see 8.3.2). 
~inal1y, and most important, the client and the contractor should 
agree that all payment certificates are prepared in the joint names of 
the contractor and the bank. In effect, the bank becomes a 'partner' ~n 
the contractor's enterprise for the duration of the project. 
13.7.2.1.4. Advances 
During the execution of the project the contractor only obtains 
advances from his loan allocation on presentation of invoices, payroll 
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sheets and special requisitions, and all honoured interim certificates 
are paid directly into the account opened for the project with the BHC. 
Thus the bank manages the contractor's funds for him, paying out profits 
only at the end of the project. This arrAngement makes it unnecessary 
for contractors to put up collaterals against loans. 
The scheme is highly centralised: it is necessary for contractors 
to present their relevant documents to the bank's offices in Accra, 
practially each time they purchase any materials, but at least once a 
month - to collect the advance for wages. This poses difficulty and 
expense to contractor-customers of the bank. 
13.7.2.1.5. Appraising the Scheme 
Despite the safeguards, the system failed to work. Some 
contractors succeeded in having payment cheques on interim valuations 
issued directiy"' to them, and others who had direct loans to purchase 
vehicles or equipment defaulted in payment. By early 1979, the bank had 
exhausted its revolving fund for aiding contractors: the scheme was 
suspended. Efforts being made to recover some of the outstanding debts 
are prov1ng unsuccessful. The claims made by many contractors that they 
owned certain assets have turned out to be fraudulent (see 13.3.1), and 
the bank cannot resort to the final sanction of auctioning the property 
of defaulters. 
The scheme 1S under ser10US review, and among the measures being 
considered are: more stringent selection of contractors, based on 
creditworthiness and efficiency, insistence on some form of collateral, 
and legally binding agreements with clients to pay sums directly to the 
bank. 
13.7.2.1.6. Reasons for Failure 
Some of the reasons for the failure of the bank's scheme for 
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providing financial assistance to contractors are: 
(a) the non-creditworthiness of contractors. Ghanaian contractors have 
established an image of conspicuous consumption;. it is not 
uncommon for loan advances to be diverted to other uses (see also 
13.6.2); 
(b) the inefficiency of contractors. Some contractors made losses on 
their projects and have been unable to repay their loans (see 
13.5.1-3). 
(c) the lack of control ~n the client organisations, which made it 
possible for normal procedures to be flouted (see 8.3.2-3 and 
9.6.7), and lack of commitment of clients to contractor development; 
(d) the inadequate provision for the entrepreneur's personal needs. 
The payment of profits to firms only at the end of the project 
(13.7.2.1.4) ignored the reality of the proprietor's day-to-day 
needs. Many small contractors rely on interim payments to meet 
h . 1 d' 32 t e~r persona expen ~ture The pr~vious arrangement was almost 
an invitation to contractors to withhold payments; and 
(e) the BHC's high rate of interest. The bank charges contractors the 
same rate of interest as the other commercial banks (18.5% in 
March-Nay, 1979, which contrasts with 10-15 per cent profits 
contractors said they could make on projects)33. 
As contracts overrun, or as interim payments due to the contractor 
are delayed, cumulative interest charges on outstanding loans become 
considerable, further limiting the ability of the contractor to pay. 
13.7.2.1.7. Training 
The decree establishing the BHC enjoined it to 
" .• , endeavlJur so far as practicable to develop and 
promote improvements in building skills of building 
contractors and to promote efficiency in the 
construction industry generally."34 
But the bank has not been active ~n the field of training. The only 
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scheme worthy of note LS a course for plant operators it ran in 
conjunction with GHA. It complains that funds that should have been 
provided by government for training have not been forthcoming. Its 
activities in this sphere have been limited to the advice on managerial 
matters offered by its professional employees to contractors. Until early 
1979 it had a World Bank consultant in construction management. Because 
of the large number of contractors and the inadequacy of staff, most of 
whose time is spent trying to collect outstanding loans from contractor-
customers, the BRC's efforts have had limited impact. 
On some occasions the bank has seconded some of its qualified staff 
to its contractors, to work on particularly sophisticated projects as 
resident engineers or site managers. 
13.7.2.1.8. Plant Pool 
Another aspect of the bank'~ support services is its plant pool in 
Accra from which contractors can bonrow key items of plant and equipment 
(see 12.6.2). Plans are afoot to open a similar pool in each regional 
capital, and the facility in Kumasi is nearly completed. 
13.7.2.1.9. Industrial Development 
The BRC, in seeking to promote efficiency in construction, has 
invested in enterprises producing the industry's more vital and more 
scarce resources, especially those for which the minimum levels of 
investment are substantial. Tables 13.7 and 13.8 show a list of such 
enterprises, the proportion of the bank's equity shares ownership, the 
amount it has invested and the size of its loans. In addition to these, 
it has provided loans for a number of timber, terrazzo, block-making and 
other constructional materials industries. 
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TABLE 13.7. Joint Venture Projects Promoted by the Bank for 
Housing and Construction as of 30th June, 1978 
Sector Equi.ty Loan 
Name of Company of Amount % Amount 
Activity t t 
1. Plant Pool Limited Construction 3,000,000 60 2,400,000 
2. Kas Products Limited Quarrying 214,990 60 1,354,530 
3. Kumasi Warehouse Warehousing 27,740 70 358,000 
4. Redco Limited Estate Housing 
5. Rids Construction 
Limited Construction 
TABLE 13.8. Joint Venture Projects Promoted by other Institutions and 
in which the Bank for Housing and Construction Participates 
6. Sa1tpond Ceramics Ceramics 1,000,000 4 -
7. Fu1grit Asbestos Asbestos 52,000 4.3 
-
8. Precast Spun Concrete 
Products Concrete 232,220 55 844,440 
9. Ready Mixed Concrete Concrete 104,460 60 348,190 
10. Amalgamated Quarries Quarrying 587,214 25 559,434 
11. Buoko Quarries Quarrying 6,670 60 98,390 
12. Tesano Terrazzo Tile 
Factory Ltd. Ceramics 25,420 25 543,697. 
13. Prefab Panel Factory Housing 50,000 5 -
14. Prampram Brick and 
Tile Limited Brick and Tile 761,625 15 -
15. Golden Beach Resorts Hotel 150,000 15 250,000 
16. Ghana Stone Quarry Quarrying 204,000 51 588,251 
17. National Trust Holding Stock- 250,000 Share o\omership 
Co. Ltd. Brockerage by instalment 
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13.7.2.1.10. Problems 
The bank's difficulties include: 
(a) its inability to obtain long-term funds. Its reliance on comrnerica1 
banking and other conventional sources of money at high interest 
prevents it from playing a more decisive role as a development and 
contractor-supporting bank; 
(b) point (a) is further amplified by the irregular nature of repayments 
of loans granted its borrowers, contractors and industrialists, and 
the high burden of bad debts (see table 13.9); 
(c) following from point (b), the need for its employees to follow up 
loans to ensu~e that they are not diverted to other purposes, and 
also to collect overdue repayments, overstretches the bank's 
executive resources and detracts from the effective use of the 
special expertise of the qualified personnel; and 
(d) the bank has no premises of its own. This is ironical for a bank 
so much involved with construction. Its activities, highly 
centralised ln Accra (although it has a branch in Kumasi), are 
carried out ln widely scattered buildings, calling for much movement 
since the country's telephone system is unreliable, and avoidable 
waste of valuable staff time and transport expenses. 
13.7.2.2. Social Security Bank (SSB). 
The Social Security Bank (SSB) was formed by the Social Security 
and National Insurance Trust, the organisation which administers national 
insurance and pension funds in Ghana. Formed in 1978, the bank has 
exhibited particular interest in the construction industry. It has 
entered into partnership with Taylor Woodrow (Ghana) Ltd. to form a 
construction firm (see 13.4.1), and has a scheme for prefinancing projects 
for contractors. 
Its methods and conditions for this scheme are similar to those 
of the BHC, except that with the lesson provided by the high level of 
TABLE 13.9. Bank for Housing and Construction: Monthly Loan Repayments on Private Industrial Projects 
DEFAULT (Months) 
Type of Project Regular ltepayment .. 0-4 4+ - 12 12+ 
No. Amount No. Amount No. Ari,ount Amount SERVICE INDUSTRIES Outstanding Outstanding Outstanding No. Outstanding 
Hotels 3 308,349.54 1 299,034.00 
Disco/Night Clubs 2 342,054.75 1 146,500.00 
Res tau rants 4 240,425.71 2 209,840.00 1 11,522.00 
Travel Agencies 2 107,047.96 1 118,000.00 
Schools 2 109,848.00 1 108,760.00 
Clinics/Hospitals 1 95,900.17 
supermarkets/Cold Stores 1 67,913.00 2 115,640.00 
BUILDING HATERIALS 
Brick and Tile 
Ceramic Projects 1 543,697.49 
Concrete Products 2 971,378.74 1 422,220.00 
Quarry Projects 1 441,916.25 2 159,959.05 
Block Making 1 7,615.68 4 173;558.00 
Heta1 Works 
Wood Products 3 194,373.18 2 505,367.46 2 129,718.00 
I 
I OLher Building Materials 5 1,074,265.75 
Miscellaneous 
TOTAL 21 2 ,441f, 906.73 9 1,829,417.71 18 2,630,580.29 
-- -- --
------
No. 
4 
3 
7 
3 
3 
1 
3 
1 
3 
3 
5 
7 
5 
48 
TOTAL 
Amount 
Outstanding 
607,383.54 
488,554.75 
461,787.71 
225,047.96 
218,608.00 
95,900.17 
183,553.00 
543,687.49 
1,393,598.74 
601,875.30 
1~1,173.68 
829,458.64 
1,074,265.75 
6,904,904.73 
I 
+=' 
o 
w 
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defaults on the latter's loans, the SSB has had to adopt more stringent 
controls. These include its handling the greater part of the firm's 
-activities; directly receiving all the correspondence on the project 
for which it has loaned some money. 
Since many of the BRC's bad debtors have become customers of the 
SSB, the t~st of the SSB's.survival will be its ability to introduce and 
enforce foorproof methods of surveillance. Much can be gained from 
healthy competition, as opposed to rivalry and vindictiveness, between 
the SSB and BRC. 
13.7.3. Encouragement 
Certain aspects of government's involvement in the contracting 
part of construction, apart from direct involvement and the provision of 
support service~, have already been referred to in various sections of 
this 
(a) 
thesis, but it 1.S worth summarising some of them here: 
measures to promote the evolution and expansion of indigenous 
construction firms, not as a means of completely indigenising 
industry but rather to make the local firms able to compete 
effectively with their expatriate counterparts. The 1970 Plan 
disclosed that: 
"Considerations will be given to making it possible 
for the best Ghanaian firms to undertake jobs on 
the 
trunk road maintenance and construction work;"35 (see also 
8.4.2) . 
(b) schemes to encourage the entry of professional personnel into 
contracting by providing them with the resource they lacked most: 
finance (see 13.2). This would infuse into the industry finns 
with greater prospects of growth as a result of the greater 
dedication, better knowledge and wider horizons of these persons 
(see 13.6.1-4); 
(c) arrangements to promote the establishment of joint ventures between 
Ghanaian and expatriate firms for. their mutual benefit and for the 
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wellbeing of the local industry; and insistence on the inclusion 
of clauses safeguarding the interests of the Ghanaian partner 
(see 13.4.1); 
(d) registration of contractors (see 13.3), which enables prospective 
firms to enter the contracting field formally and serves as a basis 
for selection, maintenance of standards, aspirations and promotion; 
and 
(e) government's attempts to ~mprove the qualities of the resources 
available to contractors (materials, plant, manpower and finance) 
and of their operating environment are, in effect, efforts to 
encourage contractors. (See 8.4.1-6). 
13.8. Contractors Association 
The effective growth of contracting firms in Ghana is the 
principal aim of the Civil Engineering and Building Contractors 
Association (CEBCA) which was formed in 1973 when government urged a 
number of splinter organisations, some of which dated back to pre-
independence days, to come together. In seeking the interests of 
contractors the assocation hopes to promote the development of the local 
construction indus~ry. It furthers good relations between contractori, 
on the one hand, and clients and consultants on the other and endeavours to 
influence government on policies and procedures which affect the 
industry (see 3.6.1.5-6, Chapter 7 and 13.5.3). 
13.8.1. Membership 
All contractors working in Ghana, expatriate and local, private 
and public, may become members of CEBCA, and most registered contractors 
belong to it. The association wishes membership to be made mandatory 
for every contractor so that it would be possible to maintain standards 
in the field to the benefit of clients and further progress in the 
industry. 
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CEBCA has branches in all the regions, with elected regional and 
national executives who are. practising contractors, and a full-time 
Executive Secretary. 
13.8.2. Relationship with Governmens 
-Although it was formed at the instigation of government, the 
CEBCA is independent and does not receive any public financial support. 
It has had limited success at lobbying government on issues vital to the 
development of the industry. Some of these issues have been: the 
shortage and high.prices of materials, labour and plant, and the devious 
payment system and its inherent delays (see 13.5.3). With its usually 
strong and vocal leadership, CEBCA's approaches to government have been 
articulate and forceful, and have tended to alienate officials who view 
the body as an antagonistic pressure group oppos~ng government policy and 
procedures. Government and CEBCA have disagreed on many points, and the 
disputes have been open and usually acr~mon~ous. For example, whereas 
government officials blame contractors for delaying projects and portray 
them as unscrupulous and unpatriotic entrepreneurs (see 13.5.2), CEBCA 
di~counts this view and refers to the shortage of key constructional 
inputs. As a past President of the association said, contractors " ... 
lack all the necessary factors which should contribute towards the 
d · . l' f' 1136 expe ~t~ous comp et10n 0 proJects ..... 
Because of this open confrontation, CEBCA has been unable to 
obtain government support on some important matters. To cite only two 
examples: (1) an exercise in the re~registration of contractors was 
mounted ~n 1978 to rid the field of inefficient and non-dedicated ones, 
and· the association applied for a place on the committee charged with 
the task. The offer of a place was made when the p.xercise had been 
completed; and (2), CEBCA has, on several occasions, requested positions 
for its representatives on the various tender boards (see 9.6.1-7), but 
these appeals have been rejected on the g'counds that membership of the 
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contract awarding body should be the prerogative of the client. 
13.8.3. Advocate and Disciplinarian 
CEBCA arbitrates in disputes involving its members and other 
parties to construction projects, and has succeeded in seeking the re-
employment of or adequate compensation for contractors whose projects 
were suspended or terminated. In this way, it has helped small contractors 
who had been unaware of their rights, or unable to enforce them (see 
9.5.6.3). 
CEBCA negotiates collective agreements with the un~ons on behalf 
of its members and tries to prevent the poaching of skilled manpower by 
barring members from advertising wages higher than those agreed upon, 
although a firm can pay its employees as much as it likes 37 . 
. The association is eager to counter the bad reputation and the 
unfavourable press that contracto~s have in Ghana (see 9.7.4 and 
13.5.2-3). In 1979 it had the intention of employing a full-time Public 
Relations Officer. At the same time, it ~s making efforts to maintain a 
high standard of discipline and competence among its members. Its 
President reiterated that it was determined: 
II to improve on the standard of performance among 
its members, and ... will not hesitate to sanction any 
member whose performance or co~duct adversely affects 
the image of the Association. ,138 
13.8.4. Resources 
The CEBCA finances itself from members' subscriptions a~d small 
fees it charges for some of. its services to members. It wishes to 
establish a central fund from which it would: 
(a) train tradesmen and artisans at the vocational and technical 
institutes; 
(b) employ a pool of qualified professionals to assist members, most of 
whom cannot afford the full-time services of such personnel (see 
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l3.6~; and 
(c)" establish a bank for contractors, if its requests to be allowed to 
playa role in the BHC fails. Its application for a place on the 
bank's board was rejected, as was its request to be allowed to buy 
some of the bank's shares. Now it is requesting that its advice be 
sought on how best assistance to contractors could be provided by 
the bank (see 13.7.2.1.2-8). 
Members have not paid their subscriptions regularly and the 
central fund has not generated any enthusiasm. Thus none of CEBCA's 
ambitious projects has been launched. The apathy to its projects is due 
mainly to members' preoccupation with the management of their firms and 
contracts, a formidable task in present circums"tances (see 13.5.3-4). 
13.8.5. Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of Ghana's well-organised contractorc 
association ~s limited by the lack of support (especially fi~ancial) from 
its own members and from the government. CEBCA's experience shows that 
whereas a docile and pliable association would be worth little, there is 
a danger that a radical and outspoken body might prompt government to 
at best adopt an uncooperative attitude, or worse, make it difficult for 
the organisation to sustain itself and grow, or even try to ban it. 
13.9. Conclusion 
13.9.1, Definition 
In view of the variety of possible and desirable sizes and levels 
of sophistication that contracting firms can have, it is necessary, in 
considering the issue of contractor development, to identify the type or 
types of contractors needed. Ghana is deficient 1n large firms whereas 
it has an abundance of small and medium-sized ones. Thus the ma1n 1ssue 
is to promote the emergence of relatively large firms. 
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13.9.2. Characteristics 
The characteristics of Ghana's contractors are the result not only 
of economic, administrative, legal and technical factors, but also 
historical, socio-cu1tura1 and political issues. The nature of the firms 
contributes to and, in some cases, worsens the problems facing them. 
The problems are, furthermore, different for various categories of 
contractors. 
Effective solutions can be found to contractors' problems only 
after careful study of the issues which lie at their roots. Thus, for 
example, it is not useful to advocate the formation of mergers when the 
issue is rarely understood in the country and certain institutional 
factors militate against it. 
13.9,3. Categorisation 
There is the need to categorise contractors 1n such a way that the 
special needs of each group can be identified and ways of meeting them 
formulated. A set of criteria such as size, level of sophisticati.on and 
technical and managerial competence of proprietors and/or staff could 
serve as a basis for such categorisation. 
13.9.4. Finance 
Although finance is usually identified as the most crucial need 
of contractors 1n developing countries (see 13.1 and most of Chapter 5), 
not much can be achieved merely by lending contractors money, and Ghana 
has particularly bitter experiences in this field. It is necessary to 
conce1ve of contractor development programmes as involving the provision 
of a package of services, of which finance is only a part, to the 
contractor. In issues pertaining to finance, efforts should be made to 
balance the special needs of the contractor with the interests of the 
lending institution. 
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l3.9.S. Training 
The institution of training programmes 1S bound to be difficult 
in practice. Not all contractors see the need for training, and the 
predominance of sole-ownerships and the present management styles of 
contractors in Ghana, rules out their participation in long or full-time 
courses. Moreover, the construction environment in Ghana does not 
facilitate the use of elaborate management techniques. Thus undue 
emphasis should not be placed on the training of contractors. 
13.9.6. Commitment 
A major problem in contractor development in Ghana is to ensure 
that firms 1n the field are sufficiently committed and dedicated to the 
industry. Of the hundreds of small firms in the country, few may be 
said to be thus committed and to be pursu1ng corporate aims that might 
promote their survival. Most were attracted to the field by the prospect 
of quick and easy profits, as foreseen by their proprietors. Many are 
only part of a number of ventures run by the proprietors. The number of 
contracting firms means little when most will withdraw or collapse at 
the first sign of difficulties. 
13.9.7. Contractors Association 
Associations of contractors can promote the interests of members 
and help in the evolution of efficient firms. Experience in Ghana shows, 
however, that the mere existence of such a body will not guarantee 
success. Also important are its relations with government, the support 
of its members and its own effectiveness. 
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1. To give an indication of the scale of the expansion, part of the 
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1965 the number of [teacher] training colleges had risen from 31 
in 1961 to 84." - "The Ghana Education Trust was established to 
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time," - Information Services Department, Ghana Today 9: 
Education in Ghana 1930-74, Accra, 1974, -pp. 15 and 17. 
See also Ministry of Education, Education Report 1960-62, Ministry 
of Information, Accra,1963; ,and Education Report 1963-67, Accra, 
1968. 
2. writes Jones (1976): "After 1951 Ghana had become a happy hunting 
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3. This includes firms who come in to work on~y on one project. 
4. Government of Ghana, Budget Statement 1978, Accra, September 1978, 
p. 22. 
5. Ibid., p. 16. 
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contractors get important building ccntracts although they do not 
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Business (Promotion) Act, 1970, and later by the Ghanaian Enter-
prises Development Decree, 1975. (NRCO 330). Foreign investment 
was, however, still encouraged under the Capital Investments Act. 
9. See 5.4.4.2; 13.2 and 12.6.5(7). 
10. The new Minister of Finance, Dr. Amon Nikoi, laid the blame for the 
non-completion of projects squarely on contractors, observing that 
governments had always " ... borne the blame which should have gone 
to contractors for failing to complete certain development projects 
•.. in the past contractors had not lived up to their responsib-
ities." - ImprQ've ~pon Performances (address tu Northern Region 
Branch of the Civil Engineering and Building Contractors 
Association, Tamale), Daily Graphic, 17 January 1980, p. 11. 
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11. Thus contractors reject the accusation that their inefficiency is 
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the argument of the Minister of Finance (ibid~ the Executive 
Secretary of the Contractors Association, Mr. Sam Boateng, 
declared: "The t •• truth is that the inputs ... machinery, raw 
materials and the like are not available and the country has not 
got the money to import them ... like all other commodities, 
building materials and constructional inputs have been in short 
supply for some years now. Have not all our manufacturing houses 
in this regard virtually seized to function?" - We Are Not To 
Blame, Daily Graphic, 19 January 1980, p. 4. 
12. See Penrose, E.T., The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1969. 
13. See also 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7. 
14. There being no floor level to projects that bigger firms can tender 
for, many of them work on projects costing less than t300,000. 
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38. Boakye, F., op. cit. (ref. 36), p. 30. 
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PART FOUR 
A PROGRAMME FOR GHANA 
14.1. Introduction 
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CHAPTER 14 
GENERAL STRATEGY 
"The challenge to the building and building 
materials industries lies in the fact that in 
most countries, in this century, the cost of a 
socially acceptable dwelling has not declined in 
terms of average incomes, as happened in many 
other consumer products. The capacities [of the 
building 'and building materials industries] 
tnough limited, can be increased more rapidly 
than those of most other industries. Also they 
are in the mmn mbour-intensive, and the capital 
investment for an expansion of capacity is low 
in comparison with other industries." 
- Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Report of the Adhoc Group of Experts on 
Housing and Urban Development, United 
Nations, New York, '1962, p. 27. 
"The social aspects of change, the immaturity of 
the legal, political and administrative devices, 
as well as the need for training and education 
are only a few of the challenges to the emerging 
societies. The place of private and public 
investment in building and materials production, 
together with the unsettled ... tax, land, 
savings and transportation policies, is another ... 
the need is not only for general theories but 
for practical proposals. The answers, moreover, 
suggest themselves after one has visited the 
country and talked to the people as well as the 
officials and experts." 
- Abrams, C., Housing in the Modern World, 
Faber and Faber, London, 1964, pp. x-xi. 
The main features of Ghana's construction industry and its 
environment are: 
(a) a Ministry of Works and Housing with a long history but little 
prestige in the governmental machinery and little control over the 
construction industry, and with feuding subordinate organisations 
starved of resources and power and unable to perform to the 
envisaged levels (see Chapter 7); 
(b) the failure of elaborate development plans and budgets which 
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incorporate construction to guide government policies and actions; 
lack of a data base for planning; and continuing econom1C 
stagnation or decline (see Chapter 8); 
(e) procedures which appear appropriate but which are seldom adhered 
to, and hence generally have limited effect on the industry; 
linkage of construction procedures with those of general adminis-
tration and hence the need for changes in the latter if the former 
are to be altered; difficulty in effecting and implementing 
change (see Chapter 9); 
(d) reliance on conventional materials due to clients' and public's 
preference for them (for historical, cultural and other reasons); 
apathy towards local materials and their limited availability due 
to the underdevelopment of the industries manufacturing them 
(see Chapter 10); 
(e) Shortage of staff at all levels; lack of incentives and, in recent 
years, a loss of qualified personnel to neighbouring countries; 
inadequate facilities and shortage of teachers, diffusion of 
control over educational programmes and imbalance in the categories 
of trained personnel (see Chapter 11); 
(f) the applicat10n of a wide range of technologies as a result of 
government policy, clients' preferences and design and specification 
criteria - a reflection of designers' training background (see 
Chapter 12); and 
(g) a long history of contractor development involving state 
. . participation, the provision of support serV1ces and government 
encouragement; lack of commitment to contractor development on 
the part of government agencies; a well-organised contractors' 
association whose potential is yet to be realised (see Chapter 13). 
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14,2. Task 
Under Ghana's present circumstances the task facing the 
construction industry becomes that of its contribution towards the 
improvement of a worsening economic situation and social conditions 
bordering on despair. Considering the difficulties and the length of 
time involved in effecting any changes in its environment (see 3.6.3), 
the problem resolves itself into that of enhancing the efficiency of 
the industry itself (see 3.8); improving its exectt:he and organisational 
capacities to enable it to cope with, and promote the improvement of, 
an unfavourable operating environment. 
In particular, it is essential that the construction industry 
should: 
(a) economise 1n the use of resources: materials, labour and plant, 
in its fulfilment of demand in order to reduce costs, provide 
value for money and help reduce government's capital expenditure, 
and hence the budgetary deficit and rate of inflation (see 6.4.6 
and 6.5,2-4); 
(b) develop local self-sufficiency and reduce the reliance on 
conventional materials, hence the import bill and, ultimately, 
the openness of the economy (see 6.3 and 6.5.3); 
(c) continue to provide employment for large numbers of people (see 
12.2) and find ways 1n which the optimum use can be obtained from 
the abundant supply of labour; 
(d) adopt a mixture of technologies which allows for the long-term 
development of the industry, using advanced technology where it is 
most appropriate (see 3.6.7 and 5.4.4.5(c); and 
(e) to recognise, and give expression to, local socio-cu1tural 
perceptions and aspirations, involving the use of local skills and 
techniques, and the development of appropriate relationships within 
the industry and between it and its clients and users (see 1.3.6; 
1.4.5-6; 3.6,5-7 and 4.4.2). 
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14.3. Dynamism 
The programme for developing Ghana's construction industry needs to 
concentrate effort on the measures that are most likely -to increase its 
flexibility, capability and efficiency and, in a dynamic process, enable 
it to be increasingly able to contend with and reduce the effect of the 
bottlenecks in its operations and eventually (after it has understood 
them better) to be able to remove them (see 3.8). 
But placing emphasis on a few issues does not mean that others 
should be ignored altogether. What is needed, however, is a sense of 
order and priority. 
14.4. Ranking and Links 
Improving the attributes of the industry mentioned in Section 14.3 
involves the enhancement of the quality of personnel involved in it. Of 
the industry's personnel, considering the llature of its task (see 14.2), 
contractors appear most important. Hence contractor development assumes 
top priority, followed by general manpower development, and by others in 
the order of ease of applying them and the likelihood of success. This 
make~ it clear that measures g~ven a low ranking are not necessarily 
unimportant, or irrelevant or impossible to alter (see also 14.3). 
It should also be remembered that the ranking is done in relation 
to Ghana's present circumstances and resources. Thus the sequence is not 
essentially applicable to other countries and, even in the case of Ghana, 
will not necessarily be valid at all times. 
Considering the proposals under the same broad headings as adopted 
in Part III of the thesis, they may be ordered as follows: 
(1) Contractor Development; 
(2) Manpower Development; 
(3) Development of appropriate materials; 
(4) Adoption of appropriate technologies; 
,I 
(5) Revision of building codes and regulations, contract 
documents and contractual procedures; 
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(6) Establishment of planning and control of the demand for, and 
resources of, construction; and 
(7) Improving the status of the Ministry of Works and the 
operations of its subordinate organisations. 
Contractor Development: See later (Chapter 15). 
Manpower Development: The development of the industry's manpower 
resource is g1ven a high priority because it has great potential of a 
multiplying effect. It would enable economies to be made in the use of 
materials, permit the proper.utilisation and maintenance of plant, 
reduce costs, make it possible for ways to be found of using labour as 
an alternative to equipment in various categories of construction work 
and, by increasing the industry's understanding of its operating 
environment, help it to formulate or support measures to improve it 
(see 3.8 and 14.2-3). 
Materials: Although manpower development would 1ncrease the ability of 
the industry to cope with the shortages of materials, the inception and 
implementation of policies to ease the acute shortages and develop 
appropriate local alternatives for conventional materials are also 
important (see 10.8), because this would ease delays, reduce costs and 
promote the development of the industry. 
Technologies: The adoption of effective measures to promote the use of 
the appropriate techilologies in categories of construction follows in 
the order of importance and ease of formulation and application (see 
5.4.4.5). It would promote efficient and optimum use of labour, self-
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sufficiency and the general technological advancement of the industry. 
Procedures: The reV1S1on of procedures and regulations used in the 
construction process will require much effort and cooperation on the 
part of several individuals and institutions, and take time to 
implement. Thus it is placed fourth in order of priority (see 9.3.5; 
9.4.6; 9.5.7; 9.6.8 and 9.7.5). 
Planning: The poor data base for planning and the weakness of budgetary 
~ 
control as well as lack of commitment to plan implementation make it 
unlikely that plans and budgets can be used to the desired effect in 
Ghana 1n the near future. This has prompted th~ low ranking given to 
it (see 8.7). 
Ministry of Works and Agencies: Changing the status of the Ministry of 
Works will necessitate a reformulation of the whole central government 
system. Similarly, the relationships between and the operations of the 
ministry's subordinate bodies cannot be altered effectively in a hurry 
(see 7.9). Thus the Ministry and its ageDcies are accorded a low ranking. 
14.5. Strategy 
The strategy to be adopted will be made up of measures classified 
into those to be embarked upon 1n the: 
(1) short term (0-5 years): these will include proposals that can be 
implemented and those of greatest priority; 
(2) medium term (5-10 years): 1ssues that, though desirable, can only 
be effectively attended to when conditions are right; and 
(3) long tenn (after 10 years): guidelines for future government policy, 
and matters that can be supported only by a strong economy and 
cooperative effort on the part of individuals and institutions 
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within and outside the indus'try (see also 3.8). 
Despite the suggestion of a scale of priorities, the approach 
should not be piecemeal: The programme itself should be drawn up in such 
a way that in each period a package of specific measures would be 
initiated and/or implemented. 
It is assumed that all the measures in one stage are implemented 
with a measure of success before those in another period are embarked 
upon. However, the stages are not discrete nor discontinuous: one stage 
blends into another, the solutions of each stage becoming the catalyst 
for programmes in succeeding stages. 
It is also recognised that changing conditions in the industry at 
anyone time, or failure of any of the measures in earlier stages, will 
generate problems of a different kind or intensity; which should be 
anticipated and tackled by tactics at subsequent stages. Thus t.he 
programme should not be a static, once and for all, package but a 
dynamic, flexible and adaptive series of proposals (see 3.8 and 5.5). 
14.6. Manpower Development 
The objectives of the programme for improving the quality and 
quantity of construction personnel would be: 
(1) to relieve present shortages of skilled personnel at all levels, 
(2) to redress the present imbalance between professional and 
technician categories, 
(3) to relate the content and background of training to local 
circumstances, 
(4) to promote cooperation among the participants ~n the construction 
process, and 
(5) ultimately, to obtain a mobile and flexible corps of local personnel 
conversant with the changing needs and available human, material 
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and institutional resources of the country. 
14.6.1, Short Term 
(1) As a matter of priority, a unit should be established within the 
Ministry of Works and Housing to coordinate training in construction 
skills (see Fig 13.1 and 11.12.3). This could be part of one of the 
technical directorates (see 7.3.1.1), composed of no more than just 
an additional administrative assistant of the director; alternatively, 
the work could be handled by two existing personnel. 
This unit would have links with the Manpower Board, the NVTI, the 
MDPI, UST and the academic committees of the professional 
institutions (see 11.5; 11.7.2 and 11.8.1), 
The first task 'of this unit should be the formulation of a 
national plan for training in construction (see 11.12.2). This 
would involve the assessment of existing needs and resources 
(buildings, equipment, teachers and funds),in the various categories 
of skills, as well as short-, medium- and long-term strategies, 
which could embrace the following points. 
(2) Apprenticeships: Self-help projects in the rural areas can be used 
as a means of imparting construction skills if small teams of 
skilled tradesmen are deployed to in~truct interested local people. 
Retired tradesmen could be used in this teaching capacity. This is 
a role for the Department of Social Welfare and Community 
Development (see 7.8.3,3). 
The NVTI should be enabled to play a more positive role in 
training by being charged with the formal organisation and 
coordination of all apprenticeships. To this end, its schemes 
should not be open only to those sponsored by their employers but, 
perhaps for a small fee, should also be put at the disposal of new 
entrants to the trades or the unemployed. 
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(3) Trades: Whereas the new national education system (see 7.8.1) and 
remunerations in the industry (see 11.4.1) would create favourable 
attitudes to the construction trades, it behoves upon the industry 
to make conditions more attractive to a higher calibre of personnel. 
This would involve safety on site, employees' welfare, remuneration 
and employer-worker relations (see 11.12.6). 
Two particular types of skill which need immediate attention are 
plant operators and mechanics. There are, at present, no facilities 
for their training (see 12.6.3). The best way of attending to them 
is to establish courses at the Bank for Housing and Construction's 
plant pools in Accra and Kumasi (see 12.6.2 and 13.7.',2.1.8), and at 
the Ghana Highway Authority's training centre at Shai Hills, Eastern 
Region, initially for contractors' employees but later also for 
other suitable persons. 
Government should provic1e funds for the courses of the H5,ghway 
Authority, but those of the Bank for Housing and Construction should 
be considered part of its responsibility to train construction 
personnel (see 13.7.2.1). 
(4) Technicians: The level of physical facilities and teachers makes 
it unlikely that the size of annual intakes to the technician 
courses can be increased (see 11.~). At this stage, efforts should 
be concentrated on the training of more technical instructors for 
technicians and the trades. Meanwhile, to relieve present shortages 
of technicians and trades (see 11.2), greater use should be made of 
on-the-job training and self-tuition. Part-time courses should be 
organised at the polytechnics for employees of both public and 
private consultants and contractors. 
The professional institutions should pay some attention to the 
technician and licentiate grades. They now concentrate on 
professional memberships (see 11.11.1.1). It should be possible 
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for the institutions to organise even~ng classes for the former 
grades, at which some of their qualified members would lecture. 
(5) Graduates: Intake into graduate courses (see 11.8.1) ~n construction 
cannot be increased without a deterioration in the quality of their 
products (see 11.9.2). At this stage, emphasis should be put on 
completing the central classroom block at UST, rehabilitating the 
laboratory and workshop equipment, other teaching aids and the 
library, and finding ways of making teaching at the university 
attractive to experienced professional personnel. TIlese measures 
could include opportunities for consultancy and research, and 
accommodation. 
The effect of the shortage of lecturers (see 11.8.1.5) could be 
alleviated through the adoption of arrangements which permit greater 
use of part-time teachers. 
A start should also be made at revising the syllabi of the 
courses at UST and elsewhere (see 11.12.1). For example, ~n 
architecture the course in contract administration should adopt a 
more critical approach to present documents and practices; that ~n 
materials and construction should consider local materials and 
techniques and leave out the obviously inapplicable items such as 
fireplaces; and the study of history of architecture should pay 
more than the present passing attention to traditional ideas. 
"Attempts to rehabilitate and renew the stock of literatur~, and to 
revise the courses, should endeavour to introduce modern ideas on 
the nature and management of construction activity (see 3.6.6. and 
7.3.5.2). 
Efforts shoul~ be made to rev~ve the sagging attempts by s~me 
members of staff at the university to write textbooks on construction 
(see 11.8.1.1), This could take the form of grants or chances of 
promotion. 
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(6) Multidisciplinary Nature: The nature of training at UST is, to some 
extent, multidisciplinary (see 11.8.1.3), a situation dictated by 
shortage of staff. There is scope, however, for continuing and 
intensifying this practice and applying it to real-life projects and 
situations. It should also cross faculty boundaries. A development 
scheme would, thus, involve the Faculties of Social Sciences (Cost-
Benefit Analysis), Architecture (Planning, Design, Cost Advice and 
Project Management) and Engineering (Roads, Structures, Services). 
This is a way not only of breaking into professional cocoons (see 
3.6.6 and 11.11.1.2), but also enabling students to gain experience 
of work situations and to appreciate the contributions of other 
participants in the construction process from the inception of a 
project to its completion. 
Such an arrangement could be used on the university's own capital 
projectE or on those of inter~sted public departments or parastata1s. 
When such live projects are not available, examples of hypothetical 
ones may be used. 
(7) Practical Training: The present system of industrial training for 
undergraduates does not enable students to obtain any real knowledge 
(see 11.8.1.1). In the first two years ~tudents know too little to 
benefit from this training, and in later years their ambiguous 
positionsin the organisations to which they are attached are not 
conducive to learning. 
In revising the contents of the courses (see 14.6.1.5), it might 
be worthwhile to consider whether it would not be better to 
restructure the courses to allow a year's industrial training 
after the third vear of the degree courses and the fourth year of 
the architecture course. The arrangement for the two- and three-
year diploma courses could remain unchanged. 
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(8) Links: UST should improve its links with industry to avail itself 
of present conditions in it and to avoid living in an abstract 
situation. Rather than teaching the ideal, it ~s more advisable 
to teach both the ideal and the real,- at the very least as a means 
of provoking further thought (see 11.8.1.1). 
Thus it might be possible, through discussion and study, for the 
university to determine methods by which the industry can deal 
with the present conditions in its environmerit (such as shortages 
of materials and delayed payments). It is surprising that such an 
issue has not been given due consideration. 
(9) Non-academic Factors: Training at all levels, and particularly at 
the technician and professional, should include non-academic or 
non-technical aspects such as discipline, leadership, personal 
relations and management (see 11.12.1). 
It should also give the student a fair idea of the Ghanaian work 
situation, not only to prepare him for employment but also to 
stimulate in him the spirit of criticism and enquiry that would 
help improve the situation. Thus, for example, students should be 
taught the rules of thumb used by the AESC and GHA, and they should 
also be told what the relations bet,,,een AESC and GHA should be as 
well as what they are (see 7.3.5.3 and 14.6.1.8). 
(10) Placement: The temptation should be avoided of placing new·ly 
qualified persons in positions where they are directly in charge 
of a whole district or region, The learning process should 
continue in the employment situation (see 11.12.1) and it should 
be a matter of policy that graduates are put 1n subordinate 
positions for at least a year to enable them to ga1n experience 
without making great mistakes. 
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(11) Retention: Government should establish a committee to study the 
factors giving rise to the present brain-drain from Ghana (see 
11.3.2 and Chapter 11, footnote 23) and propose appropriate 
measures to reduce it, or enable it to be organised in a way which 
benefits the nation, either financially or 1n terms of" enhancing 
the experience of qualified Ghanaians, or both; or, at least, 
reduce the disruptive effect of the exodus on the local industry 
and economy. 
14.6.2. Medium Term 
(1) Expansion: in the medium term, if resources allow, attempts should 
be made to expand the physical facilities for training at any 
desirable level. When this has been done, and assuming that the 
number of instructors has increased (see 14.6.1.4), the intake into 
the va~ious courses can be raised. 
(2) Responsibility: Government should, progressively, pass on increasing 
parts of the responsibility for financing training to the industry 
itself, especially apprenticeships and training for the trades. 
This could be "done by encouraging the Contractors Association (see 
13.8) to establish and administer a training fund for its members. 
Government's taxation policy should enable firms to claim tax 
exemption on their expenditure on training. Furthermore, the award 
of construction and consultancy contracts (see 9.6) could" be used 
to promote training and so could the promotion of construction 
firms to higher financial classes (see 13.3). 
(3) The MDPI (see 1] .7.2.1-2) should establish a construction unit to" 
run occasional and refresher courses for construction personnel and 
to impart basic ideas on the nature of the construction process to 
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civil servants and politicians to g1ve them an idea of how their 
actions or inactions help or harm the industry and to enlighten 
them on the implication of policies for the industry. 
This unit need not employ teachers; it could use practising 
professionals on its courses. 
(4) The subordinate organisations of the Ministry of Works and Housing 
(particularly the PWD, AESC and GHA) should together establish an 
institution for the training of technicians. This could involve an 
expansion of the PWD's draughtsmanship school or the use of the 
premises of the Accra Polytechnic in the evenings. Instructors at 
this institution would be the organisations' professional employees. 
(5) UST should involve itself 1n the national development effort. It 
should divest itself of the pedestal on which universities 
usually ra1se themselves, or are placed. It is possible for this 
to be combined with ways of earn1ng money for UST's development 
programmes. For example, a multi-disciplinary consultancy 
organisation of the staff could be formed and, also, postgraduate 
design students could be involved in the design of projects for the 
various para&amls, fourth-year quantity surveying students could 
be entrusted with the preparation of bills of quantities for, say, 
the standard drawings of the AESC and Housing Corporation, and 
fourth-year engineering students could design services and structures 
for such schemes. (See also 11.8.1.2; 11.8.1.4; 14.6.1.6). 
These measures would call for a series of arrangements between 
the university and the various client and consultancy organisations. 
The staff and students of UST are thus in a position to relieve the 
present shortage of skills of the professional and technician 
categories. (See 11.2). 
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(6.) Schemes should be formulated to reduce the predominantly 
residential nature of Ghana's education institutions and to relieve 
the constraint that students' accommodation has on expans10n 
programmes (see 11.8.1.5). This could involve the encouragement by 
government and the institutions of developers such as the Social 
Security Bank, Ghana Commercial Bank and Bank for Housing and 
Construction to provide hostels near the campuses for renting to 
students, or the provision of efficient means of transport for 
students between campus and their places of residence. 
(7) When the revised syllabi for the training institutions have been 
implemented (see 14.6.1.5), then orientation courses should be run 
for expatriates coming to work in Ghana, or Ghanaians trained 
abroad. This would be done under the auspices of the MDPI (see 
14.6.2.3) at six-monthly or annual intervals, depending on the 
number of entrants. 
14.6.3. ~ong Term 
(1) If demand for construction continues to increase manpower require-
ments would increase, and it would be necessary - if any new 
university is considered in the long term - to consider the creation 
of faculties for construction. Otherwise the facilities at UST 
and other institutions should be ~xpanded progressively in tune 
with long-term forecasts (see 14.6.1.1). 
(2) Should demand for construction 1n Ghana fall dramatically and lead 
to large-scale unemployment of skilled personnel (an unlikely 
situation), then arrangements could be made to lend staff to other 
African countries, particularly English-speaking West, East and 
Southern African countries, as has occurred since the early 1970's 
in the case of graduate teachers. 
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(3) Attempts should be made to reduce the tension within organisations, 
especially between professionals and administrators, and also 
between organisations, to allow for the integration of effort and 
the enhancement of executive capacity (see 11.12.7-8). 
14.7. Materials 
Manpower development will promote economies in the use of 
materials (see 14.6). At the same time, a progranmle should be formulated 
for materials with the objectives of: 
(1) relieving current acute shortages; 
(2) effectively utilising local materials, and eventually 
(3) expanding the production of both conventional and local materials. 
14.7.1. Short Term 
(1) The Ministry of Works and Hoasing should assume direct control of 
the materials development progranmte to provide a point of focus fOJ~ 
the activities of the various bodies concerned with aspects of the 
progranmte: the research institutions, Forestry Department, the 
Ministry of Industries, and the various public and private investors. 
(2) Imports of materials for construction should be rationalised, with 
greater emphasis on the provision of spare parts to rehabilitate 
existing factories such as Tema Steelworks, the quarries and the 
timber processing industries, and raw materials for those factories 
utilising them. The importation of finished materials and 
components should be limited to items like bitumen that cannot be 
produced locally. (See 7.7.1, 10.3.1 and 10.3.1.1-2). 
Importation of materials should be planned; annual needs should 
be related to estimates of foreign exchange (see 8.2.7). 
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(3) A committee should be established to take stock of and relate 
available research results to formulate ways of ensuring their 
effective implementation. Members could be drawn from the Ministry 
of Works, AESC, PWD, UST and representatives of the professional 
institutions. It would extend the work of the committee on local 
building materials (see 10.5.2). 
(4) A national conference should be organised by the Ministry of Works 
for professionals, lecturers, planning officers, building inspectors 
and officers of the city engineers' and district councils to enable 
the research institutions to appra1se them about the performance 
characteristics of new materials and generate ideas for the reV1S10n 
of building regulations. This could be a biennial affair. 
(5) A social study should be conducted by the DHPR, using students of 
the Faculty of Architecture, to identify and classify preferences 
for materials and the nature of traditional construction (see also 
11.8.1.2 and 14.6.2.5). This should lead to the delineation of 
areas where certain indigenous materials are likely to be 
acceptable,to enable a regional attitude to the promotion of 
indigenous materials to be adopted. The study should also attempt 
to identify local raw materials and help in decisions on the 
establishment of a~propriate production units. Hence, burnt brick 
factories could be set up in areas where sun-dried bricks are a 
traditional building material (see 10.8.4-7). 
(6) Government should give the political lead 1n the use of appropriate 
materials in various areas (see 10.8.4). It should instruct its 
consultants and parastatals involved in construction (such as the 
State Housing Corporation) to use them. Such materials should also 
be used in self-help projects (see also 14.6.1.2). 
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Promotion exercises should not. be limited to occasional 
exhibitions or isolated buildings, but should be widespread with 
prototypes near market places, lorry stations, meeting places, 
sports stadia, hotels and similar places of easy access to the 
public (see 10.8.4). 
(7) Landcrete blocks appear to be material that can be propagated for 
nationwide utilisation as a substitute for the ubiquitous sandcrete. 
Skills for placing it are also available. The problem, however, 
lies with controlling the quality of the material, and in obtaining 
the manual and mechanical presses for producing it. To relieve the 
pressure on the demand for cement, it is worthwhile to attempt to 
produce the manual press in appreciable quantities for effective 
distribution (see 10.5.6). 
It would also be prudent, at this 3lage, to make the pOSbeSSLon 
of a mechanical press a prerequisite for registering contractors 
(especially Classes II, III and IV) (see 13.3.1). 
Courses should be run at the DHPR and BRRI to teach the correct 
method of making 1andcrete blocks. 
(8) Bricks are popular Ln the urban areas; the bottlenecks in its 
utilisation lie in obtaining sufficient quantities of the material 
and skilled tradesmen. The emphasis at this stage should be on the 
rehabilitation or completion of existing factories, and the 
introduction or expansion of courses in bricklaying at the technical 
and vocational institutes (see 10.5.4 and 10.8.8). 
(9) Timbe~ is preferred by the middle class as a hui1ding material 
(see 10.8.6) and "it may be promoted among this category of clients 
through strategies such as the Public Servants Loans Scheme. It 
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may also be used on mass housing schemes. It is unlikely, however, 
that the apathy towards timber will be removed in the short term. 
The use of timber and its products: plywood, blackboard, 
laminated boards, as components should be promoted (see 10.5.3). 
(10) Traditional materials will remain, for a long time, the only types 
of material that the majority of rural folk can afford. Thus, 
efforts should be made in the development and dissemination of 
cheap materials or methods that will make traditional structures 
durable and attractive, such as foundations, finishings, water-
proofing of walls, and methods of sealing and preserving thatch 
(see 10.5.5 and 10.5,10). 
(11) Terrazzo chippings should be considered under the quarry development 
programme (see 10.5.9). It is unlikely that natural stone and 
dimension stone will become widely-used building materials in view 
of their expense, the cost of transporting them and the lack of 
skills (see 10.5.8), and it is not advisable to mount efforts to 
promote them. 
(12) Shortages of key materials are inevitable in the short term, and 
the construction industry needs to develop the ability to deal with 
the situation. 
(13) Some attention should be paid, at this stage, to the ~raining of 
persons in production management for the factories. Such courses 
are at present not available in Ghana and technical assistance from 
foreign agencies have to be arranged or utilised if the nation 
cannot bear the expense. 
(14) The Ghana Standards Board should be charged with ensuring an 
acceptable quality of locally-produced materials to engender 
confidence in consumers (see 10.3.2.6). 
14.7.2. Medium Term 
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(1) With the expectation that at this time the BRRI's study on 
appropriate methods of exploiting limestone would be completed (see 
10.5.7), some of the production units would be located near the 
existing deposits, to produce limestone to feed the cement factories. 
The use of pozzolana as an additive to cement should also be 
encouraged at this stage (see 10.5.7). 
(2) The aluminium venture at Kibi would be operative by now. It would 
relieve the burden of aluminium imports and shortages of roofing 
sheets, and also provide pozzolana as a by-product (see 10.3.4). 
(3) It is to be hoped that the integrated iron and steel project at 
Oppong Mansi would be completed by this time (see 10.3.2.3) to 
support the production of steel reinforcement, sheet steel for the 
Tek block presses, steel sections and spare parts for plant and 
equipment. 
The completion of the Kumasi Steelworks and the foundries at 
Takoradi and Kumasi at this stage would be particularly helpful 
(see 10.3.2.3). 
(4) Knowledge about indigenous materials would have increased as a 
result of the changes in the contents of courses at UST and else-
where (see 14.6.1.5) and the conferences on indigenous materials. 
The specification and use of local materials would increase. 
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(5) Timber preservation depots should be established ~n the forest 
areas, particularly at the major sawmills, by the Forestry Department; 
testing facilities should also be provided under the PWD. These would 
permit the utilisation of the secondary species, data about which 
would be available at this stage (see 10.5.3 and 14.7.1.9). 
If the demand for timber buildings rises, the establishment of 
units to mass-produce timber compo~ at two of the sawmills or 
timber processing plants, say at Nkawkmv. in the Eastern Region and 
Mim in the Brong-Ahafo Region, should be considered. It will also 
be necessary to intensify the training of carpenters, joiners and 
woodworking machinists and mechanics. 
(6) Brick_production should be increased at this stage to close the gap 
between demand and supply. Existing factories should be encouraged 
to expand production. 
Government should also establish additional production units ~n 
the regions under the Regional Development Corporations (see 
10.5.4 and 14. 7.1. 8) • 
"(7) The availability and cost of energy will soon prove a bottleneck to 
the materials, and indeed the whole industrial development 
programme. Attention should, therefore, be .paid to this point 
when deciding on the establishment of production units. 
It also means that research into appropriate technology in the 
production of materials, as well as the identification and 
development of local materials, should be intensified (see 10.8.5). 
"(8). A factory for the production of sanitary units should be" established 
• beside the kaolinitic deposits near Nkawkaw, Anfoega or Asamankese 
(see 10.3.2.6). 
14.7.3. Long Term 
(1) The establishment of a bitumen processing plant to use the by~ 
products of the oil refinery at Tema should be considered as a 
long-term objective (see 10.3.1.1). 
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(2) In the long term, a kiln may be built to use the iron-ore deposits 
at Shieni in the Northern REgion. This will be conditioned by the 
availability of foreign exchange as well as energy (see 10.3.2.3 
and 14. 7.2.7). 
(3) Government should encourage international cooperation 1n the field 
of materials and technology ie between the research bodies and the 
Ministry of Works and their counterparts in other countries to 
enable the nation to benefit from the results and experiences of 
other countries. 
(4) Government should promote amongst the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) the establishment of regional ventures in 
building materials, particularly those that requ1re a large foreign 
exchange component, or those for which the raw materials are 
available in only a few countries in the sub-region (cf. the CIMAO 
Cement project. See 10.3.2.1, also 1.4.4 and 5.3.1.2). 
(5) It should be possible for the country to export any material it 
produces in surplus to other countries in the sub-region, such as 
timber products to Gambia. 
14.8. Techno1o~ 
The programme for the technological development of the construction 
industry will give expression to government's aspirations in that 
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respect (see 12.6.5.7). Its aims would be: 
(a) by pursu~ng a m~x of technologies, to enable the nation to benefit 
from the most modern ideas ,~hile using traditional techniques to 
best advantage; 
(b) to classify construction projects in terms of the most appropriate 
technologies and adopt policies that permit the utilisation of such 
techniques ~n the delineated categories; and 
(c) to promote increases in productivity while utilising the available 
manpower resources in the most economic and socially desirable 
manner. 
14,8.1. Short term 
(1) Industrialised Building was introduced to increase the production 
of houses (see 12.4.1-4). Having established the factories it is 
unwise to neglect them. As a matter of priority, the Precast 
Concrete Factory should be provided with the plant and cement that 
will enable it to achieve a reasonable level of output even if it 
cannot produce at its full capacity. 
African Timber and Plywood's facilities should be rehabilitated: 
it should be provided with import licences to import vital spares 
and replacement machinery. 
These measures would enable the factories to use their idle 
capital stock and labour and also help relieve the housing shortage. 
(2) Plant. The policy for contractors' plant at this stage should be 
one of rehabilitation and rationalisation. Spare parts should be 
imported to service broken-down plant (see 12.6.2). Applications 
should be made to patent holders to allow the production of spares 
under licence at a later st2ge (see 14.8.3.2). 
A study should be ~ounted at this stage to standardise plant and 
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equipment used in Ghana (see 12,6.4). This would take the form of 
a review of the performance of brands of plant in the past and the 
identification of at most two brands. of each type to be adopted as 
the only ones to be imported into Ghana. This would make it eas~er 
to maintain adequate stocks of spares. The study could be 
entrusted to the BRRI and GHA. 
The courses established for operators and mechanics of construction 
plant ( see 14.6.1.3) will enhance the supply of such persons and 
engender the efficient use of plant and equipment. 
Efforts should be made to encourage studies into the use of 
labour-intensive methods in road and civil engineering construction 
to relieve the constraint on this sector posed by inadequate plant 
capacity (see 12.6.2). 
Plant capacity can be increased by continuing to encourage foreign 
firms to enter into joint ventures with local companies (see 
12.6.5.7). This can have the desired effect if the local counter, 
parts are established contractors rather than banks or other 
'sleeping' partners. The former would be in a position to benefit 
from the equipment holding and expertise of the expatriate firm. 
Ghanaian firms could also be given preference on contracts financed 
by external agencies, which include funds for the purchase of plant. 
The best Ghanaian firms should be encouraged to tender for such 
jobs: government might have to convince the funding agencies about 
the necessity for additional percentage tender preferences, over and 
above agreed present levels. 
Alternatively or additionally, arrangements could be made to 
purchase plant belonging to foreign contractors leaving the country 
after completing a project. This could be incorporated in the 
contract, 
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(3) Labour-Intensive methods of construction should be made possible or 
mandatory on single and two-storey buildings. This would 
necessitate the relaxation or review of prequa1ification criteria 
for Classes III and IV cont ractors (see 14.8 (2» . 
Efforts should be made to arrest the upward trend in wages to 
avoid a swing by contractors to capital-intensive methods of 
construction (see 12.2.2). 
Studies into the use of large numbers of persons on the site 
should be mounted by the BRRI, and courses on appropriate 
organisational structures run by the institute for contractors' 
foremen and supervisors at a later stage. This study should 
embrace both traditional and modern construction methods. 
Facilities for teaching traditional and rationalised traditional 
techniques should be established at the DHPR: Village Development 
Committees should be requested to nominate participants. 
14.8.2. Medium Term 
(1) Industrialised Building: Steps should be taken to incorporate the 
use of components made from local materials such as timber in the 
reinforced concrete building systems (see also 14.7.2.5). 
(2) Plant: The results of the study into the best brands of plant and 
equipment (see 14.8.1.2) should be implemented. If the Oppong-
Mansi> steel project and the foundries are operative (see 14.7.2.3), 
spare parts for key ite~ of plant could be produced under licence 
(see also 14.8.1.2). 
Plant hire facilities should be extended by the Bank for Housing 
and Construction (see 12.6.2): a depot should be established in 
each of the n~ne regions and should include maintenance and repair 
facilities, and a training unit for operators and mechanics (see 
14.6.1,3). 
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Government should institute a guarantee scheme for hire-purchase 
services to be provided for contractors by the commercial banks to 
enable them to acquire vital plant and equipment. 
(3) Component Manufacture: Attempts should be made to standardise the 
sizes of the more common building components to aid their manufacture 
on a large scale (see 12.5,1). Most of this work should be done by 
the research institutions and the professional bodies and should be 
coordinated and implemented by the Standards Board. 
(4) Labour Intensive: Studies into means of improving productivity 
should be intensified if labour-intensive methods are to remain 
econom~c. Measures could include training, the local production of 
tools or the introduction of simple mechanical aids such as block 
presses or concrete mixers (see also 14.8.1.3). 
14.8.3. Long Term 
(1) In the long term, plant should either be manufactured locally or ~n 
a sub-regional production unit, say, in cooperation with Nigeria 
(see also 14.7.3.4). 
(2) In furtherance of government's policy of promoting technological 
advancement (see 12.6.5.7), local research should be blended with 
developments in the whole range of technologies in both the 
developed and developing countries. This implies better contact 
between Ghana's construction industry and those of other countries. 
In th~ long term the restriction on Ghana's attendance at inter-
national conferences, sem~nars and workshops should be relaxed 
(see also 14.7.3.3). 
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14.9. Procedures 
14.9.1. Land 
Ideally, procedures and legislation regarding the acquisition 
and use of land should be simple, rational, effective and we11-
disseminated (see 9.3.5). Suggestions of measures to achieve these 
attributes in matters related to land in Ghana are as follows. 
14.9.1.1. Short Term 
(1) The most pressing need in the short term is for a study and 
dissemination of var10US methods of land acquisition. Since the 
formulation or implementation of a single system is not possible at 
this stage (see 9.3.5), an attempt should be made to categorise the 
various forms and the areas 1n which they apply. This could be 
entrusted to the Land Administration Research Centre at UST, and 
the information should be well-propagated amongst Ghanaians in the 
form of a booklet, talks and radio and television programmes. 
(2) The present system of obtaining title to land (see 7.6.1-4 and 
9.3.2-3) could be decentralised 1n this way: the Lands Department 
should be empowered to process all the papers for any piece of land, 
and to pass these on to the regional courts of law for registration 
and final legitimation. The centralised system of deed registration 
seems superfluous since it has not been able to stop false claims 
or reduce litigation. 
14.9.1.2. Medium Term 
< 
(1) The Survey Department should be strengthened with funds, staff and 
modern equipment to enable it to prepare a comprehensive national 
cadastral survey. Only when this is done, can claims to titles 
to land be checked (see 9.3.3). 
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(2) Legislation on land should be revised to reflect socio-cultural and 
metaphysIcal aspects of Ghanaians' estimation of the value of land 
(see 9.3.4). Guidelines for such legislation could be prepared by 
a committee composed of representatives of: the National House of 
Chiefs, Ghana Bar Association, Ghana Institution of Surveyors, 
Ministry of Lands and .Mineral Resources, Ministry of Works and 
Housing, Land Administration Research Centre, and Department of 
Land Economy, UST, and the Faculty of Law of the University of Ghana. 
It would be inappropriate in the present mixed. economy and socio-
political system to place all lands under central control. This 
would only compound the present delays, inefficiency and 
difficulties (see 9.3.3). Legislation should endeavour to reflect 
local variety, anticipate problems in each area and attempt to 
propose remedies (see 9.3.5). 
(3) Some control on the use of land could be realised if government 
increased present development fees and used the funds to provide 
serviced plots to prospective developers. 
14.9.1.3. Long Term 
Land is a vital and, so far in Ghana, non-renewable resource. It 
behoves government to ensure that it is used in the most beneficial 
manner, satisfying competing needs and striking the proper balance 
between economic and other values. 
14.9.2. Planning Permission 
Whereas the need for some m1n1mum standards in building cannot 
be disputed, standards should be formulated and applied with realism and 
pragmatism. Present regulations regarding physical development in Ghana 
are redundant because the machineries for implementing them are weak (see 
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9.4.6). It is important to have both appropriate building regulations 
and bye-laws, and the means of implementing them. 
14.9.2.1. Short Term 
(1) The Town and Country Planning Department should be strengthened 
with appropriate executive and financial powers at the district 
level (see 9.4.5). The experience of Tema Development Corporation 
as the planning, executing and municipal authority would be useful 
in this exercise. The fusion of the department with the district 
councils has, so far, been ineffective. 
(2) Efforts to reduce the delays inherent in the vetting of drawings at 
regional capitals, where development is most rapid and delays 
longest, could include the addition to the technical subcommittees 
of the Statutory PJanning Co~itees, of regional structural 
engineers of the AESC and the Regional Medical Officer of Health 
(see 9.4). 
(3) At this stage, attempts at rationalisation of the building 
regulations would only involve the national conference referred to 
above (see 14.7.1.4). 
14.9.2.2. Medium Term 
(1) The planning legislation should be revised. This would use the 
report of the Land Use Planning Committee as a basis (see 7.6.4 and 
9.4.5.1). 
(2) The Town and Country Planning Department should avail itself of the 
research results of the DHPR and the Department of Planning of UST 
(see 10.5.1). It could ameliorate its own lack of a data base for 
action by proposing research topics to these two institutions and 
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arrang1ng for support grants from government. Such topi~~ ~ould 
be assigned to individual or groups of final-year planning students 
as project tasks for their degree examinations (see 11.8.1.2). 
Thus the Town Planning Department would obtain data on density, 
spac~ ratios, local purchasing power and local preferences to enable 
it to formulate more practical schemes (see 9.4.5.5). 
14.9.2.3. Long Term 
(1) New and appropriate building regulations should be drawn up by a 
committee composed of representatives of district councils, 
professional institutions, BRRI, Faculty of Architecture (UST), 
Ministry of Works and Housing, AESC and Ministry of Health. This 
should be done on a regional basis by two teams: one dealing with 
the northern sector (Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Northern and Upper 
Regions) and the other with the southern sector (Western, Central, 
Eastern, Greater Accra and Volta Regions), each team considering 
one region at a time (see 9.4.4). 
(2) Eventually, the Town and Country Planning Department should be 
enabled to develop into a strong, independent planning and executing 
agency, and physical planning should be accorded the same prestige 
and influence as economic planning (see 9.4.5.1-5). This would 
promote environmental health and social harmony in the face, or 
absence, of economic development. 
14.9.3. Contract Documents 
Contract documents should be simple, accurate and useful .and 
reflect the nature of the local construction industry's operating 
environment as well as endeavour to promote the most beneficial 
contractual relationships among participants in the construction process 
(see 9.5). 
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14.9.3.1. Short Term 
(1) The lack of awareness among clients of the nature of the construction 
process implies that, in the short term, pre-contract periods will 
continue to be short and there is the need for greater cooperation 
amongst consultants to make the best use of the time, to reduce 
errors and inconsistencies in production information, and to adopt 
a more sympathetic attitude to contractors (see 9.5.2-6). 
(2) The Department of Building Technology (UST) should be commissioned 
to write a pamphlet on "The Organisation of the Construction Process" 
for sale at a low pr1ce to the general public, and for distribution 
to various departments and parastatals. This could explain the 
duties of the participants, outline the various stages in the 
process, identify where bottlenecks are most likely to occur and 
indicate how clients could best help to relieve the problems of 
the industry (see 11.8.1.3-4 and also 14,6.1.5). 
(3) Much could be gained by greater understanding and joint effort 
amongst the professional institutions and the contractors' 
association (see 9.5.7). The activities of the various bodies, 
such as seminars, lectures and conferences, should transcend 
institutional boundaries. The task of promoting such an outlook 
should be entrusted to the technical directors of the Ministry of 
Works (see 7.3.1.1) who are themselves senior members of their 
respective professional bodies and are often in touch with 
executives of the Contractors Association. 
14.9.3.2. Medium Term 
(1) The GIA, GhIE, GIS, the Contractors Association and the Ministry of 
Works should establish a permanent working party to formulate and 
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revise contract documents, starting with standard methods of 
measuring building and civil engineerings works, continuing with 
appropriate forms of bills of quantities and schedules of rates for 
various categories of work and, eventually, drawing up standard 
forms of conditions of contract. Government should promote the 
fQ.rmation of the party and provide a supporting grant for it (see 
9.5.2-7). 
(2) The working relationships between individual professionals and the 
different bodies will improve when the products of UST, trained in 
a cross-discipline manner (see 11.8.1.3), have become established 
in the field. 
(3) Standard specifications (see 9.5.3) are useful as a means of 
economising effort and making the most of the low executive 
capacity but they need to be revised to reflect local conditions 
and reviewed building regulations, and should incorporate greater 
flexibility in materials and methods of construction (see 14.9.2.3.1). 
14.9.3.3. Long Term 
The joint working party (see 14.9.3.1.4) needs to be a permanent 
feature though with changing membership to enable it to undertake 
occasional reviews of contract documents to keep them in step ~lith 
changing conditions in the industry and its environment. 
14.9.4. Tendering 
The public sector's tendering policy can be used to support 
the development of the best or most dedicated construction firms. 
Whereas it is not practical to legislate for private clients in terms of 
forms of tendering, it is wise to increase their knowledge of the merits 
and demerits of various forms in relation to the nature of their 
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construction needs. 
14.9.5.1. Short Term 
(1) The cost ranges of projects awarded by the different tender boards 
need to be revised. The Central Tender Board should have the final 
say only on contracts worth over ~1 million (see 9.6.1-5). 
(2) Present circumstances do not allow the use of open tendering on all 
projects as prescribed by government policy (see 9.6.7). It 1S 
more advisable to recognise this fact in order to be more able to 
outline guidelines for the various tender boards and to devise ways 
of reducing" or detecting corruption and other non-administrative 
activities. Such guidelines could include, "for example, the way 
in which contractors should be selected for shortlisting on various 
types of projects (see 9.6.8). 
(3) The extensive powers of the chairmen of the tender boards (see 
9.6.7) should be curtailed and greater weight given to the advice 
of the professional members of the board. 
14.9.4.2. Medium Term 
(1) The Department of Building Technology (UST) should be commissioned 
to write a small pamphlet on "Tendering", explaining the chara,cter-
istics, advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of 
tendering for publication by the Ghana Publishing Corporation and 
for sale to the public (see 11.8.1.3-4; 14.6.1.5; and also 
14. 9. 3. 1. 2 ) . 
(2) Tendering can be used to support the development of effective and 
efficient contractors. It is, therefore, necessary to adopt 
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imaginative and dynamic tendering policies for various types of 
construction contracts. There is a need for a basis of categorising 
projects into groups such as those that should be used as a means 
of training contractors (see 15.12.9), those on ~hich time is of 
the essence and those on which economy and/or sophistication is 
essential. Considering the variety of desirable objectives for 
construction (see 3.B and 14.2), it is inappropriate to adopt a 
wholesale approach to tendering (see 14.9.4.1.2). 
The categorisation should be annual and should be entrusted to 
regional branches of AESC and GHA and, at the national level, the 
Ministry of Works and Housing. When this is done, each contract 
should be awarded on its own merits. 
(3) It is essential that the Ministry of Works and Housing is enabled 
to playa greater role in the award of construction contracts: it 
should be g1ven greater influence on the Central Tender Board (see 
also 14.9.4.1.3). 
14.9.4.3. Long 1erm 
.(1) Eventually, tender boards for construction projects should be 
separated from the general tender boards and placed under the 
Ministry of Works and Housing. Tendering for construction 1S 
dissimilar to those for other items: it cannot be based solely on 
econom1C considerations (see 14.9.4.2.2) and is best handled by 
persons with knowledge and exper1ence in it (see also 14.9.4.1.3). 
(2) Attempts to curb the incidence of corruption 1n the award and 
administration of construction projects should be made by 
government, the contractors assocation and professional institutions. 
Clear and simple guidelines and statements of procedures at each 
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stage of the construction process would be helpful in this sphere 
(see 9.6.7; footnote 62 of Chapter 9 and 14.9.4.1.2). 
14.9.5. Contract Administration 
The system of paying contractors for the work they do was 
considered the most important aspect (see 9.7.1) of contract 
administration. To support the effective development of construction 
firms, there is the need for a simple and expeditious payment system 
which, while ensuring accountability in the public services, does not 
adversely affect contractors' operations. 
14.9,5.1. Short Term 
(1) The method of managing public finances (see 7.5.1) prescribes the 
procedure for paying contractors. Thus the latter cannot be 
altered in a hurry (see 9.7.5). There is, however, the need for 
rationalisation, an effort to reduce the bureaucratic nature and 
the length of the process. Guidelines for such an exercise should 
be formulated by a conunittee made up of representatives of AESC, 
GHA, the Contractors Assocation, and the Ministries of Finance, 
Economic Planning and Works and Housing, or from memoranda 
submitted to a sole commissioner by these bodies. 
This would involve, for example, the issuing of instructions to 
signatories on the appropriate appIlQ'ach they should adopt to their 
task or the elimination of some of the steps within the ministries. 
14.9.5.2. Medium Term 
(1) The publication of the "Organisation of the Construction Process 
(see 14.9.3.1.2) will engender amongst officials a more sympathetic 
attitude.to contractors. 
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(2) The reorganisation of government's financial administration (see 
14.9.5.1.1) should be a medium-term priority, Alternative 
arrangements for financing construction projects should be devised, 
such as: 
(a) decentralising funds for projects on a regional basis and 
making the Regional Commissioner the final signatory of all 
payment certificates; or 
(b) entrusting funds for development projects directly to the AESC, 
GHA and PWD, and making their administrative heads the final 
signatories of payment certificates. This would still maintain 
the national outlook and offer a check against collusion 
between contractors and individual of.ficia1s. The processing 
should be done through administrative channels to relieve the 
contractor of the burden of carrying the certificate from one 
stage to the next (see also 9.7.5). 
14.9.5.3. Long Term 
Attempts to curb the incidence of corruption 1n. the award and 
administration of construction projects should be made by government, 
the contractors association and professional institutions. Clear and 
simple guidelines and statements of procedures at each stage of the 
construction process would be helpful in this sphere (see 9.6.7.; 
footnote 62 of Chapter 9 and 14.9.4.1.2). 
14.10. Planning 
A plan remains academic unless it is accompanied by the political 
commitment and the economic means to implement it. Thus plans need to 
be realistic, with an assessment of the resources and the administrative 
machinery to implement them. This implies the existence of accurate 
data for planning which, in turn, calls for a nationwide information-
gathering system (see 8.7). Planning and plan implementation for the 
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construction industry in Ghana can be improved by adopting the following 
strategy. 
14.10.1. Short Term 
(1) As a major priority, government should develop a commitment to all 
its programmes. In other words, programmes should not be published 
unless government has the intention of diligently fulfilling them 
(see 8.2.3). 
(2) The Ministry of Economic Planning should be empowered, at both the 
regional and national levels, to exert a controlling influence on 
the plans and budgets of other ministries, departments and 
parastatals (see Fig. 8.1 and 8.3.1.1). Only thus can uni-sectoral 
development be avoided and some realism incorporated into plans and 
plan implementation. 
(3) Arrangements should be made for fina}year students of the Depart-
ment of Building Technology, UST, to estimate and phase out, 
annually, typical designs of public buildings (see 11.8.1.2; 
14.6.1.6 and 14.6.2.5) and other designs should be entrusted to the 
AESC. In this way, projects would be cos ted and programmed with 
some accuracy' (see 8.3.1.2). 
(4) Government should institute measures to control the award of 
contracts by its officials to prevent or reduce the incidence of 
'extra-budget' projects (see 8.3.2). Instructing contractors to 
inquire about projects is not completely fair since it involves them 
.1n some expense. 
(5) In view of the present weakness of the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) (see 8.2.6 and 8.2.6.1), the Institute of Social Scientific 
and Economic Research, Legon, and the Departments of Mathematics 
at the University of Ghana and UST should, in association with the 
CBS and the Bank of Ghana, develop methods of predicting with some 
, 
,I 
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accuracy, 
(a) government r~venue, and 
(b) the nation's receipts of foreign exchange. 
(6) Annual Estimates should be less dense in the number of projects 
(see 8.3.3) and the financial allocations for each project should 
bear a close relationship to what the average contractor would do 
in a year (see 14.10.1.3), with some allowance for variations and 
inflation. 
(7) The number of projects awarded in a year should be related, albeit 
roughly, to the availability of resources. Where materials and 
finance are short, it is best to suspend the initation of new 
projects to enable available resources to be concentrated on the 
completion of on-going ones. Half-finished projects are not 
useful in themselves and are also wasteful in terms of tied-down 
resour~es (see also 8.7). 
14.10.2. Medium Term 
(1) The data base for planning should be improved by strengthening the 
CBS and improving its relationships with the research institutions 
(see·14.10.1.5). The Bureau's effort could be augmented by the 
collection of data on construction by the district councils, and 
by small units for collecting information in the more important 
bodies such as AESC, PWD and GHA. 
(2) The CBS should publish in a separate document annual information on 
construction: such as gross output, value added, employment, 
capital formation, consumption of broad types of materials, in 
addition to its present publication on building costs. 
(3) The CBS and BRRI should be entasked with ascertaining- annually, 
national requirements and levels of production of key construction 
materials to provide the basis for resource planning for the 
I, 
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construction industry (see 8.4). 
14.10.3. }..ong Tenn 
(1) Future development plans should recogn1se construction as worthy of 
being placed under a definitive chapter, as opposed to the present 
diffused apporach (see 8.7). 
(2) Finally, the planning of the development of the industry followed 
by conscientious and persistent application, effective monitoring 
and review, will enable it to grow in step with the economy 
generally (see also 3.4). 
14.11. Government and Construction 
In v,iew of the place of construction 1n the economy (see 6.2 
and Appendix A) and the large volume of output due to the public client 
(see 6,5.2), government, having assumed responsibility for the 
development of the industry, should ensure that: 
(U general economic and admini.strative policies are not detrimental 
to the growth of the industry (see 6.5.2 and also 3.6.1-3); 
(2) all aspects of construction, necessarily controlled by different 
ministries, are effectively correlated (see Chapter 7); 
(3) the Ministry of Works and Housing is given the required prestige 
and authority to perform the above tasks (see 7.9.1); and 
(4) the organisations subordinate to the Ministry of Works (see 7.3.1.4-5 
and 7.3.2-5) are enabled to execute their tasks. 
The strategy for achieving these objectives would be as follows. 
14.11.1. Short Term 
(1) The staffing problems of the 'Ministry of Works and its subordinate 
organisations (see 7.9.3) should be attended to. One way of doing 
this would be the provision of accommodation with professional 
posts in such bodies, as was the practice in the past. Thus' 
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government would acquire some houses built by the State Housing 
Corporation, the Social Security and National Insurance Trust and 
other developers. Such houses could be in bricks or timber since 
their prospective occupants would know more about the materials 
and would be less apathetic towards them (see 10.8.7). 
(2) The subordinate organisations should be provided with adequate 
import licences to obtain spare parts and some vehicles to increase 
the mobility of their staff and hence improve their executive 
capacity (see 7.9.4). 
Intra-organisational friction (see 7.9.2) could be reduced if 
there were equal chances of advancement for all the professions. 
Government should formulate and issue instruction to this end. It 
is important ,too, that restructuring or reorganisation (see 7.3.1.5-7) 
of these bodies are kept to a minimum. 
The organisations should implrove their links with the V.<lrl.ous 
parts of the industry and follow developments ~n its environment 
to enable them perform their duties as technical arms of the 
Ministry of Works, and hence government (see 7.3.1.8). 
Government should institute measures to promote cooperation 
between AESC and GHA. These could include insistence on their 
sharing facilities such as office equipment and accommodation, 
transport and personnel, and the assignment to them of tasks 
requ~r~ng their joint effort (see 7.3.1.6). 
14.11.2. Medium Term 
(1) It is important that all ministries and departments whose operations 
have some implications for the construction industry (see 7.4-8) are 
enabled to perform satisfactorily. It is necessary, too, that their 
activities are g~ven some direction and integration. 
(2) The Ministry of Works and Housing should act as a point of focus 
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for all matters directly related to the prosperity of the industry, 
such as production and supply of materials, manpower development 
and finance for both public and private sector projects, as well as 
being placed in an advisory position in a variety of policy 
decisions such as fiscal and labour policies and the desirable rate 
of economlC development. Within the Ministry, effort should be made 
at reducing conflict and rivalries between professional personnel 
and civil servants to enable the greatest benefit to be obtained 
from the skills and experience of each cateogry (see 7.3.1.1). 
(3) The subordinate organisations have certain assets that can be 
developed to further advantage. For example: the GRA has a 
training department which has played a pioneering role in post-
qualification training of graduates, training of illiterate or 
semi-literate persons, and the organisation of training on the job 
or at district offices (using previously trained supervisors). It 
has developed modules and aids for such courses. Its advice would 
be invaluable to the UST, NVTI and MDPI (see 14.6.1-3). 
14.11.3. Long Term 
The Ministry of Works and Housing should be given greater 
prestige 1n the community of public bodies. This might necessitate 
adjustments 1n the allocations of duties of the ministries and 
departments and might be difficult, but it 1S a worthwhile long-term 
goal if the eventual development of an efficient and prosperous 
construction industry is to be a reality (see also 14.11.2.2). 
14.12. Summary 
A summary of the above measures 1S now presented 1n tabular 
form. 
, . 
MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT 
Short Term 
1. Establish a unit at 
Ministry of Works and 
Housing to coordinate 
training and education 
for construction. 
2. NVTI to organise and 
coordinate all 
apprenticeships and 
expand its schemes. 
3. Institute training for 
Medium Term 
1. Expand physical 
facilities and 
increase intake 
into courses. 
. Government to 
delegate responsib-
ility for trades 
training 
progressively to 
CEBCA. 
operators and mechanics 3. MDPI to establish a 
of plant. construction unit. 
4. 
5. 
Train instructors for 
technical institutes. 
Professional 
institutions to attend 
to technician and 
licentiate grades. 
Complete central class-
room block at UST; 
rehabilitate workshops 
and laboratories; 
incorporate part-time 
teaching; improve links 
with research bodies 
and industry. 
6. Attempt to revise 
syllabi and training 
background; intensify 
multi-disciplinary 
training and revise 
practical training 
arrangements. 
7. Study ways of making 
employment in 
construction attractive 
to higher calibre of 
p~rsons, and ways of 
retaining public-sector 
construction employees. 
GHA, AESC and PWD t 
establish institute 
for training 
technicians. 
5. Staff and students 
of UST to be used t 
relieve manpower 
short age s in 
construction 
organisations. 
• Attempt to reduce 
residential bias of 
education and 
training in Ghana. 
7. Run __ orientation 
courses for 
expatriates and 
Ghanaians trained 
abroad. 
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Lon Term 
1. If need for 
manpower 
l.ncreases, 
faculties for 
construction 
should be included 
in any envisaged 
new university. 
2. If need for 
manpower falls, 
arrangements to 
be made to lend 
. personnel to 
other english-
speaking African 
countries. 
3. Attempt to 
relieve intra-
and inter-
organisational 
frictions, 
rivalries and 
non-cooperation. 
~--------.-------------------
MATERIALS 
Short Term 
1. Ministry of Works to 
assume direct control of 
the materials developmen 
programme. 
2. Rationalise imports: pu 
emphasis on spares for 
rehabilitating existing 
factories. 
3. Establish a committee to 
take stock of available 
research findings ~n 
construction. 
4. Initiate social research 
to identify and classify 
preferences for types 
of materials. 
5. Hold national 
conference on 
indigenous materials; 
reorganise their 
promotion: goverrnent to 
give lead in their use. 
6. Increase production of 
block presses to 
exploit the potential 
of landcrete blocks as 
a national substitute 
for s andcrete. 
:. Rehabilitate and complet 
existing brick 
factories. 
8. Promote timber amongst 
the middle class. 
9. Disseminate methods and 
materials .for improving 
traditional materials 
and structures. 
10. Train persons in 
production management 
to run the factories. 
11. Standards Board to 
control the quality 
of materials to engender 
public confidence. 
Medium Term 
1. Implement the results 
of BRRI's study of 
limestone production. 
2. The aluminium 
venture at Kibi will 
relieve the burden 
of aluminium 
imports. 
3. Iron and steel plant 
at Oppong-Mansi, 
foundries and the 
second steel 
factory at Kumasi 
to be completed. 
4. Knowledge of and 
interest in 
indigenous 
materials will 
increase as a result 
of the revision of 
syllabi. 
5, Establish timber 
preservation 
depots in the 
forest areas. 
6. lracz-ease brick 
production to 
relieve shortages. 
7. Pay attention to 
energy issues; 
intensify research 
into local sources 
of cheap energy. 
8. Establish factory 
for sanitary 
products at 
Nkawkaw, Anfoega 
or Asamankese. 
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Long Term 
1. Establish a 
bitumen plant 
at Tema. 
2. Establish 
second kiln 
at Shieni ore 
deposits, if 
necessary. 
3. Government to 
promote 
regional 
ventures in 
building 
materials ~n 
West Africa. 
4. Export any 
surplus 
materials to 
neighbouring 
countries. 
TECHNOLOGY 
short Term 
1, Provide the Precast 
Concrete Panel factory 
with its vital inputs to 
enable its potential to 
be utilised. 
Rehabilitate African 
Timber and Plywood's 
factory at Samreboi. 
2. Rehabilitate and 
rationalise construction 
plant. Import spares 
to service brGken-down 
plant; initiate study 
to standardise plant 
and equipment. 
3. Encourage joint ventures 
bet\l1een Ghanaian and 
foreign firms with the 
latter providing key 
plant. 
4. Initi ate studies into 
Jabour-intensive methods 
in road and civil 
engineering construction; 
study ways of using 
labour effectively in 
construction; and 
formulate policy on 
technology for various 
sizes and types of 
projects. 
5. Attempt to restrain the 
upward trend in wages ~n 
construction to avoid 
wholesale adoption of 
capital-intensive 
methods. 
Medium Term 
1, Use components from 
local materials ~n 
system buildings. 
2. Implement result of 
study on 
standardisation of 
plant and equipment; 
produce spares for 
plant under licence 
~n the new 
foundl::ies. 
3. BHC to establish 
plant pools ~n each 
reg~on, 
incorporating 
servicing centres 
and training 
facilities. 
4. Government to 
institute guarantee 
scheme for plant 
hire-purchase by 
contractors. 
5. Intensify 
standardisation of 
more common 
building components. 
6. Mount studies into 
ways of improving 
productivity. 
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Long Term 
1. Manufacture 
plant locally 
or in a sub-
regional unit. 
2. Maintain close 
contact with 
other coun tries 
to ensure the 
development of 
technology at 
all levels. 
Short Term 
1. Mount a detailed study 
of methods of land 
acquisition. 
2. Decentralise system of 
obtaining title to land 
by making greater use 
of Lands Department. 
Planning Permission 
1. Strengthen the Town and 
Country Planning 
Department. 
2. Reduce delays 1n vetting 
drawings. 
3. Organise conference on 
indigenous materials 
for planners, adminis-
trators and 
professionals. 
Contract Documents 
1. Greater cooperation 
among professionals to 
ensure best use of short 
pre-tender periods. 
2. The Department of 
Building Technology, 
UST,to write a pamphlet 
on "The Organisation of 
the Construction Process" 
for national 
dissemination. 
3. More understanding and 
cooperation between 
professional bodies and 
the contractors 
association. 
PROCEDURES 
Medium 'Term 
1. Strengthen the 
Survey Department 
to enable it to 
perform its tasks. 
2. Revise legislation 
on land to embody 
non-material 
factors; stream-
line procedures. 
3. Control use of land 
by providing 
serviced plots from 
increased 
development fees. 
1. Revise planning 
legislation. 
2. The Town and Country 
Planning Department 
to make greater use 
of the findings of 
the research qodies, 
and UST. 
1. Establish a 
permanent joint 
working party to 
revise or formulate 
contract documents. 
2. Inter-professional 
relationships will 
improve with the 
intensification of 
multi-disciplinary 
training at UST. 
3. Revise standard 
specification to 
reflect local 
condi tions. 
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Long Term 
1. Ensure proper 
land 
management and 
balance among 
competing uses 
and values. 
1. Formulate new, 
appropriate 
building 
regulations. 
2. Enable the TO~1 
and Country 
Planning 
Department to 
grow in prestige, 
infl uence and 
executive ability. 
1. The joint working 
party to continue 
to review documents 
and procedures in 
response to changes 
in the industry and 
its environment. 
cont'd 
Short Term 
Tendering 
1. Revise cost ranges of 
projects awarded by 
various tender boards. 
2. Outline guidelines for 
the operations of 
tender boards. 
3. Reduce powers of 
chairmen of tender 
boards. 
Contract Administration 
1. Establish a committee 
to study ways of 
rationalising the 
payment system on 
public projects. 
PROCEDURES (cont'd) 
Medillm Term 
1. The Department of 
Building Technology 
of UST to write a 
pamphlet on 
'~Tendering" . 
2. Projects to be 
categorised and 
awarded on a 
pragmatic basis. 
3. Ministry of Works 
and Housing to have 
greater influence 
on the Central 
Tender Board. 
1. The publication of 
liThe Organisation 
of the Construction 
Process" will 
engender greater 
~. sympathy for 
contractors from 
officials. 
2. The report of the 
committee on the 
payment system for 
public projects 
should be 
implemented. 
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Long Term 
1. Tender B6ards for 
construction to 
be separated from 
general tender 
boards. 
2. Attempt to curb 
corruption in 
award and 
administration of 
contracts. 
1. Issue clear and 
simple guidelines 
for each stage of 
the construction 
process to reduce 
corruption in 
contract 
administration. 
PLANNING 
Short Term 
1. Government to show 
greater commitment to 
its published programmes. 
2. Ministry of Economic 
Planning to be enabled 
to correlate and control 
all "annual plans of 
various bodies. 
3. Students at the 
Department of Building 
Technology, UST, to 
phase out typical designs. 
4. Government to institute 
measures to control 
award of construction 
projects. 
5. The Institute of Social 
and Scientific Research, 
Legon, and Departments 
of Mathematics at UST 
and University of Ghana 
to help the CBS in its 
work~ 
6, Annual Estimates to be 
realistic in terms of 
contractors' performance. 
7. Number of projects 
awarded annually to be 
related to availability 
of resources. 
Medium Term 
1. Improve data base 
for statistics. 
2. The CBS to publish 
data on 
construction in a 
separate complete 
document. 
3. The CBS and BRRI to 
ascertain annual 
national needs of 
key construction 
materials. 
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Long Term 
~. Development 
plans to 
consider 
construction 1n 
a definitive 
chapter. 
~. Planning for 
construction 
to be 
accompanied by 
application, 
monitoring and 
review. 
GOVERNMENT AND CONSTRUCTION 
Short Term 
1. Attend to staffing 
problems of Ministry of 
Works and subordinate 
bodies. 
2. Provide subordinate 
bodies with import 
licences for key 
equipment, vehicles 
and spares. 
3. Maintain stability among 
the subordinate bodies 
and promote cooperation 
between them. 
4. Improve links between 
subordinate bodies and 
var10US parts of the 
industry. 
Medium Term 
1. Enable ministries 
and other bodies 
controlling aspects 
of construction to 
perform satis-
factorily. 
2. Ministry of Works 
and Housing to act 
as point of focus 
for matters directly 
related to the 
prosperity of the 
construction 
industry. 
3. Develop subordinate 
bodies to their 
full potential. 
Long Term 
1. Ministry of 
Works and 
Housing to be 
given greater 
prestige in the 
connnunity of 
organisations. 
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CHAPTER 15 
CONTRACTOR DEVELOP}lliNT 
"Management manpower is in very short supply in 
almost all developing nations ... The develop-
ment of local educational centres, the use of 
expatriates as a training mechanism, and the use 
of computers are ... possible means of 
alleviating the problem ... In addition, 
contractual arrangements, bidding practices and 
the manner of selecting contractors all require 
substantial improvements. Financing prob1ems 
arise both for working and investment capital. 
High interest rates, lack of adequate credit 
with ... suppliers, the unavailability of rental 
equipment, lengthy delays in payments, ... are 
serious issues facing local contractors in most 
developing countries. II 
Hoavenzadeh, F., Construction Industry in 
Developing Countries, in ~~orld Development, 
1978, Vol. 6, No.1 (pp. 97-116), p. 114. 
"It takes a lot of sophistication to be simple ... 
Construction is a messy business, whic:h is 
better left to the messy crafts and contractors. 
With the critical shortage of experienced 
foremen ... the best expertise available is 
still probably in the hands of the despicable 
'basses'. Turn them into salaried 'clerk of 
works', filling in a day-sheet and half a dozen 
administrative forms religiously filed in dusty 
cupboards, and you have lost one of the main 
springs of construction initiative." 
- Turin, D.A., Construction and Inefficiency 
(On the Construction Industry of Sri Lanka), 
mimeo, University College London, p. 9. 
15.1. Introduction 
Improving the competence and effectiveness of contractors in 
Ghana should be the first priority of any programme to improve the 
construction industry for the following reasons: 
(1) although proposals are made for its improvement, contractors I 
operating environment will not change for the better in the 
immediate future. Thus it 1S neccesary to develop contractors who 
can operate in such difficult conditions; 
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(2) developing sound construction firms is a long process fraught with 
obstacles and mistakes, and the earlier a start was made, the 
better, especially since; 
(3) a strong base for an indigenous contracting sector needs to be 
developed not only to reduce the drain on foreign reserves caused 
by the use of expatriate firms, but also to prepare for the eventual 
departure of the foreign firms when better prospects emerge ~n their 
home country or elsewhere, and/or when demand for the sort of 
projects for. which their skills are specially suited (see Chapter 
4) falls, or when local conditions such as the imposition of 
exchange controls or limits on expatriate personnel, make it 
difficult for them to operate; 
(4) the need for mobility and flexibility in the contracting sector ~s 
greatest and can compensate for lack of success of the proposals 
for other sectors of the industry: contractor development is the 
best bulwark of any programme for improving the industry generally 
(see 14.2); and 
(5) finally, the resources needed to support any programme of contractor 
development can be obtained locally, and the institutional infra-
structure exists in Ghana. (See 13.7.2 and 13.8). 
15.2. Nature of Demand and Contractors' Response 
Construction projects are usually buildings or works of a 
particular size, using types of materials and/or techniques, and at a 
location, all three attributes predetermined by the client and his 
consultants (see also 3.6.4-6). Moreover. the time for the execution of 
the contract, and an indication of a range of its cost, are fixed. 
In certain instances, subcontractors and suppliers of some 
materials are nominated, leaving the contractor little room for 
manoeuvre and entrepreneurial judgement. 
Faced with this demand matrix, contractors specialise by type of 
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work, by geographical location, or by size of project. They also place 
a limit on the number of projects they undertake at a time (see also 
3.6.5). In Ghana, some of these decisions, especially size of project, 
are made for the contractor by the registration authorities (see 13.3). 
At one extreme, the larger firms have the resources to undertake 
any size of project, although they may specialise in buildings or ~n 
civil engineering, in any part of the country and involving any 
technology, limited only by the amount of work they already have ~n 
hand and their corporate aims. At the other end of the spectrum, some 
firms can only operate in a small geographical area on a small range of 
yrojects, determined by cost and type of technology (see 13.6.1). 
Thus there is a matrix of firms of vary~ng ability and mobility, 
determined not only by their resources but also by their corporate 
objectives. The position in which any firm finds itself in this matrix 
is usually determined by economic as well as historical factors (see 
13.3.1). 
15.3. Strategy 
The present situation ~n Ghana is that of a dearth of firms at 
the large end of the scale and a proliferation of smaller ones (see 
13.4). The strategy is to permit and support the development of 
dedicated and most promising firms, and thereby increase the number of 
larger firms. 
Thus a dynamic process is envisaged which would identify and 
provide for the special needs of the ma~n categories of firms. This 
strategy can best be formulated by studying, in some detail, the 
structure of a typical construction establishment. 
·15.4. The Enterprise 
Although it ~s possible to consider a business organisation 1n a 
variety of ways, depending upon the purpose of the analysis, our 
interests are best served here by using the systems approach. Each 
enterprise may be considered as consisting of two basic parts: the 
formal and informal systems. The formal system is more obvious, 
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composed of the persons in the organisation and depicted in organisational 
charts. The informal system arises as a result of the relationships 
between individuals and groups in the organisation. In recent times, 
the nature of business and other organisations have been understood to 
be very complex. 
15.4.1. Formal System. 
The formal part of a business organisation would be composed of: 
(a) A sensor s~bsystem to measure changes within the organisation and 
to provide an interface with the environment (market intelligence, 
new materials or methods, i~inent legislation). 
(b) An information processing subsystem, for example, accounting or 
data process~ng (estimating and cost accounting). 
(c) "A decision-making subsystem which receives inforfilation and emits 
planning messages (contractor's decisions ego adjudication). 
(d) A processing subsystem which uses information, energy and materials 
to accomplish certain tasks (site activities). 
(e) A control component which ensures that processing ~s in accordance 
with planning (cost control). 
(f) A memory or information storage subsystem (records, manuals), 
computer programmes or human experience (past priced bills of 
quantities; experience which builds up prestige and the ability to 
attract contracts and loans)~ 
The decision-making subsystem ~s considered ~n detail below for 
reasons stated ~n 15.4.5. 
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15.4.2. Informal System 
In addition to, and tending to modify this formal system, are 
a number of other systems called "overlays" by Pfiffner and ShenlOod 
(1960)2. TIluS the informal part of the organisation is complex and 
variable. If the business set-up is to operate successfully then there 
is a need for complete integration of its parts. TIle various components 
must be so closely related that the system becomes an operating, 
integrating whole. Angya1 (1941) suggests that the system must be seen, 
" ..• not as interacting parts, not as constituents which have independent 
existence, but as aspects of a single reality which can be separated only 
by abstraction,,3 TIle system should also be flexible so that subsystems 
may be created, expanded or dissolved as the need arises. 
15.4.3. TIle Eavironment 
The business system operates in, and 1S itself, a subsystem of a 
a number of successively larger systems: the industry, the region, the 
nation or society as a whole. It operates in an environment in which 
exist its opportunities as well as obstacles. The enterprise is, there-
fore, a dynamic organ1sm in constant interaction with its environment 
and as a result growing smaller or bigger. 
The environment is constantly changing and exerts var10US influences 
on the enterprise, which may be beneficial or harmful. From this uncertain 
environment the enterprise obtains its resources, draws ideas, sells its 
products and meets competition. .The organisation can be successful only 
if it can take advantage of or create beneficial factors, and finds ways 
of counteracting the harmful ones. 
15,4.4. The Construction Firm's Environment 
Although the factors which might promote or frustrate the 
activities of the enterprise differ with the type of activity and its 
location, they fall under five main headings: Political, Economic, 
I 
, 
I 
• ! 
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Social, Technological and Environmenta14 . 
A construction firm in a developing country may be influenced by 
the following factors: 
,,(a) Economic: state of markets; availability of funds for mortgages and 
working capital; costs; availabili.ty of materials; and foreign 
exchange; 
(b) Political: policies on employment, ownership, land, taxation and 
industry; licensing; and international agreements. 
(c) Social: attitudes of the populace to work; spending habits; and 
attitudes to types of materials; 
(d) Technological: methods of construction; rate of development of 
materials and components; availability of plant and equipment; and 
(e) Environmental: laws on pollution; pressure groups; regulations on 
the 'exploitation and use of materials. (See also 3.6-7). 
These external factors are i~terr~bed and interacting. For 
example, economic factors may generate political decisions affecting the 
enterprise, and environmental considerations may affect the choice of 
technology. The enterprise can also exert some influence on the environ-
ment in the above fields, depending especially on its size and area of 
operation. For example, a large construction firm building a dam in a 
rural area not only offers direct paid employment for local residents, 
but also gives rise to several ventures indirectly (trading, catering, 
etc) and the project it undertakes alters the social and economic 
conditions 1n the locality when completed (see 3.3)~ 
The enterprise competes with others for resources and customers 
aRd needs to operate efficiently by exploiting any advantages it has. 
Finally, and especially for the construction firm, since it is inevitable 
that the firm ,~ill coonerate with others (see 3.6.6), it must have the 
means for maintaining viable coalitions with them. 
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15.4.5. The Decision-Haking Subsystem 
The decision-making subsystem 1n the enterprise is made up of 
the individual or team performing the entrepreneurial function. Although 
the success of the business as a whole depends upon the smooth integration 
of the var10US subsystems,it is clear that the quality of the decision-
making clement makes most of the difference between success and failure. 
The ability of the entrepreneurial team to make use of or create 
beneficial factors in the environment and overcome harmful ones 1S 
essential. Thus, having correctly discovered or predicted environmental 
factors, arid processed information on them, there is the need for 
judgement and technical ability if the right decisions are to be taken. 
It is necessary, therefore, to consider the entrepreneur in greater 
detail. 
15.4.6. Clarification 
Ghana has a mixed economy (see 6.3) and there are some direct-
labour organisations and a state-owned construction firm (SCC) in 
addition to private contractors (see Chapter 13). The term entrepreneur 
is used to refer to persons or teams in decision-making positions 1n 
these enterprises:· directors or managers of the direct-labour 
organisations, the management team of SCC, 8.nd the proprietors of the 
private cons~ruction firms. 
15.5. The Entrepreneur 
The entrepreneur 1S identified as the person who performs the 
function of leadership in the business organisation: he owns and/or 
controls capital, organises the factors of production and, in most 
contexts, has a capacity for innovationS The head of a construction 
firm is, therefore, to all intents and purposes an entrepreneur and, in 
order to understand the lack of or the embryonic nature of indigenous 
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construction firms in Ghana, despite seemingly adequate attempts by 
government to encourage their emergence and growth (see 13.7), an 
overview of entrepreneurial theory is relevant. 
15.6. Contributions to Entrepreneurial Theory 
. . 6 
Many wr1ters agree that a study of the role of the business 
leader started with the works of Cantillon (1755) and Say (1821). The 
early works were, however, confined to the definition of the term 
'entrepreneur' and of the role of entrepreneurs in economic systems. 
Questions as to whether there were any forces which tended to recruit 
certain individuals or groups into entrepreneurship, whether entrep-
reneurs required any psychological attributes and whether there were any 
special factors which determined how well or badly an entrepreneur 
performed, began to be considered only in this century. 
15.6.1. The Protestant Ethic 
7 Weber (1904) traced "the spirit of capitalism" (the body of 
ideas and habits which favours the pursuit of economic gain) to the 
teachings of the Calvinist movement in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
which called on men to devote all their strengths to their secular 
activities lito the greater glory of God", to live frugally and earn 
their salvation through good works. 
This theory has been criticised: some studies8 have shown that 
capitalism is much older than the Reformation; and that many of the 
factors which led to the advent of capitalism were adopted by the 
Europeans from several lands, such as financial science and systematic 
book-keeping from the Moslem Arabs and Syrians, centuries earlier. 
9 Papanek (1962) found that, in Pakistan, large numbers of Hoslems turned 
to innovative entrepreneurship for achievement and profit, although 
the Islamic faith did not particularly encourage its adherents to pursue 
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such activities. Again, 1n the Philippines several Catholics turned to 
10 
entrepreneurial activity when conditions were favourable . 
Although Weber's analysis of some of the factors that spawned 
the rise of entrepreneurship in the 18th century might have been correct, 
today's conditions are much different and the attributes necessary for 
successful entrepreneurship might not be the same. However, the 
Protestant teaching of the importance of frugality and its development 
of people with investment rather than consumption orientations is of 
particular interest in our study of entrepreneurship in the developing 
countries (see 13.8.3). 
15.6.2. Innovation 
Schumpeter (949)11 referred to entrepreneurship as "innovation", 
suggesting that entrepreneurial activity stemmed from the profit motive 
and that economic development resulted fr.om a multiplicity of pntrepren-
eurial acts in which factors of production were applied to new 
activities. Schumpeter emphasised the importance of bank credit and the 
need to reinvest profits in entrepreneurial development. The unique 
role that Schumpeter attributed to the individual entrepreneur is 
questionable, especially S1nce he considered entrepreneurship to be 
synonymous with innovation. Again, the profit motive is now recognised 
as only one of a variety of factors which engender the emergence of 
business organisations. 
15.6.3. Dynamism 
12 . Penrose's (1959) theory on the growth of the firm advocated 
the study of certain "intra-firm determinants" and the relationship of 
the firm with its environmen~ rather than the search for and study of 
individual entrepreneurs. It argued that Tn a firm it was an organised 
association of persons rather than individuals who played the entrcpren-
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eurial role. 
The ability of a firm to grow depended on "all the productive 
possibilities its entrepreneurs can see and take advantage of", and such 
productive opportunity is a function of the quality of entrepreneurial 
services in the firm - 'enterprise', 'versat.ility', 'fund-raising 
13 ingenuity', 'ambition', and 'judgement' of the management team 
The management team of a construction firm needs another important 
attribute: 'contract-winning ability'. In Ghana this might entail not 
only having a good reputation and a competent estimating unit, but also 
• knowing the right people in the right positions at the right time (see 
9.6.7). 
The theory is useful ~n its consideration of the firm in a 
dynamic manner but it lacks internal consistency: it starts by reducing 
the entrepreneurial role to the actions of a "single rational organism", 
but the "entrepreneurial services" it refers to are, essentially, personal 
attributes of the management team. Again,the value of the theory for 
our purpose is reduced by its reliance on the assumption that " ... -
there is not an effective limit to the amount of any kind of productive 
resources (capital, labour or management) that the firm can obtain at 
. ,,14 .. d 1 . . h . f h any pr~ce ,s~nce ~n many eve op~ng countr~es t e scarc~ty 0 t ese 
resources is an ever-present phenomenon and hence their availability 
cannot be assumed as given. 
15.6.4. Studies in Developing Countries 
In their study of entrepreneurship ~n the emergent nations both 
Hirschman (1958) 15 and Singer (1964)16 identified a gap betweer. "s.ctual" 
and potential levels of investment. According to Hirschman, this gap 
was due almost wholly to the scarcity of business informaticn. Singer 
attributed it to lithe human, technological and data infrastructure" of 
the developing economy. Together, they introduced into the analysis of 
• 
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the supply and performance of entrepreneurs the availability of 
information, the supply of personnel with requisite technical 
qualifications and the familiarity of the general population with the 
possibilities of modern science and technology. Neither author 
explained why some foreign firms succeeded in the unfavourable 
environment, whereas locally-owned firms did not even emerge in Some 
instances, 
Considering the construction industry in particular, the 
inadequacy of information on it and the uncertainty surrounding 
activities in it are not confined to the emergent countries but are 
features of the industry that are evident in the advanced countries 
also (see 3.6.8 and 3.7). Singer's insistence on the necessity of the 
general population to be familiar with science and technole'bY is 
invalidated by the sudden increase ~n entrepreneurial activity in Japan 
17 
after 1868, in Pakistan after 1947 or the Philippines after 1946 . 
(See also 1.4.5). 
After several empirical studies in Nigeria, Schatz (1964, 1965)18 
argued (like Singer) that the major obstacle to the expansion of 
private indigenous entrepreneurship in Nigeria was neither capital 
shortage nor deficiency in lrentrepreneuria1 capacityll but I:more general 
factors prevailing in the country as a whole ll ; problems in securiu& in 
time the proper equipment, problerr.s (If human resources, of infrastructure, 
of supplies and of adequate markets. Again, the same factors did not 
hinder the establishment or expans~on of locally-based expatriate firms. 
schatz's claim that the quality of entrepreneurial services available 
to the firm played no part in the success of its activities (in 
contradiction to Penrose - see 15.6.3) is questionable . 
19 Ironically, after another empirical study, Kilby (1966) concluded 
that the problems met ~n trying to develop most modern medium-scale 
firms in Nigeria were ultimately related to "deficient entrepreneurial 
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act1v1t1es ; and Harris (1967)21 found that the ma1n impediments to 
the development of the firms he studied were poor standards of financial 
management and production control, and incompetent organisation. 
15.6.5. Contributions by Sociologists 
The foregoing mainly evaluates the contribution of economists to 
entrepreneurial theory. Sociologists, who see the process of development 
as involving the transformation of man and the social environment within 
which he performs his economic activity, consider the economic theories 
of entrepreneurship as inadequate. To them, entrepreneurial development 
is a function of the nature of the society and its cultural characteristics. 
Parsons (1951)22 theorised that a number of factors, among them 
certain value-orientations, universalism, achievement, functional 
specifity, and effective neutrality, were "prerequisites" for the 
emergence of effective entrepreneurs in the developing countries. This 
theory and several like it called for appropriate changes in value-
orientations in the developing countries' societies. Thus it fails to 
explain the rapid emergence of entrepreneurs in Meiji Japan and post-
independence Pakistan and the Philippines. (See 1.4.6 and 15.6.4). 
Papanek (1962) writes) " .. it is difficult to interpret ~"hat 
happened in Pakistan in terms of a slow fundamental change in motivation, 
or 1n ideology, or in custom, which then caused an alteration in econom1C 
behaviour,,23. Experience has shown that it is not necessary for a 
country's people to develop Hestern attitudes before their societies can 
develop (see also 1.4.6). It is pertinent to outline briefly the case of 
. .. J 24 . . h 1 1 f h . Me1J1 apan ,S1nce 1t as severa essons or t e poor countr1es. 
The Meiji government formulated and popularised a progressive 
ideology, sought knowledge from allover the world and used the 
educational system to provide highly trained personnel and to increase 
the status of the occupations needed for a modern economy. It also 
subsidised private industry by acting as its chief customer, and 
engaged itself directly in some economic activities. Thus, Drucker 
(1970) writes: 
"It is still almost axiomatic ... that social and 
economic development requires the abandonment of 
'nqn-scientific', ie traditional cultural beliefs, 
values and habits ... That ... the assumption is 
little but Hestern narrowness and cultural ego-
centricity, one look at the development of Japan 
would have shown"25 
15.6.6. Contributions by Psychologists 
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Some psychologists have also studied the factors which determine 
the ability of societies to supply their o\m entrepreneurs and the 
likelihood of such entrepreneurs to succeed. (See also 1.4.5) Their 
approach is summarised by HcClelland (1966) thus: 
"Is the need to achieve (or the absence of it) an 
accident, is it hereditary, or is it the result of 
the environment? Is it a single, iso1atable human 
motive, or a combination of motives ... Most 
important of all, is there Some technique that could 
give this will to people, even whole societies who do not 
not' nmV' have it?"26 
According to McClelland (1961), entrepreneurs or persons with high 
nkhievement were developed by a particular configuration of parental 
values and child-rearing practices, The sources of this high 
nAchievement were: '~arly mastery training ... provided it does not 
reflect restrictiveness, authoritarianism, 27 or rejection by parents" , 
the imposition of "reasonably high standards of excellence on the child 
at a time that he can achieve them together with a willingness to let 
him attain them without interference, overprotection and indulgence,,28. 
McClelland asserted that 
"Whenever people begin to think often in n,...<\chievement 
terms, things beg~n to move ... [the] nation does 
better economically ... careful quantitative studies 
have shown this to be true in ancient Greece, in 
Spain in the middle ages, in England from 1400-1800, 
as well as among contemporary nations ... ,,29 
hcCle1land has devised courses aimed at introducing his 'nAchievement 
476 
virus' into people lacking it, and claims considerable success for its 
use ~n the United States, India and Mexico30 
• 
Hagen's (1962) hypothesis was that traditional society was 
"custom-bound, hierarchical, ascriptive and unproductive", with child-
rearing practices that tend to produce "authoritarian" rather than 
"innovational,,3l personalities. The entrepreneur was produced in a 
historical sequence which started by an elite group in the society 
suffering a "withdrawal of status respect" reacting first by anger and 
anxiety and its later generations by "normlessness" and "retreatism", 
and eventually by "creativity,,32 Hagen, therefore, agreed with 
McClelland that the fundamental factors which caused the emergence and 
performance of entrepreneurs were psychological. 
Although the psychological approach may correctly outline ways 1D 
which persons positively disposed to the entrepreneurial role may be 
produced, it fails to show how people may actually enter or be ~ade to 
enter it instead of any of the other competing roles. It is also 
inadequate in explaining how a business may succeed or fail. By 
ignoring economic factors such as availability of capital, skilled labour, 
raw materials and machinery, the market and distributory channels, its 
value ~s minimal since these factors vary from place to place and 
different types of skills are required for the successful organisation 
of the factors of production in any gi.ven context. For example, in some 
developing countries where corruption is rife, Akeredolu-Ale (1975) 
rightly points out that " ... 
" 
if the 'inner standards of excellence' by which 
high nAchievement persons are ruled are what one would 
expect them to have ... a man with high nAchievement 
would be scrupulous, and would not go far in business 
at all •. , Apparently success in such a situation might 
require a different set of 'needs' .. ' a man could fail 
in business, precisely because he has high nAchievement.,,33 
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15.6.7. ~iteracy 
Some students of econom~c history attribute the rise of 
capitalism during the Reformation to the Protestant emphasis on Bib1e-
reading literacy rather than the ethic for hard work as suggested by 
Weber (see 15.6.1). Similarly, the talent for entrepreneurship among 
Jews, Japanese and Chinese is sometimes traced to the possession by these 
34 people of sacred texts . Several writers note a rough correlation 
, 
between high per capita national income and high per capita public 
expenditure on education, although it is not clear whether nations spend 
more on education as their income increases, or that education is a 
. 1 f h' . l' 35 v~ta actor t at ~ncreases nat~ona ~ncome . For example, Kendrick 
36 (1951) found that 46 per cent of the increase in total output in".the 
United States between 1889 and 1957 may be attributed to what he 
referred to as "total factor productivity", of which educational 
advances are the major part, although it includes many other unspecified 
inputs such as increase in the quality of capital assets, improvement in 
national health, organisational changes, and so on. Anderson (1963)37 
studied hist6rica1 data on a sizeable number of countries and concluded 
that any country, if it ~s to stand at the threshold of industrial 
development, must teach about 40 per cent of its adults to read and 
write. (See also 1.4.7). 
Whereas there are many virtues to be derived by a nation from a 
largely literate populace, literacy as such is not as important as the 
acquisition of the right type of education and training. Furthermore, 
although a minimum level of formal education might be necessary for 
successful operation in modern business, whether an educated person 
actually becomes an ent repreneur, and succeeds as one, depends on the 
type of education he had, the nature of the operating environment and 
the availability to him of the means of acquiring factors of production. 
(See also 11,12.4). 
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Studies on the role of education 1n entrepreneurial development 
are not unan1mous in their conclusions. Whereas Carroll (1965)38 found 
the level of education of Filipino entrepreneurs to be higher than that 
of the majority of their contemporaries, Papanek (1962)39 found no such 
difference between these two categories of persons in Pakistan. Finally, 
since organisational skills vital to businessmen are developed in the 
work situation, practical experience may compensate for lower levels 
of formal education. 
15.6.8. Entrepreneurial Theory and Ghana's Experience 
The above discussion shows that entrepreneurial development is 
a complex issue calling for a multi-disciplinary approach from 
historians; economists, sociologists and psychologists. What exists, 
however, is a number of theories, each of which explains a few aspects 
of the matter, and some of which are. not internally consistent. 
Entrepreneurial activities are pursued in Ghana in several fields 
but, invariably, the scale of operations are small. Those who tried to 
establish large ventures faced problems in the beginning: 
"There had been, true enough, a long history of 
capitalist venture by West Coast Africans. As early 
as 1880 Africanus Horton and others in the Gold Coast 
had tried - and failed - to float a syndicate to 
mine gold.,,40 
At independence it became a question of providing finance for prospective 
businessmen, and not sufficient of the latter could be found4l • 
Government, thus, performed most new etrepreneurial functions itself 
through public corporations (see 6.4.1-5). Providing finance to 
entrepreneurs proved wasteful (see 13.7.2.1.5). The issue now is that 
of providing finance,some training, support services and opportunities 
of obtaining exper1ence to entrepreneurs. That is~ improving the 
quality of the entrepreneur, the firm and its environment (see 15.4.1-5). 
The issue of developing efficient and effective contracting 
organisations in Ghana is nm., discussed. 
• i 
I 
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15.7. Types of Construction Organisations 
Contracting organisations operating 1n Ghana may be classified 
according to the form of ownership. There are four main groups: 
(a) public-owned firms 
(b) direct-labour organisations 
(c) cooperatives, and 
(d) capitalist firms. 
Programmes for improving contracting capacity need to utilise 
the special strengths and benefits of each category and identify areas 
in which emphasis may best be placed. Thus it is relevant to consider 
the prospects of bringing about progress in each category in order to 
find out one or more on which the strategy for achieving the more 
effective and efficient contracting sector can be based. 
15.8. Nationalisation 
The public-owned, commercial SCC exists with direct labour public 
sector organisations such as the State Housing Corporation and P\'ID. In 
view of the problems that confront construction concerns in Ghana (see 
13,,5. 3~4) it might be argued that government should take over all 
construction activity, or at least, those areas in which needs are most 
acute such as in thelarge-firm class (se~ 15.3). This could take the 
form of creating one or more additional state-owned construction 
corporation(s), or the establishment of district or regional direct 
labour or commercial construction units nunder the Regional Development 
Corporations or District Councils, or by expanding existing direct-
labour organisations such as the P~ro, the GHA and the Housing 
Corporation. 
This approach would not be successful in Ghana because: 
(1) unless a major change in economic policy (ie total socialisation) 
occurs, or except the whole construction industry is effectively 
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nationalised, it would be inappropriate to single out the 
contracting sector for nationalisation (see also 9.3.3); 
(2) a construction firm's efficiency is determined by the quality of 
its staff and their collective experience in the organisation. 
Unless such persons are willing to work for the state .the exercise 
would be counterproductive; the inability of public organisations 
to obtain sufficient qualified staff makes this even more 
pertinent (see Chapter 7, especially Fig. 7.2); 
(3) the bitter experiences of public-owned bodies in Ghana: governmental 
interference, legal constraints, financial difficulties and 
inefficiency bode ill for total nationalisation of construction, 
f .. bl . 42 ( 7 5 1 d or even expans~on 0 ex~st~ng pu ~c concerns see.. an. 
13.7.1.1.2); and 
(4) foreign firms have a role to play ~n the high technology (inter-
national) end of the construction spectrum, not only in the sense 
that they offer competition to the few large firms, but also 
because they introduce modern techniques in the industry and thus 
help it to progress. Ghana's industry has not yet developed the 
facilities for sustained growth and increasing adaptability (see 
3.8; 14,2 and 15.1(4», 
Thus, although proposals will be made for the improvement of the 
SCC and the direct-labour organisations (see 15.13), the nationalisation 
of the contracting sector is not considered the best answer to the 
question of how contractor capacity in Ghana can be increased. 
15.9. Cooperatives 
A number of formally-organised cooperative firms exist ~n Ghana's 
construction industry (see 7.8.3.3). These are mainly in the 
conventional-medium or small category (see 4.4,2). In the same category, 
and sometimes working on .substantia1 projects,is a large number of 
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informal, transient labour-only subcontracting teams, assembled by 
largely semi-literate 'contractors' for particular projects and 
disbanded when the work is finished. These 'contractors' are experienced 
tradesmen. They do most of the work in the private sector. 
They benefit from their anonymity, informality and freedom from 
the procedural constraints of the modern sector of the industry. Few 
have tried to register as contractors with the public agencies (see 
13.3), despite the obviously better prospects in that area (see 6.5.2). 
It is unlikely that many more would be prepared to make such a move. 
Attempting to identify and organise them formally might be more 
destructive than otherwise. So would be any effort to teach them any 
management techniques. (See 11.12.4 and 13.5.4). It is essential, 
however, that this category of contractor is recognised, and those 
wishmg to be formally registered given every encouragement and 
assistance. These are particularly dedicated person on which the future 
development 6f the contracting sector could be based, but the right 
policy at the moment is that of non-interference. 
There is also the possibility of organising formally-trained 
persons into cooperatives. (See also 11.4.2). Ghana's first civilian 
government adopted such an approach. A Minister observed that if Ghana 
was to make any peadway 
" •.• it can only be through cooperative and similar 
bodies, since experience ha·s shown that private 
Ghanaian businessmen cannot or will not work on a 
sufficient scale to compete with overseas firms.,,43 
A1thuugh certain producers' cooperatives were formed allover the 
country, builders did not formally organise themselves in this way to 
any large extent. 
In the Ghanaian setting, where the contractor needs much lobbying 
to obtain jobs, to acquire materials and ensure that payments due to 
him for his work are expedited (see 9.6.7; 9.7.3 and 10.7.1), it 1S 
necessary for every contracting organisation to have a person or group 
to perform these activities. Thus each cooperative would have to be 
provided with a management team, Experience shows that independent 
managers of such units (ie non-members) in Ghana have defraud~d them. 
It is best, therefore, to have members performing these duties. Thus 
forming cooperatives is likely to be as long and difficult as 
encouraging individual contracting firms. 
The best way in which cooperatives can be used is on serial 
projects on which materials are provided for them and payments are made 
directly and expeditiously, as the one that is being utilised in the 
cooperative housing scheme at Tema. Thus they could be employed on some 
of the schemes of the State Housing Corporation. Whereas it is possible 
to suggest that the Department of Cooperatives· (see 7.8.3.3) take some 
of the cooperatives under its wing, it is true that it has little 
expertise in contracting, and its limited executive capacity would in 
any case mean that few firms can be supported in this way. 
A few more can obtain some technical assistance at the Technology 
Consultancy Centre (see 11.8.1.4) and the BP~(see 10.5.1), but these 
will be limited to units in the municipality of Kumasi. Thus, although 
cooperatives hold some potential, their effective development is not 
without its problems and few of them can be assisted in a way that will 
eventually make them self-sufficient. It is pertinent that these are 
identified and encouraged in the ways outlined above and later (see 
15.13), but the strategy for developing contractors should concentrate 
on other areas. 
15.10. The Capitalist Firm 
Ghana has a very large number of capitalist construction firms 
of a variety of sizes and levels of efficiency (see 13.4.). To achieve 
the aim of increasing the number of large firms and that of small 
dedicated firms (see 15.3), several approaches are possible and these 
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are usually suggested as: mergers (see 5.4.3.3), cooperation between 
foreign and local firms (see 5.4.4.2), the provision of capital (see 
5.4.3.1),and/or training for small contractors (see 5.4.3.4). 
Several reasons have been advanced as contributing to the oon-
popularity of mergers in Ghana (see 13.6.4). These rule out that 
option. 
Cooperation between foreign and local firms is useful but 
possible only if it is made obligatory in a contract and if joint 
partnerships are encouraged, as is being done in Ghana (see 13.4.1), 
rather than limiting it to particular projects. The difficulty lies 
in ensuring that local counterparts are genuine contractors rather than 
profit-seeking dormant partners lending their namesto the expatriate 
firm for material r~wards. Furthermore, since Ghana's economic 
situation (see 6.4.6) will rule out widespread involvement of foreign 
firms, few Ghanaian firms will bE''1efit from this scheme. (See also 
5.4.4.5(b) and 14,8,1.2). 
Concerning the provision of finance to contractors, the 
experience of the BRC and other Banks in Ghana shm., that not much can 
be gained from merely lending contractors money (see 13.7.2.1-2). 
Organising training for small contractors is not simple since most of . 
them control almost all aspects of their firms' operations (see 13.6.3) 
and cannot leave them for long periods at a time. (See 13.9.5). 
Moreover, most contractors in Ghana do not see the need for training. 
(See 11.12.4). Thus, comprehensive and imaginative programmes are needed 
for small contractors. Before discussing such a scheme for Ghana, 
examples of similar attempts in other African countries are briefly 
considered. (See also 5.4.4.1). 
15.11. Examples of Contractor Development Programmes 
In an attempt to promote the emergence and growth of indigenous 
I 
! 
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contractors some governments ~n Africa have established schemes, two 
of which are now discussed. 
15.11.1. The National Construction Corporation (NCC) of Kenya 
Having been made aware of the inability of African firms to 
compete effectively with their Asian and expatriate counterparts, the 
Kenyan government adopted measures to redress the situation. These 
started with tender preferences and reservation of certain contracts 
only to African contractors, and culminated in 1968 in the formation of 
the National Construction Corporation (NCC)44, which is basically: 
(a) a bank 
(b) a training centre, and 
(c) a construction unit providing support serv~ces. 
The essential concept of the programme of the NCC is the 
provision and management of all the contractor's key resources to 
enable him to acquire experience on projects awarded him. 
The governments of Kenya and Norway contributed 1 million 
shillings each to a revolving fund which is used to prefinance 
contractors' projects, There are also hire-purchase arrangements to 
help contractors to acquire small and medium equipment, and a plant 
pool from which they can hire essential heavy plant and equipment; 
The Ministry of Works reserves a quota of its jobs each year 
to the NCC for award to its contractors, The Corporation maintains an 
office in each prov~nce and its staff run courses such as in estimating, 
tendering, project planning and also visit the sites of trainee 
contractors, The Kenyan African Contractors Association is actively 
involved in NCC, 
15.11,1.1, Policy 
After initial teething problems and major setbacks the NCeis 
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present policy includes: 
(a) selecting its trainee contractors on ob)ective criteria and limiting 
the number of trainees and the jobs they have at any time in order 
to provide an acceptable level of assistance to each: it maintains 
a ratio of one instructor to between 5 and 7 projects to enable 
each job to be visited once a week; 
(b) keeping trainee contractors continually employed: adopting a 
training rather than production approach to projects under the 
programme. Clients had to be prepared to accept a level of 
substandard or delayed work; 
(c) accepting that there will be some financial losses and setting a 
limit to such losses; instituting sound accounting machineries 
and, in general, adopting realistic and flexible operating 
procedures; 
(d) finally, categorising contractors into groups which indicate the 
special services they need, and deciding on the length of the 
training period and the type of assistance to be provided at 
each stage. 
15.11,1.2. Appraisal 
The Nee started with a budget of 170,000 shillings (7.5 
shillings = US$l.OO) and a staff of 15. By 1979 it was spending over 
5 million shillings per annum, employing 175 persons and with 395 
contractors on its register, some contractors having-already graduated 
from being under its umbrella. 
15.11.1.3. Special Features 
The Nee's scheme was initially possible because of and 
continues to benefit from: 
(1) a government committed to the development of local entrepreneurship 
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and willing to sacrifice quality and speed of construction as well 
as some ftnancial costs to achieve it; 
(2) Norwegian financial and technical assistance, Differences between 
the organisation of the Kenyan (similar to the British) and 
Norwegian construction industries, however, made it necessary for 
orientation courses to be organised for the expatriate staff; 
(3) the ability and willingness to recognise errors and review 
procedures and thus the adoption of a pragmatic, albeit persistent, 
programme; and 
(4) the placing of the NCC under the wing of a high government body -
the Xinistry of Works- conversant with construction. 
15.11.2. The Small Enterprises Development Company (SEDCO) of 
Swaziland 
The Small Enterprises Development Company45 is a subsidiary of 
the National Industrial Development Corporation (NIDCS), which is under 
the Ministry of Industries, Mines and Tourism. SEDCO's Building Section 
has been assisting contractors since 1972 and its present activities 
i~corporate the provision of: 
(a) training and advice; 
(b) finance and its management; and 
(c) support for contractors in their .bidding. 
15.11.2,1. Operations 
SEDCO has only one branch ~n the capital Mbabane. Its financial 
assistance to contractors takes the form of advances to cover invoices 
for materials and other supplies, monthly wages, including an agreed 
salary for the proprietor, and any special requirements. Interim 
payments on the projects are also made directly to SEDCO. This process 
enables contractors' finances to be managed for them and helps them to 
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to learn book- and record-keeping. Kenya's NCC (see 15.11.1) uses 
essentially the same procedure. 
SEDCO's contractors are instructed in estimating, accounting and 
project management at the initial stages of their selection, and at 
occasional courses. The staff visit construction sites to provide 
technical and managerial advice to the contractors. 
As a matter of policy, SEDCO encourages contractors to look for 
jobs in both the public and private sectors. It checks all tenders 
submitted by its contractors, and on government projects, this has led 
to a waiver. of the requirement of Performance Bonds (10 per cent of 
estimated costs). Some private clients restrict eligible bidders on 
their projects to SEDCO-supported contractors. 
Loans provided by SEDCO are interest-free, although a "ledger 
fee" of 2~ per cent of contract sum is levied on successful bidders for 
the financial management services. 
15.11.2.2. Assessment 
The Building Section of SEDCO is a small unit which has never 
had more than four members of staff at any time. Its achievement·s have 
been modest. None '0£ its contractors has achieved self-dependence 
although a 1976 policy restricted its period of assistance to three years. 
With a revolving fund of 100,00.0 Emalangeni (0.75 emalangeni -
US$1.00), its small staff and highly centralised procedure, it now 
provides support for about 15 of its 40 contractors, some of whom have 
grown 1n size and competence. 
15.11.2.3. Special Features 
Factors that contributed to the establishment of SEDCO and help 
to sustain it include: 
(a) NIDCS and SEDCO were created with a loan provided by UNDP and 
obtain technical assistance from the International Labour Office 
., 
! 
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(ILO): and 
(b) SEDCO's creation and its provision of free serV1ces to contractors 
called for a government intent on developing private construction 
firms with public funds. 
15.11.3. Comparison of NCC and SEDCO 
The similarity between NCC and SEDCO lies only in their 
pursuit of the same object: a strong and efficient indigenous 
contracting sector. There are major differences in their sizes, the 
scale and scope of their operations, and their relationship with other 
institutions; each of which is dictated by government policy, human and 
material resources, and the country's needs and aspirations. 
Thus, whereas NCC is a nation-wide organisation providing the 
whole spectrum of serV1ces an emergent contractor would require: 
training, advic~, funds, management, jobs, hire-purchase scbeme~, 
materials purchasing arrangements and a plant pool; involving government 
and the Contractors Association and being under the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Works, SEDCO is smaller and provides a more limited 
range of services, having been conceived as part of the attempt to 
develop local entrepreneurship and operates under the wing of the NIDCS 
and the Ministry of Industries. 
SEDCO, however, is making some impact 1n the very small country 
of Swaziland with its modest needs in terms of the number of contractors. 
15.11.4. Other Examples 
Examples of progrannnes to develop indigenous contractors 
which have failed may also be cited46 : 
(1) Botswana's Batswana Enterprises Development Unit (BEDU) approached 
the task in the same manner "as it did other light industrial and 
commercial enterprises: the provision of working premises in an 
estate and the giving of loans to pre finance contractor's p~ojects. 
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The approval of such loans is so often delayed that few construction 
firms have found it worth their while to remain 1n BEDU's charge. 
(2) Lesotho's Basutho Enterprises Development Company (BEDCO)'s 
attempts at contractor development resulted in a sort of direct 
labour organisation, the finns being used on the construction of 
BEDCO's own estates and other projects. 
15.12. A Scheme for Ghana 
»aving studied attempts 1n various African countries to develop 
indigenous contractors, the implications of these approaches 1n the 
context of the Ghanaian situation are now considered, and an outline of 
a similar scheme that could be introduced in the country essayed. The 
latter is only a series of broad proposals for further discussion (see 
15.12.5) , 
15.12.1. Lessons 
The experiences of various countries which attempted to 
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encourage contractors 1mply that success 1S most l1kely 1f 
(a) policies are related to needs, reviewed in the light of events, 
and pursued with persistent endeavour; 
(b) the peculiar nature of construction activity 1S recognised and the 
right mix of services provided; 
(c) the administering body is given a measure of independence but 
placed under a MInistry most qualified to deal with it; 
(d) the number of contractors under the programme is limited to that 
which allows assistance to be intensive and effective. 
I 
There also arise difficulties which every such scheme will 
have to tackle. These include "featherbedding" and the issue of 
selection. 
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15.12.2. Featherbedding 
There is the danger that assisting contractors will blunt their 
entrepreneurial capacities (see 15.6.1-6) and lead to complacency and 
inefficiency. Policies, therefore, need to strike a balance between 
the reliance on market forces, which means only the most efficient firms 
will survive, and excessive support for local firms. Decisions in this 
sphere need to be based on the time-scale for the programme and the 
attitude of the local entrepreneur. 
The latter differs from one country to the other. SEDCO's 
contractors, for example, tended to consider themselves as employees of 
the Building Section and some were apt to delay projects to keep them-
selves and others in jobs. In particular, tendering for projects on 
behalf of the contractor, as the NCC does (see 15.11.1), is potentially 
counter-productive, especially if the intention is to encourage the 
evolution of self-sufficient, risk-bearing contractors (see 15.1). 
The issue resolves itself into how much risk the contractors 
under the scheme are allowed to bear, for their own present benefit and 
future development, and for the successful completion of the programme. 
In the context of the Ghanaian situation this would best be 
approached through a careful and systematic categorisatiori of contractors, 
various kinds of support services being limited only to those most 
needful and/or in the best position to. benefit from it. 
15.12.3. Selection 
The need to limit the number of contractors under the scheme at 
any time will, in the case of Ghana, call for a selection of most 
suitable candidates from the large number of registered contractors (see 
.13.4). It is, therefore, necessary to build into the scheme: 
(a) a measure of dynamism which enables firms to enter, to progress 
within and graduate from the programme; and 
(b) criteria for determining entry, promotion and graduation. 
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These would necessitate not only a decision on the cut-off 
points in time within the programme but also the qualities of the fi~ 
that could be assessed, and a consideration of what to do about 
contractors who remain at the same level over too long a time (see 
15.11. 2.2) • 
15.12.4. Infrastructure 
The nature of the contractor development scheme should be based 
on existing institutional frameworks that are most suited to its success 
(see 15.0. 
In Ghana it would be based on the present schemes of the Bank for 
Housing and Construction (BRC) (see 13.7.2.1.1-8) and the programmes of 
CEBCA that are yet to reach fruition (see 13,8.4). The Social Security 
Bank's (SSB) (see 13.7.2.2) scheme would also be utilised as would the 
services of commercial concerns s~ch as banks, plant-hire firms (see 
12.6.2) and materials suppliers (see 10.7.2), government's tendering 
system (see 9.6 and 14.9.4) and the contractors within the scheme them-
selves. Also to be utilised would be the MDPI's Ghanaian Business 
Bureau (see 11.7.2) and the country's experiences in entrepreneurial 
development in general (see footnote 8, Chapter 13; 13.7.1-3 and 15.8). 
15;12.5. Working Party 
A committee should be establish~d to formulate the details of 
the scheme; its members should be drawn from: CEBCA, BRC, SSB, the 
Ghanaian Business Promotions Office, and the Ministries of Works, 
Finance and Industries (see Chapter 7). Arrangements should be made to 
enable the party or some of its members to visit Kenya's NCe and/or 
obtain documents on the NCC, SEDCO and similar bodies in other 
developing countries. 
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15.12.6. Organisation 
The scheme would be administered by a body, the Ghana 
Contractor Development Corporation (GCDC), directly under the Ministry 
of Works and Housing. It would use the BHC's Engineering Services 
Department as a nucleus. 
Under a 3-year development programme, it would have four 
branches in: 
(1) Accra for Greater Accra, Eastern and Volta Regions; 
(2) Takoradi for Central and Western Regions; 
(3) Kumasi for Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo; and 
(4) Tamale for Northern and Upper Regions. 
15.12.7. Finance 
The GCDC should be a self-supporting, fee-charging organisation, 
its initial capital to be provided by government drawn, say, from its 
shares in the BHC; and CEBCA. Each branch would be relatively 
autonomous, with its own revolving fund and the power to accept and 
approve applications for any assistance it can provide. 
15.12.8. Staffing· 
The Corporation would be governed by a Board of Directors, 
appointed by government, with representatives of CEBCA and, preferably, 
including some experienced construction ·.professionals. 
Each branch office would bp. headed by a Regional Manager and 
would have at least: 
2 Building Technologists (Management) 
2 Quantity Surveyors 
1 Civil Engineer 
1 Land Surveyor 
Some. supporting Technicians 
1 Accountant and 
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Some Administrative staff. 
The head office in Accra would have a greater number of each category of 
personnel since most firms are based in Accra (see 13.4). 
15.12.9. Categorisation 
Contractors would be divided into three major classes, and 
each class would then be divided into categories, depending upon the 
qualification of the proprietor or the personnel he can and does employ. 
Having categorised the firms, it is then possible to identify the 
services each type of firm would require and the duration of the stages 
of such assistance. Contracting firms in Ghana could be categorised 
as follows. 
15.12.9.1, Class I 
This would correspond roughly with the existing government 
Class I (see 13.3 and 15.13.1.3). The nep.d here is to increase the 
efficiency and technical sophistication of firms. Hire-purchase 
facilities for the acquisition of heavy plant should be provided to all 
firms in this group. 
Firms owned by or employing qualified graduates or sub-
professionals (QI) need to be assisted with finance. Such firms would 
operate on a national basis and can benefit from the services of 8SB.-
Financial aid for this category of contractor should not be provided 
from the GCDC's revolving fund. 
The other category of firm in this class would be owned by well-
to-do entrepreneurs with little technical knowledge (see 13.2) and, in 
many cases, not employing adequately qualified persons (NQI) (see 13.6.3). 
Such contractors should be provided with some of GCDC's professional 
personnel from the Head Office on secondment basis on major projects and 
arrangements made to train an understudy within the firm. The firm 
should pay at least half of the professional's salary within the period 
as a fee. Such firms could also be provided with estimating and other 
consultancy services by branches of Gcnc at a fee. 
15.12,9.2. Class II 
This class would include some of the existing Class II and III 
(see 13.3. and 15.13.1.3). Strategies for this group should aim at 
increasing capability of contractors and expediting their upgrading to 
Class I (see 15.3), They should be given priority in the hiring of 
plant at the Corporation's plant pools. The hire-purchase facilities 
provided them should be for the purchase of vehicles and medium or 
light equipment. 
Firms owned by or employing graduates and subprofessionals ~n 
construction (Q2) should be given financial assistance from GCnC's 
revolving fund. 
Other firms (NQ2) would be given financial assistance cnd 
assistance with their estimating, tendering and project management, each 
service being more intensive and free in the initial stages, and 
progressively reduced and charged for. Monthly one- or two-day courses 
on ~ost essential subjects could be arranged for contractors or their 
supervisors. In addition, the staff of the branch offices would pay at 
least fortnightly visits to contractors' sites to advise and guide them. 
15.12.9.3, Class III 
Firms in this group would be given the full complement of 
services provided for NQ2 (see 15.12.9.2) and in addition would be 
assisted to obtain jobs either as general contractors or subcontractors 
with firms in Class I and the SCC (see 13.7.1.1). 
15.12.10. Selection 
There are only a few firms ~n Class I, and it ~s unlikely 
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that all of these would want to associate themselves with the Corporation. 
In addition, since they should be made to obtain their financial 
assistance from outside t~e revolving fund, the problem of selecting 
those to be aided is not serious. Hire-purchase arrangements should be 
financed by the commercial banks, especially the Chana Commercial Bank 
and SSB, with the CCDC acting as guarantor. 
In Class II, although any number of firms may register with the 
Corporation, only those that are able to obtain jobs should be given 
active assistance. Where such firms are more than the local branch can 
effectively handle, priority should be given to firms with qualified 
proprietors or personnel for two reasons: 
(a) this would reduce the strain on the Corporation's staff; and 
(b) such firms have greater promise of expansion and, hence, promotion. 
to Class I, which is the ma~n aim of the strategy for this 
category of firm. (See 15.3.). 
The Class III firms would be the most numerous (see 13.4) and 
supporting each of them would place much more demands on the Corporation's 
resources than other types of contractors (see 15.12.9,3). Their 
se~ection would be based on issues such as those stated above for 
Class II firms as well as the dedication of the entrepreneur and 
prospects for the effective advancement of the firm. Initially, 
experience would be a vital consideration although, once again, any 
firm could register. 
It is clear that at each point in time and within each category 
some firms would be competing on their own against others assisted by 
the CCDC. Whereas this could be termed unfair, there seems little 
alternative if any effective headway is to be made (see 15.12.1). The 
introduction of cut-off points within the scheme will ensure that other 
contractors have a chance to benefit from this preferential treatment, 
and will also encourage those under the scheme to strive to ga1n the' 
maximum benefits from it within the time (see also 15,12.3). 
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15.12,11. The Revolving Fund 
The Regional Manager of each branch office would have the 
entrepreneurial responsibility for the administration of the revolving 
fund. The size of the fund in each region should be dependent upon: 
(a) number of contractors under the scheme at any time; 
(b) percentage of project costs that is to be considered a maximum 
level of pre financing loans; 
(c) acceptable levels of bad debts and delayed repayments (see 15.11.1.0; 
Financial assistance under the revolving fund would not be in 
the form of loans but rather advances to cover contractors' expenditure 
on presentation of relevant evidence. The geographical d~stribution of 
the branches should reduce the transport costs and inconvenience to 
contractors under such a scheme. Monthly payrolls should include a 
negotiated realistic 'salary' for the proprietor(s) of the firm. 
15.12.12. Interests and Fees 
Pre financing assistance under the revolving fund should be 
interest-free, although a fee of not more than 3 per cent of the 
estimated cost of a successful bid may be charged for the financial 
management service. For Class I and Class II firms, consultancy services 
would be at the prevailing commercial rates, but site visits and 
occasional advice and training would be free. 
In the first year of their association with the GCDC, 
consultancy services for Class III contractors would be free, rising to 
a half of the commercial rate in the second year and the full rate in 
the third year. 
The possibility of government subsidising the interest rate on 
hire-purchase facilities, provided especially to Classes II and III 
contractors, should be considered., 
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15.13. Programme for Contractors 
A p~ogramme for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
Ghana's contractors is now formulated. It is based on the strategy 
outlined in 15.3 and attempts to improve the quality of the entrepreneur-
contractors, the internal attributes of his firm (see 15.4.1-2) and parts 
of the environment in which he operates. (See 15.4.3-4. Detailed 
proposals for improving contractors' environment are made in Chapter 14.) 
15.13.1, Short Term 
1. SCC: It is of particular importance that the objectives of the SCC 
are clarified. If it is to be used to its full potential then it should 
be allowed to operate on a commercial basis. It should be left to decide, 
for example, which jobs to undertake or how many people to employ, or 
the level of its wages and salaries. 
It is also necessary that plans are i~itiated at this stage to develop 
the Corporation into a technically-sophisticated, first-class construction 
organisation, executing projects only in the international and 
conventional large category. Guidelines for such plans include: how 
pl~nt is to be acquired for the SCC, how employment in it can be made 
attractive to qualified Ghanaians, and placing a floor limit (say 750,000 
cedis) on its projects. The MDPI and the BRRI could be charged with 
devising the plan. 
2. PWD: The PWD has a valuable network of district offices; it can 
thus be used to execute small projects allover the country. It could 
be assigned the more social aspects of the SCC's operations. It 15 
essential to take measures to halt the rapid decline and loss of status 
of the Department. While remaining in the civil service, it can be made 
more useful than it 1S at present if provided with materials and vital 
equipment. 
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3. Registration: The registration of contractors is useful in many 
ways: at the very least it provides a basis for formal entry into the 
field. Whereas the process should be continued, there is the need for 
some rationalisation. 
The ranges of contract values for classifying contractors have been 
overtaken by· inflation and need to be revised. It would be best to 
create three classes of contractors: 
Class I 
Class II 
Class III 
Over t1~ million 
i500,OOO - 1,500,000 
Up to /500,000. 
Generally, the new Class III would embrace the present Classes III and 
IV. The new Class II would be mainly the present Class II with a few 
of the better Class III firms, and the new Class I would be hardly 
different from the present. 
To maintain greater control, the registration of contractors should 
be performed annually at specific periods of the year, say, in July-
August, when the workload of the public agencies is lightest (at the 
end of one and beginning of the next financial years). 
Each contractor would be required to re-register every two 
years: in this way their assets can be checked. Furthermore, an idea 
of contractors' possession of such assets can be obtained if indications 
of types and numbers of labour and plant on each project were made in 
progress reports accompanying interim payment certificates. 
4. Contractors: Much will depend at this stage on what contractors and 
their assocation are willing and able to do to help themselves. For 
example, contractors could: 
(a) avoid taking on too many projects at a time; 
(b) employ qualified persons, even if on a part-time basis, to seek 
their financial interests and supervise their projects; 
(c) endeavour to rehabilitate their public image through better quality 
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of work and fulfilment of their obligations; and 
(d) support their association morally and materially to make it more 
able to help them. 
The CEBCA should organise short talks through MDPI on some of the 
above issues as well as on management styles and corporate behaviour for 
its members, (See also 14.6.2.3), 
As the difficulties in the field persist, only the dedicated and/or 
more efficient firms will remain. Measures should be taken by the public 
agencies to revise their lists of contractors at this stage and to find 
ways of preventing another flood of small contractors emerging when 
public sector demand rises. (See 15.13,1.3). 
5. Expatriate Contractors have a role to play in the technological 
development of the industry. Government should maintain its policy of 
encourag~ng joint Ghanaian-foreign enterprises, but it should take steps 
to ensure that Ghanaian counterparts are in a position to benefit from 
such ventures, Thus only established Class I and II firms should be 
permitted to enter such agreements. 
6. At this stage, the contractor development scheme (see 15.12) will be 
launched: the working party on it will meet to draw up its details. 
Branch offices of GCnC should be opened as soon as the scheme is 
finalised. 
7. CEBCA should be enabled to participate fully in the contractor 
development scheme and in the formulation of policies and programmes 
for construction, The Association should integrate some of its own 
plans such as establishing a bank or employing a pool of consultants 
with the activities of GCnC, 
Whereas contractors should still be free to decide whether to join 
CEBCA or not, the Association should demonstrate that it would be 
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worthwhile for all firms to join it. It should concentrate at this 
stage on attempts to ilnprove the image of the local contractor. This can 
best be done by enforcing discipline and maintaining adequate standards 
of work. 
8. The success of some of the short-term measures to relieve shortages 
of materials, plant and skilled manpower, and generally improve the 
environment of the construction industry (see Chapter 14) would 
contribute towards enhancing contractors' efficiency. 
15.13.2. Medium Term 
1. The Contractor Development Corporation would be fully operational 
at this stage. 
2. At this stage the programme for developing the SCC should be 
implemented. It is possible to groom it into an organisation capable 
of undertaking contracts ~n neighbouring countries. 
3. If demand for international and large projects falls then Class I 
Ghanaian firms including the SCC should be encouraged to develop an 
export strategy: to take contracts in other African countries. This 
could be a way of meeting Nigeria's needs for expertise: Ghanaians 
could be organised as firms <consulting and contracting) to go there, 
rather than as individuals (see also 14.6.1.11). 
4. Cooperatives: Existing local builders cooperatives should be 
actively encouraged. Furthermore, where groups of trained tradesmen 
wish to form cooperative groups, they should be provided with support 
services, especially financial management and in their administrative 
duties through the GCDC, BRRI and MDPI, but the overall coordination 
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of the programme for cooperatives should rema1n with the Department of 
Cooperatives. 
Informally organised contracting organisations and the self-employed 
tradesmen cater for the needs of the private sector client. Attempts to 
make them register as contractors,or otherwise bring them into the main-
stream of the formal sector of the industry or to teach them any 
management principles, will at best lead to confusion and, at worst" the 
destruction of such a useful though difficult to identify part of the 
industry. Movement from this field into the formal sector should result 
from voluntary decisions taken by the individuals or groups concerned. 
5. The prequa1ification criteria for registering contractors should be 
revised at this stage. This task should be entrusted to a committee 
composed of representatives of the PWD, AESC and GHA and the GCDC. 
Issues to be considered include how qualifications and/or exper1ence of 
applicants could be made to compensate for physical capital assets; 
the possibility of the contractor hiring plant or employing persons 
part-timej and measures to prevent the abuse of the registration process. 
6. The inclusion of non-academic factors in educational and training 
syllabi at all elevels) (see 14.6.1.9) will engender the emergence of 
persons more inclined towards contracting. Measures should be taken to 
facilitate the entry of such persons into the field (see 15.13.2.5). 
15.13.3. Long Term 
1. In the long term, some first-class Ghanaian firms should be able to 
undertake projects in other parts of the African continent. Some 
developing countries such as South Korea have firms effectively competing 
in the lucrative Middle-East construction market and in some African 
countries. Some Ghanaian firms have won contracts in the new Zimbabwe. 
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This should be the beginning of bigger things in that sphere. 
2, As in many other things, Ghana could give a lead to other African 
countries Ln contractor development. In the long term, the larger 
Ghanaian firms should be encouraged to team up with indigenous firms Ln 
other African countries as a way of training the· latter. This could be 
incorporated in the ILO's contractor development programme for Africa. 
3. Government should gradually pass control of the GCDC to the Contractors 
Association. It is important that the association develop its· own 
technical expertise to match its political awareness and vocal leader-
ship. Submissions to government on matters affecting contractors should 
consist of wide-ranging, professionally sound arguments in memoranda 
rather than verbal statements and newspaper articles dwelling on the 
more obvious issues such as shortages of materials or delays in 
honouring payment certificates. Thus the Executive Secretary and/or 
two of his assistants should be qualified and exper.ienced Ln construction 
management and economLCS. 
15.14. Summary 
A summary of the programme for contractors LS presented below 
Ln tabular form. 
Short Term 
1. Clarify SCC's corporate 
objectives and commission 
study into developing its 
technical sophistication. 
2. Endeavour to halt the 
decline of the PWD and 
attempt to utilise its 
present strengths. 
3. Revise registration 
procedure. 
4. Educate contractors on 
how they can help 
themselves. 
5. Continue to encourage 
joint ventures between 
foreign firms and 
Classes I and II 
Ghanaian firms. 
6. Establish the working 
party on the contractor 
development scheme. 
CONTRACTOR DEVELOPMENT 
Medium Term 
1. Implement the 
programme for the 
SCC. 
2. Contractors' environ-
ment will be improved 
by this stage by the 
success of short- and 
medium-term measures 
for materials, man-
power, procedures, 
planning, technology 
and the government's 
role. 
3. Revise prequalification 
criteria for 
registering 
contractors. 
4. Identify and promote 
cooperatives. 
5. Encourage some Class I 
Ghanaian firms to 
develop export 
strategies. 
6. Launch the Contractor 
Development Corporation. 
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Long Term 
1. First-class 
Ghanaian 
firms to 
undertake 
projects in 
other 
African 
countries 
2. Larger 
Ghanaian 
firms to be 
used to 
train 
indigenous 
firms 1n 
other 
African 
countries 
3. Control of 
the GeDC to 
be 
gradually 
passed to 
CEBCA. 
CEBCA to 
develop· 
technical 
expertise. 
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PART FIVE 
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
16.1. General Lessons 
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CHAPTER 16 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
"There is a real danger ... that scrutiny of 
past development experiences will turn up all 
manner of 'roads not to be taken' and will 
constrict and paralyse policy makers anxious 
to learn from other countries' mistakes ... 
It is much to be hoped that the lessons from 
past development experiences will not be 
allowed to turn into a new and tougher 
generation of obstacles. II 
- Hirschman, A.O., Preface to: A Rothko 
Chapel Colloquium, Toward a New Strategy 
for Development, Pergamon Press, New York, 
1979, p. xviii. 
'~ountry-specific sub-models would evolve, in 
attempting to realise the new frame-;wrk. But 
broad objectives and means of achieving them 
are necessary if country-specific transitional 
pathways are to be relevant and operationally 
valid. II 
- Wignaraja, P., A Creative Confli~t (on a 
new strategy of development) 1n 
Development Forum, June-July 1979, 
Vol. VII, No.5, p. 4.' 
The non-homogeneity that has characteriseu the evolution of 
paradigms on socio-economic development (see 2.6) has been lacking 1n 
that of ideas on the construction industries of developing countries 
(see 5.5). Most writers on the latter subject agree on the basic 
features of the industries and on the need for the possibility of, and 
basic strategies for, their improvement and expansion (see 5.6). 
The points raised in various parts of this thesis, consolidated 
by the experience of Ghana over three decades, show that some of these 
ideas need to be discarded or revised. 
16.1.1. Intractability of Construction Problems 
Because of the nature of construction activity, the industry 
510 
faces problems in every country (see 3.n. Whereas these problems are 
usually more severe in developing than in developed countries, and it is 
desirable to formulate measures to alleviate them as existing studies of 
the issue suggest (see Chapter 5), it is unwise to suppose that their 
removal is a condition for future progress in the industry. Since it is 
a real-life activity, some of construction's aspects are related to the 
historical, socio-cu1tura1 and political factors of a society. The 
problems can, therefore, while remaining obvious and seemingly super-
ficial, be deep-seated, complicated and also variable with time. 
Thus, whereas a problem-free construction industry should remal.n 
an ideal, it is best to shape tactics in such a way that, while attacking 
and attempting to alleviate the easier problems, the existence of the 
more difficult ones are recognised and best ways of getting around them 
sought, at least in the short and medium term. 
16.1.2, Existence of an Infra-Structure 
Suggestions for improving the construction industries of 
developing countries, such as those on a Ministry for construction or 
those on the choice of technology (see Chapter 5), are usually made as 
if the countries were starting with a 'clean slate'. Although it might 
be wrong to generalise, it is safe to say that at least some of the 
developing countries have made some headway towards implementing some 
of the measures usually suggested by the writers, with varying degrees 
of success (see 8.5.7). The need, therefore, is for ideas that build 
on present achievements, or attempt to utilise failures in the best 
possible way, rather than those that echo past suggestions or suggest 
radically new units, systems and regulations - such as the use of 
computers (see 5.4.3.3). 
16 .• 1.3. Absence of a Blueprint 
Considering 16.1.1 and 16.1.2, it becomes clear that there can 
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be no single blueprint for improving the construction industries of the 
developing countries. Although this was said by some of the authors 
(see 5.3.1.5, 5.3.2 and 5.4.3.3), the similarity between existing 
approaches to the issue does not give the impression that there can be 
alternatives. (See 5.6). The need for country-specificity is valid for 
overall strategies as well as for detailed tactics. Not only do the 
different countries have dissimilar backgrounds, resource endowments and 
institutional infrastructure (see 1.3.8) but also their perceptions of 
the same problem might be different. For example, at a sub-regional 
workshop on contractor development for six West African countries, two 
countries reported that they had too many small local contractors, and 
while one of these countries considered this a problem, the other 
thought it welconle. Among the other four countries, one had only two 
local road contractors and was sceptical about encouraging mergers 
amongst small contractors because of bad experiences with conglomerates. 
In yet another country, contracting on public projects was a new 
phenomenon, all such projects having been executed by direct labour 
until a year back. Programmes for developing efficient local contractors 
should, therefore, be different in detail in each of these countries. 
16.1.4. Need "for a Comprehensive Approach 
Considering the nature of construction, and indeed the economy, 
in developing countries, it is unfortunate that few writers make not 
more than passing references to the 'traditional' sector (see 4.1). 
For a long time to corne, in many developing countries private sector 
demand will be met by systems other than the 'modern' sector: by self-
employed tradesmen, called 'tacherons' in French West Africa and 
various names in other places, and traditional builders or by self-
help and subsistence building (see 4.4), It is difficult to see how 
books and articles on 'Construction Industries of Developing Countries' 
can neglect such a large part of the industries and do justice to the 
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subject. 
Where suggestions are made, it is important that sectors of the 
industry to which they apply are identified. Not all of these are 
relevant or safe to apply to all parts of the industry, and mistakes can 
be made by diligently implementing seemingly logical measures in an 
unsuitable area. For example, attempting to formalise and/or train the 
self-employed tradesmen is bound to drive them 'underground' or out of 
business. 
16.1.5. Construction in the Development Process 
It is true, as most writers on the issue assert (see 5.4.1, 
5.4.3.1 and 5.4.3.5a), that construction plays an important role in the 
economies of all nations: But, while avoiding detailed arguments about 
statistics on construction, it is debatable whether it is necessary 
(it will certainly be difficult) for the industry to have as much share 
of the economy in the developing countries as it does in developed ones. 
Experience has shown unilineal approaches to development and issues 
related to it to be inappropriate (see 1.4.2). Similar approaches to 
the problem of improving construction should be revised. 
In developing countries, where resources are scarce, improving 
-construction does not imply or necessitate increased output. The 
efficient use of resources is more important. 
In every country, the profile and size of demand for construction 
is determined by clients, and reflects government's development 
strategy which, in turn, depends upon its perception of what is good 
for the country. Governments have been concerned with managing the 
whole economy. (See 1.3,6, 3.6.2 and 6.6). Thus it is unlikely that 
demand for construction will be stable anywhere in the face of economic 
difficulties: it is unrealistic to admonish or expect governments to 
give priority to construction under such circumstances. (See also 
5.3.5). 
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It is better for construction industries to anticipate and react 
to changes in demand (as indeed in other aspects of their environment). 
16.1.6. Dynamism 
Despite the impression given by current approaches to the 
issue (see Chapter 5), improving construction is hardly a once-and-for-
all phenomenon: new problems arLse as others are solved. For example, 
progress Ln the industry could lead to the proliferation of bodies 
involved in its varLOUS aspects, raising problems of integration and 
coordination (see 7.3.1.4-8). Again, the development of a new local 
construction material might call for training or retraining of skilled 
persons, and for new units to produce its tools and equipment (see 
10.6). With such linkages among issues of construction, strategies for 
its improvement need to be dynamic, the later stages anticipating and 
utilising, or attempting to alleviate the effect of, £uccesses ~n 
earlier stages; and at anyone time, each tactic drawing upon the 
success or failure of others in areas linked most directly to it (see 
14.3-5). 
16.1.7. Priority and Time Scale 
In view of the difficulty of solving problems related to 
construction, and because resources ar~ often limited (for example, 
even where finance is not a problem, the scarcity of teachers, say, 
would hamper a manpower development programme), it is unlikely that the 
developing countries can successfully implement all-out, balanced 
programmes for the construction industry. (See also 5.4.3.5). Under 
such circumstances the best approach is to arrange strategies in an 
order of priority, gLvLng higher ranking to the issues that are easiest 
to "implement, in terms of time and need for resources, or whose 
successful implementation \-lou1d, in the context of the particular 
country lead to success in most other areas of the industry. (See , 
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14.3-5). 
In selecting particular tactics and ranking them, the emphasis 
should be on the possible and feasible: ·'what can be done' rather than 
the ideal or desirable 'what should be done'. (See also 5.5).-
Finally, detailed tactics should be ordered on a time scale, the 
short, medium and long term, the length of each period and the measures 
introduced within it would be dictated by the peculiar conditions in 
each country. 
16.1.8. Application to Ghana 
These ideas were utilised Ln formulating the programme for 
improving Ghana's construction industry (see Chapters 14 and 15). ~bile 
they indicate that there are no easy solutions to the problems involved 
in the industry, they also identify ways of approaching the issues. 
The ideas are summarised in Fig. 16.1. Generally, what is needed in 
several instances is a change of emphasis or alterations in existing 
details rather than new institutions or procedures, The complexity and 
variability of the problem call for pragmatic and flexible approaches. 
16.2. Lessons from Ghana's Experience 
From Ghana's experience in construction over the past three 
decades (see Chapters 6-13) a few lessons may be learned. Whereas there 
is no intention here to generalise examples in one country 
for others or to formulate a package for application Ln all 
countries, it is useful to obtain a simple outline which might be 
expedient whenever any of the broad Lssues are considered. (The 
following points are summarised from the 'conclusions' of Chapters 6 
to 13.) 
.Fig. 16.1. A Diagrammatic Representation of the Method used to Study Ghana's Construction Industry 
,-- ~---.----------r:-
, 
Define the task of developing 
the construction industry in 
the light of present and 
expected future conditions. 
Hence state broad short-, 
medium- and long~term goals. 
Ir 
Identify possible general 
constraints and resources 
List desired measures 
Consider constraints 1n 
greater detail, and 
classify into those that 
can be removed in the short, 
medium and long term. 
Identify the feasible 
measures and the 
links between them 
, 
Rank measures in order of 
priority, considering the 
ease of application, 
availability of resources, 
and linkage effects 
Concentrate effort on measures 
with greatest linkages, at any 
time adopting an industry-wide 
approach and considering the 
effect of other measures on each 
particular tactic 
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16.2.1. Construction and the Economy 
The level of output in construction (see Chapter 6) 1.n any 
country depends upon factors including: 
* volume of demand 
* availability of inputs 
* the capacity of the industry, and 
* natural phenomena. 
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Thus, although developing countries are often advised to pursue 
econom1.C gro\,lth to support expanding construction programmes (see 5.3.1.1 
and tactic (i), 5.6) and to increase the proportion of construction 
output in the national economy (see 5.4.3.1) and though the capacity of 
a country's constyuction industry is often meaiured by the level of. 
output, it should be remembered that: 
(1) increasing the proportion of output of construction 1.n the national 
economy involves more 1.ssues than merely in,creasing or mair',taining 
the level of demand. Hhere inputs are imported, foreign exchange 
can be a severe constraint; 
(2) econom1.C growth does not necessarily lead to or create conditions 
for incyeased output 1.n construction; and 
(3) the level of but put might bear little relation to the capacity of 
the industry and is not a trustworthy indicator of the success or 
failure of specific measures for improving construction. Thus, 
programmes for the industry are best evaluated in terms of how far 
detailed objectives \vere met rather than whether they led to 
increases in output or not. 
16.2.2. Government and Construction 
The construction industry is so wide that it is not possible 
to place all of its aspects under one government ministry (see Chapter 
7). Therefore, whereas, as often suggested (see 5.3.1.1, 5.4.3.1 and 
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tactic (2), 5.6), creating a ministry or high-level government department 
to manage construction is important, whether the ministry is already 
established or about to be created (it was pointed out in 16.1.2 that the 
former is more likely in most developing countries), the following points 
need consideration: 
(1) creating a Ministry is relatively easier than staffing it, and 
resolving the classical differences and conflicts between 
administrative and professional staff, as well as those between staff 
and politician-Ministers. Formulating measures aimed at attracting 
qualified professional staff into the public service and ensur~ng 
internal cooperation at the decision-making and operational levels 
are also important; 
(2) since several aspects of construction and matters of indirect 
consequence to it will, necessarily, be administered by other 
ministries and departments, the status of the 'Ministry for 
Construction ' in the community of organisations needs particular 
attention; 
(3) the ministry.for construction will need smaller bodi.es to help it 
in its duties. The relationships between these bodies as well as 
their ability to perform their tasks and their links with industry 
and the ministry should also be considered; and 
(4) the existence of a ministry for the purpose does not make the task 
of formulating and implementing policies for construction any easier. 
16,2.3. Planning 
Planning the volume of construction and the resources required 
is often considered a vital aspect of attempts to improve the construction 
industries of developing countries. (See 5.4.3.2 and tactic (3), 5.6). 
However, planning is not an end in itself. (See Chapter 8). In addition 
to plans there should be: 
(1) the will amongst politicians and other officials to follow them. 
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(2) the existence of a machinery to effectively implement and control 
particular measures; and 
(3) the availability of disciplined, qualified and experienced 
personnel to implement the plans. 
16.2.4. Procedures 
,. 
Descriptions of the construction industries of developing 
countries portray them as being impeded by inappropriate legal, 
administrative and technical regulations, codes and procedures (see 3.7 
and Chapter 5). However, such regulations and procedures are not as 
restrictive as usually supposed since they affect only the formal sector 
of the industry, or are usually ignored (see Chapter 9). Therefore, 
whereas admonitions to developing countries to revise their regulations 
and procedures pertaining to construction are very common (see Chapter 5 
and tactic (4), 5.6), it should be noted ~hat: 
(1) it is not easy to effectively change procedures, most of which 
(a) date far back into the past; 
(b) are the basis for the training of existing skilled personnel; 
(c) are complex; or 
(d) are linked to the culture and traditions of the var~ous 
peoples of the country; 
(2) changing specific procedures would necessitate broader alterations 
in several areas, and call for the cooperation of a variety of 
persons and institutions. It would also involve some sacrifices; 
and 
(3) the machineries for implementing regulations and procedures need 
consideration. In advocating changes, an assessment should be made 
as to whether this is possible, whether the rEquired data base 
exists, and what should and can be done to ensure their 
implementation. 
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16.2.5. Materials 
The reliance of developing countries on imported materials is 
often referred to and the production and use of indigenous materials 
advocated. (See 5.3.1.1-5, 5.3.2.1-2 and 5.6). However, like 
procedures, materials being used at present in any country reflect 
historical and socio-cultural factors. (See Chapter 10). In addition, 
econom~c considerations apply in ,case of the latter. These have shaped 
training backgrounds of designers and attitudes of clients, users and 
administrators. A policy for materials should consider, among other 
things: 
(1) the need for selection. Materials for which raw materials are 
available in the country need to be identified and a few selected 
for development and propagation based on their popularity, or 
likely acceptability; 
(2) selection of materials should be accompanied by differentiation 
(geographical) and categorisation (by ~ncome levels) to determine 
in which localities and amongst which segTIlents of the population 
particular materials are popular. A national outlook to the 
development and promotion of materials may not always be 
appropriate I 
(3) manpower and technology should be correspondingly attended to, to 
support the materials development programme; 
(4) government·s leadership and example in all these points ~s 
important; 
(5) certain materials, for which raw materials are not locally 
available, will continue to be imported in finished or sem~­
finished form. For these it is necessary to formulate long-term 
policies as to how much can be imported annually and/or whether 
to develop local alternatives; and 
(6) schemes for ensuring effective geographical distribution and 
520 
retail of materials are also important, as are those for maintaining 
prices at reasonable levels, 
16.2.6. Manpower 
The scarcity of skilled construction personnel is often pointed 
out, and the need for education and training emphasised. (See Chapter 5 
and tactic (6), 5.6). However, expanding executive capacity in 
construction is not simply a matter of increasing the supply of qualified 
persons (see Chapter 11). In some cases the non-availability of resources 
and physical and institutional infrastructure render such an approach 
difficult or impossible. Manpower policies should be broad and should 
consider, among other things: 
(1) content of training: ~n some instances much can be achieved by 
making slight alterations in the detailed content and background of 
education and training; 
(2) organisation and balance: education and training programmes should 
be coordinated although they might have to be performed by a 
variety of institutions. There ~s the need to strike a balance 
among the categories of skilled personnel trained, to permit 
effective use of all the nation's manpower resources; 
(3) manpower development programmes should be accompanied by appropriate 
. income policies if the nation is to retain its skilled personnel; 
(4) formal education or training should not be indiscriminately 
applied: certain persons ~n the industry might perform well 
without it; and not everyone will benefit from it; 
(5) ways in which skilled persons are deployed is important. The 
conflict between qualified youth and experienced but relatively 
less qualified persons, and among professionals, civil servants 
and politicians; methods of selection and promotion; and 
allocation of jobs to private firms (contractors and consultants) 
all need attention; and 
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(6) the coordination and integration of the activities of organisations 
that need to cooperate should also be considered. 
16.2.7. Technology 
Despite the assumptions to that effect made by some writers on 
the issue (see 5.4.4.3.rV, the choice of technology is seldom made on the 
academic criteria of economic costs or even on wider cost-benefit bases. 
(See Chapter 12) It is determined by a number of factors including: 
* clients' and designers' attitudes and backgrounds; 
* national aspirations as perceived by government; 
* availability of skills; 
* consideration of costs, quality of workmanship and time by 
government, clients and contractors; 
* existing legal and technical procedures 1n construction; and 
* tht attitudes of external financing agencies. 
Appropriate technology is not necessarily 'intermediate' or low-
level technology, as is usually supposed (see 5.4.4.3.2); it is a 
mixture of technologies adopted by a nation to meet its present needs, 
as well as ensure the future development of its construction industry. 
Thus, approaches to· the issue should, rather than advocating the adoption 
of low technologies, consider: 
(1) the need for a long-term approach, considering the whole industry. 
There should be an analysis of various technologies being used at 
present and the ways in which demand for them is likely to alter in 
future, to enable comprehensive programmes to be drawn up to 
respond to such changes; and 
(2) in the long term, it is necessary for the industry to retain a 
high-technology subsector, able to benefit from international 
developments in construction and to act as a unit on which any 
desirable and possible future progress in the industry can be based. 
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16.2 r 8. Contractors 
The development of a local contracting sector 1S an issue that 
. every country will, sooner or later, have to attend to. The existence 
of competent contractors will make major contributions towards ensuring 
value for clients' money and enabling the industry to contend with some of 
of its most intractable problems. (See Chapters 13 and 15) However, 
there are no effective blueprints for developing contractors. Moreover, 
(1) there are several ways in which capacity in the contracting sector 
can be enhanced and every nation needs to identify those that are 
most suited to its conditions; 
(2) the characteristics of and problems facing local contractors are 
the results of combinations of socio-cultural, historical, political 
and economic factors; and 
(3) whereas contractors usually operate in an unfavourable environment, 
they can do something to help themselves. Most import3nt, 
contractors associations have a role to play in developing the 
sector but their relationships with government and corresponding 
institutions are important. 
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APFENDIX A 
SOME STATISTICS OF GHANA'S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, 1965~74 
A.1. Output 
Ghana's construction industry has a capacity of about i500 millions 
at today's prices. Table A.1 shows gross output at constant prLces Ln 
construction for the period 1965-74. It indicates that output has 
fluctuated over the years, falling from 6225.5 m to 132.8 m between 1965 
and 1969, rising to t196.6 m Ln 1971, only to fall again and then rLse 
dramatically in 1974. As shown in Chapter 6, the level of output in 
Ghana depends on a number of factors including government expenditure, 
imports of building materials and the capacity of the industry. (See 
6.5.1-5). 
TABLE A.1. Gross Output from Construction Activity (1965-74) (c million) 
Current 
Prices 
Constant 
1968 Prices 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
171.7 152.4 133.7 132.8 149.2 179.1 226.6 186.5 239.5 403.9 
225.5 177.4 147.3 132.8 138.4 159.5 196.6 141.9 161.3 207.7 . 
Source: Economic Survey, 1969, 1972-74. 
Table A.2 shows that over 1965-74 construction output was between 
13 and 7 per cent of GDP, an average of 9 per cent. 
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TABLE A.2. Gross Output from Construction and Gross Domestic Product, 
(1965-74) (Constant 1968 Prices) 
(i million) 
Year Construction GDP Construction Output 
Output as a Percentage of GDP 
--
1965 225.5 1716.6 13 
1966 177.4 1643.5 11 
1967 147.3 1693.9 9 
1968 132.8 1700.2 8 
1969 138.4 1802.4 8 
1970 159.5 1928.7 8 
1971 196.6 2029.3 10 
1972 141.9 1978.4 7 
1973 161,3 20S8.1 8 
1974 207.7 2195.6 9 
Source: Economic Survey 1969, 1972-74 
TABLE A.3. Gross Output in Construction per Capita (1965-74) 
(Constant 1968 Prices) 
Year 
Construction Output 
. U 106) 
1965 225.5 
1966 177.4 
1967 147.3 
1968 1.32.8 
1969 138.4 
1970 159.5 
1971 196.6 
1972 141. 9 
1973 161.3 
1974 207.7 
Population 
(10 6 ) 
5.5 
7.9 
8.1 
8.4 
8.6 
8.6 
8.8 
9.0 
.9.2 
9.4 
Source: Economic Survey 1969, 1972-74. 
Output per Capita 
(U.) 
41 
22 
·18 
16 
19 
22 
16 
17 
22 
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From table A.3, output in construction per capita was an average 
of t21.00 over the period 1965-74. 
A.2. Composition of Output 
Data on construction in Ghana are classified into Permanent Buildings, 
Non-permanent Buildings and other constructionw~ks (civil engineering). 
Tables A.4 and A.5 show that over 1965-74 new construction predominated, 
constituting an average of 88 per cent of output. Of this, 67 per cent 
was in building and 21 per cent in other works. Buildings accounted for 
76 per cent of all new construction, and works 24 per cent. 
TABLE A.4. Composition of Gross Output from Construction Activity 
(1965-74) (At Constant 1968 Prices) (i million) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- --
New Construction 
Permanent 
buildings 111. 7 94.3 68.9 66.9 76.7 89.4 111. 5 64.6 89.2 112.4 
Non-permanent 
buildings 33.1 31.3 30.2 30.2 15.5 15.5 16.1 15.9 16.3 15.7 
Other 
construction 
... 
works n 61.1 36.8 35.5 22.6 25.4 32.7 43.8 37.6 33.7 55.0 
SUB-TOTAL 205~9 162.3 134.6 119.7 117.6 137.6 171.4 118.2 139.2 183.1 
ReEairs and 
Maintenance 
Permanent 
buildings 6.0 5.7 5,6 5.2 16.8 16.6 17.9 17.9 17 .6 14.4 
Non-permanent 
buildings 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.1 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.3 
Roads 8.9 4,"9 2.6 3.8 2.3 3.6 5.4 3.8 2.6 8.9 
SUB "",TOTAL 19.7 15.1 12.7 13.1 20.8 21. 9 25.2 23.7 22.1 24.6 
TOTAL 225.6 177 .4 147.3 132.8 138.4 159.5 196.6 141.9 161. 3 207.7 
J 
* Comprises roads and bridges, airports, aerodromes, harbours, railway 
permanent way, sewerage, drainage, Posts and Telecommunications installa-
tions, electricity generation and distribution civil works, dams and power-
houses civil works, water supply civil works, other construction works and 
land improvement. 
Source: Economic Survey 1969. 1972-74. 
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TABLE A.5. Percentage Composition of Construction Output (1965-74) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 !..2.1l 1973 1974 
-- -- -- ---
New Construction 
Buildings 64 70 67 73 67 65 65 57 65 61 
Works 27 21 2l. 17 18 21 22 26 21 27 
SUB-TOTAL 91 91 91 90 85 86 87 83 86 88 
Repairs & Maintenance 9 9 9 10 15 14 13 17 14 12 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
The relative disregard of repairs and maintenance (see table A.4) 
has led to the deterioration of Ghana's stock of buildings and works. 
(See 6.4.7; 7.3.1 and 10.7.1.2). 
Figures on non-permanent buildings show a sudden fall to about 
half its value over 1968-69 (see table A.4). No explanation could be 
obtained for this. (See also 8.2.2). On the other categories of work, 
changes in output mainly reflect government's policy at the time. 
A.3. Value Added 
Figures on value added in construction in Ghana are indicated in 
table 6.3 and compared with gross output in construction, which shows 
that over the period 1965-74 gross domestic product was 55 per cent of 
gross output. Table A.6 compares value added in construction with GDP 
and indicates that value added in construction was between 4 and 6 per 
cent of GDP, an average of 5 per cent for the period. 
A.4. Employment 
Table A. 7 presents figures on recorded employment in construction 
1n Ghana and compares these with total recorded employment. These 
figures indicate only enterprises employing ten or more persons and, 
apart from public sector organisations, do not include employees of 
small construction firms, the self-employed, or casual workers. The 
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TABLE A.6. Value Added in Construction and Gross Domestic Product 
(1965-74) (1968 Prices) 
Value Added in GDP Value Added in Construction 
Year Construction as a Percentage of GDP (C 106) (ri 106 ) (%) 
1965 99.5 1716.6 6 
1966 83.7 1643.5 5 
1967 81.4 16.93.9 5 
1968 72.9 1700.2 4 
1969 72.6 1802.4 4 
1970 88.6 1928.7 5 
19.11 110.6 2029.3 5 
1972 85.3 1978.4 4 
1973 99.9 2088.1 5 
1974 130.2 2195.6 6 
Source: Economic Survey 1969, 1972-74. 
TABLE A.7. Recorded Employment in Construction and All Recorded 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
197L~ 
Employment (1965-74) 
Recorded Employment 
l.n Construction 
72.8 
46.2 
47.6 
54;7 
57.3 
49.8 
44.1 
50.1 
46.3 
47.4 
Total All Recorded 
Employment 
(10 3) 
.395.8 
361.5 
361.2 
385.2 
395.1 
393.0 
396.6 
424.5 
442.1 
468.9 
Source" Economic Survey 1969, 1972-74. 
Recorded Employment l.n 
Construction as a 
Percentage of All 
Recorded Employment 
(%) 
18 
13 
13 
14 
15 
13 
11 
12 
11 
10 
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data on all recorded employment also exclude agriculture, small trades 
and commerce. The current Five-Year Plan (1975-80) estimated total 
employment in Ghana in 1970 at 3.1 million, and in construction at 73.6 
thousand (compared with 49.8 in table A.7); hence construction was 2 per 
cent of all employment. This, again, neglects employment in the informal 
sector of the industry. 
Recorded employment in construction fell most dramatically in 1966 
when the H'orkers Brigade (see 12.7.2) was disbanded and other organisations 
laid off several workers as a result of the suspension of several 
government projects and cuts in public expenditure (see 6.4.3). Note 
that in 1972, when several projects were again suspended and output 
fell, employment in construction increased due to government's labour 
policy (see 12.2.1). Over the period 1965-74 recorded employment in 
construction was an average of 13 per cent of all recorded employment. 
A.5. Capital Formation 
Figures on capital formation in construction (1965-74) are 
presented in table A.8. Compared with total gross fixed capital 
TABLE A.8. Capital Formation 1n Construction and Gross Domestic Fixed 
Capital Formation 1965-74 (At 1968 Prices) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Gross Domestic 
Fixed Capital 6 
Formation (tl0 ) 351.4 251.1 194.51 186 . 8 180.0 230.8 262.4 172.7 172.3 268.5 
Capital Formation 
in Buildings and 
other Construc-
tion Works (t106 )205.8 161, 2 134.7 119.7 117.5 137.5 171.4 118.2 139.2 183.3 
Capital Formation 
l.n Construction 
as a Percentage 
of GDFCF (%) 59 64 69 64 65 60 65 68 81 68 
Source: Economic Survey 1969, 1972-74. 
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formation in Ghana, capital formation in construction ranged between 59 
and 81 per cent of the total 1n the decade, an average of 66 per cent. 
A.6. Summary and Generic Relationships 
From the above, a summary of vital statistics on Ghana's 
construction industry is now offered. It shows that generally the 
industry fits the generic relationships for the construction industries 
of developing countries observed by Turin (see 5.4.3.1): 
gross output in construction is 9 per cent of GDP; and value 
added 1n construction 5 per cent of GDP (Turin found value added 
in construction to be 5-8 per cent of GDP). 
employment in construction is over 2 per cent of total 
employment (Turin 2-6 per cent); 
capital formation in construction is about 66 per cent of gross 
domestic fixed capital formation (Turin 45-60 per cent); 
investment in civil engineering works is about 24 per cent of 
all investment in new construction (Turin's 30-55 per cent); 
value added in construction is 55 per cent of gross output: 
the industry obtains 45 per cent of its inputs from other 
sectors of the economy (Turin's 50-60 per cent). 
A.7. Construction Costs 
Figures on construction costs (table A.9) show that there has been 
a rising trend since 1964, but that consumer prices have generally 
increased at a higher rate than building costs. 
Discussions the author he~d with Quantity Surveyors (see Appendix 
B.l.7) showed that costs have increased at a faster rate than the 
official figures indicate. Data obtained from these discussions are 
shown 1n table A.lO. 
The official figures (table A.9) are pr1me building costs, 
TABLE A.9. Indices of Prime Building Costs and Consumer Prices 
(1964-77) (1963 = 100) 
Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Building Costs 107.6 116.5 122.8 124.7 135.5 152.3 148.0 
Consumer Prices 119,7 151. 3 171.4 157.0 169.7 181.8 188.5 
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Building Costs 153.9 180.8 212.2 285.8 396.6 432.2 602.4 
Consumer Prices 206.0 226.7 266,4 315.3 408.9 639.3 1382.5 
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Source: Index Numbers of Prime Building Costs and Consumer Price Index 
Numbers (1978) , Central Bureau of Statistics. 
TABLE A.10. Average Building Costs per Square Foot (1965-79) 
Year 
Cost per sq. ft. (i) 
1965 
3.50 
1970 
5.00 
1976 
45.00 
1979 
100.00 
Source: From estimates obtained from Quantity Surveyors. 
exclusing profits and overheads, but as table A.ll shows, the level of 
profits and overheads in construction has been rising. 
The figures in table A.ll roughly, correspond with those in 
table 6.3: value added in construction has been rising over the years. 
Although the prices of materials have increased, wages and profits seem 
to have risen at a faster rate. The former has been due to the difficulty 
in controlling prices in Ghana (see 7,7.2.2), and the latter to the 
greater level of costs due to abortive efforts and increasing risks in 
construction. (See 13,5.2-3). 
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TABLE A.11. Percentage Composition of Construction Costs (1965-73 and 
1974-79) 
Materials 
Labour 
Plant 
Profits and Overheads 
1965-1973 
60-65 
25-30 
0-5 
10-15 
1974-1979 
50-55 
20-25 
0-5 
15-25 
Source: Compiled from estimates obtained from Quantity Surveyors. 
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APPENDIX B 
FIELD STUDY 
B.l. Interviews 
The author undertook a detailed study of Ghana's construction 
industry as part of a wider study of a number of African countries 
including Malawi, Swaziland and Botswana (See 1.7). The reports on the 
other countries, though not directly relevant to this thesis, have helped 
the author in developing his ideas on the subject of improving the 
construction industries of the developing countries. (See Chapters 14-
16 and Fig. 16.1). The studies involved interviews of persons 1n 
construction in these countries and aides mem01re were prepared for the 
purpose. (See 1.9). Copies of these can be found in section B.3. 
The study in Ghana took place between 2nd March, 1979 and 31st 
May, 1979, and the broad categories of persons interviewed were as 
follows. 
B.l.l. Contractors 
Amongst contractors with which the author had discussions was 
the State Construction Corporation which does over 60 per cent of all 
public projects (see 13.7.1.1.2); the State Housing Corporation, a 
direct labour public body; two of the largest indigenous contractors, 
one a Roads Contractors and the other a Building Contractor, who were 
also Kegional Chairmen of the Contractors Association; two graduate 
builders who have become contractors; and one small contractor. 
Thus, perSOffi interviewed represented contracting organisations 
responsible for nearly half of the total construction output in Ghana. 
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B.l,2. Contractors Association 
The National President of the Civil Engineering and Building 
Contractors Association (CEBCA) tragically passed away during the period 
of the study. However, the author had discussions with the Chairmen of 
two 'of the regional branches of the Associat ion. 
B.l.3. Ministry of Works 
The author had discussions with two technical directors at the 
Ministry of Works and Housing in Accra, and was also received by the 
Principal Secretary. 
Bl.4. Client Organisations 
Several officials of public sector construction organisations 
were interviewed by the author. These included the Public Works 
Department, Architectural and Engineering Services Corporation and the 
Ghana Highway Authority. 
B.lo 5. Banks 
Detailed discussions were held with the Bank for Housing and 
Construction, the Bank of Ghana (Development Finance Division) and the 
First Ghana Building Society. 
B.l,6. ~raining Institutes 
In the field of manpower development, interviewees included 
persons at the Manpower Board, Manageluent Development and Productivity 
Institute, and the University of Science and Technology. 
B.l.7. Professionals 
Altogether, four architects, eight quantity surveyors, three 
engineers and three town planners in public and private consultancy 
organisations were interviewed, including a past President of the 
Institute of Architects, a past President of the Institution of 
Engineers and a vice-President of the Institution of Surveyors. 
B.I.8. Research Institutions 
Persons at the Building and Road Research Institute and the 
Department of Housing and Planning Research were interviewed. 
B.I.9. Other Public Bodies 
Discussions were held with persons at the Central Bureau of 
Statistics, the Ministry of Economic Planning, the Town and Country 
Planning Department and the Department of Lands. 
B.I.IO. Materials Manufacturers 
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Amongst manufacturers of building materials interviewed were 
African Timber and Plywood Ltd; the Bank for Housing and Construction, 
which owns at least part of a number of industries; and the Bank of 
Ghana, which also owns some materials-producing enterprises. 
B.I.II. Plant-hire Organisations 
Discussions were held with the Bank for Housing and Construction 
and the State Construction Corporation , both of whom have large stocks 
of plant for hire. 
B.2. Report on Interviews 
B.2.1. General 
As can be seen from B.I, a fair part of Ghana's construction 
industry was covered in the field study. Some arranged interviews could 
not take place for diverse reasons. Although most of the interviews 
were held in Accra, where most of the organisations in the construction 
industry are based, the regional view was obtained for most of the 
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industry's aspects at Koforidua (Eastern Region) and Kumasi (Ashanti). 
. . 
Certain parts of the aides memoires, for example, questions on 
contractors t turnover and employment practices, turned out to be too 
sensitive in practice and were omitted in discussions or the answers 
discounted, since some appeared unreasonable. 
Although there was a similarity of V1ews on certain topics such 
as.difficu1ties to contractors posed by shortages of materials, there 
were divergences of opinions on other issues such as whether present 
contract administration procedures aided or impeded contractors. On the 
whole, the results of the interviews form a considerable part of the 
information on the various institutions, persons or procedures in 
Part III of the thesis. The following observations may be made in 
addition. 
B.2.2. Constructibn and the Economy 
Most of the data in Chapter 6 were obtained from publications of 
the Central Bureau of Statistics. The head of the National Accounts 
Section, which deals with construction statistics, had resigned his 
post earlier in the year so the author was unable to obtain explanations 
for abnormal figures in the data such as the rather high construction 
output in 1974 (see table 6.1) or the high proportion of construction 1n 
capital formation in 1973 (see table A.S) (See Question 3 in B.3.10). 
However, some officers indicated that estimates of construction 
output (see Q.1 in B,3.10) were computed, with the help of the PWD, 
using imports of materials for the year as a basis. Responses to 
questionnaires sent by the Bureau to various organisations were seldom 
received on time, if they were received at all (see Q.2 and 3 in B.3.10). 
Non-permanent construction was calculated as a percentage of that of 
permanent buildings (See Q.1d in B.3.10, and table A.4). The author's 
general impression was that data on construction in Ghana were unreliable. 
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B.2.3. Government and Construction 
Some of the material in Chapter 7 was obtained from responses to 
B.3.3, B.3.4 and B.3.11. The subordinate organisations of the Ministry 
of Works complained that administrative interference in their operations 
was harmful to them. Some of the answers to the questions were evasive. 
For example, none of the organisations would say that their employees 
worked for contractors in their spare time (see Q117, B.3.4). It was 
particularly difficult, for reasons still not clear to the author, to 
obtain accurate data on the categories of employees of the various 
organisations (see Q.18, B.3.4). Data that were given were inaccurate. 
For example, one body gave about 7000 as the total of its workforce, 
whereas government publications and newspapers usually put it at 
12-14,000. Thus, all such data were omitted from the thesis. 
Generally, the Ministries did not criticise each other, although 
government and the media frequently referred to instances of inter-
Ministerial rivalry or non-cooperation. The hierarchy of ministries 
portrayed in Chapter 7 appeared accurate from the various discussions. 
(See Figure 7.1). 
B.2.4. Planning 
Part of Chapter 8 is made up of responses to B.3.10 and B.3.11. 
The regional view of the situation was obtained at Koforidua and Kumasi. 
Officers 1n Accra blamed influential officials in the regions, especially 
Regional Commissioners, for initiating or awarding unlisted projects 
(see B.3.11 Question 1.b-c), whereas consultants in the industry 
generally blamed the Ministry of Economic Planning for failing to relate 
demand for construction to the availability of the industry's inputs 
(see B.3.10, Q.1c). 
The information on the Central Bureau of Statistics 1n Chapter 8 
was largely obtained in response to B.3.10. 
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B.2.5. Procedures 
Chapter 9 is based on discussions with the Department of Lands 
(for which the questions were off~the-cuff, but similar to B.3.3); the 
Town and Country Planning Department (B.3.14); PWD, AESC and GHA 
(B.3.4); Contractors (B.3.1) and the Contractors Association (B.3.2). 
Discussions with the Lands Department confirmed the complex nature 
of matters relating to land in Ghana and created the impression that the 
department itself was losing prestige and power as some of its duties were 
delegated to other bodies such as the Lands Commission or the courts of 
law. 
Whereas some officers of the Town and Country Planning Department 
agreed that existing bye-laws made building expensive, they were of the 
opinion that standards were necessary to preserve and enhance the quality 
of the environment, or at least parts of it, and especially those 
designated high class areas by the planners. They realised, however, 
the present irrelevance of such bye-laws in most areas of the countr.y 
but looked forward to the time when all places would be declared 
statutory planning areas, and the department would become sufficiently 
powerful to enforce building regulations. They placed responsibility 
for the delays in issuing planning permission on the PWD, and blamed 
their department's inability to match the pace of urban development on 
the time it took for its schemes to be approved by the Minister of Works, 
and its continuing administrative and legal weaknesses. Architects did 
not have any serious problems with existing regulations and bye-laws 
(see B.3.7, Q.13-15). 
The organisations administering public contracts did not believe 
their procedures harmed contractors (see Questions 2-8, B.3.4), but 
contractors thought otherwise (See Questions C.I-7, B.3.!). The former 
as well as private consultants thought present contract documents were 
adequate. To them; contractors found the documents difficult or 
insufficient because they were not qualified or would not employ 
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qualified persons. (See Question 9, B.3.4; Questions 16-19 in B.3.7; 
and Q.6 in B.3.8), Some surveyors had helped or would help contractors 
to claim any sums of money due to them, but others would not. The latter 
asserted that it was solely up to the contractor. (See Question 7, 
B.3.8), Generally, public servants supported the maintenance of the 
status quo with regard to paying contractors for their work, whereas 
private consultants and contractors were in favour of a change. (See 
Q.5, B.3.1 and Q.5, B.3.4). Consultants-other than architects-and 
contractors favoured the introduction of new, fairer conditions of 
contract. (See Q.3-4, B.3.1; Q.16-18, B.3.7 and Q.8-9, B.3.8). 
B.2.6. Materials 
Chapter 10 ~s based on discussions with Architects (B.3.7), 
Research Institutions (B.3.9) and materials manufacturers (B.3.12). 
Architects were divided in their opinions on the possibility of replacing 
conventional materials with locally-developed ones. Some thought 
standards should be upheld and believed cheaper construction would lower 
them. Others would leave the issue with their clients without trying 
to influence them. Yet others would specify locally-developed materials 
if they were available and genuinely cheaper than conventional 
alternatives, (See Q.9-10, B.3.7). 
The research bodies lamented the lack of enthusiasm amongst 
Ghanaian entrepreneurs and industrialists in implementing the results 
of their studies. (See Q.6, B.3.9.). 
The materials manufacturers had common problems: difficulty ~n 
obtaining foreign exchange,dilapidated or obsolete building stock and 
equipment; and lack of skilled personnel. (See Q.2-3, B,3.12). 
Generally, public-owned units appeared worst off (see Q.IO, B.3.12). 
The report of the committee on local materials (see 10.5.2) was 
discussed with two of its members. 
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B.2.7. Manpower " 
The author of a report on the manpower situation 1n the 
construction industry (1977) was interviewed (see 11.3.2). The part of 
Chapter 11 on the University of Science and Technology (see 11.B.l.1-5) 
and the Management Development and Productivity Institute (see 11. 7.2) 
are based on responses to B.3.6. Additional information for the chapter 
came from discussions with contractors (see Q.B4-ll, B.3.l) and others 
such as architects (see Q.11-12, B.3.7). 
The educational and training institutes were eager to maintain the 
teaching of the 'correct practice', meaning the old British-based 
syllabi. Some contractors and consultants, however I believed there was 
need for a reorientation. (See Q.6, B.3.6 and Q.11-12, B.3.7). 
B.2.B. Technology 
Chapter 12 is based on discussions held at Precast Cnncrete Pavel 
Factory and African Timber and Plywood Ltd., as well as with plant hire 
organisations (using B.3.l3), contractors (B.3.l), architects 
(B.3.]), client organisations (B.3.4) and research bodies (B.3.9) 
Architects believed that thei~ duty lay with their clients. They 
would, therefore, not consider the technology to be employed by the 
contractor in their design. (See Q.l, B.3.7). Contractors stressed the 
difficulty 1n obtaining plant in good condition. One related an anecdote: 
.. 
he paid tl,OOO for a day's use of a l5-year old bulldozer which could 
not even move a small tree! (See Q.l3-l5, B.3.l). They thought hire 
rates for plant were prohibitive considering especially the quality of 
the plant available. 
Plant-hire organisations complained of their inability to obtain 
sufficient foreign exchange to import plant and spares, and of the 
shortage of skilled plant operators and mechanics. (See Q.6-B and 13, 
B.3.l3). 
• 
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Client organisations did not have plans for nor did they show any 
inclination towards revising the prequalification criteria for 
registering and classifying contractors (see Q.13-l5, B.3.l). 
B.2.9. Contractors 
Chapter 13 draws from discussions with contractors (B.3.l), the 
Contractors Association (B.3.2), ~he Client Organisations (B.3.4), the 
Banks (B.3.5), Architects (B.3.7) and Surveyors (B.3.8). Generally, 
contractors and their association saw themselves as victims of an 
unfavourable operating environment, whereas officials and consultants 
considered them inefficient or dishonest. (See Q.D3-6, B.3.l; Q.9-l0, 
B.3.2; Q.9, B.3.4; Q.7-9, B,3.5; Q.1, n.3.7; and Q.13-l4, B.3.8). 
The State Construction Corporation opposed the complete 
nationalisation of the industry as a way of facilitating its development. 
It b2lieved competition was essential for efficiency in the industry. 
The Contractors Association believed the government could do more 
to help contractors. (See Q.lO, B.3.2), and wished to be enabled to 
play a bigger role ~n the efforts to encourage local contractors (see 
Q.27-28, B.3.2). 
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B.3. The Aides-Memoire 
B.3.l. CONTRACTOR 
A. Contractor's Background 
1. Do you have any professional/technical qualifications in Building 
or Engineering, 
2. How did you become a contractor, and why? 
3. For how long have you been a contractor? 
4. Have you worked for any other public or private client, consultancy 
or construction organisation? 
5. Do you have any other business(es) apart from contracting? 
6. Who are your partners in the construction firm, and what positions 
do they occupy? 
7. If you do not have any technical/professional qualifications in 
construction, have you considered teaming up with somebody with 
such qualifications? 
B. The Firm and its Resources 
I. What is the annual turnover of your firm? 
2. What 1S the size of your labour force (quantity and level of skills)? 
3. a) What would be a typical organisation chart for a site? 
b) How much authority do your site agents or foremen have? 
4. What sort of staff do you employ in your office? 
5. HoW many permanent employees do you have? Do you employ all your 
casual labour in the local area adjacent to the site? 
6. Do you have any trouble recruiting adequate numbers of workers? 
7. HoW high is your labour turnover? 
8. Do you have any trouble with the trade unions? 
9. What is the level of wages and salaries in your firm: do you pay 
the rates stipulated by government or a little bit more? 
10. no you have any incentive schemes to bo.ost productivity? 
11. Are the government's rates of minimum wages too high for the amount 
of work your employees are able to do? 
12. Have you made any financial losses on any project? 
13. a) What sort of plant do you own! 
b) Do you hire them out when you do not need them yourself? 
14. Do you have any trouble obtaining spare parts for your plant? 
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15. Are you able to hire the plant that you do not own yourself? 
16. Do you thinkthe hire rates are fair? 
17. a) Do you have any trouble obtaining adequate supplies of materials? 
b) Do you obtain your materials on credits or on payment of cash? 
18. What do you do when shortages of key materials (for example, cement 
and steel) bring work on the site to a standstill? ie do you, for 
example, layoff some, or all, of your workers? 
19. a) How do you control your finance? 
b) Does your firm experience occasional financial problems? 
2). a) Are you able to obtain loans from the conventional or any 
specially established banks? 
b) What would you consider as normal profit on a typical project? 
21. Have you had any contracts terminated by the client for any reason? 
22. Is the government providing any assistance or encouragement to 
construction firms, and have you made use of any 'such support 
services? 
23. a) Who do you see as offering the most effective competition to 
your firm? 
b) Would you like to see expatriate firms taken over by local 
people, would you like there to be joint expatriate-local 
operations or would you like the foreign firms to remain 
unchanged? 
24. What are the major problems facing your firm? 
25. Do you have any plans for expanding your operations? 
C. Contract Administration 
1. How do you obtain information about prospective contracts? 
2. If you do not employ a Quantity Surveyor permanently, how do you 
prepare estimates for tendering? 
3. a) Do you see the government's tendering policies as affecting 
the effective growth of your firm? 
b) Do contracts always go to the deserving firms? 
4. Are contract documents adequate? 
5. Do you obtain prompt payment for interim certificates? 
6. Are the client organisations efficient? For example, are inspections, 
valuations and authorisations prompt enough? 
7. Is there any political or bureaucratic interference 1n contract 
administration? 
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D. Improving the Situation 
1. Have you, at any time, considered merging with another firm ~n order 
to expand the scope of your operations? 
2. a) Do you See the formation of mergers as a way of increasing the 
effectiveness of small construction firms? 
b) What do you see as some of the factors preventing the formation 
of mergers, 
3. Do contractors have a good social image in your country? 
4. Do you see the formation of a Contractors' Association (or the 
strengthening of the existing" one) as one of the measures for solving 
some of the problems facing the construction industry? 
5. Do you think the government is aware of the problems facing the 
construction industry? 
6. From your exper~ence, would you consider construction a risky 
business? 
7. What advice would you give someone trying to enter the contracting 
field for the first time? 
8. What would you like to see the government and other institutions 
doing to improve the lot of the small contractor? 
9. What should the small indigenous contractor himself do? 
B.3.2. CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION 
A. Formation and Membership 
1. a) When and how was your association formed? 
b) How does one become a member, and what conditions must one 
satisfy? 
2. How many members do you have at present: large, medium, small firms; 
local, expatriate and joint ventures? 
3. a) Is every contractor in the country a member of your association? 
b) Would you like to see membership of the association made 
mandatory for all contractors, for example, as one of the 
criteria for prequalification for public sector contracts? 
B. Aims, Policies, Succeses, Failures 
4. What are the main aims of your association? 
5. What specific major successes have you achieved? 
6. Is the association very effective ~n influencing government policy? 
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7. What particular government decisions, acts or omissions have been 
harmful to the construction industry? 
8. Would you like to see the complete indigenisation of the industry 
in your country, and why? 
C. Difficulties of the Local Contractor and Government's Awareness 
9. a) What are the major difficulties facing the indigenous contractor? 
b) In what ways can they be removed, and what is your association 
doing in this connection? 
10. a) Is the government doing enough to help the local contractor? 
What other announced policies has it yet to implement, 
b) What other things would you like to see it doing to help local 
contractors? 
c) How often have you brought these matters to the notice of the 
government? 
d) Is the absence or insufficiency of action on the part of the 
government the result of a lack of understanding of the plight 
of the local contractor or a shortage or inadequacy of the 
necessary resource inputs such as finance, foreign exchange, 
trained personnel, equipment, etc? 
D. The Organisation of the Association 
11. How often does the association meet, and how ~s it run ~e national 
and regional secretariats, executives, etc? 
12. How are the problems of members ascertained? 
13. Does the association deal only with matters concerning the whole or 
a majority of members, or would it take up the case of one or a 
few members? ie, does it have the organisational ability to do the 
latter? 
14. How are your activities financed, and what sort of activities do 
you organise? 
15. Are there any other associations or institutions for contractors? 
If so, would you like to see all these groups merge, and what is 
your association doing about that? 
E. The Local Contractor 
16. What, would you say, ~s the level of competence of the ,average 
local contractor? 
17. Is there any formal training programme for contractors? 
18. Does your association run any training courses for members or their 
employees? 
19, What advice would you g~ve someone who wanted to become a contractor? 
20, What, would you say, is the reputatio~ of the contractor among 
government officials and the general public? 
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21. a) What is your association doing to enhance the reputation of 
contractors? 
b) Do you have any sanctions against members who fail to perform 
effectively on projects, and tend to discredit the association? 
22, a) Are 'contractors' really committed to the field of building, or 
do they have interests and/or investments Ln other forms of 
business? 
b) Would you say the small contractor wishes to expand his 
activities? 
c) Do you think the financi~l institutions are justified in 
considering the contractor a risky customer-in terms of loans? 
d) Would a contractor reinvest his profits in his construction 
enterprise, would he seek to diversify his activities by 
investing in other business, or would he spend it? 
23. a) What is the attitude of local contractors to the merging of two 
or more of their firms, and how popular has the formation of 
mergers been? 
b) What are the particular obstacles in this connection? 
c) Is your association encouraging members to form mergers? 
d) If not, does it not see any opportunities or advantages for the 
large or medium-sized firm? 
F. Local Contract Practice 
23. Do you think present tendering procedures entail fair competition 
with the job going to the most deserving bidder? 
24. a) Are present contract conditions and administrative procedures 
fair to the contractor? 
b) What changes would you like to see? 
25. a) In what particular parts of the construction process are 
bottlenecks most likely to occur? (eg interim payments, 
inspections, preparation of production information, physical 
execution) 
b) How do these hold-ups affect contractors' operations? 
26. Would you say there is an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual trust 
among the participants of the building process, or are there 
usually conflicts and divergence of interests and loyalties? 
G. Problems and Actions 
2Z. What are the major difficulties facing the locruconstruction 
industry? 
28. How can these difficulties be reduced or removed altogether? 
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B.3.3. MINISTRY OR DEPARTMENT OF WORKS 
A. Policies, Actions and Results 
1. What are the government's policies with respect to the construction 
industry? 
2. What real action has been taken on any or all of these policies? 
3. What difficulties were met, or are being met, 1n implementing these 
policy decisions? 
4. What are the overall results of the implementation of the measures? 
5. What causes can you see as lying behind the failure of any of these 
measures? 
B. The Ministry or Departmens 
6. What ~e the main responsibilities of your department or ministry? 
7. Does the department or ministry have enough qualified personnel to 
carry out all its duties? 
8. Is there sufficient coordination of the act1V1t1es of all 
institutions concerned with the construction industry? 
9. Have there been any occasions of duplication of effort, inter-
departmental rivalry or insufficient definition of duties? 
10. What are the problems facing the department or ministry? 
11. a) What are the major problems facing the industry? 
b) What plans does the ministry/department have for alleviating 
these? 
B.3.4. CLIENT ORGANISATIONS 
A. The System and how it Affects Contractors 
1. a) What are the responsibilities of your organisation? 
b) Have you had any complaints from contractors or others involved 
in your industry that your tendering policies and contract 
administration procedures are affecting their operations? 
2. a) What sort of tendering procedures do you employ? 
b) Is the tendering period long enough to allow contractors to 
prepare estimates? 
c) What tender documents do you normally use? Could you provide 
copies? 
d) Is there enough time in the precontract period for the successful 
bidder to prepare proper site layouts, construction programmes 
and financial plans? 
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e) From your experience, do contractors usually use any of the 
simple management tools mentioned in (d)? If they do not, is 
it because they find them irrelevant, or because they cannot 
prepare them? 
3. What ~ the interim valuation, certification and payment procedure? 
4. Could you trace the path of a typical certificate from the time the 
site valuation is made to the time payments are actually made to 
the contractor? 
5. a) Have you had any complaints from contractors over undue delays 
in the payment of monies due to them? 
b) What measures are you taking to improve the situation? 
6. a) Are contracts pre-financed by the client? ie does the contractor 
get any advance payment before commencin~·the project? 
b) What measures do you employ to ensure that the advances are 
actually used on the projects? 
7. Are contractors able to handle the sort of contracts you give them 
(especially the small contractor)? 
8. Have you had any major problems with contractors? ie bankruptcies, 
terminations, disputes, non-completion, etc? 
B. The Locel Contractor 
9. Would you say that contractors ~n your country are generally 
competent? 
10. a) From your experience, do contractors always know their rights 
and obligations under the conditions of contracts? 
b) Do you think the terms of contract are fair to the contractor? 
c) Would your officers help a contractor to make a claim to which 
he is entitled, but of which he is ignorant? eg Fluctuations, 
Variation Orders, etc. 
11. a) Do you require performance bonds from contractors? 
b) Can they obtain such bonds in this country? 
12. a) Do contractors have to register with your organisation before 
they can undertake some of your contracts? 
b) How many contractors are there, and what are their ownerships? 
c) Is it possible to obtain promotion to a higher classification? 
13. What are some of the criteria for prequalification for registration 
in the various classes of contractors? Can you provide copies of 
registration forms and prequalification requirements? 
14. Does the contractor himself have to be a person with a professional, 
managerial or techn~cal qualification? 
15. Does your organisation have any means of ensuring that the 
contractor's claim to possess any equipment and employ certain 
people are really genuine or that the equipment, say a truck, is 
really used by his construction firm and not other subsidiaries? 
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16. Are contractors willing to employ qualified personnel? Are they 
able to do so? 
17. Do any of your members of s·taff work for contractors or other clients 
in their spare time? 
C. Executive Capacity 
18. a) Do you think your organisation has all the personnel it needs 
(at the head office, regional and district levels) to handle 
all the contracts entrusted to it? 
b) Would you say your contract administration procedures are 
efficient and free from any red-tape and delays? ego 
Inspections, Valuation and Payment. 
c) Please indicate an organisational chart for your body and 
outline the main duties of the various divisions. 
d) Please provide details of the personnel employed by your 
organisation classified by profession or other qualification. 
19. a) Is there any political or administrative interference in your 
organisation's activities, and does this increase or decrease 
the effectiveness of your operations? 
b) Does the political interference (if any) affect the performance 
of contractors? 
20. a) What other organisations are there which control the construction 
industry in this country? 
b) Is there enough coordination of their activities? 
c) Have there been any instances of duplication of effort or lack 
of a clear definition of duties? 
D. Specifications and Building Regulations 
21. a) Do you think your specifications, building regulations and the 
various codes are appropriate to the conditions of this country? 
b) What specific changes would you like to see in any of these, 
E. Support Services 
22. a) What help or support services do you provide for contractors 
or people who want to be contractors? 
b) What advice or warning wouid you give any asp1r1ng contractors 
or practising contractors or any other people working in 
construction? 
F. Problems and Plans 
23. a) What, do you think, are the most important problems facing the 
contractor in this country, especially the indigenous ones? 
b) What is your organisation doing, or hoping to do, to help the 
contractor? 
24. a) What are the problems of the construction industry in this 
country? 
b) What plans has your organisation made to tackle these? 
25. What are the problems of your organisation? 
B.3.5. BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
A. Operating Policies 
1.. a) 
b) 
Do you do business with contractors or developers? 
What sort of financial services do you offer them? 
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2. What conditions would you require a potential borrower to satisfy, 
and what sort of information do you ask for? 
3. Ifa contractor-customer of yours wanted to obtain credit from you 
what procedure would he follow? 
4. What 1S the rate of interest chargeable on your loans? 
5. How are repayments made, and at what intervals? Do you have any 
special arrangements in this connection for contractors? 
6. a) If a contractor presented an interim valuation certificate to 
you would you deem it enough evidence to qualify him for a 
short-term loan not exceeding the value of the certificate? 
b) Would you charge your customer-contractor any amoun~ for 
performing the above service, and what would be the level of 
such a charge? 
B. The Behaviour of Contractor-Customers 
7. Do you have any trouble effecting repayments from contractors wh9 
have borrowed from you? 
-8. -~ Have there been any instances 1n which contractors have diverted 
parts of loans advanced to them to uses other than construction? 
b) Is it the normal practice of your institution to follow up such 
loans and ens.ure that they are used for the projects for lIlhich 
they were given? 
9. a) Is the contractor more of a risk in the granting of loans than 
other businessmen? 
b) Would you say that businessmen in your country are generally 
consumption- rather than investment-oriented? ie would they 
reinvest profits or spend them? 
10. What are your penalties for non-payment by borrowers? 
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C. Problems and Future Plans 
11. a) What are some of the problems facing the contractor in this 
country, of which you are aware? 
b) What assistance are you giving your contractor-customers to 
overcome these problems? 
12. Does your institution have any plans for measures to give more 
help to the contractor in future? 
B.3.6. TRAINING INSTITUTES (CONSrRUCTION) 
A. Establishment and Intake, 
1. When, and under what circumstances, was your institute established, 
and who provides funds for its operation? 
2. a) What is your annual intake (by type of course)? 
b) What numbers and types of personnel have you produced SLnce 
your inception? 
3. a) On what is the total annual intake of students in a particular 
course based: is it on the needs of the industry, the physical 
facilities and teaching potential available, or on guidelines 
issued by government or a professional or other body? 
b) Is your institute produci~g enough people to satisfy the 
requirements of the local industry? 
4. What sort of liaison is there between the institute and the industry 
or a body determining the manpower situation in the industry? 
5. Has there been any difficulty in obtaining any entry applicants 
for any of the courses? Is it the case in this country that people 
resort to traLnLng in construction trades only after searching 
unsuccessfully for white-collar jobs for long periods of time? 
B. Graduates and Job Opportunities 
6. Does the institute follow ~p on the activities of its graduates in 
order to review its courses? 
7. Do your graduates find any difficulty Ln getting jobs? 
8. Have you tried to train people specifically for the contracting 
business? Do you see the need for such training? 
9. Do you have any short-term courses available to contractors and 
their staff, and others involved in construction? If so, do you 
have any difficulty inviting contractors and others to attend or 
allow bheir employees/subordinates to attend such courses? 
559 
C. Productivity, Job Satisfaction and Conditions of Service 
10. African workers are said to have very low productivity as compared 
to their counterparts in the developed countries. What, do you 
think, are some of the reasons for this? 
11. Do you think jobs given to workers in the industry are challenging 
enough to enable them to obtain the necessary experience and 
self-confidence? 
12. Are salary levels, promotion prospects and other conditions of 
service adequate to induce the qualified person to remain and work 
in the country? 
C. Problems and Strategies 
13. What are some of the major difficulties facing your institute? 
14. a) What are some of the main problems facing the construction 
industry in your country? 
b) What strategy and tactics would you like to see adopted to 
solve the problems you outlined? 
15. a) Are there any plans for increasing the intake of students, 
widening the scope of existing courses, or introducing new 
courses? 
b) What would be your most important requirements in such an 
expansion exercise, and how would you obtain them? 
B.3.7. ARCHITECT/ENGINEER 
A. The Local Contractor 
1. Do you have, as one of your design criteria, the ability of the 
small indigenous contractor to build the structure? 
2. In youropinion, is the indigenous contractor efficient? 
3. Is the contractor always fully aware of his rights and obligations 
under the conditions of contract? 
4. Are there any delays in providing the contractor with any 
information, certification or authorisation that he may need? 
5. Would you say the indigenous contractor is committed to the business 
of building, or does he consider it as one from which he can earn 
quick profits? 
6. Would a contractor employ a qualified engineer or surveyor, or buy 
plant and equipment if he had the funds? 
7. Is it common for contractors in your country to indulge 1n 
conspicuous spending of their earnings? 
8. Do contractors usually delegate some authority to their subordinates, 
especially site agents or foremen? 
.' 
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B. ~PEropriate Technology 
9. a) Is it possible to make more use of indigenous building materials 
so as to conserve foreign exchange? 
b) What problems do you see in this connection? 
19. Is there scope for developing traditional construction and 
integrating it into the mainstream of the industry? 
11. Is the graduate or technician in construction freshly produced by 
the university or technical institute fully aware of the problems 
and peculiar conditions of the industry in this country? 
12. Would you like to see any changes 1n the syllabi of the courses for 
training professional, technician or other grades in construction? 
13. Would you say that the building regulations, standards and 
specifications, in use in your ~ountry, are consistent with the 
peculiar conditions prevailing in it? For example, climate, 
culture, purchasing power, foreign exchange and availability of skills. 
14. Do you think the designer's initiative is thwarted by such 
regulations and standards~ 
15. Which particular regulations or codes would you like to see changed? 
C. The Organisation of the Industry 
16. Do you consider the present organisation of the indu.stry and the 
rights and duties of the various participants appropriate? 
17. a) Is there adequate cooper~tion among the participants 1n the 
building process, especially 
(i) among the professional consultants themselves? 
(ii) between the professionals and the contractor? 
b) Is there smooth communication among the participants? 
18. What changes would you like to see in the Conditions of Contract 
and other similar documents? eg reallocation of duties or rights. 
19. a) Are the present client organisations effective and efficient? 
b) What advice would you give them in order to effect improvements 
in their operations? 
D. Problems and Actions 
2). a) What are the problems facing architectural/engineering 
consulting firms in this country? 
b) \.]hat can be done about such problems? 
21. a) What are the major issues facing the construction industry at 
the moment? 
b) What strategies and tactics should be adopted to solve them? 
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B.3.8. QUANTITY SURVEYOR 
A. Estimating and the Contractor 
1. Are contractors in this country able to prepare accurate estimates? 
2. a) What methods of estimating do they normally use? 
b) Is the tendering period long enough to allow accurate estimating? 
3. Are private surveyors or those in public organisations usually 
employed by contractors to prepare one-off estimates? 
4. Are contractors always able to use the Bill of Quantities? 
5. Have you ever used, or are you planning to use, any different system 
of itemisation of works in the light of the shortcomings usually 
attributable to the existing bill formats, even by surveyors and 
qualified estimators? eg units in bill different from those used 
in marketing. 
B. Contractor's Rights 
6. Is the contractor always aware of his financial rights under the 
conditions of contracts? eg fluctuations and variations. 
7. Have you ever helped a contractor whose work you were administering 
to put in a financial claim? Would you do so if the contractor 
himself was ignorant of his rights? 
C. Relationships among Participants 
8. a) Would you say there are always smooth relationships among the 
members of the building team in this country? 
b) Do you always receive, on time, all the information you require 
from architect/engineer? 
9. Can you recall a few instances where conflict amongst the 
participants were clearly observed by you, or by others? 
D. Contracts and Contractors 
10. What is the normal length of the precontract period? ~e appointing 
architect, preparing drawings, bills, specifications and tendering. 
11. What would you consider to be the major bottleneck in the building 
process? 
12. a) Have you had to advise any of your clients to terminate a 
contract? 
b) What werE~ the particular circumstances of such cases? 
13. Do you think contractors in this country areCcompetent? 
14. What do you see as SOme of the reasons why contractors in this 
country are not successful, and what can be done about these~ 
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E. Building Cost Data 
15. a) What ~s the import content of materials and components used ~n 
this country? 
b) Do you see scope for the development of local materials and 
traditional construction techniques? 
16. a) What has been the trend in construction costs ~n the past few 
years? 
b) To what major factors would you attribute this trend? 
c) What can be done to improve the situation? 
17. a) What would be the breakdown of building costs in this country 
in terms of labour, materials, plant and equipment, and profits 
and overheads? 
b) Do you have any comment to make on these? 
18. In your opinion, what percentage profit are contractors able to make? 
F. Problems and Actions 
19. Do you think this country has adequate quantities and qualities of 
professionals and technicians in construction? If not, what can be 
done to improve the supply of such persons? 
2). a) What are the major problems facing the construction industry in 
thiR country? 
b) What can be done about them? 
8.3.9. RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS 
1. What are some of your findings about the construction industry ~n 
tbis country, especially in terms of management and economics? 
Please provide copies of reports. 
2. a) Have you 
b) How have 
is their 
c) What are 
items? 
developed any local materials and/or techniques? 
they been received by the populace, and how widespread 
use in the country. 
some of the factors hindering the wider use of these 
3. What are the major problems facing the industry in this country? 
4. What ser~ous proble~s does your institute have at the moment? 
5. a) Do you think the government'.' s policies for construction are 
adequate and practicable? 
b) What additional measures would you like to see introduced? 
6. Is there enough liaison among the various bodies concerned with 
construction in this country? 
7. Is complete indigenous capacity achievable in this country ~n the 
very near future? 
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8. q) Do you have links with similar institutions in other parts of 
Africa or the third world, or for that matter, any country? 
b) Are there any institutions or practices in other countries that 
you would like to see introduced in this country? 
B.3,10. CENTRE FOR STATISTICS 
1. a) How do you compute estimates of construction output and value 
added? What are the unit~ used? eg money values and/or numbers 
of projects. 
b) On what criteria are the estimates for the informal, non-monetary 
sector based? 
c) Do you think the statistics portray a fair picture of the industry 
in your country? 
d) If not, how would you like to see such data collected, presented, 
or interpreted? 
2. With employment practices in construction so flexible and with 
labour turnover in the industry so high, how do you collect data 
for employment in the industry? 
3. Can you give any major reasons for the abnormal figures for the 
years , •. ? 
4. What difficulties do you usually encounter ~n collecting data on 
construction? 
5. What plans do you have of improving and/or extending your 
information-gathering activities? 
6. What do you expect to be the trends in the industry in, say, the 
next decade in terms, for example, of output, employment, 
productivity and costs? 
B.3.11. MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC PLANNING 
1. a) Has inadequate construction capacity ever constituted a 
constraint in the implementation of development plans? 
b) How serious has the shortfall between construction targets and 
actual achievements been? 
c) Are annual allocations of funds to capital projects always 
related to the capacity (national, regional, district; s~ze 
and sophistication of projects; resources - local and 
imported; allocation of foreign exchange for materials and 
plant, raw materials and spare parts) of the construction 
industry? 
2. a) Is construction activity used by government to intr.oduce changes 
(ie deflation or reflation) into the ,economy? 
b) How effective have such measures been and what has been their 
effect on the construction industry: were any such adverse 
developments envisaged? 
c) Is construction considered to have much employment-generation 
potential in this country? 
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3. a) Is the effective indigenisation of the construction industry one 
of the government's priorities? 
b) What do you see as the most pressing problems facing the industry? 
c) What can your ministry do to help solve some of these problems? 
d) What are you actually doing in this connection? 
B.3.12. HATERIALS HANUFACTURERS 
1. a) What is the annual output of your enterprise; and what 1S its 
total capacity? 
b) When was it established? 
c) Who are your major competitors? 
2. a) What raw materials do you require? 
b) Are any of your raw materials imported? Is it possible to 
develop local alternatives, and what are the problems involved? 
c) Are some of your raw materials renewable (eg timber) and if so, 
what are the provisions being made to ensure their continued 
supply? eg replanting of timber. 
3. a) From what sources do you obtain your raw materials, equipment 
and spare parts? 
b) Are the supplies regular? What are the reasons for any 
irregularities in supplies? 
4. What is the ownership of the enterprise? 
5. How many people do you employ and what are their nationalities and 
grades? 
6. How are your products distributed at the national, regional and 
district levels? 
7. How popular are your products and other components they help to make? 
8. What has been the trend of the cost of your products over the years? 
Is the price controlled by government and if so, is the controlled 
price adequate? 
9. What do you see as the major problems facing the construction 
industry 1n this country? 
10. a) What problems does your establishment have at the moment? 
b) What are its plans for the future? 
B.3.13. PLANT HIRE ORGANISATIONS 
1, a) When was your enterprise established? 
b) What 1S its ownership? 
2. What types and numbers of plant and equipment do you own? 
3. What 1S the scope of your operations (geographically)? 
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4. What conditions govern the hiring of your items of plant, and what 
is the procedure: would you lend to anybody or do you limit the 
field, and how? 
5. a) What are the hire rates, and what has been their trend ~n 
recent years? 
b) Has the government ever interfered ~ith your pricing? 
6, a) Do you provide operators with your plant? 
b) How are plant operators trained in this country; do you have 
any problems finding such qualified persons? 
7. a) Do contractors always use your equipment for the right tasks? 
b) Do they order them at the right time? 
c) What, do you thi~, is the factor of utilization of your hired 
plant? 
8. How do you service/maintain your stock? 
9. Do contractors often owe you money? 
10. Do you have problems obtaining foreign exchange for new stock or 
spare parts1 
11. a) Is it possible to produce any of your items of plant or spare 
parts locally? 
b) If so, does your company have plans to do so? 
12. Who are your competitors? 
13. a) What are the main problems facing your enterprise? 
b) WhaL are its plans for the future? 
14. What do you see as some of the major difficulties facing the 
construction industry in this country? 
15. What advice would you give to somebody, or a group of people, who 
wished to set up a plant hire organisation in this country? 
B.3.14. TOWN PLANNING DEPARTMENTS, LAND ADMINISTRATOR§ AN~ 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
1. What are the procedures involved ~n obtaining a. building permit/ 
title to land? 
2. What major problems face those who want to obtain such permits/titles? 
3. a)· m1en were your building regulations and bye-laws drawn up, and 
by whom? . 
b) Have you had any complaints that such regulations, bye-laws ~nd 
codes are stifling local initiative in materials development, 
or discouraging investment in construction by the ordinary people? 
c) If so, what are you doing about them? 
d) From whom did you receive most of such complaints: architects, 
contractors, clients, etc? 
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4. What is the machinery for enforcing your regulations or bye-laws 
at the design stage and during construction after permits have been 
granted? 
5. What, do you think, are the ma~n problems facing the construction 
industry in this country? 
6. a) What links does your organisation have with the research and 
other institutions? 
b) Have you ever revised any of your procedures, regulations or 
bye-laws as a result of certain research findings, professional 
or public demands or government instruction? 
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APPENDIX C 
HOUSING IN GHANA 
C.l. Priority 
All· .the development plans, annual budgets and publications on the 
subject stress the determination of government to ensure that all 
Ghanaians are properly housed. (See 7.2.1). Housing has always been one 
of the government's priorities, and its policies for it have been 
implemented with some dedication. The main aim has been to provide 
" ... decent housing within a decent environment 
at a cost that most Ghanaian families can afford ,,1 
Over the years, however, policies on and efforts in the housing sector 
have been variable and ~jointed, so that despite a generation of 
conscientious effort, problems of housing are acute, especially in the 
urban areas. 
C.2. Housing Needs 
Census data indicate that Ghana's population increased from 
6,726,815 in 1960 to 8,559,313 in. 19702 , and that over the same period 
3 the housing stock increased from 636,189 to 898,670 houses. Housing 
production in the period was about 3.6 per thousand of population (see 
table C.1, row 1). At the same time, there was some improvement in 
occupancy rates. 
The population ~s expected to exceed 14 million by the end of this 
4 
century. In terms of housing needs, however, the nite of urbanisation 
is more important than increases in total population, since the housing 
problem ~s more acute ~n the urban areas (see C.1). Available data show 
that the number of urban settlements increased from 27 in 1931 to 135 ~n 
The major contributing factor to the increase in the urban 
population is the increasing scale of migration from the rural to the 
TABLE C.1. Population and Housing, 1970 
Region 
All Regions, Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Western, Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Central, Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Greater Accra,Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Eastern, Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Volta, Total 
Urban 
.Rura1 
Ashanti, Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Brong Ahafo Total 
Urban 
Rural' 
Northern, Total 
Urban 
Rural 
Upper, Total 
Urban 
Rural 
1970 Pop. % Change Houses % Change Persons Persons 
/House /House 
(000) 
8559.3 
2472.5 
6086.8 
770.1 
207.3 
562.7 
890.1 
258.6 
631.5 
851.6 
726.5 
125.1 
1261.7 
310.1 
951.6 
947.3 
151.1 
796.2 
1481.7 
440.5 
1041.2 
766.5 
169.1 
597.4 
727.6 
148.3 
579.3 
862.7 
60.8 
801.9 
1960-70 (000's)1960~70 
+27.2 941. 2 +47. 9 
+59.4 180.3 +70.0 
+17.6 760,9 +43.5 
+23.0 86.6 +41.7 
+36.8 
+18.6 
+ 18.5 
+22,9 
+16.7 
+73.2 
+84.7 
+27.1 
+15.3 
+40.5 
+ 9.0 
+21.9 
+48.0 
+17.9 
+33.6 
+59.2 
+25.1 
+30.4 
+84,8 
+20.4 
+36.9 
+114.8 
+25.3 
+13.9 
+86.8 
+10.6 
14 .• 2 +12.1 
72.4 +49.4 
111. 8 . +41. 1 
19.2 +22.1' 
92.6 +45.8 
-71.2 +94.3 
52.8 +20.7 
18.4 +44.6 
159.2 +47.3 
26.6 +66.7 
132.6 +43.9 
137.4 +61.8 
17.0 +71.7 
120.4 
136.4 
22.0 
114.4 
80.9 
+60.5 
+44.4 
+43.6 
+44.6 
+73.0 
10.7' +16.4 
70.2 +67.9 
71.8 +42.7 
13.0 +152.7 
58.8 +30.1 
85.9 +15.1 
4.8 +95.8 
81.1 +12.3 
1970 
9.1 
13.7 
8.0 
8.9 
14.7 
7.8 
8.0 
13,5 
6.8 
12.0 
13.8 
6.8 
7.9 
11.6 
7.2 
6.9 
8.9 
6.6 
10.9 
20.0 
9.1 
9.5 
15.9 
8.5 
10.1 
11.4 
9.9 
10.0 
12.7 
9.9 
1960 
10.6 
14.6 
9.8 
10.3 
12.0 
9.8 
9.5 
13.4 ' 
8.5 
13.4 
16.4 
7.7 
10.1 
13.9 
9.5 
9.2 
10.3 
9.0 
11.7 
18.0 
10.5 
12.6 
18.6 
11.9 
10.6· 
13.4 
10.2 
10.2 
13.3 
10.0 
Source: Housing Statistics, BRRI, vol. 1, No.2, July 1975. 
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Average Annual 
Annual product. 
Prod'-
of Hous.per 1000 
Popu1. 
30498 3.56 
7427 3.00 
23071 3.79 
2549 3.31 
153 0.74 
2396 4.26 
3256 3.66 
346 1.34 
2910 4.61 
3455 4.06 
2888 3.97 
567 4.53 
5111 4.05 
1066 3.44 
4045 4.25 
5246 5.54 
711 4.71 
4535 
4197 
669 
3528 
3414 
574 
2040 
2147 
787 
1360 
1124 
5.70 
2.83 
1.52 
3.39 
4.45 
3.40 
4.75 
2.95 
5.31 
2.35 
1.30 
235 3.86 
890 1.11 
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urban areas. This has led to a housing surplus in and the blighting of 
the rural areas, whereas housing shortages and high rents have resulted 
in the development of slums in and adjacent to the urban areas, such as 
Nima in Accra, Ashiaman in Tema, and An10ga in Kumasi. In the urban 
centres, 
", .• some 6,000 dwellings are produced annually. 
This ... contrasts sharply with the estimated 
annual need of some 16,090 units at present 
occupancy rates.,,6 
Table C,2 shows estimates of recurrent housing need, ie excluding 
replacement and decrowding needs. The totals in table C.2 contrast with 
those in C.l and show the difference between production and needs. 
C.3. Government Involvement 
Ghana has no written, consistent housing policy (see 7.2.1). The 
approach to the issue has been ad hoc, disjointed, and variable. 
Government has been involved in housing in a number of ways including 
direct provision, financial assistance, subsidies, encouragement and 
control. Generally, most attention has been concentrated on the plight 
of the urban poor. 
C.3.l. Direct Provision 
Government agencies charged with increasing the nation's housing 
stock include the state Housing Corporation (SHe) and the Tema Development 
Corporation. 
C.3.l.1. State Housing Corporation (SHC) 
The SHC was established in 1955 to build houses for sale or 
1etting7 . In recent times government has encouraged it to concentrate on 
the latter. It now manages over 20,000 units altogether, in its estates 
in the regional capitals and larger towns 8 . It designs its own hOllses 
and builds most of them by direct labour, although it employs contractors 
TABLE C.2. Recurrent Housing Needs - Regions (1971-85) 
Region 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Western 4158 4270 4386 4504 4626 4750 4879 5010 5146 5284 5427 5574 5724 5879 6038 
Central 4806 4936 5069 5206 5394 5491 5639 5792 5948 6109 6274 6443 6613 6796 6979 
Greater Accra 4598 4722 4850 4981 5115 5254 5395 5541 5691 5824 6022 6164 6331 6502 6677 
Eastern 6813 6998 7185 7379 7579 7783 7994 8209 8391 8699 8893 9135 9379 9632 9892 
Volta 5115 5253 5395 5540 5690 5844 6001 6164 6330 6501 6676 7057 7142 7232 7427 
Ashanti 7894 8214 8436 8664 8897 9138 9384 9638 9898 10166 10440 10722 11011 11308 11614 
Brong Ahafo 4139 4250 4363 4483 4604 4729 4856 4987 5122 5260 5402 5548 5698 5852 6010 
Northern 3929 4035 4144 4256 4371 4489 4610 4734 4862 .4993 5128 5267 5409 5555 5705 
Upper 4658 4784 4913 5046 5382 5422 5566 5613 5765 5921 6081 6245 6413 6586 6764 
All Regions 46110 47462 48743 50059 51638 52900 54325 55688 57153 58757 60343 62155 63720 65342 67106 
Source: National Housing Estimates, BRRI, Current Report No.6, September 1976. 
V1 
........ 
o 
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on some occasions. By 1976 the corporation received 27,000 new 
1 " h 9 app 1cat10ns eac year its own annual target was 2,000 houses. This 
was raised to 2,500 in 1977/78, but SHC seldom. builds more than 600 
houses a year. It built less than 300 in 1974/75. By 1979 it had over 
4,000 applicants who had paid their deposits and whose houses should have 
10 been completed, in some cases four years back SHC's problems include 
its inability to obtain finance on favourable terms. Government makes it 
sell or rent houses below econom1C levels. It relies on conventional 
materials most of which it finds difficult to obtain, and it is unable 
to engage contractors at prices for which they are willing to work. 
Altogether, the SHC has made little impact on the urban housing situation, 
and has failed to reach the levels envisaged for it. 
C.3.l.2. Tema Development Corporation 
The Tema Development Corporation was established to plan and 
develop the new industrial and harbour city of Tema. Although it has over 
000 h · . 11 . h b bl . f h d d f 17, ous1ng un1ts , 1t as not een a .e to sat1s y t e eman or 
shelter in Tema, and the area has one of the nation's largest and most 
deprived slums. (See C,2). 
c.3.l.3. Other Agencies 
In the mid-1970's the Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust embarked upon an urban estate development scheme in all the 
regional capitals, which has become bogged-down by the acute shortages 
of cement. 
The Bank for Housing and Construction (see 13.7.2.1) will start, 
in 1980, the construction of an estimated 10,000 housing units at Legon, 
near Accra, a programme in which it is in partnership with a private 
spanish firm. 
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C. 3.1. 4. Low-Cos t Housing 
In the late 1960's government launched a low-cost housing 
programme which involved the use of landcrete blocks mainly, in the 
building of simple units by contractors in the urban areas for low-income 
earners. This scheme, too, had little success: in the two-year period 
12 1968-70 out of a target of 8,000 units only 1776 were completed The 
scheme was intensified by the seco~d military government in 1972 but 
abandoned in 1977. (See C.3.2). 
C.3.2. Sites and Services 
Obtaining title to land has always been difficult in Ghana (see 
7.6.4 and 9.3.3). The enthusiasm of a section of the urban population 
to build their own houses has also not been matched by the rate at which 
essential infrastructural services were provided by government, although 
privace developers in the formal sector pay a fee for such a purpose. In 
1977 government announced that: 
II ••• the low-cost housing programme has not had the 
desired impact on the low income housing problem and 
as a result, Government intends to bring this programme 
to an end ... The sites and services approach ... will 
be adopted and given due emphasis."13 
Under the site's and services scheme, financed with a World Bank 
loan, government will acquire large areas of land which it would clear, 
provide with roads, water, electricity and other communal facilities, and 
distribute to interested persons at reasonable prices. The scheme, 
envisaged for all the regional centr~s, is still at the feasibility 
studies stage. 
C.3.3. Finance 
The cost of a house is beyond the means of the majority of ( 
Ghanaians, (See also 3.6.1-2). Government has aided or encouraged the 
provision of loan and mortgage schemes for housing development. 
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The public-owned First Ghana Building Society was established 1n 
1956 to encourage individuals to save and to g1ve mortgages to its 
members. 
" 14 
By 1978, 1680 persons had benefited from its mortgages which 
are up to 80 per cent of the estimated cost of the project with an 
amortisation period of 5 to 25 years, and at commercial rates of interest 
(14 per cent in 1979), The Society's major constraints are its inability 
to attract sufficient savings despite impressive promotion efforts, and 
the tendency of its mortgagors to default in payments. After some 23 
years of operation the Society has only seven branches in the regions. 
The commercial banks15 and the State Insurance Corporation provide 
mortgages to their customers. In general, their services are beyond the 
reach of most Ghanaians since most of the banks are in the urban areas, 
insist upon a m1n1mum deposit (invariably 20 per cent of estimated cost 
of the project), have short periods of amortisation (maximum 15 to 25 
year~), and require that the individual should earn a regular income 
(thus excluding farmers whose earnings are seasonal) or certain m1n1mum 
16 levels of income (depending on the size of the mortgage) . 
Government established the National Mortgage Financing and Guarantee 
Scheme under the Bank of Ghana in 1976 to facilitate the flow of funds 
from the commercial banks to prospective developers. Under this scheme, 
government guarantees 95 per cent of the estimated cost of the building, 
thus reducing the banks' risks. The interest rate is fixed at not more 
than 2 per cent above each banko's prevailing rate of interest on savings 
deposits. It would seem then, that the scheme brings mortgages within 
the reach of most Ghanaians. However, between April, 1976 and May, 1979, 
. bl' . d d . 17 it had served only 32 people desp1te the pu 1C1ty accor e 1t This 
disappointing record is due mainly to non-cooperation from the banks 
because of the low interest rate. The public-owned Ghana Commercial 
Bank, the largest and most nationwide bank in Ghana, refuses to take part 
in the scheme. The acute shortages of building materials, the need for 
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a deposit of 5 per cent of estimated costs and the fact that individual 
banks will only entertain applications from customers with good saving 
records, are other factors contributing to the limited success of the 
scheme, 
C.3.4. .Rural Housing 
In the rural areas government's policy has been that of assisting 
the people to provide houses for themselves. The 
" aim of Government in the rural housing sector 1S 
to improve the quality of housing in terms of 
durability and strength without unduly increasing 
costs and to provide the social infrastructure which 
are currently lacking in the rural areas ... "18 
To achieve these aims, the Roof Loans Scheme had been established 1n 1956; 
by 1977 it had catered for 13,900 persons. (See also 10.5.5 and 10.5.10). 
The Wall Protection Loans Scheme, started in 1972, had also aided 100 
persons by 197719, Th d' 1 1 d . h h . ese are 1sma resu ts compare W1t t e est1mate 
that more than 82 per cent of Ghana's population live in settlements of 
20 less than 20,000 persons 
C.4. The Private Sector 
Most of Ghana's stock of housing is owned by private persons. In 
the urban areas, most private demand for housing occurs in the conventional 
medium or small sub-sector and are built by informally organised groups of 
self-employed persons, with the building owner directly supplying and 
controlling the use of materials. (See also 15.9). Most houses in this 
category are usually only up to 3-storeys high, although a few are 4- or 
5-storeys,and under multiple occupation. The semidetached or self-
contained flat or bungalow are still the preserve of the middle class. 
Government makes attempts to fix and control rents by the Rent Control 
Unit, a subordinate body of the Ministry of Works and Housing (see 
7.3.1.4,), but in the face of an acute urban housing shortage, rents 
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have escalated. The situation is most ser~ous ~n Accra where a sing1e-
room in a compound house is rented at over i40 per month, about a third 
of the minimum monthly wage. (See Table 12.2). 
Rural housing is predominantly private: either monetary or 
subsistence, using traditional materials, although building in conventional 
materials ~s considered a mark of progress which most people aim for, and 
some have achieved. (See 10.5.5 and 10,6). The majority of rural 
settlements have Village Development Committees, and some of these 
committees have commissioned physical plans for their areas, purchased 
simple common equipment such as a concrete mixer and Tek block press, and 
are endeavouring to ra~se the quality of houses in their locality. Such 
groupS have been helpful in the administration of the Roof Loans Scheme 
(See C.3.4) and it is government's intention to encourage these and 
smaller housing cooperatives. (See 7.8.1-3). 
Large-scale speCUlative housing became popular in the early 1970's 
as developers built several units in the urban areas for rerit. Acute 
shortages of materials in the latter part of the decade throttled most 
of the schemes, Formally organised cooperative housing is a new idea 
pioneered by the Tema Cooperative Housing Association which was initiated 
by the staff of the Department of Housing and Planning Research, UST. 
(See 7.8.3,2 and 15.9), 
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